Summary: The term "decree" is nowhere defined in the Family Courts Act, 1964. So for this purpose, recourse can be made to section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908), which defines the decree. After having a glimpse of the definition of decree, no doubt left that a decree means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint the determination of any question within section 144 and an order under rules 60, 98, 99, 101 or 103 of Order XXI but shall not include any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order or any order of dismissal for default. Suit for dissolution of marriage was decreed in terms of section 10 (4) of the Family Courts Act, 1964. The decision was compound, which on the one hand dissolved the marriage interse parties and on the other dissolution was made subject to return of dower. Section 13 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 provides the manner of enforcement of decrees The manner and form of decree is provided in the West Pakistan Family Court Rules, 1965. Rules 16 and 17, for the said purpose, are more relevant The above discussion leads to irresistible conclusion that the order dated 8th December, 2010 resulting into dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula subject to return of dower, for all intent and purposes, was a decree under section 13 of the "Act, 1964" and was executable.

Summary: Background: The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan challenging the judgments and decrees of the Family Court, Phalia, and the Additional District Judge, Phalia. These judgments partially decreed a suit for dissolution of marriage, recovery of maintenance, and dowry articles filed by the respondents. The Family Court had ordered the petitioner to pay maintenance for the minors at the rate of Rs.20,000 per month per child and maintenance for the respondent (the wife) during the Iddat period. The petitioner contested the jurisdiction of the Family Court, arguing that the minors were born and residing in Italy, making the cause of action for their maintenance outside Pakistan's jurisdiction. -----Issues: 1- Whether the Family Court in Phalia had jurisdiction to hear the case regarding maintenance, given that the minors and the petitioner were residing in Italy. 2- Whether the maintenance decree issued by the Family Court and upheld by the Additional District Judge was valid. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Jurisdiction: The court found that the Family Court in Phalia did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. The minors were born and resided in Italy, where both parents had lived since shortly after their marriage. The cause of action for the maintenance, including expenses for food, accommodation, health, and education, arose in Italy. The court noted that Italy, as a welfare state, provided substantial support for minor citizens, which should have been considered when determining the quantum of maintenance. Since the cause of action arose outside Pakistan, the courts in Italy were deemed to have jurisdiction, and the suit for maintenance in Pakistan was not maintainable. Judgment: The court set aside the judgments and decrees of the Family Court and the Additional District Judge, dismissing the suit for maintenance for lack of jurisdiction. -----Citations/Precedents: Shahdad Khan v. Judge Family Court, Rawalpindi and another (2014 CLC 1238) Major Muhammad Khalid Karim v. Mst. Saadia Yaqub and others (PLD 2012 SC 66) Muhammad Younas v. Shahzad Qamar & others (NLR 1982 CLJ 35)

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964) ––– ---Non-payment of maintenance and dissolution of marriage--- Respondent No.1 filed for dissolution of marriage on grounds of non-payment of maintenance and alleged mental incapacity of Petitioner No.1---Trial court dissolved the marriage under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, citing non-provision of maintenance for over two years and directed payment of outstanding Haq-Meher (85 Misqal gold) and maintenance allowance---Held, dissolution of marriage was justified based on admitted failure to provide maintenance. (b) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 ––– ---Non-payment of maintenance as a ground for dissolution--- Marriage dissolved due to non-payment of maintenance for a continuous period of over two years, as stipulated under the Act---Trial court also awarded ancillary relief for unpaid Haq-Meher and maintenance despite the absence of a specific prayer clause, citing principles of justice and fair play. (c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) ––– ---Art. 120---Claim for past maintenance--- Trial court erroneously awarded maintenance for 17 years preceding the filing of the suit---Held, claims for past maintenance are subject to a six-year limitation period under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act---Past maintenance award modified to comply with statutory limitations, reducing the maintenance period to six years. (d) Haq-Meher ––– ---Failure to pay agreed dower--- Haq-Meher of 100 Misqal gold was agreed at the time of Nikah, of which 85 Misqal remained unpaid---Held, trial court correctly decreed payment of unpaid Haq-Meher, as evidence showed petitioners failed to establish that any additional amount had been paid. (e) Family Responsibility ––– ---Payment by family members of petitioner--- Petitioner No.2 (grandfather of minors) was directed to pay decretal amounts on behalf of Petitioner No.1 due to his mental incapacity, following precedents permitting such orders to protect dependents' rights. (f) Precedents and Legal Principles ––– ---Scope of ancillary relief in family cases--- Courts have discretion to grant ancillary relief even when not specifically prayed for, as long as it serves justice and equity---Reliance placed on Jamila Begum v. Awam-un-Nass (PLD 2005 SC 831) and Mst. Farah Naz v. Judge Family Court, Sahiwal (2022 CLC 158). -----Cited Cases: Mst. Farah Naz v. Judge Family Court, Sahiwal, 2022 CLC 158 Muhammad Sharif v. Additional District Judge, PLD 2020 SC 481 Jamila Begum v. Awam-un-Nass, PLD 2005 SC 831 Bushra Qasim v. Abdul Rasheed, 2019 CLC 1234 Sultan Ahmad v. Judge Family Court, PLD 2018 SC 292 -----Disposition: Petition partly allowed; past maintenance award reduced to six years preceding the filing of the suit. Remaining findings and decrees upheld.

