Summary: Sections 561-A CrPC & 5 & 8 of the KP Prosecution Service Act, 2005 have been discussed. Moreover, the only piece of evidence allegedly connecting the accused-petitioner with the offence is the recovery of a portion of the robbed amount. However, this recovery was neither effected at the time of arrest nor pursuant to any pointation made by the accused-petitioner. Instead, it was reportedly produced by one of his relatives. The Investigating Officer neither recorded the statement of the said individual under Section 161 CrPC nor incorporated his name in the recovery memo. This omission is both procedural and substantive in nature, striking at the root of the credibility and admissibility of the recovery itself. In the absence of any cogent corroborative evidence, and keeping in view the overall factual matrix, I am of the view that the accused-petitioner is entitled to the concession of bail in the attending circumstances of the case. Accordingly, this bail petition is allowed. The accused-petitioner is admitted to bail, subject to his furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs.100,000 with two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Illaqa/Judicial Magistrate concerned, who shall ensure that the sureties are local, reliable, and persons of sufficient means. It is a matter of grave concern that, in recent times, citizens are increasingly losing their lives, dignity, honour, valuable movable and immovable properties due to systemic failures in the processes of investigation, prosecution, and adjudication. The inadequacies and inefficiencies within these fundamental pillars of the justice system have resulted in gross miscarriages of justice, wherein aggrieved individuals are often unable to obtain appropriate reliefs in accordance with the mandate of law. This pervasive failure not only undermines the rule of law but has also led to an alarming erosion of public trust in the justice delivery system. The situation has deteriorated to such an extent that it borders on a near-anarchical state of affairs, wherein law and order are increasingly becoming unmanageable and beyond the effective control of state functionaries and institutions. Given the gravity of the situation, there is an urgent and compelling need for comprehensive, swift, and result-oriented remedial measures aimed at strengthening the investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative mechanisms. Such measures must be implemented across the board and by all lawful means, with a view to restoring public confidence and addressing / allaying the legitimate grievances and agonies of the citizens. It is imperative that all stakeholders viz. executive, judiciary, and legislature collaborate proactively to undertake necessary legal, institutional, and procedural reforms to ensure the delivery of timely and effective justice, in consonance with constitutional mandates and principles of natural justice. Without prejudicing the merits of the case and bearing in mind that findings at the bail stage are necessarily tentative, it is nonetheless imperative to note, with serious concern that the Investigating Officer failed to investigate essential links in the chain of evidence. Specifically, the omission to conduct an Identification Parade despite the complainant’s declared ability to identify the culprits, and the failure to formally associate or record the statement of the individual from whom the alleged recovery was made, reflect a glaring lapse in investigative diligence. This inaction stands in stark violation of Rule 25.2(3) of the Police Rules, 1934, which mandates that: “It is the duty of an investigating officer to find out the truth of the matter under investigation. His object shall be to discover the actual facts of the case and to arrest the real offender or offenders. He shall not commit himself prematurely to any view of the facts for or against any person”. The Investigating Officer is expected to proceed objectively, exploring all material aspects necessary to ensure a fair, thorough, and lawful investigation. In the present case, the investigative omissions have not only diminished the evidentiary value of the prosecution’s case but also raise questions regarding the integrity of the process. Such dereliction of duty warrants appropriate action through the competent authority. Given that this Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), is ordinarily required to confine itself to a tentative appraisal of the material placed on record, but sometime it cannot turn a blind eye to the manifest illegalities, grave procedural improprieties, and conspicuous inaction on the part of the prosecution, notably, the worthy District Public Prosecutor and the Investigating Officer. Such glaring lapses not only undermine the integrity of the investigative process but also pose a serious threat to the administration of justice. In these exceptional circumstances, where the prosecutorial conduct appears to defeat rather than advance the cause of justice, this Court finds it necessary to invoke its inherent jurisdiction in terms of section 561-A CrPC, to prevent the abuse of the process of law and to ensure that justice is truly served in order to secure the ends of justice. Accordingly, the worthy Superintendent of Police (Investigation), Charsadda is directed to look into the matter of defective investigation by the IO, as highlighted hereinabove. Simultaneously, the investigation of the case shall be entrusted to another competent and impartial officer, who shall proceed with due diligence and in accordance with law. A compliance report in this regard shall be submitted through the worthy Additional Registrar (Judicial) of this Court for the perusal of the Bench in Chamber within one month, positively. This Court is nonetheless constrained to record its concern regarding institutional failures that extend beyond mere police