Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----S.5---Intra-court appeal---Condonation of delay---Appellant asserted on affidavit that judgment reserved after hearing was later announced upon relisting through supplementary cause list without notice to its outstation counsel and remained unavailable in Writ Branch for a considerable period---Appellant acquired knowledge only upon receipt of departmental notice---Procedural rules of limitation were intended to advance and not defeat justice---Where explanation disclosed good faith and absence of culpable negligence, delay could be condoned through pragmatic and justice-oriented approach, particularly where appeals raised substantial questions concerning statutory powers of revenue authorities---Delay condoned and appeals heard on merits. (b) Administrative law---Nature of document---Substance over form---Legal character of an official communication was determined by its substance, purpose and legal effect rather than nomenclature, title or express recital of statutory provision---Notice identifying discrepancies in tax declarations and requiring explanation, reconciliation and production of information constituted an inquiry or investigative exercise notwithstanding omission of words “inquiry” or “investigation”---Failure to cite a specific statutory provision was a defect of form and did not invalidate an otherwise lawful act issued by competent authority. (c) Sales Tax Act, 1990----Ss.25 & 38-B---Inquiry into discrepancies in sales tax declarations---Initiation---Communication issued by Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue identifying discrepancies for tax periods July to September 2015 and calling upon registered person to explain and reconcile them contained essential characteristics of an inquiry---Essence of inquiry lay in commencement of examination, verification and information-gathering by competent authority rather than use of any particular expression---Such inquiry remained pending when subsequent notice for stock information was issued. (d) Sales Tax Act, 1990----Ss.25 & 38-B---Audit and information-gathering powers---Distinct fields of operation---Section 25 governed a formal audit of sales tax affairs, including authorization, recorded reasons, procedure and consequences---Section 38-B independently empowered Inland Revenue officers to obtain documents, records, explanations and information relevant to audit, inquiry or investigation---Operation of S.38-B was not expressly or impliedly made conditional upon prior initiation of audit under S.25---Both provisions could operate concurrently but neither was textually subordinate to the other. (e) Sales Tax Act, 1990----S.38-B---Jurisdictional precondition---Prior audit under S.25---Statutory precondition affecting jurisdiction had to be found in express language or necessary implication of statute and could not be imported through assumption or administrative preference---Reading a mandatory prior audit into S.38-B would add words deliberately omitted by Legislature and amount to judicial legislation---A formal audit under S.25 was therefore not a sine qua non for requiring information or documents under S.38-B. (f) Sales Tax Act, 1990----S.38-B---Pre-audit inquiry and information gathering---Purpose---Revenue legislation equipped tax authorities with separate tools for preliminary scrutiny, inquiry, risk assessment, formal audit and adjudication---Information-gathering power was intended to enable authorities to examine discrepancies and determine whether formal proceedings were warranted---Requiring a formal audit before preliminary information could be obtained would invert statutory design, impair risk-based enforcement and frustrate rather than advance purpose of Act. Cited Cases: • Heydon’s Case (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7a • Notham v. London Borough of Barnet [1978] 1 WLR 220 • R. (on the application of HMRC) v. First-tier Tribunal [2010] UKSC 28 • R. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte T.C. Coombs & Co. [1991] 2 AC 283 • Halifax plc v. Customs and Excise Commissioners [2006] Ch. 387 (g) Statutory interpretation---Purposive construction of fiscal enforcement provision---Court was required to identify legislative mischief, remedy and practical administrative context and adopt interpretation suppressing evasion and advancing enforcement---Tax information-gathering provisions were not to be construed narrowly so as to disable revenue authorities at preliminary intelligence-gathering stage---Purposive interpretation of S.38-B supported power to requisition relevant records before commencement of a formal audit or adjudicatory proceeding. (h) Sales Tax Act, 1990----S.38-B---Notice requiring location-wise stock of finished goods and quantity available on specified date---Nature---Notice merely sought factual information relevant to scrutiny of discrepancies already noticed in declared supplies---It did not determine liability, impose tax, levy penalty, confiscate property or alter legal status of registered person---Such notice was investigative and informational rather than adjudicatory. (i) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Constitutional petition against preliminary tax inquiry or information notice---“Aggrieved person”---Constitutional jurisdiction was remedial and ordinarily required an actual legal injury, adverse determination or civil consequence---A person merely asked to produce information, explain discrepancies or facilitate verification was not thereby an aggrieved person in constitutional sense---Speculative apprehension that inquiry might later result in adverse action did not create a present cause of action. (j) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Judicial review---Premature challenge to statutory process---High Court was not to supervise every preliminary or exploratory step of an administrative inquiry---Interference before authority had examined explanation or reached any conclusion would obstruct lawful administration and convert constitutional jurisdiction into a mechanism for pre-empting statutory fact-finding---Party was expected to participate in inquiry and, if an adverse order was eventually passed, pursue remedies then available under law. Cited Case: • Attock Gen Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others, Writ Petition No.1756 of 2018, Islamabad High Court (k) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Sales Tax Act, 1990---Alternative statutory remedies---Fiscal matters---Sales Tax Act provided a complete and specialized mechanism for adjudication and redress against adverse tax orders---Constitutional jurisdiction was not intended to supplant or bypass such mechanism, particularly where no liability had yet been determined and technical questions of tax administration