Summary: Provisions of Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC are not attracted when limitation is a mixed question of law and fact requiring evidence----The case involves a dispute over the rejection of a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (C.P.C.) due to alleged limitations. The Respondents filed a suit for possession and specific performance of a contract against the Petitioner and others, claiming that an agreement to sell property was made in 1998 but not executed until 2009. The Petitioner argued that the suit was time-barred under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The key legal issue revolved around whether the suit was barred by limitation and if the rejection of the plaint was justified. The Petitioner contended that the suit, filed over seven years after the agreement, was indeed time-barred. However, the Respondents argued that the agreement was ambiguous and raised factual issues regarding its genuineness and the absence of a fixed completion date. The court considered several legal precedents cited by both parties, Inayatullah Khan and others v. Shabir Ahmad Khan (2021 SCMR 686): This case likely deals with issues related to property or contracts and may provide insights into the interpretation of relevant laws or principles regarding specific performance and limitation. Haji Saindino Khan and another v. Mst. Zaibunnissa through Legal Heirs and another (1991 SCMR 972): This case might have addressed issues relevant to contract law, limitations, or specific performance, offering guidance on legal principles and precedents.Jan Muhammad Abbasi v. Mukhtiarkar Estate, Larkana (Barrage Mukhtiarkar) and others (2007 CLC 1790): This case likely involves property or contract disputes and may offer insights into the interpretation of laws or principles regarding limitations and specific performance. Muhammad Ali v. Province of Punjab and others (2005 SCMR 1302): This case may have dealt with legal issues related to limitations, contracts, or governmental matters, providing guidance on relevant legal principles and precedents. Hakim Khan v. Aurangzeb and another (1979 SCMR 625): This case might have addressed legal issues related to property, contracts, or limitations, providing valuable insights into relevant legal principles and precedents. Sardar Muhammad and others v. Muhammad Iqbal and others (1985 SCMR 1221): This case likely deals with property or contract disputes and may offer insights into the interpretation of laws or principles regarding limitations and specific performance. Nadeem Ahmad v. Saif-ur-Rehman and others (2021 MLD 354): This case may have addressed legal issues related to limitations, contracts, or property disputes, offering guidance on relevant legal principles and precedents. Syed Amjad Mahboob v. Raja Mumtaz Hussain Arif and 3 others (2014 MLD 1607): This case might have dealt with issues related to limitations, contracts, or property disputes, providing insights into relevant legal principles and precedents. Irshad Ali v. Sajjad Ali and 4 others (PLD 1995 SC 629): This case may have addressed legal issues related to limitations, contracts, or property disputes, offering guidance on relevant legal principles and precedents. Haji Abdul Sattar and others v. Farooq Ahmad and others (2013 SCMR 1493): This case might have dealt with issues relevant to limitations, contracts, or property disputes, providing insights into relevant legal principles and precedents. These legal precedents were likely cited by both parties to support their arguments regarding the interpretation and application of laws, especially concerning limitations, contracts, and specific performance.The court also highlighted that the mere delay in filing a suit was not sufficient to reject the plaint unless evidence indicated the date of refusal to perform the agreement. The court ultimately dismissed the Petitioner's constitutional petition, stating that the rejection of the plaint was justified. It cited legal precedents supporting the view that once evidence had been recorded and the trial was at its final stage, the case should proceed to its logical end. Additionally, it emphasized that the absence of a fixed date in the agreement invoked the second part of Article 113 of the Limitation Act, necessitating consideration of the date of refusal to perform the agreement.