negligence. In addition to the lapses on the part of the Investigating Officer, it is imperative to examine the role of worthy District Public Prosecutor, Charsadda, in light of his statutory duties under Sections 5(d) to (f) and 8 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Prosecution Service (Constitution, Functions and Powers) Act, 2005. These provisions were designed to serve not as hollow formalities, but as substantive safeguards to ensure prosecutorial supervision over police investigation, with the object of strengthening justice delivery at the earliest stage of criminal proceedings. Under Section 5(d), it is the express function of the DPP to issue instructions or guidelines to police officers in relation to the conduct of investigations. Section 5(e) empowers him to recommend appropriate disciplinary action where such investigations are found to be defective, negligent, or in contravention of law. Section 5(f) further empowers worthy Director General of Prosecution to initiate proceedings where such recommendations are not acted upon. Most significantly, Section 8(2) mandates that a copy of every FIR registered by the police must be forwarded to the concerned DPP, who is required to scrutinize the investigation and, where lapses are found, report the same to the appropriate authority under Section 8(4). These provisions collectively reflect the legislative intent to institutionalize prosecutorial oversight, not only to assist in the pursuit of justice but also to act as a check on investigative arbitrariness and procedural irregularities. In the present case, the FIR was admittedly registered against unknown accused, and serious procedural failures subsequently marred the investigation, including the failure to conduct an identification parade despite the complainant’s assertion that he could recognize the perpetrators; a dubious recovery process unsupported by legally admissible evidence; and non-recording of statements under Section 161 CrPC. In the investigation, despite these glaring defects, no corrective measure or intervention appears to have been taken by the worthy DPP in the given circumstances of the case. This dereliction not only undermines the statutory function of prosecutorial supervision, but also renders the safeguards built into the criminal justice framework largely illusory. This Court is compelled to note that the establishment of the Prosecution Service under Section 3 of the 2005 Act, comprising the Director General, Deputy Directors, and Assistant Directors, is not a symbolic gesture nor a ceremonial institution. It is a public trust, funded by the exchequer, created to elevate the standard of criminal investigation and prosecution, and to ensure that the investigative process is guided by law and legal acumen at every stage. The failure of the worthy DPP, Charsadda, in the present case thus represents not merely administrative oversight but a breach of statutory obligation. This Court observes with due emphasis that, under the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the High Court, being the superior Court of the province, is vested with broad supervisory and regulatory powers, both on its judicial and administrative sides. These powers extend to overseeing the performance of all public functionaries who are tasked with exercising authority or discharging duties under the Cr.P.C. In doing so, the Court ensures the rigorous enforcement of legal provisions pertaining to registration of criminal cases, the conduct of investigations, and all matters incidental thereto. The High Court is not only competent but constitutionally mandated to issue directions aimed at securing adherence to the rule of law. Moreover, public officers acting under the framework of the CrPC may, when required, be directed by this Court to perform specific functions necessary to achieve the objectives of justice. Besides, at the heart of a just and functional criminal justice system lies vibrant, active and watchful role of the judiciary, particularly at the district level. Sessions Judges, Additional Sessions Judges, and Judicial Magistrates are not only adjudicators but also entrusted with significant magisterial powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, to oversee and guide the investigative process under their respective jurisdictions. These judicial officers are empowered to ensure that police investigations are conducted lawfully, fairly, and without abuse of authority. They may direct the registration of criminal cases, ensure proper investigation, summon investigating officers, and restrain law enforcement agencies from engaging in harassment or acting beyond their lawful mandate. These powers must be exercised proactively to uphold the rule of law and alleviate the suffering of ordinary citizens. In view of the foregoing, the Additional Registrar (Judicial) of this Court is directed to circulate a copy of this order among all Criminal Courts of the province, so that judicial officers may remain alert and responsive in the exercise of their respective jurisdictions. In these circumstances, the worthy Director General Prosecution, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, is directed to initiate an appropriate inquiry strictly in accordance with law into the conduct of the worthy District Public Prosecutor, Charsadda, for his failure to exercise statutory supervision as required under Sections 5 and 8 of the Prosecution Service Act, 2005. The inquiry shall assess whether the DPP discharged his obligations in relation to the present case and shall determine whether disciplinary or corrective action is warranted. A report in this regard shall be submitted through the worthy Additional Registrar (Judicial) of this Court for perusal in Chamber within one month positively. The worthy Director General Prosecution is further directed to submit a detailed and comprehensive report