Summary: [The dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty, the Court must adjudge the intensity and ruthlessness of the acts and examine whether the conduct complained of is not merely a trivial issue which may happen in day-to-day married life, but is of such a nature which no reasonable person can endure. While claiming conjugal rights by a husband in response to the suit for dissolution of marriage, dower, dowry and maintenance, it is also an onerous responsibility of the Court to see whether he is sincerely fulfilling his obligations towards his wife] The petitioners argue that the lower courts misread and failed to consider the evidence of cruelty presented by petitioner No.1. They claim that respondent No.1's behavior and attitude caused hatred and resentment in petitioner No.1's mind, justifying the dissolution of the marriage. The petitioners argue that the Family Court made a correct judgment based on the evidence, but the Appellate Court unjustifiably modified the decision. The respondent's counsel rebuts these arguments, claiming that the Family Court failed to properly consider the evidence and that the Appellate Court rightly modified the judgment. They also assert that petitioner No.1 voluntarily left the respondent's house and expressed a desire not to rejoin him. The summary emphasizes the importance of properly evaluating evidence in cases of cruelty and highlights the burden of proof on the party making the claim. It mentions relevant legal provisions and references various legal sources to define and understand the concept of cruelty. The summary concludes by stating that the High Court should exercise its jurisdiction to correct any errors or violations of law or evidence committed by the lower courts.

Summary: Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, Article 199----West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964----S.10 (4)---Proviso---suitfor dissolution of marriage on the ground of non-payment ofmaintenance for three (03) years, cruelty and recovery of doweretc---trial court dissolved marriage on the ground of Khulla subjectto return of golden ornaments---Appellate Court modified thejudgment of the Judge Family Court, holding that dower is stillunpaid and entire dower is outstanding---constitution petitionagainst the judgment passed in appeal---validity. Evidenceavailable on record reveals that respondent / wife in her evidencehas admitted to have been provided golden ornaments at the timeof marriage---no evidence of taking back/snatching was brought onrecord hence in the event of decree on the basis of Khulla, wifeunder the law, is bound to return the same to the petitioner---petition was accepted and by setting aside judgment of appellatecourt, the judgment of Family Court was restored.

Summary: Issues:The jurisdiction of Pakistani Union Councils in divorce proceedings when one party resides abroad.The applicability and authority of the Arbitration Council in international divorce matters.Holdings:The Lahore High Court upheld the appellate court's decision, emphasizing that divorce proceedings initiated in Pakistan lacked jurisdiction due to the ongoing case in the USA.It was determined that the Union Council's actions were unauthorized as Sana Waqar resided in the USA, where the designated officer in the Pakistan Mission abroad should oversee such proceedings according to SRO No.1086(K)61 dated 09.11.1961.Reasoning:The court reasoned that the petitioner, having consented to the US court's jurisdiction, could not initiate parallel proceedings in Pakistan. Moreover, the correct forum for such a case, given the respondent's US residence, was through the officer appointed at the Pakistan Mission in the USA, not the local Union Council.Conclusion:The petition was dismissed, affirming the appellate court's ruling that the Pakistani divorce proceedings were without jurisdiction and the civil court in Lahore had the authority to adjudicate the matter.

Summary: Background: A suit was filed in the Family Court for the dissolution of marriage, recovery of maintenance, dower, and dowry articles. The court dissolved the marriage and awarded Rs. 4000 per month for the maintenance of a minor child with an annual increase, Rs. 15,000 to the wife for the iddat period, Rs. 100,000 for dowry articles, and 75% of the unpaid dower in the form of a residential house or its market value. Both parties filed cross-appeals, but the appellate court upheld the Family Court's decision. The husband challenged the award of 75% unpaid dower in the Lahore High Court, arguing that, under Islamic law, the wife was bound to return all paid dower and forgo unpaid dower upon obtaining Khula. -----Issues: 1- Whether the wife was entitled to retain 75% of the unpaid dower after obtaining Khula. -----2- Whether the recent ruling by the Federal Shariat Court in Imran Anwar Khan v. Government of Punjab applied, which invalidated certain provisions of the Family Courts Act allowing the wife to retain a portion of the dower. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court upheld the lower court's judgment, affirming the wife's entitlement to 75% of the unpaid dower. It was established that while Imran Anwar Khan invalidated the statutory cap on the proportion of dower a wife could retain upon Khula, the courts retained the discretion to determine the amount of dower return or surrender based on the facts of the case. In this instance, the court found that the husband was largely at fault due to cruelty and non-maintenance, and thus it was justified to grant the wife a substantial portion of the unpaid dower. The court also clarified that this decision was consistent with Islamic principles, which provide that a wife may retain her dower if she seeks Khula due to mistreatment or other valid grounds. -----Citations/Precedents: Imran Anwar Khan and others v. Government of Punjab (PLD 2022 Federal Shariat Court 25) Dr. Anees Ahmad v. Mst. Uzma (PLD 1998 Lahore 52) Khalid Mahmood v. Anees Bibi and 2 others (PLD 2007 Lahore 626) Muhammad Kamran v. Mst. Samera Majeed and others (2018 YLR 1251) Mst. Saima Irum and 3 others v. Tariq Javed and another (2006 MLD 83) Mst. Zahida Bi v. Muhammad Maqsood (1987 CLC 57) Saleem Ahmad and others v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 2014 Federal Shariat Court 43)