Summary: Intra Court Appeal not maintainable against the judgment of Court Martial under Pakistan Army Act, 1952----This Intra Court Appeal (ICA) challenges the judgment of a single judge regarding the conviction and dismissal from service of Naik Mumtaz Hussain by a summary Court martial (S.C.M.) under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952. The single judge's judgment set aside the conviction and dismissal, remanding the matter back to the trial court to fulfill mandatory requirements under the Army Act. The appellant argues that the ICA is maintainable under the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 (LRO), which allows appeals to a bench of two or more judges of a High Court against orders passed by single judges. However, the court examines the maintainability of the ICA under Section 3 of the LRO, which places limitations on the right to file an ICA. The court emphasizes that an ICA is not maintainable if the law provides for at least one appeal, revision, or review against the original order. It cites legal precedents to clarify that the term "original order" refers to the order passed by the first forum or authority in the legal proceedings. In the context of military courts, the court outlines the remedies available under the Army Act against decisions of various Courts martial, including review, appeal, and petitions. It concludes that since there are remedies available against the original order of conviction and dismissal, the ICA is not maintainable. SME Bank Limited through President Islamabad and others Vs. Izhar Ul Haq (2019 SCMR 939): This case sets the precedent that if the proceedings from which a writ petition arises provide for either review, revision, or appeal, then the remedy of Intra-Court appeal would not be available against the judgment passed by the Single Judge in the writ petition. It establishes the principle that the availability of other remedies under the law affects the maintainability of an ICA. Syed Arif Raza Rizvi v. Messrs Pakistan International Airlines through Chairman/M.D., Karachi (PLD 2001 SC 182): This case clarifies that the writ jurisdiction is a constitutional jurisdiction, and a judgment deciding a constitutional petition would not be a judgment in the exercise of the original civil jurisdiction within the meaning of subsection (1) of section 3 of the LRO. Mst. Karim Bibi And Others v. Hussain Bakhsh And Another (PLD 1984 SC 344): In this case, the Supreme Court elaborated on the term 'original order' as used in the proviso to section 3(2) of the LRO, stating that it refers to the order with which the proceedings under the relevant statute commenced. It clarifies that the relevant order may not necessarily be the one under challenge but the original order passed in the proceedings subject to an appeal under the relevant law. The court dismisses the ICA without delving into the merits of the case, citing legal principles that require addressing the question of maintainability before considering the merits.

Summary: The petitioner in this case has challenged the order issued by the learned Judge Family Court, Gujranwala, and the judgment issued by the learned Additional District Judge, Gujranwala. The petitioner was married to respondent No.3 on 31.12.2005, with a dower of 32.25 tola gold ornaments, which was later taken back by respondent No.3. Additionally, the petitioner received dowry articles worth Rs.13,91,000 from her parents. Due to conflicts between the parties, the petitioner filed for dissolution of marriage, recovery of dower, dowry articles, and maintenance. The Family Court decreed the dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula under Section 10(4) of the Family Courts Act, 1964. However, the petitioner contested that the grounds for dissolution, namely failure to pay maintenance and cruel behavior, fall under Section 2(ii) and (viii)(a) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, which does not allow dissolution based on Khula. Legal precedents cited include the case of Sardar Abid Iqbal vs. Tabassam Khursheed (2009 YLR 1745) and Mst. Saima Irum vs. Tariq Javed (2005 S.L.R. 655), emphasizing that the court cannot pass a decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula unless specifically requested by the wife. The court must ensure that the wife voluntarily surrenders her right to dower. The court highlighted the difference between Talaq and Khula, stating that Khula is initiated by the wife and requires her to forego certain rights, whereas Talaq is initiated by the husband and entails paying the dower to the wife. In conclusion, the court found that neither the petitioner intended nor requested dissolution based on Khula, and therefore, the orders issued by the Family Court and the Additional District Judge were without jurisdiction. The petitioner's case for dower will continue before the Family Court, allowing respondent No.3 to present their defense. Consequently, the petition was allowed, and a decree for dissolution of marriage was granted in favor of the petitioner, based on other grounds justifying dissolution.