remained before competent authority. (l) Sales Tax Act, 1990----Ss.38 & 38-B---Routine inspection, verification or search---Appellant contended that intended stock verification was in substance a search requiring warrant under S.40---Impugned communication, however, only demanded production of specified stock information and formed part of an ongoing inquiry into declared supplies---No coercive search, seizure or entry producing adverse civil consequences had yet occurred---Challenge based upon anticipated exercise of search powers was premature. (m) Intra-court appeal---Scope of interference---Single Judge had correctly appreciated that departmental scrutiny was lawfully initiated, S.38-B was not dependent upon prior audit under S.25 and impugned communications had caused no adverse civil consequences---No illegality, jurisdictional defect or material irregularity warranting appellate interference was established. Disposition---Applications under S.5 of Limitation Act allowed and delay in filing intra-court appeals condoned---Intra-Court Appeals Nos.284 and 285 of 2016 dismissed on merits along with pending applications---Judgment of learned Single Judge dismissing constitutional petitions maintained---No order as to costs. Fauji Fertilizer Company Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others, Intra-Court Appeals Nos.284 and 285 of 2016, Islamabad High Court, heard on 08.06.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) g Ordinance, 2001?Section 22?Contract Act, 1872?Sections 171 & 176?Regular First Appeal?Foreign Currency Deposit?Banker's Lien?Collateral Security?Joint Account?Either or Survivor Mandate?Unilateral Encashment?Appropriation of Deposit?Due Process?Demand Notice?Judicial Determination of Liability?Scope of Banker's Rights?Restitution. A banker's lien is fundamentally a right of retention and, in the absence of an express statutory provision or an unequivocal contractual stipulation, does not by itself confer authority to unilaterally encash, realize or appropriate a customer's deposit towards an alleged outstanding liability. Where a financial institution seeks to deprive a customer of proprietary rights in funds held as collateral security, the burden lies upon it to establish clear contractual authority, effective service of demand notice, compliance with due process and lawful determination of liability. Internal statements of account, unilateral calculations or self-assessment of default cannot substitute judicial adjudication nor authorize the bank to simultaneously assume the roles of claimant, adjudicator and executing authority. The expression "either or survivor" merely regulates the operational mandate of a joint account and cannot be construed as empowering one account holder to create a security interest binding upon the proprietary rights of the other, nor does it authorize a financial institution to appropriate the entire joint deposit in satisfaction of the liability of one account holder or of a third-party borrower without the express consent of the co-holder. Failure to prove effective service of demand notice deprives the customer of the opportunity to redeem the security, dispute the alleged liability or seek protection from a competent judicial forum, thereby rendering any unilateral realization of the security inconsistent with the principles of natural justice, fairness and due process. A financial institution is undoubtedly entitled to recover amounts lawfully due and enforce valid securities; however, recovery must always be pursued through lawful means. Banking convenience, contractual expediency or commercial necessity cannot override the rule of law or justify unilateral deprivation of proprietary rights. Liability must first attain the character of a due, certain and legally determined obligation before any right of set-off, adjustment or realization can lawfully be exercised. Where a bank, without prior judicial determination of liability, without effective demand notice, and without lawful authorization from all persons having proprietary interest in the secured asset, unilaterally encashes and appropriates a foreign currency deposit held as collateral security, such action is legally unsustainable and liable to be reversed through restitution. Restoration of the amount wrongfully appropriated, together with consequential profit, constitutes an equitable and restorative remedy designed to place the parties in the position they would have occupied had the unlawful appropriation not occurred. Held: A banker cannot convert a disputed claim into an enforceable liability through its own internal determination, nor can it exercise the powers of claimant, judge and execution Court simultaneously. A lien remains a right of retention unless enlarged by clear contractual authority and exercised strictly in accordance with law, due process and prior lawful determination of liability.

Summary: (a) Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908)--- ----S. 64---West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---Execution of decree for maintenance of minor children---Attachment of immovable property---Transfer of attached property through subsequent mutation---Validity---Property measuring one kanal was attached by the Executing Court on 16.07.2021 in execution of a decree for recovery of maintenance of minor children---Mutation transferring the attached property in favour of petitioners was sanctioned subsequently on 21.12.2022---Once a valid attachment order had been passed and remained operative, judgment-debtor was legally incompetent to create any interest in the attached property so as to prejudice or defeat the rights of decree-holder---Principle embodied in S.64, C.P.C. reflected the settled rule that a private transfer of attached property effected after attachment was void against all claims enforceable under the attachment---Object of attachment was to preserve the sanctity of judicial process and prevent a judgment-debtor from frustrating execution through clandestine alienations---Subsequent mutation could not defeat the attachment already operating against the property---Cancellation of mutation by Executing Court was a necessary legal consequence of the subsisting attachment and was not without lawful authority. Amjad Iqbal v. Mst. Nida Sohail and others (2015 SCMR 128) and Muhammad Sadiq v. Dr. Sabira Sultana (2002 SCMR 1950) rel. (b) Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908)--- ----S. 64---Transfer of attached property---Bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration---Constructive notice---Plea of petitioners that they were bona fide purchasers without notice was devoid of substance---Order of attachment passed by a competent Court constituted constructive notice to the public at large---Subsequent transferee