Summary: Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, (1961)--S.7 Dissolution of marriage on the ground of Khullah--- In the event of dissolution of marriage on the ground of Khullah, wife has to invariably surrender the dower to the respondent received by her at the of time of marriage, unless waived by him, however, when the Appellate Court in view of evidence arrived to the conclusion that golden ornaments 16 tollas have already taken back by the petitioner, no order for its return in the event of decree for dissolution of marriage on the ground of khullah was required.

Summary: (1) In Muslim Law when a minor girl is entered into contract of marriage by her father or guardian during her minority she has the option to repudiate this marriage called KhiarulBaloogh on attaining puberty before the age of eighteen years. Provided that the marriage has not been consummated. It may be noted that as per Article 195 from the book 'Principles of Mohammedan Law by Sir Dinshah Fardunji Mulla', EveryMohammedan of sound mind, who has attained puberty, may enter into a contract ofmarriage, and Puberty is presumed, in the absence of evidence, on completion of the ageof fifteen years.(2) According to Paragraph-274 of Mahommedan Law, "when a marriage is contracted for a minor by any guardian other than the father or father`s father, theminor has the option to repudiate the marriage on attaining the puberty. This is technically called the "option of puberty" (KhiarulBaloogh).(3) The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, however, gives her the rightto repudiate the marriage before attaining the age of eighteen years, provided that the marriage has not been consummated. But in the case of a male the right continues until he has ratified the marriage either expressly or impliedly as by payment of dower orby cohabitation." ----Background: The petitioner, through a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, challenged the judgment and decree dated 10.09.2021 by the Judge of the Family Court, D.I. Khan. The petitioner sought dissolution of her marriage on the basis of Khula, claiming that the marriage was contracted during her childhood and had not been consummated. The petitioner also contended that she had repudiated the marriage upon reaching puberty, exercising her right under Islamic law. ----Issues: 1- Can a minor girl repudiate a marriage contracted by her guardian before the age of puberty under Islamic law? ---2- Is the repudiation of the marriage by the petitioner valid under Section 2(vii) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, given that she was married as a child and the marriage had not been consummated? ---3- Did the Family Court err in decreeing the dissolution of the marriage based on Khula? ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court found no error in the judgment of the Family Court, which decreed the dissolution of the marriage based on Khula. Upon review, the court noted that the marriage was contracted when the petitioner was a minor (approximately 10-11 years old) and had not been consummated. The court also confirmed that the petitioner had exercised her right of Khiar-ul-Baloogh (option of puberty) by repudiating the marriage before turning 18. The court affirmed that under Muslim law, a girl who is married during her minority can repudiate the marriage upon reaching puberty, provided the marriage has not been consummated. Section 2(vii) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, allows a woman who was married before the age of 15 to repudiate the marriage before she turns 18, without the need for court intervention, as long as the marriage has not been consummated. As the conditions for repudiation were met, the petition was dismissed, and the dissolution of marriage based on Khula was upheld. ----Citations/Precedents: Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, Section 2(vii) Mst. Farangeza v. The State (1995 MLD 1439) Mst. Janat v. Additional District Judge Principles of Mohammedan Law by Sir Dinshah Fardunji Mulla Fatawa Alamgiri (Vol-V, Page 93) for the definition of puberty in Islamic law

Summary: [Requirement of substituted service under Order V Rule 20 C.P.C and effectiveness. Against the judgment of Family Court, a right of appeal is provided under Section 14 of the Family Courts Act 1964. Ubi jus ubi remedium (wherever there is a right, there is a remedy). Writ jurisdiction could not be exercised to bypass the remedy of appeal which is also against the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies] The petitioner, Sana Jamali, filed a suit in the Family Court seeking dissolution of her marriage, maintenance for herself and her two minor daughters, and retrieval of dowry articles. The respondent, Mujeeb Qamar, failed to appear in court and was declared ex-parte. The Family Court granted the petitioner's request and dissolved the marriage. However, the respondent filed an application in the Family Court seeking to set aside the judgment and decree. The application was dismissed, and the respondent filed a Constitution Petition in the High Court, which set aside the ex-parte judgment and remanded the case back to the Family Court. The petitioner argued that the Constitution Petition was not maintainable and that the remand was unjustified. The respondent claimed that he was not served with the notice or summons and had no knowledge of the suit. The Supreme Court examined the issue of substituted service and found that the Family Court failed to follow the procedure for it. The Court also noted that the Constitution Petition should have been filed before the District Court, not directly in the High Court. Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected the office objection regarding the timeliness of the petition and ruled in favor of the petitioner, setting aside the High Court's judgment and remanding the case back to the Family Court.