Summary: Fundamental right to movement elaborated under Article 15 of the Constitution with reference to placement of name on Exit Control List. Mere relationship with accused is not a valid ground to curb the right to movement-----The petitioners are relatives of the CEO of a brokerage firm accused of embezzlement. The CEO's alleged misappropriation led to the petitioners' names being added to the ECL based on claims of holding properties linked to the CEO's actions. The petitioners argued that their association with the CEO did not justify ECL placement. They contended that the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) lacked jurisdiction to recommend such action. The respondents relied on SECP recommendations, alleging the petitioners' active involvement in trading shares and holding properties on behalf of the CEO. The court found ECL placement without notice or hearing unconstitutional. It emphasized the separate legal entity of the brokerage firm and criticized the lack of substantive reasons for ECL placement. The judgment cites international conventions and legal precedents to support the right to freedom of movement. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, M/O Interior v. General (R) Pervez Musharraf and others, PLD 2016 SC 570: Recognized the right to movement as a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958): United States Supreme Court upheld the right to travel as part of personal liberty under the Fifth Amendment.Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1869): Recognized the right of citizens to move freely within states as a fundamental right, Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas 546 (1823): Declared citizens' rights to move freely within states as fundamental privileges and immunities, Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Article 13 asserts the right to freedom of movement within and between countries. The court ruled in favor of the petitioners, setting aside the ECL placement as unconstitutional and illegal. The judgment reaffirmed the importance of the right to freedom of movement and emphasized the need for substantive justifications for restricting this right.

Summary: Entries under columns No. 13 to 16 of the nikahnama envisage reflection and manifestation of the parties as to amount/Raqm and other articles and/or property given or to be given by husband to wife as the dower overall----Muhammad Qayyum Anjum (the petitioner) was married to Mst. Rehana Shamas (the respondent), as per their nikahnama. The respondent filed a suit seeking recovery of dower, maintenance allowance, dowry articles, and dissolution of marriage. The family court decreed in favor of the respondent, which was upheld by the appellate court. The petitioner challenged the judgments primarily regarding the grant of dower, arguing that the transfer of a house mentioned in the nikahnama constituted deferred dower and shouldn't be paid during the marriage. The petitioner's counsel argued that the marriage's terms related to the transfer of the house were deferred dower, citing the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Saadia Usman v. Muhammad Usman Iqbal Jadoon. On the other hand, the respondent's counsel referred to the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, contending that the dower was on demand, obligating the petitioner to hand over the house or its value. The case examined various columns of the nikahnama and Section 10 of the Ordinance to determine the nature of the dower. Dower in Islam can be specified or unspecified, prompt, or deferred, with no upper limit set. The Supreme Court's precedent emphasized the importance of clarity in defining prompt and deferred dower in the nikahnama. Saadia Usman v. Muhammad Usman Iqbal Jadoon (2009): This case established principles regarding deferred dower and the necessity for clarity in defining the nature of dower in the nikahnama. Mst. Yasmeen Bibi v. Muhammad Ghazanfar Khan and others (2016): This case highlighted that entries in various columns of the nikahnama are part of undertakings related to dower, emphasizing clarity in defining dower in the nikahnama. Syed Sajjad Hussain v. Judge Family Court etc. (2019): This case discussed the waiver of entitlement to deferred dower through consent or conduct. State Bank of Pakistan through Governor & another v. Imtiaz Ali Khan & others (2012): This case emphasized the doctrine of laches in legal matters. Ghulam Hussain Ramzan Ali v. Collector of Customs (Preventive), Karachi (2014): This case further discussed the doctrine of laches in legal proceedings. The court ruled that since the nikahnama didn't specify the mode or time of payment for the house mentioned under column No. 16, it constituted deferred dower, and the respondent was entitled to claim it. The petitioner's contradictory statements and the delay in filing the petition led to its dismissal on grounds of laches.