was deemed to have notice of attachment and could not avoid its legal consequences by merely pleading ignorance---Executing Court and Revisional Court had concurrently found that petitioners were closely related to judgment-debtor and were aware of pending litigation---Timing of transfer, relationship between parties and subsisting attachment unmistakably indicated that transaction was intended to defeat realization of maintenance decree---Transfer effected after attachment was not legally sustainable and could not defeat rights of decree-holder. Muhammad Sadiq v. Dr. Sabira Sultana (2002 SCMR 1950) rel. (c) Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908)--- ----S. 64---Specific performance decree---Consent decree obtained after attachment of property---Effect---Decree for specific performance in favour of predecessor of petitioners was passed after property had already been attached in execution of maintenance decree---Judgment-debtor had filed a consenting written statement and unequivocally admitted the claim while execution proceedings were pending and attachment was already operative---Sequence of events prima facie suggested that civil proceedings had been utilized as a device to create an apparent legal shield against execution of maintenance decree---Attachment already operating against property could not be nullified by a subsequent consent decree between judgment-debtor and another party---Decree for specific performance did not confer any superior right upon petitioners capable of defeating rights of decree-holder in execution proceedings. (d) Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908)--- ----S. 12(2)---West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S.13(3)---Execution of maintenance decree---Pendency of application challenging decree for specific performance---Whether execution proceedings were liable to be suspended---Mere pendency of proceedings under S.12(2), C.P.C. did not automatically stay operation of the decree or suspend execution proceedings pending before a competent Court---Unless a competent Court specifically restrained continuation of execution proceedings, Executing Court was bound to proceed in accordance with law---No order staying execution proceedings had been produced---Pendency of application under S.12(2), C.P.C. was, therefore, of no legal consequence for deciding validity of execution proceedings. Mst. Safia Bibi and others v. Additional District Judge and others (PLD 2019 Lahore 502) rel. (e) West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----Execution order---Remedy---Proceedings initially instituted as appeal---Conversion into revision---Technicalities---Additional District Judge rightly noticed that proper remedy against execution order was revision under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964---Instead of dismissing proceedings on a technical ground, Court converted them into revision to advance substantial justice---Revisional Court independently appraised record and concurred with findings of Executing Court that mutation had been sanctioned during subsistence of attachment and was intended to frustrate execution of decree---Findings disclosed neither misreading or non-reading of evidence nor any jurisdictional infirmity. (f) West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----Execution of maintenance decree---Sale of attached property through public auction---Persistent default by judgment-debtor---Procedural safeguards---Judgment-debtor had persistently defaulted in satisfying decree for maintenance of minor children and had deliberately avoided appearance before Executing Court---Order directing sale of attached property through public auction was a lawful continuation of execution proceedings---Executing Court appointed an independent auctioneer, fixed remuneration, prescribed publication schedule, directed public proclamation, ordered market valuation through concerned Patwari for fixation of reserve price and scheduled auction proceedings accordingly---No violation of any mandatory provision governing execution proceedings was established. (g) West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----Maintenance of minor children---Nature and object---Duty of Court---Maintenance was not merely a money claim but embodied a continuing statutory obligation intended to secure welfare, sustenance and upbringing of minors---Courts were under a corresponding duty to ensure that maintenance decrees were not rendered illusory by permitting judgment-debtors to defeat execution through colourable, sham or collusive transfers of property---Conduct of a father seeking to avoid maintenance obligations through unlawful transactions could not be countenanced by a Court exercising parental jurisdiction---Orders cancelling subsequent mutation, maintaining attachment and directing auction were consistent with the obligation to protect lawful maintenance rights of minor children. Amjad Iqbal v. Mst. Nida Sohail and others (2015 SCMR 128) rel. (h) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction---Challenge to legal consequences of attachment order which had attained finality---Petitioners had not challenged original attachment order at the appropriate stage and approached High Court only after Executing Court declined to recognize a transfer made during subsistence of attachment---Constitutional jurisdiction could not be invoked to indirectly nullify legal consequences of an attachment that had attained finality---Parties could not be permitted to achieve indirectly what law did not permit them to do directly. (i) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Scope of constitutional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of Executing Court and Revisional Court---Reappraisal of facts---Jurisdiction under Art.199 was supervisory and was not intended to provide another forum for reappraisal of facts or substitution of concurrent findings recorded by competent Courts---Interference was warranted only where impugned orders suffered from patent lack of jurisdiction, material illegality, procedural impropriety, violation of mandatory law or perversity resulting in miscarriage of justice---Petitioners failed to establish existence of any such ground---Courts below had correctly appreciated factual matrix, applied governing legal principles and recorded concurrent findings supported by material on record---No illegality, jurisdictional defect, material irregularity or perversity was found in the impugned orders. Disposition--- Writ petition, being devoid of merit, was dismissed with no order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.497(1), third proviso---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.324, 109, 148 & 149---Post-arrest bail---Statutory delay in conclusion of trial---Offences not