covering a period of the last five years, within the stipulated time, regarding the submission of challans in criminal cases on a district-wise basis. The report shall include the fate of such cases, specifying the number of convictions and acquittals, including those decided by the superior courts. Furthermore, the report must particularly highlight the reasons and causes for acquittals, especially in instances where the prosecution failed to establish the charges against the accused. Special emphasis shall be laid on cases where the failure to secure a conviction was attributable to poor or defective investigation, so as to ascertain the lapses and ensure remedial measures. Furthermore, the worthy Additional Inspector General (AIG) Investigations, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, is hereby directed to prepare and submit before this Court a consolidated, district-wise report encompassing: (i) the total number of criminal cases reported during the last five years in which the investigation was declared defective, deficient, or found to be non-compliant with statutory requirements, along with the final outcome of such cases; and (ii) the nature and extent of remedial or disciplinary actions initiated or taken against the delinquent investigating officers whose negligence or misconduct resulted in the failure of prosecution cases. This exercise is essential not only for ensuring accountability but also for enabling institutional reflection and systemic reforms. The report shall be submitted through the worthy Additional Registrar (Judicial) within the same timeframe. Copy of this order be endorsed to the worthy Inspector General Police, worthy Additional Inspector General (Investigation) and worthy Director General Prosecution Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for information and further necessary action at their end. The Additional Registrar (Judicial) is also directed to open a separate file till the submission of the compliance reports. Above are the reasons of this court’s short order of even date.

Summary: (a) It is a settled principle of law that khula, being a form of dissolution of marriage initiated by the wife, cannot be granted by a court unless it has been explicitly and unequivocally sought by the woman herself. The rationale behind this requirement lies in the fact that khula entails relinquishment of the woman`s financial right, particularly the dower (mahr), and such relinquishment cannot be presumed or inferred without a clear and voluntary demand by the wife. Therefore, in the absence of a specific prayer or request for khula, the court has no lawful authority to unilaterally pass a decree for khula on its own motion. Any such act would amount to overstepping its jurisdiction and interfering with the substantive rights of the parties, particularly when the wife has not consented to forego her dower in exchange for dissolution. (b) The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, in Section 2(ii), explicitly provides that a wife is entitled to seek dissolution of marriage if the husband has neglected or has failed to provide maintenance for a period of two years. This provision recognizes the hardship caused to a woman when she is deprived of her right to sustenance, a right that is integral to the marital relationship and guaranteed under both Shariah and family law. The consistent denial of this right amounts to an inexcusable act of cruelty and justifies the dissolution of the matrimonial bond. (c) It is a settled principle of law that an appeal is considered to be a continuation of the original proceedings, unless the right to appeal has been specifically barred by the legislature through express words or necessary intendment.

Summary: (a) When a party asserts that a transaction is benami, the initial and primary burden of proof lies squarely upon that party. It must be established through cogent, reliable, and independent evidence that the ostensible owner was merely a name-lender, while the actual ownership and consideration belonged to the claimant. (b) In determining whether a transaction is benami, the courts have laid down certain guiding factors, which include: (i) the source of purchase money relating to the transaction; (ii) possession of the property, (iii) the position of the parties and their relationship to one another, (iv) the circumstances, pecuniary or otherwise, of the alleged transferee, (v) the motive for the transaction, (vi) the custody and production of the title deed, and (vii) the previous and subsequent conduct of the parties. Each of the above- stated circumstances, taken by itself, is of no particular value and affords no conclusive proof of the intention to transfer the ownership from one person to the other. But a combination of some or all of them and a proper weighing and appreciation of their value would go a long way towards indicating whether the ownership has been really transferred or where the real title lies. Since the very object of a benami transaction is secrecy, the evidence adduced in cases of this character should stand the test of strict scrutiny and satisfy the tests mentioned above. In other words, the evidence must be reliable and acceptable impelling the Court to take a view contrary to the recitals in the impugned document. The consideration of such evidence should be in a proper manner and in the right perspective. (c) The burden of proof initially rests upon the party alleging that the ostensible owner is a benamidar. The weakness or insufficiency of the defence case does not absolve the claimant of this burden. However, during the course of trial, the burden of proof may shift from one party to the other. Once the plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case and the burden shifts to the defendant, failure of the defendant to discharge this shifted burden would result in the plaintiff’s success.