Summary: The respondent, M/s Saritow Spinning Mills Limited, is a public limited company engaged in spinning, manufacturing, and selling yarn. The tax department initiated proceedings against the company for alleged failure to deduct tax at source while transferring cotton (raw material) from its sister concern. Despite earlier assessments and appeals, the issue persisted, leading to a reference application under Section 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The department argued that the transfer of raw material to the sister concern falls under the category of "sale of goods" and is subject to withholding tax provisions. They relied on legal provisions and case law to support their stance. However, the respondent contended that no actual payment had been made in this case, and therefore, withholding tax provisions were not applicable. The transactions between the associate companies involved only book adjustments without any cash involvement. After hearing arguments and examining the record, the court found that no actual payment had been made, and withholding tax provisions were contingent upon the time of making payment. Since no payment was made, the provisions regarding tax deduction were not applicable. The court rejected the argument that the issue had been settled in a previous case, as the circumstances differed. The judgment was ruled against the applicant-department, in favor of the respondent-taxpayer.

Summary: Acquittal granted----The abrasion, the most informative of all injuries----The case involves an appellant accused of causing the death of a seven-month-old child, the daughter of the complainant, during a dispute over water control on July 22, 2009. The incident escalated from a wrestling match between the appellant and the complainant, who were siblings involved in a longstanding family feud over land. The appellant allegedly entered the complainant's house and struck the child with an iron blow pipe, resulting in her death. During the trial, the prosecution presented two eyewitnesses, both brothers of the complainant, to support the charges against the appellant. However, critical inconsistencies and gaps in the prosecution's case emerged: The delay in reporting the incident to the police, the absence of spot recovery, and the lack of blood evidence at the crime scene raised doubts about the credibility of the prosecution's case. The medical evidence presented during the trial contradicted the prosecution's narrative. The autopsy report indicated injuries inconsistent with the alleged weapon used by the appellant, suggesting the possibility of the child's injuries resulting from a fall rather than a deliberate attack. The prosecution failed to establish a clear motive for the appellant's alleged actions, and essential witnesses, including the child's mother, were not produced in court. In light of these inconsistencies and shortcomings in the prosecution's case, the court ruled in favor of the appellant. The appellant's conviction and sentence were overturned, and she was acquitted of all charges.

Summary: The petitioner, Hussain Ahmed, sought post-arrest bail in a case registered against him under Section 302/34 PPC at Police Station Nawagai, District Bajaur. The petitioner was accused in a land dispute with the complainant and his co-accused. During the dispute, the accused allegedly fired at the head of the deceased, resulting in his death.The petitioner argued that the FIR did not attribute any specific role to him and only contained general allegations. He also claimed that the investigation was conducted dishonestly, and the Police Diaries were manipulated to frame him falsely. The petitioner pointed out that his co-accused, Liaquat Ali, had been granted bail by the trial court due to conflicts between his role in the FIR and the statements of eyewitnesses.The learned Law Officer defended the impugned judgment, asserting that the trial court's order should not be interfered with unless it is perverse. However, he admitted that the record was tampered with during the investigation.After hearing the arguments, the Supreme Court acknowledged that no specific role had been ascribed to the petitioner in the FIR, and the allegations were of a general nature. Considering the tampering of the record during the investigation and the bail granted to the co-accused on similar grounds, the Court concluded that the petitioner was entitled to the same relief. The Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, admitting the petitioner to post-arrest bail on the condition of furnishing bail bonds.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Sentence, reduction in---Delay ofone hour in lodging FIR---Scope---Accused was charged for committing murder of thebrother of the complainant---Record depicted that the matter was reported on the same nightat 12:30 am within one hour of the occurrence---Parties were known to each other before theoccurrence and there was no chance for false implication---Such circumstances were enoughto believe that the FIR was registered without pre-consultation or premeditation---Circumstances established that the prosecution had proved its case beyond any shadow ofdoubt, however, the death penalty was altered into imprisonment for life, in circumstances---Appeal was dismissed with said modification in sentence.