punishable with death---Accused continuously detained for more than one year---Computation of statutory period---Petitioners were arrested on 17.03.2025 and trial had not concluded despite lapse of more than one year---Where offence did not entail punishment of death, accused was required to demonstrate continuous detention for one year---Statutory period was to be calculated from date of arrest and not from date of indictment or any subsequent stage of trial---Once prescribed period had elapsed without conclusion of trial, statutory right to release on bail ripened in favour of accused, subject to exceptions provided by law---Such right was time-based and its accrual did not remain within discretion of Court once statutory conditions stood fulfilled. Mehran v. Ubaid Ullah (PLD 2024 SC 843); Adnan Shafai v. The State and another (2024 SCMR 1543); Muhammad Umer Shahzad v. The State and others (2023 SCMR 1450); Syeda Ayesha Subhani v. The State (PLD 2023 SC 648); Nadeem Samson v. The State (PLD 2022 SC 112); Shakeel Shah v. The State (2022 SCMR 1) and Saleem Khan v. The State (PLD 2020 SC 356) rel. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.497(1), third proviso---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.9, 10-A & 14---Statutory bail---Fundamental rights to liberty, fair trial and dignity---Right to bail arising from statutory delay flowed from constitutional guarantees of liberty, fair trial and dignity---Purpose of third proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C. was to ensure expeditious trial of an accused---Recurring statutory right could not be denied merely because an earlier post-arrest bail petition had been dismissed on merits---Denial of such right would confer upon prosecution an unfettered licence to delay trial indefinitely and leave an undertrial prisoner confined for an indeterminate period at the mercy of prosecution---Such consequence would be antithetical to constitutional scheme and would render fundamental rights of accused illusory. Syeda Ayesha Subhani v. The State (PLD 2023 SC 648); Shakeel Shah v. The State (2022 SCMR 1); Nadeem Samson v. The State (PLD 2022 SC 112) and Muhammad Usman v. The State (2024 SCMR 28) rel. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.497(1), third and fourth provisos---Statutory delay---Exceptions to right of bail---Conjoint interpretation---Two exceptions to statutory right of bail were co-existent and were required to be interpreted conjointly---First exception applied where delay in conclusion of trial had been occasioned by an act or omission of accused or any person acting on his behalf---Court could refuse bail where record demonstrated a visibly orchestrated or concerted effort by accused or his counsel to hinder timely conclusion of trial by seeking adjournments without sufficient cause on crucial hearings---Exercise was not a mere mathematical counting of adjournments---Prosecution was required to establish from trial record that accused had deliberately contributed to delay. Ali Akbar v. The State and another (2020 SCMR 1225); Muhammad Usman v. The State and another (2024 SCMR 28); Muhammad Ali v. The State and another (2023 SCMR 1131) and Shakeel Shah v. The State (2022 SCMR 1) rel. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.497(1), fourth proviso---Previously convicted offender---Hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal---Scope---Previous conviction became relevant only where bail was claimed under third proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C.---Conviction simpliciter did not debar an accused from statutory bail unless previous conviction related to an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life---Expression “hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal” referred to a person likely to seriously injure others without regard to consequences and capable of posing a serious threat to society if released---Tentative opinion regarding character of accused was to be formed upon careful consideration of nature of offence, its effect upon victim or society, role attributed to accused, manner of commission and conduct of accused---No such exception was found applicable to petitioners. Moundarr and others v. The State (PLD 1990 SC 934); Shakeel Shah v. The State (2022 SCMR 1) and Allah Wasaya v. The State and others (PLD 2022 SC 541) rel. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss.205, 353 & 540-A---Recording of prosecution evidence---Absence of co-accused---Personal attendance dispensed with---Presence through pleader---General rule under S.353, Cr.P.C. requiring evidence to be recorded in presence of accused was expressly subject to contrary provisions contained in Code---Sections 205 and 540-A, Cr.P.C. constituted exceptions enabling Court to dispense with personal attendance of accused and permit representation through pleader---Object of S.353, Cr.P.C. was to prevent prejudice and safeguard right to fair trial, but it did not prohibit recording of evidence where personal attendance had lawfully been dispensed with and pleader of accused was present---Presence of pleader sufficiently satisfied statutory requirement in such circumstances---Trial Court had misconstrued S.353, Cr.P.C. by deferring prosecution evidence merely because attendance of certain co-accused had been dispensed with---No legal impediment existed to recording evidence on those dates when their pleaders were present. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto v. The State (PLD 1979 SC 53); Searle IV Solution (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (2018 SCMR 1444); Collector of Sales Tax and Central Excise (Enforcement) and another v. Messrs Mega Tech (Pvt.) Ltd. (2005 SCMR 1166); Kamaluddin Qureshi v. Ali International Co. (PLD 2009 SC 367) and Agha Shariq Raza v. The State (2025 YLR 808) rel. (f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.497(1), third proviso---Delay caused by co-accused---Attribution to accused seeking bail---Requirements---Delay caused by one co-accused could not, as a matter of course, be attributed to another accused---For such delay to defeat statutory right of bail, prosecution was required to establish through undisputed material that accused seeking bail was complicit in acts or omissions of co-accused or had acted in aid of a concerted effort to delay trial without sufficient cause---Nothing on record demonstrated that petitioners were complicit with absent co-accused or had acted in aid of them---Delay caused by co-accused could not be allowed to hang as a sword of Damocles over petitioners while deciding their entitlement under third proviso. Muhammad Usman v. The State (2024 SCMR 28) and Shakeel Shah v. The State (2022 SCMR 1) rel. (g) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss.173 & 497(1), third proviso---Post-arrest