Summary: High Court allowed the appeal filed by Muhammad Iqbal, setting aside the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Ombudsperson's order directing the Deputy Commissioner, Swat, to incorporate an inheritance mutation for the legal heirs of late Asil Khan. The Court held that the Ombudsperson lacked jurisdiction under Section 4 of the KP Enforcement of Women's Property Rights Act, 2019, as a civil suit filed by the respondent (Mst. Badrai) over the same property was already pending before the Civil Judge, Khwaza Khela. Further, the Ombudsperson violated mandatory procedure under Section 7 of the Act by failing to refer the matter to the civil court or seek suspension of proceedings before issuing the mutation order. The Court also noted that complex disputes including whether properties were self-acquired by the appellant or inherited, and the applicability of pre-1962 Swat State inheritance laws required evidence-based civil adjudication, not summary proceedings. Criticizing the Ombudsperson's use of coercive tactics (e.g., non-bailable warrants) in a civil matter, the Court directed the civil court to conclude the pending trial within three months.

Summary: (a) Under Rule 11 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Service Commission Regulations, 2017, the eligibility of candidates shall be determined in accordance with the advertisement of the post, the service rules governing appointments to the relevant post, and such other ancillary instructions as may be issued by the Government and/or the Commission from time to time. Furthermore, Rule 3(2) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989, provides that the method of appointment, qualifications, and other conditions applicable to a post shall be as laid down by the department concerned in consultation with the Establishment and Administration Department and the Finance Department. Rule 10(3) of the ibid Rules further stipulates that a candidate for initial appointment to a post must possess the prescribed educational or technical qualifications and requisite experience. Rule 28 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Service Commission Regulations, 2017, stipulates that the acceptability of a diploma or degree shall be determined by the Commission on the basis of academic relevance, as certified by the Higher Education Commission, the Pakistan Medical & Dental Council, the Pakistan Engineering Council, or the Pakistan Veterinary Medical Council, as the case may be . (b) The expression employee, as defined in clause (b) ibid, means an ad hoc or contract employee appointed by the Government on an ad hoc or contract basis, or on a second-shift/night-shift basis, but excludes employees appointed against project posts, on a work-charge basis, or those paid out of contingencies. Appointments of any nature — whether initial, ad hoc, permanent, or temporary — if made in violation of the principles of transparency and competitive selection, including appointments made without inviting applications from the public, are contrary to the Constitution and, therefore, void. The selection of a qualified, eligible, and most deserving person is a sacred trust, to be discharged honestly, fairly, and transparently, in a manner that serves the best interests of the public.

Summary: Legal set-off, under Order VIII Rule 6 CPC, applies to ascertained sums within the court's jurisdiction, while equitable set-off, rooted in fairness and equity, covers closely connected cross-demands even if unascertained. Order XX Rule 19 serves as a statutory acknowledgment of the remedy of equitable set-off. However, both require that the claim falls within the court's pecuniary jurisdiction. Any counter-claim, other than those permitted under Order VIII Rule 6 or qualifying as an equitable set-off, is not a recognized form of defence under the CPC. -- As a general rule, the pecuniary jurisdiction of a civil court is determined based upon the value of the suit as stated in the plaint. However, a plea of set-off under Order VIII, Rule 6 CPC constitutes an exception to this rule. Since a claim of set-off constitutes an exception to the general rule, the court, while entertaining such a plea, must ensure that it does not exceed its pecuniary limits.--- A plea of set-off, whether legal or equitable cannot exceed the pecuniary limits of the court's jurisdiction, but in the same vein, neither could a plaint be returned for the reason that a written statement filed thereto carry excessive plea of set-off. ---When a plea of set-off exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court, the proper course is to direct the defendant to file a separate suit instead of returning the plaint.