(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 302(b)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 46---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation ofevidence---Dying declaration---Scope---Accused was charged for committing murder of thebrother of the complainant---Evidence of complainant revealed that when he reached theplace of occurrence, he found his brother in an injured condition, who disclosed that accusedhad fired at him---Said witness was cross-examined, but nothing came on record to discardhis evidence---No serious efforts were made to challenge his statement on the question ofdying declaration---From the evidence, it had been established beyond any shadow of adoubt that deceased made a dying declaration immediately after the incident, eliminating thepossibility of influence etc. before making the accused responsible for causing him injuries---Prosecution had proved the dying declaration, which by itself was sufficient to maintainconviction and sentence---Circumstances established that the prosecution had proved its casebeyond any shadow of doubt, however, the death penalty was altered into imprisonment forlife, in circumstances---Appeal was dismissed with said modification in sentence.(c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-------Art. 46---Dying declaration---Scope---Dying declaration, even made before a private person, is free from influence and the person before whom such dying declaration is made isexamined, then it becomes a substantive piece of evidence, and, no corroboration is requiredand such declaration can be made the basis of conviction.Farmanullah v. Qadeem Khan 2001 SCMR 1474 rel.(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 164---Confession---Requirement---For accepting a confession, two essentialrequirements must be fulfilled, i.e. the confession was made voluntarily, it was based on trueaccount of facts, leading to the crime and the same was proved at the trial.(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 302(b)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 164---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation ofevidence---Confessional statement, recording of---Accused was charged for committingmurder of the brother of the complainant---Record showed that the accused was arrested on26.12.2019 and was produced before the Judicial Magistrate for taking remand on27.12.2019---After remaining in police custody for fourteen days, accused recorded hisconfessional statement---No evidence was available on record to remotely show that theaccused was subjected to any torture, inducement or promise---Judicial Magistrate, who hadrecorded the confessional statement of the accused, deposed that after fulfilling all legalformalities within the meaning of section 364, Cr.P.C., he recorded the confessionalstatement of the accused---Sufficient time was given to the accused to think over hisconfession---Replies of the accused to the questions left no room for any doubt that hisconfessional statement was involuntary or the result of torture, force, inducement or promise---Judicial Magistrate had been subjected to lengthy and taxing cross-examination by thedefence, but nothing could be extracted from his mouth to prove that the confessionalstatement of the accused was the result of force, torture, promise or inducement---JudicialMagistrate while recording the confessional statement of the accused had taken all theprecautions and had faithfully complied with all the formalities as envisaged under S.364,Cr.P.C.---Chain of circumstances brought on record by the prosecution fully corroborated theconfessional statement of the accused---Accused remained unable to give a plausibleexplanation for his false involvement by the complainant and the witnesses---Prosecution hadproved its case beyond any shadow of doubt, however, the death penalty was altered intoimprisonment for life, in circumstances---Appeal was dismissed with said modification insentence.Dadullah and another v. The State 2015 SCMR 856; Wazir Khan v. The State 1989SCMR 446; Muhammad Amin v. The State PLD 2006 SC 219 and Ahmad Hassan andanother v. The State 2001 SCMR 505 rel.(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 302(b)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 164---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation ofevidence---Delay of fourteen days in recording confessional statement---Scope---Accused was charged for committing murder of the brother of the complainant---Confessionalstatement of the accused had been recorded with a delay of fourteen days---Admittedly theaccused was arrested and his statement under S.164, Cr.P.C. had been recorded on10.01.2020---Judicial Magistrate, who recorded the statement of the accused was found to behaving no motive/malice for implicating the accused in the crime---Investigating Officer wasnot alleged to have induced, pressurized or tortured the accused so as to obtain theconfessional statement---Statement of Investigating Officer as well as cross-examination didnot reflect any motive on his part for fabricating false evidence to involve the accused in thecrime---Since the rule of admissibility of a confession prescribed no time for recording theconfession, if recorded within the period of legal, physical remand with police---Confessionof an accused and its different aspects in each case were to be looked into in the light of itsattending facts and circumstances---Delay would essentially damage the evidentiary value ofconfession was not a rule of universal application---No doubt that there was a delay offourteen days in recording the confessional statement of the accused, but that by itself wasnot sufficient to discard the same---Circumstances established that the prosecution hadproved its case beyond any shadow of doubt, however, the death penalty was altered intoimprisonment for life, in circumstances---Appeal was dismissed with said modification insentence.PLD 1978 Quetta 1; 1985 PCr.LJ 2375; 2005 YLR 908; 2013 PCr.LJ 127; 2004 YLR1088; 2006 PCr.LJ 62; 2021 MLD 729; Nabi Bakhsh v. State 1999 SCMR 1972; MuhammadIsmail and another v. The State 1995 SCMR 1615; Majeed v. The State 2010 SCMR 55 andMuhammad Yaqoob v. State 1992 SCMR 1983 rel.