bail---Examination of trial order sheets---Delay not attributable to accused---Interim challan was submitted approximately three months after arrest and petitioners were indicted on 24.07.2025---Thereafter case was repeatedly adjourned due to non-attendance of prosecution witnesses, absence of co-accused, dispensation of attendance of certain co-accused and failure to produce petitioners from jail owing to prevailing law and order situation---Petitioners could not be held responsible for such circumstances---Order sheets did not disclose any design, pattern or concerted effort by petitioners to delay conclusion of trial---Prerequisites of third proviso stood fulfilled and neither statutory exception was attracted---Petitioners were entitled to post-arrest bail as a matter of right on ground of statutory delay---Statutory right could not be refused on hyper-technical grounds under discretionary power of Court. Muhammad Usman v. The State (2024 SCMR 28); Adnan Shafai v. The State and another (2024 SCMR 1543); Muhammad Umer Shahzad v. The State and others (2023 SCMR 1450); Syeda Ayesha Subhani v. The State (PLD 2023 SC 648); Nadeem Samson v. The State (PLD 2022 SC 112); Shakeel Shah v. The State (2022 SCMR 1) and Zahid Hussain Shah v. The State (PLD 1995 SC 49) rel. (h) Criminal procedure--- ----Bail order---Tentative observations---Effect upon trial---Observations recorded while deciding bail petitions were purely tentative and confined to determination of entitlement to bail---Such observations were not to prejudice or influence trial proceedings---Trial Court was required to decide case independently and strictly upon evidence produced before it in accordance with law. Disposition--- Both petitions were allowed---Ghulam Rasool and Muhammad Jahangir were admitted to post-arrest bail subject to furnishing bail bonds of PKR 1,000,000 with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of Trial Court---Trial Court was directed to conclude trial expeditiously, on merits of evidence, within two months from receipt of order.

Summary: (a) Power of attorney--- ----General Power of Attorney---Attorney’s fiduciary position---Alienation of principal’s property in favour of attorney’s close relative---Validity---Attorney occupied a fiduciary position and was bound to exercise delegated authority solely for benefit of principal---Attorney could not lawfully transfer principal’s property either to himself or to his kith and kin without prior knowledge, consent or specific authorization of principal---Such self-serving transaction involved an inherent conflict between attorney’s personal interest and fiduciary obligation and, therefore, invited strict judicial scrutiny---General Power of Attorney, however widely worded, did not by itself authorize attorney to alienate principal’s property in favour of himself or his close relative---General authority to sell could not be equated with authority to enter into a transaction involving self-dealing. Allah Bakhsh (deceased) through L.Rs. and others v. Muhammad Riaz and others (PLD 2025 Supreme Court 63); Muhammad Arshad and 2 others v. Haq Nawaz and 9 others (2019 YLR 958); Muhammad Anwar v. Mst. Bahrawar Sultana and others (2021 CLC 1707) and Muhammad Mansha and others v. Saleem Bibi (2026 MLD 320) rel. (b) Power of attorney--- ----Transfer by attorney to his brother-in-law---Burden of proof---Specific authority or ratification---Beneficiary of a transaction involving transfer of principal’s property to attorney’s close relative bore a heavy burden to establish that principal had expressly authorized, or subsequently ratified with full knowledge, the transaction and that it was bona fide and free from conflict of interest---Neither General Power of Attorney nor pleadings or evidence disclosed any express authority permitting attorney to transfer suit property in favour of his brother-in-law---Defence was silent regarding time, place or manner in which consent of principal had allegedly been obtained---Petitioners failed to establish specific authority enabling attorney to execute agreement to sell in favour of his close relative. (c) Registration--- ----Registered General Power of Attorney and registered agreement to sell---Presumption of due execution---Scope---Registration merely raised a rebuttable presumption regarding due execution of an instrument---Such registration neither enlarged authority conferred upon attorney nor validated a transaction beyond scope of delegated authority---Mere execution or registration of documents, or incorporation of mutation entries, did not by itself establish a valid transfer unless underlying transaction satisfied legal requirements governing fiduciary dealings---Registered instrument could not sanctify an otherwise unauthorized or legally impermissible transaction. (d) Fraud and misrepresentation--- ----Unauthorized exercise of delegated authority---Proof of fraud in execution of General Power of Attorney---Effect---Even if execution of General Power of Attorney itself was accepted, surrounding circumstances established abuse of fiduciary authority---Impugned decrees substantially rested upon unauthorized exercise of delegated powers rather than fraud in execution of document itself---Challenge to Dastawaiz Yadasht was inconsequential because, even upon its exclusion, judgments remained sustainable on independent grounds of absence of specific authority, breach of fiduciary obligation, contradictory defence evidence, prompt revocation of authority and conduct of parties. (e) Power of attorney--- ----Revocation---Prompt repudiation of transaction---Conduct of principal---General Power of Attorney was executed on 08.02.2010; attorney executed agreement to sell in favour of his brother-in-law on the following day; principal revoked authority on 12.02.2010 and instituted declaratory suit on 13.02.2010---Prompt revocation and immediate institution of proceedings were wholly inconsistent with suggestion that principal had consented to or ratified impugned transaction---Subsequent conduct of principal supported finding that transfer had not been authorized. (f) Evidence--- ----Agreement to sell---Payment of consideration and execution---Contradictory evidence---Witnesses of petitioners contradicted one another regarding presence of principal at time of execution, payment of sale consideration and amounts allegedly paid---Further inconsistencies existed between written statement and subsequent suit for specific performance---Contradictions materially impaired credibility of petitioners’ case and supported concurrent findings recorded by Courts below. (g) Specific performance--- ----Discretionary and equitable relief---Readiness and willingness---Delay in seeking enforcement---Even where execution of an agreement was established, Court was required to examine