Summary: i) The party to a suit cannot be allowed to lead evidence beyond its pleading and if led the same could not be considered in its favor, as it is settled that a party has to alleged a facts) and then it has to be allowed to prove the same. ii) The production of a document, proof of execution of documents and proof of contents of a document are distinct phenomenon and a beneficiary of a document could only be succeeded to get a favorable decree, if he succeeded to prove all of them. iii) There is no cavil that u/s 118 of The Negotiable instrument Act, 1881, a negotiable instrument has a statutory presumptions to the effect that the same has been made/ drawn for a valid consideration, however, such presumptions is rebuttable and if the defendants succeed to establish that no negotiable instrument was drawn or that there exist no considerations for issuance of the same then, the said statutory presumptions would automatically lose its significance and as such in such eventuality, the plaintiff would not be entitled for the decree on the basis of a negotiable instrument. iv) Where in a suit filed on the basis of a negotiable instrument and a direct trustworthy and confidence inspiring evidence is brought on record especially, from the statements of the marginal witnesses of the said negotiable instrument then in such state of affairs too, the plaintiff would not be entitled to get a favorable decree on the basis of the said negotiable instrument.

Summary: Acquittal ---- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 324 & 334 – Qatl-i-Amd, Attempted Murder, Arsh – Acquittal on Benefit of Doubt: Prosecution case involving charges of murder and attempted murder—Conviction based on testimony of related witnesses with delayed FIR and contradictions—Held, significant delay of nearly 3 hours in FIR registration without plausible explanation, contradictions in ocular and medical evidence, unexplained delay of 15 hours in postmortem, and 126-day delay in recording injured witness’s statement under S.161 Cr.P.C. created serious doubt—Motive unproven, presence of eyewitnesses questionable, and no forensic linkage to firearms established—All doubts resolved in favour of accused—Convictions set aside—Accused acquitted. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 161, 342 & 374 – Delay in Witness Statements and Postmortem – Impact on Credibility: Delayed postmortem and recording of statements—Effect—Held, unexplained delay in conducting autopsy and recording statement of injured witness renders prosecution version doubtful—Statements recorded after 126 days without any medical certification or justification regarding witness’s unavailability—Raises presumption of deliberation and fabrication—Benefit of doubt extended—Conviction reversed. (c) Evidence – Ocular vs. Medical Conflict – Forensic Gaps: Discrepancy between eyewitness account and medical evidence—Held, prosecution claimed deceased received two firearm injuries from two accused, but postmortem revealed only one entry and one exit wound—Contradiction undermined credibility of ocular account—Further, blood-stained cots and weapons were not properly sent for forensic analysis or recovered according to standard protocol—PFSA report deemed inconsequential due to same-day deposit of weapons and empties—Forensic evidence not supportive—Conviction set aside. (d) Criminal Trial – Motive – Burden on Prosecution to Prove Specific Allegation: Motive based on earlier murder case allegedly pursued by deceased—Held, deceased not complainant or witness in that case—Prosecution failed to establish any direct nexus between deceased and motive case—Motive was exaggerated and unproven—Once motive is alleged but not proved, prosecution must suffer—Motive discarded. (e) Benefit of Doubt – Standard of Criminal Justice: Principle—Held, single material doubt sufficient for acquittal—Multiple doubts arising from procedural lapses, inconsistent testimonies, and weak motive—Court reiterated that benefit of such doubts must go to the accused—Convictions set aside—Death sentence not confirmed. Cited Cases: • Ghulam Abbas v. The State (2021 SCMR 23) • Muhammad Ilyas v. Muhammad Abid (2017 SCMR 54) • Amin Ali v. The State (2011 SCMR 323) • Nazir Ahmad v. Muhammad Iqbal (2011 SCMR 527) • Muhammad Asif v. The State (2017 SCMR 486) • Abdul Jabbar v. The State (2019 SCMR 129) • Sarfraz v. The State (2023 SCMR 670) • Tariq Parvez v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345) • Muhammad Akram v. The State (2009 SCMR 230) • Muhammad Imran v. The State (2020 SCMR 857) Disposition: Criminal Appeals No. 27076-J and 27077-J of 2022 allowed. Convictions and sentences set aside. Appellants acquitted. Murder Reference No. 58 of 2022 answered in the negative. Death sentence of Alam Sher not confirmed.