(g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 302(b)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 164---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation ofevidence---Confession, retraction of---Accused was charged for committing murder of thebrother of the complainant---Undoubtedly, the accused had retracted his confession, samecould be relied upon because the events disclosed by him for the purpose of the commissionof a crime in his confessional statement, including the manner adopted by him, were fullycorroborated by prosecution evidence available on record---Accused had also disclosed themotive of killing the deceased which indicated that his confessions was voluntary and trueand the same could not be discarded for the sole reason of having been recorded afterfourteen days in view of the facts and circumstances of the case---Prosecution had proved itscase beyond any shadow of doubt, however, the death penalty was altered into imprisonmentfor life, in circumstances---Appeal was dismissed with said modification in sentence.(h) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Recovery of weapon and crimeempties---Scope---Accused was charged for committing murder of the brother of thecomplainant---Crime weapon was recovered on the pointation of accused and the pistol alongwith empties secured from the place of occurrence were sent for the report of the BallisticExpert---Ballistic Expert Report had been produced, which showed that the crime emptieswere fired from the pistol recovered on pointation of the accused in pursuance of the disclosure made by him---Circumstances established that the prosecution had proved its casebeyond any shadow of doubt, however, the death penalty was altered into imprisonment forlife, in circumstances---Appeal was dismissed with said modification in sentence.(i) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Quantum of sentence---Scope---Accused was charged for committing murder of the brother of the complainant---Recordshowed that although all the other formalities vis-a-vis recording the statement of theaccused under S.164, Cr.P.C., had been duly complied with, yet same was recorded after adelay of fourteen days---Said fact was an irregularity, not vitiating the confessional statementitself, but putting the court to caution---Accused made one fire upon the deceased and hadnot repeated the same---Alteration of the death penalty into imprisonment for life would be aconscionable wage in the circumstances---Consequently, the penalty of death awarded toaccused was altered into imprisonment for life---Appeal was dismissed with saidmodification in sentence.

Summary: Background: The respondents filed an application for the custody of minors before the Additional District Judge, Hajira, claiming they were the paternal grandparents and thus suitable guardians. The petitioner, who is the maternal grandmother and an American national, filed an application for the cancellation of the guardianship certificate, arguing that she was not made a party in the original proceedings and that she could better care for the minors. The trial court rejected her application, and the High Court upheld this decision. ----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioner was improperly excluded from the original guardianship proceedings. 2- Whether the application for cancellation of the guardianship certificate was filed within the appropriate time frame. 3- Whether the petitioner or the respondents are better suited to be the guardians of the minors. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Improper Exclusion: The court found that the petitioner was not a necessary party to the original guardianship application. The guardianship certificate was issued with the minors' welfare in mind, and the petitioner's exclusion did not invalidate the proceedings. --Timeliness: The petitioner's application for cancellation was deemed untimely. According to Rule 13 of the AJ&K Family Courts (Procedural) Rules, 1998, an application to set aside an ex-parte decision must be filed within 30 days of the decree, not from the date of knowledge. The court emphasized there is no provision for condonation of delay under this rule. --Best Interest of the Minors: The court concluded that the respondents, as the paternal grandparents, were best suited to be the guardians of the minors, given the petitioner's American residency and the stability provided by the respondents. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the decisions of the trial court and the High Court. ----Citations/Precedents: 2012 SCR 341