authority of executant, fairness of transaction, conduct of parties and surrounding circumstances---Transaction originated from attorney dealing with principal’s property in favour of his close relative without proving specific authority---Vendee had immediate knowledge of dispute and contractual period of two months for execution of sale deed but remained inactive for almost nine years and instituted suit for specific performance only after death of attorney---Prolonged and unexplained delay was inconsistent with continuous readiness and willingness required for equitable relief of specific performance---Refusal of specific performance by Courts below called for no interference. (h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.115---Revisional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of fact---Scope of interference---Revisional jurisdiction was supervisory and not appellate---Interference was permissible only where impugned judgments suffered from jurisdictional error, patent illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or findings based upon misreading or non-reading of material evidence---Appellate Court had independently reappraised evidence and rightly concluded that petitioners failed to prove specific authority enabling attorney to alienate property in favour of his brother-in-law---Absence of prior consent, contradictions in petitioners’ evidence, prolonged delay in seeking enforcement and prohibition against self-dealing fully supported concurrent findings---No jurisdictional defect, material illegality, perversity or misreading or non-reading of evidence was established. Abdul Hakeem v. Habibullah and 11 others (1997 SCMR 1139); Nasir Ali v. Muhammad Asghar (2022 SCMR 1054) and Mst. Farzana Zia and others v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb and others (2024 SCMR 916) rel. Disposition--- Civil revision petitions, being devoid of merit, were dismissed with no order as to costs.

Summary: A person drawing ex-gratia salary in lieu of compensatory employment would forfeit entitlement to said benefit, in case of variation in the family structure / unit, upon remarriage --- (a) Civil servants--- ----Civil Servant Family Assistance Package---Compensatory employment---Payment of salary to surviving spouse without assignment or performance of duties---Nature---Appellant was receiving salary following death of his wife under Government’s Family Assistance Package but was neither contractually appointed nor required to perform any duties---Such payment was ex gratia financial assistance extended to alleviate economic hardship caused to family by loss of an earning member and did not constitute an independent employment arrangement---Appellant could not claim vested or personal right to continuation of salary as though he had been regularly or contractually appointed to a post---Cases in which widows were appointed on contract and required to perform duties were distinguishable because such appointments constituted independent employment arrangements capable of attracting individual or constitutional protection. The Chief Commissioner Regional Tax Office, Bahawalpur and others v. Shaheen Yousaf (2025 SCMR 1076) and Zoya Islam v. Government of Pakistan etc. (PLJ 2024 Lahore 811) distinguished. (b) Civil servants--- ----Civil Servant Family Assistance Package---Surviving spouse---Remarriage---Continuation of compensatory salary---Effect---Compensatory employment was a welfare measure intended to support family of a civil servant dying in service---Remarriage of surviving spouse altered and voluntarily reconstituted family structure as it existed at time of death of employee---Such change constituted a fair, genuine and plausible ground for discontinuance of ex gratia salary---Appellant had other legal heirs besides himself and could not treat assistance intended for family as his exclusive personal entitlement---Remarriage was fatal to survival of benefit claimed by appellant. (c) Civil servants--- ----Civil Servant Family Assistance Package---Notification No.FD-SR-1/3-10/2004 dated 15.08.2017---Notification No.FD.SR-III-4-244/2023(B) dated 02.12.2024---Salary and pension---Construction---Notification of 2017 treated salary and pension as components of one integrated assistance package and both remained subject to prescribed conditions---Absence of specific reference to salary in Notification of 2024, which dealt with remarriage and pension, did not confer a right upon appellant to continue receiving salary---Family of deceased civil servant was central to scheme of compensatory assistance and any alteration in composition of family affected entire arrangement---Notification of 2017 neither protected nor guaranteed continuation of salary after remarriage. (d) Civil servants--- ----Civil Servant Family Assistance Package---Salary till projected superannuation followed by pension---Integrated components---Disjunctive interpretation---Package contemplated payment of salary up to projected date of superannuation of deceased employee and pension thereafter---Both components formed parts of one continuous compensatory arrangement and could not be interpreted separately---Where remarriage disentitled surviving spouse from pension, same change in status necessarily defeated salary component as well---Allowing ex gratia salary to continue after remarriage while pension stood discontinued would create an irrational and asymmetrical result---Voluntary decision to remarry carried legal consequences which appellant had chosen to accept. (e) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Discrimination and arbitrariness---Family Assistance Package---Cessation of benefit upon remarriage---Distinguishable precedents---Cases concerning independent contractual appointments of widows or unauthorized executive curtailment of accrued benefits did not govern payment of ex gratia salary without performance of duties---Case concerning entitlement of daughter to pension of both parents was also distinguishable---Stoppage of appellant’s salary was aligned with applicable policy and underlying object of assistance package and did not amount to arbitrary or discriminatory treatment. Province of Punjab through Secretary, Finance Department, Government of the Punjab, Lahore and others v. Kanwal Rashid and others (2021 SCMR 730); The Chief Commissioner Regional Tax Office, Bahawalpur and others v. Shaheen Yousaf (2025 SCMR 1076); Zoya Islam v. Government of Pakistan etc. (PLJ 2024 Lahore 811) and Province of Sindh through Secretary, Government of Sindh, Karachi and others v. Mst. Sorath Fatima and another (PLD 2025 SC 856) distinguished. (f) Intra-court appeal--- ----Concurrent dismissal of representation and constitutional petition---Scope of interference---Claim for continuation of compensatory salary after remarriage had rightly been declined---No legal infirmity warranting interference in judgment of learned Single Judge was established. Disposition--- Intra-court appeal, being without merit, was dismissed.