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan––Art. 9A [inserted via 21st Constitutional Amendment]––Right to clean and healthy sustainable environment––Scope and enforceability––Untreated sewerage discharge by Municipal Committee Khanpur into Khanpur Minor Canal used for drinking and irrigation purposes––Violation of fundamental rights––Maintainability of constitutional petition. Petitioner, a resident of Khanpur, invoked constitutional jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution on the ground that untreated sewerage effluent was being discharged by Municipal Committee Khanpur into Khanpur Minor Canal, a vital water source used for drinking and agricultural irrigation, particularly in areas where groundwater was saline and unfit for consumption––Record revealed the disposal was made without obtaining No Objection Certificate (NOC) from Punjab Irrigation or Environmental Departments––Municipal Committee admitted existence of a secondary emergency outlet near the canal but failed to rebut ongoing contamination or produce evidence of regulatory compliance––High Court held that Art.9A guarantees every person the right to a clean and healthy sustainable environment and such contamination posed a grave threat to public health, agricultural sustainability, and ecological balance––Petition was held maintainable under Art.199 for enforcement of Art.9A as a fundamental right––Petition allowed with directions. Cited Cases: • Raja Zahoor Ahmed v. Capital Development Authority 2022 SCMR 1411 • D.G. Khan Cement Co. Ltd. v. Government of Punjab 2021 SCMR 834 • Shahab Usto v. Government of Sindh 2017 SCMR 732 (b) Environmental law––Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997, S.5––Duties and powers of Director-General EPA––Failure of regulatory oversight––Duty to assess and prevent contamination. Court examined statutory role of the Punjab Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under S.5 of the PEPA, 1997––Director-General of EPA was found to have failed in initiating timely environmental assessments and enforcing regulatory mechanisms against illegal discharge––In exercise of constitutional jurisdiction, High Court directed the Director-General to visit the site forthwith, conduct an environmental assessment of the Khanpur Minor Canal, and take appropriate remedial action––Compliance report was ordered to be submitted within 30 days. (c) Common law––Water pollution––Right to unpolluted water––Judicial precedents––Discharge of sewage as nuisance and actionable wrong––Scope. High Court drew from English common law and precedent to reinforce that discharge of untreated sewage into natural water bodies constitutes an actionable nuisance––Referring to Goldsmith v. Tunbridge Wells Improvement Commissioners, Pride of Derby v. British Cleanese Ltd., and Overseas Tankship v. Morts Dock (Wagon Mound No. I), Court reiterated that even public benefit or lack of alternate disposal options do not justify environmental degradation––Principle that each polluter is liable regardless of prior contamination upheld––Discharge into Khanpur Minor Canal held to be unlawful and injurious to public health and property rights. Referenced Authorities: • Goldsmith v. Tunbridge Wells Improvement Commissioners (1865) • Pride of Derby v. British Cleanese Ltd. (1953) • Overseas Tankship Ltd. v. Morts Dock (Wagon Mound No. I) (1961) • Dell v. Chesham Urban District Council (1921) 3 KB 427 • Halsbury’s Laws of England (5th Ed., Environmental Quality and Public Health) (d) Public health––Environmental degradation and waterborne diseases––Duty of the State––Preventive obligations. Court held that untreated sewerage discharge not only violates environmental rights but also endangers public health by exposing communities to waterborne diseases including cholera, hepatitis, and typhoid––Noted that biodiversity collapse and pollution-related illnesses are escalating due to anthropogenic negligence––Directed that preventive measures must be urgently taken by the State to avert an imminent public health crisis in Khanpur and surrounding villages. Disposition: Writ petition allowed. Director-General of EPA Punjab directed to conduct environmental assessment and take remedial steps within 30 days.

Summary: The pivotal question before us is whether the powers conferred under Section 11 of the "Act" extends to the imposition of penalty and default surcharge for violations exclusively covered under Sections 2(43A), 3(9A), and 40C of the "Act", read with Serial No. 24 & 25 of Section 33 thereof. This structural distinction is well entrenched in the jurisprudence that machinery provisions must operate within the express confines of the substantive charging provisions they support. Any attempt to expand a machinery provision, such as Section 11 of the "Act", to cover penalties for purely regulatory defaults (as described at Serial Nos.24 and 25, or similar entries in the Table) amounts to reading into the statute a jurisdiction, which the Legislature has not conferred. Where a fiscal statute provides a penal consequence for breach of a statutory duty, such penal consequence must be enforced strictly within the four corners of the enabling provision. The Officer must cite and rely upon the specific statutory authority for both the imposition and recovery of penalty. Absent clear words to the contrary, a machinery provision designed to recover tax shortfall cannot be used as a fallback to recover regulatory penalties that do not flow from tax under assessment.