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts.4, 5, 23, 24 & 25---Overseas Pakistanis---Protection of legal and property rights---Equality before law---Overseas Pakistanis, despite residing abroad, remained citizens of Pakistan and were entitled to same constitutional safeguards, remedies and protection of law as citizens residing within country---Their property rights were protected under Arts.23 and 24, while Arts.4, 5 and 25 guaranteed lawful treatment and equal protection---Overseas Pakistanis could not place themselves above law, claim preferential treatment or bypass due process merely by reason of residence abroad---Nevertheless, practical disadvantages faced by them in pursuing litigation justified affirmative institutional measures and special procedures for expeditious protection of their lawful rights. Tahir Mirza v. Saleha Mehmood, DCO and others (2019 YLR 2852); Tanvir Chishti v. City Police Officer and another (PLD 2020 Lahore 453); Abdul Wali through Special Attorney v. State Bank of Pakistan through Director Banking Conduct and Consumer Protection Department and 4 others (2020 CLD 147); Muhammad Yaqoob v. Commissioner Lahore Division etc. (2021 CLD 392) and Haji Muhammad Yunis (deceased) through legal heirs and another v. Mst. Farukh Sultan and others (2022 SCMR 1282) rel. (b) Punjab Establishment of Special Courts (Overseas Pakistanis Property) Act, 2025--- ----Preamble---Object and purpose of enactment---Interpretation---Act was enacted to secure and protect ownership and possession rights of Overseas Pakistanis in respect of immovable property and to provide a specialized, expeditious and accessible mechanism for resolution of their disputes---Preamble, though not an operative part of statute, served as a useful guide for discovering legislative purpose, mischief sought to be remedied and intention underlying substantive provisions---Act introduced specialized judicial forums, strict timelines, electronic filing, video-link evidence and mechanisms aimed at overcoming procedural delays faced by litigants residing abroad. Director General, FIA and others v. Kamran Iqbal and others (2016 SCMR 447) rel. (c) Punjab Establishment of Special Courts (Overseas Pakistanis Property) Act, 2025--- ----Ss.9, 10, 11 & 12---Expeditious adjudication, appeal, execution and protective orders---Legislative scheme---Section 9 prescribed strict period for disposal, restricted adjournments and empowered Special Court to summon official record---Section 10 provided a streamlined appellate remedy while preventing routine suspension of decrees and interlocutory obstruction---Section 11 automatically converted proceedings into execution after decree, authorized assistance of police and law-enforcement agencies and permitted imposition of penalty for mala fide objections intended to delay execution---Section 12 empowered Special Court to restrain alienation, attach property, transfer possession, appoint receivers and pass orders even against third parties or benami holders---Collectively, provisions demonstrated legislative intent that judgments concerning property of Overseas Pakistanis should not be frustrated through procedural devices, fraudulent transfers or collateral proceedings. (d) Punjab Establishment of Special Courts (Overseas Pakistanis Property) Act, 2025--- ----Execution of order for delivery of possession---Objection petition based upon subsequent ex parte decree---Maintainability---Special Court had earlier recalled ejectment order and directed petitioner to hand over vacant possession to attorney of Overseas Pakistani owner---Challenge to said order through constitutional petition had already been dismissed, while subsequent appeal against consequential order for delivery of possession had been withdrawn---Orders directing restoration of possession had, therefore, attained finality---Petitioner could not resist their implementation by subsequently obtaining an ex parte judgment and decree from Civil Court---Rights crystallized through final judicial determinations could not be defeated by a later decree obtained in collateral proceedings. (e) Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908)--- ----S.12(2)---Ex parte decree---Suspension of operation---Legal effect---Ex parte judgment and decree relied upon by petitioner had subsequently been suspended by Civil Court upon application under S.12(2), C.P.C.---Once operation of decree stood suspended, petitioner could derive no legal advantage therefrom and such decree could not furnish a lawful basis to obstruct or nullify implementation of earlier binding judicial orders---Even otherwise, a decree obtained subsequent to orders sought to be executed could not eclipse determinations that had already attained finality, particularly where validity of subsequent decree itself remained under challenge. (f) Administration of justice--- ----Finality of judicial determinations---Successive and collateral proceedings---Reopening concluded issues---Petitioner, under guise of filing objections, sought to reopen matters already finally adjudicated---Chronology of proceedings showed repeated resort to different forums with apparent object of frustrating implementation of binding orders---Judicial process could not be permitted to become an instrument for defeating final determinations through successive, collateral or ex parte proceedings---Such conduct constituted abuse of process of law. (g) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction---Nature and scope---Re-agitation of concluded matters---Constitutional jurisdiction was supervisory and extraordinary in nature---It could not be invoked to re-agitate issues which had already attained finality between parties or to defeat implementation of binding judicial orders by relying upon a subsequent ex parte decree, especially where operation of such decree stood suspended---No jurisdictional defect, illegality, material irregularity or violation of law was found in order of Special Court dismissing objections---Interference under Art.199 was, therefore, unwarranted. Disposition--- Constitutional petition, being devoid of merit, was dismissed.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (1) Distinction between “supersession” and “deferment” (2) Rule 13-A of 1975 Rules for determination of inter-se seniority (3) Principle “Birds of a feather flock together” explained. --- (a) Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973----Ss.8 & 9---Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975, Rr.9, 10, 11 & 13-A---Seniority of Mukhtiarkars (BPS-16)---Promotees, deferred promotees and direct recruits---Seniority was to be determined according to mode and date of regular appointment and relevant statutory rules---Civil servant possessed no vested right to a particular position in seniority list, but appointing authority was required to prepare and revise seniority according to law---Seniority on promotion ordinarily took effect from date of regular appointment, subject to protection of inter-se seniority of persons belonging to same promotion batch---Direct recruits were to reckon seniority from date of their regular appointment and according to merit assigned by selection authority. (b) Service law---Promotion---“Supersession” and “deferment”---Distinction---Supersession involved conscious assessment by competent selection forum that civil servant was not fit or suitable for promotion on a particular occasion, resulting in promotion of junior and ordinarily affecting inter-se seniority---Deferment was temporary postponement of consideration due to incomplete service record, missing training, pending disciplinary or criminal proceedings or other administrative impediment and did not amount to adverse determination on fitness or merit---Supersession and deferment carried distinct legal consequences and could not be used interchangeably---Deferred civil servant, upon subsequent promotion after removal of impediment, could retain seniority with original batch in accordance with governing rules. (c) Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975----R.13-A---Deferred civil servant---Subsequent promotion---Inter-se seniority with juniors---Civil servant not promoted on his turn because seniority was disputed, he was on deputation, training or leave, disciplinary proceedings were pending, or for a reason other than unfitness for promotion, was, upon subsequent promotion and subject to competent authority’s order, deemed for purposes of inter-se seniority in higher post to have been promoted in same batch as his juniors---Fifty-four Assistant Mukhtiarkars had not been meaningfully considered and superseded on merit but were deferred because departmental, criminal or anti-corruption proceedings were pending---Upon subsequent promotion, their inter-se seniority with batchmates promoted on 03.01.2011 was protected under R.13-A. (d) Service law---Deferment from promotion---Non-reservation of vacancies---Effect upon seniority---Argument that deferred candidates could not claim seniority with original batch because no posts had been reserved for them was not sustainable---Deferred candidates were temporarily kept out of consideration and available candidates could lawfully be promoted against existing posts without suspending entire promotion process---Requirement to reserve posts for every deferred candidate would create administrative stalemate and frustrate Departmental Promotion Committee proceedings---Mere exhaustion or non-availability of promotion quota at time of subsequent promotion did not by itself deprive deferred civil servants of inter-se seniority protected by R.13-A after removal of impediment and regular promotion. (e) Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973----S.8---Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975, Rr.10 & 11---Initial appointees and promotees---Determination of inter-se seniority---Seniority of civil servant was ordinarily reckoned from date of regular appointment and ad hoc appointment could not be retrospectively regularized---Among direct recruits, earlier selection ranked senior to later selection and merit assigned by selection authority governed inter-se position---Among promotees, seniority in lower post governed their inter-se ranking---Rule 11 further required determination of relative seniority of promotees and direct recruits according to prescribed statutory criterion---Department was bound to reconcile seniority positions strictly under applicable rules. (f) Service law---Promotion quota---Earlier remand directions of Supreme Court---Compliance---Earlier judgment dated 19.01.2021 required department to follow fifty percent quota each for direct recruits and promotees, ensure promotion only against available post in relevant quota, prohibit cross-quota promotion, treat persons promoted without available posts as ad hoc promotees until regular appointment and determine seniority from date of regular appointment under relevant rules---Grant of inter-se seniority to genuinely deferred promotees under R.13-A did not, by itself, violate said directions---Deferred candidates had not been promoted cross-quota merely by being placed with their original batch for inter-se seniority. Previous Proceedings: • Civil Appeals Nos.489 to 491 of 2017 and connected petitions, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment dated 19.01.2021 (g) Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975----Rr.10 & 11---Promoted Mukhtiarkars vis-à-vis directly recruited Mukhtiarkars---Final seniority list dated 08.06.2021---Promotees, including deferred promotees accorded batch seniority, claimed promotion date of 03.01.2011, whereas direct recruits were regularly appointed on 31.10.2011---Service Tribunal correctly held that direct recruits’ seniority commenced from date of regular appointment, but did not clearly determine whether their placement above promotees regularly promoted from an earlier date was consistent with governing rules---Matter required limited administrative reconciliation and re-examination rather than wholesale disturbance of seniority already determined regarding deferred promotees. (h) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.212(3)---Service Tribunal judgment---Seniority dispute---Scope of interference---Tribunal’s conclusion applying R.13-A to protect inter-se seniority of deferred promotees with their original batch was maintained---Interference was required only to extent that relative ranking between regularly promoted Mukhtiarkars and directly recruited Mukhtiarkars had not been examined with clarity under Rr.10 and 11 of the 1975 Rules. Disposition---Civil petitions converted into appeals and partly allowed---Finding protecting inter-se seniority of deferred Mukhtiarkars with their original batch maintained---Matter remanded to Secretary, Revenue Department, Government of Sindh, for limited re-examination of seniority ranking of promoted Mukhtiarkars from dates of promotion vis-à-vis directly recruited Mukhtiarkars from dates of appointment---Competent authority directed to hear stakeholders and, if any lapse, apparent error or violation of 1975 Rules was found, make necessary correction in Final Seniority List dated 08.06.2021 within two months. Faheemuddin Memon and others v. Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others, C.P.L.A. Nos.914-K to 919-K of 2023, Supreme Court of Pakistan, heard on 25.03.2026, approved for reporting.