Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 109 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, abetment, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Unexplained delay of about more than four hours in lodging the FIR---Consequential---Accused were charged for making indiscriminate firing upon the complainant party, due to which one person died and one person sustained firearm injury---Occurrence took place on 20.09.2020 at 01:00 p.m. and was alleged to have been seen by complainant and injured, but the matter was reported to the police on the same day at 05.05.p.m. i.e. with the delay of about four hours, despite the fact that police station was 4.5 kilometers from the place of occurrence---Injured and deceased in an injured conditioned were taken to District Headquarter Hospital---Medical Officer categorically stated that he medically examined deceased the then injured on 20.09.2020 at about 01:25 p.m. who was brought by the police---On the same day at 01:40 p.m. injured was medically examined who was brought by the police---Said portions of statements of Medical Officer were not challenged by the State or complainant---Said fact was also fortified from the statement of Investigating Officer who during his cross-examination admitted that when he reached in the hospital, it came into his knowledge that deceased and injured were brought in the hospital in an injured condition who were medically examined, and Police Constable handed over to him the injury statements of injured and deceased---Thus, at the time of medical examination of injured and the then injured (deceased), the incident was in the notice of the police---Both the witnesses of ocular account did not utter even a single word about the said delay---Said witnesses were closely attached inter-se and also to the deceased, in such a situation if these witnesses were present at the place of occurrence and also witnessed the scene of occurrence then such an inordinate and unexplained delay would have never occurred---Such inordinate delay in setting the machinery of law in motion spoke against the veracity of prosecution version---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Mehmood Ahmed and others v. The State and another 1995 SCMR 127; Altaf Hussain v. The State 2019 SCMR 274; Abdul Ghafoor v. The State 2022 SCMR 1527; Pervaiz Khan and another v. The State 2022 SCMR 393; Amir Muhammad Khan v. The State v. The State 2023 SCMR 566; Muhammad Hassan and another v. The State and others 2024 SCMR 1427 and Muhammad Nawaz and another v. The State and others 2024 SCMR 1731 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 109 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, abetment, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Presence of the eye-witnesses at the spot not proved---Accused were charged for making indiscriminate firing upon the complainant party, due to which one person died and one person sustained firearm injury---Ocular account in this case was furnished by complainant and injured---Presence of both the said witnesses on the spot at the time of incident was doubtful in nature because they allegedly saw the incident from a close distance but failed to understand that in the presence of both these witnesses, who were closely attached inter as well as to the deceased how such tragedy with the deceased could happen without any intervention on their part to rescue the deceased---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 109 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, abetment, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Contradictions and improvements in the statements of witnesses---Accused were charged for making indiscriminate firing upon the complainant party, due to which one person died and one person sustained firearm injury---In the FIR, appellant had been ascribed specific role of causing pistol fire shot hitting on the head of deceased when he was turning back---Complainant in his examination-in-chief although had stated the same story but injured in his examination-in-chief stated that the first fire was made by accused with his pistol which landed on the back side of his head while he was turning back and he fell down---From the said version of the injured, it was clear that he did not name the person on whose head the injury was caused by appellant whereas as per story put forth in the FIR and the statement of complainant/ eye-witness, deceased had received the injury on his head---Thus, it remained shrouded in mystery that as per statement of injured as to who had caused injury to deceased on his head---Had injured been present at the time and place of occurrence, there should not be such like contradiction in his statement rather he had to make his statement in line with the prosecution case---As per prosecution's own case, appellant made a straight fire shot which hit injured on his chest---Although complainant in his examination-in-chief had narrated the same story but injured in his examination-in-chief had changed the role of appellant who caused him fire shot injury---From the perusal of the statement of injured, it was clearly established that injured had changed the role of appellant of causing him fire arm injury by stating that the appellant made fire shot which hit him at his back whereas the prosecution case was that appellant made straight fire shot which hit injured on his chest---Besides the contradictions in the statement of the eye-witnesses, they had also made certain dishonest and substantial improvements in their statements---From the contradictions as well as dishonest improvements of complainant and injured, it appeared that if these witnesses of ocular account were present on the spot then they did not have to make dishonest improvements in their statements in such a manner to strengthen the prosecution case---Such flaws, contradictions and improvements in the statements of said witnesses created doubts in the prosecution story---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (d) Criminal trial--- ----Dishonest improvements---Scope---Dishonest improvements made by a witness in his statement to strengthen the prosecution case casts serious doubt about veracity of his statement and makes the same untrustworthy and unreliable. Mst. Saima Noreen and another v. The State 2024 SCMR 1310 rel. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 109 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, abetment, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Delay in recording statement of injured witness---Consequential---Accused were charged for making indiscriminate firing upon the complainant party, due to which one person died and one person sustained firearm injury---Medical Officer, who medically examined injured opined that he was fully conscious, oriented in time, place and person---Medical Officer further stated that according to injured, he was shot by some person---Delay of three days in recording the statement of injured under S.161, Cr.P.C., had not been explained by the prosecution when he was fully conscious and oriented at the time of medical examination---Evidentiary value of such statement recorded under S.161, Cr.P.C., after a delay of three days was considered unreliable unless such delay was reasonably explained---Because the delay could allow any witness to fabricate or tailor his statement based on subsequent events or other witness testimony, which was the result of due consultation and deliberation, creating serious doubts about the veracity of the prosecution version---Moreover, the statement under S.161, Cr.P.C., recorded by the local police after a considerable delay, without any tangible and plausible explanation, must vanish its sanctity and would not be held to be confidence inspiring evidence---Furthermore, credibility of such witness is looked with serious suspicion if his statement under S.161, Cr.P.C., is recorded with delay without offering any plausible explanation---Such statement also reduces its value to nil until and unless it is explained rendering justifiable reasoning---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Abdul Khaliq v. The State 1996 SCMR 1553 and Noor Muhammad v. The State 2020 SCMR 1049 rel. (f) Criminal trial--- ----Injured witness, evidence of---Scope---Mere injuries on the person of the injured witness do not mean that he is stating the whole truth and his evidence is to be relied upon or discarded while keeping in view the other facts and circumstances of particular case. Said Ahmad v. Zammured Hussain and 4 others 1981 SCMR 795; Muhammad Pervez v. The State and others 2007 SCMR 670; Naveed Sadiq v. The State 2023 YLR 2562 and Muhammad Atif Naveed and another v. The State 2024 PCr.LJ 1421 rel. (g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 109 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, abetment, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Ocular account and medical evidence---Conflictions---Accused were charged for making indiscriminate firing upon the complainant party, due to which one person died and one person sustained firearm injury---As per contents of FIR and statement of complainant, appellant was attributed role of causing pistol fire shot on the chest of injured but Medical Officer at 01:40 p.m. on 20.09.2020 medically examined injured and observed two injuries on the body of injured---Medical Officer further stated that said injured made his statement before him that he was shot by some person at 01:00 p.m. on 20.09.2020---On medical examination, injured was fully conscious and oriented in time, place and person---Medical Officer in his cross-examination stated that there were two injuries on the body of injured, i.e. one entry wound and second exit wound---Injury No.2 was the entry wound whereas injury No. l was exit wound---Injury No.1 was not an independent wound rather it was result/exit wound of injury No.2---Blackening was observed on injury No.2 of injured---Blackening occurs when the shot is fired from close range within 3 feet---Pictorial diagram also depicted that injury No.2 was on the left back side of the deceased which as per statement of the Medical Officer was entry wound---According to site plan, injured was present at Point-1 whereas appellant made fire shot at him while standing at Point-4---Distance between Point-1 and Point-4 was about 08 feet whereas as per postmortem report, burning was present, therefore, ocular account furnished by the two eye-witnesses was not inconsonance with the medical evidence which clearly contradicted the statements of the eye-witnesses---Contradiction in the ocular account of the occurrence as narrated by the prosecution witnesses and the medical evidence furnished by the Medical Officer clearly established that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charge against the appellants---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Riasat Ali and another v. The State and another 2024 SCMR 1224; Muhammad Idrees v. The State 2021 SCMR 612 and Muhammad Hanif v. The State 2023 SCMR 2016 rel. (h) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 109 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, abetment, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Recovery of weapon of offence and crime empties---Inconsequential---Accused were charged for making indiscriminate firing upon the complainant party, due to which one person died and one person sustained firearm injury---Record showed that Investigating Officer collected 24 empties from the place of occurrence---Investigating Officer arrested appellant on 02.10.2020 who on 11.10.2020 got recovered pistol 30 bore on the pointing out of the said appellant which he took into possession vide recovery memo---On 18.12.2020, Investigating Officer arrested other appellant and on his pointing out got recovered pistol on 14.12.2020---Pistols recovered from both the appellants were sent to the Forensic Science Agency for analysis---Cartridge cases collected from the place of occurrence and sent by the Investigating Officer and it was reported that it was not possible to identify or eliminate those cartridges cases as having been fired from the pistol recovered on the pointing out of one appellant, thus, the recovery of pistol .30 on the pointing out of said appellant remained inconsequential---So far as the recovery of pistol recovered from other appellant, it was opined in the report of Forensic Science Agency that the empties collected from the place of occurrence were identified as having been fired from his pistol and the report in that regard was positive---As per record two persons were the attesting witnesses of the recovery memos of empties collected by the Investigating Officer of the case from the place of occurrence but they were given up by the prosecution, hence, they failed to appear before the Trial Court to prove the recovery of the empties---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (i) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 109 & 34---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, abetment, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Withholding material witnesses---Effect---Accused were charged for making indiscriminate firing upon the complainant party, due to which one person died and one person sustained firearm injury---According to the contents of FIR the most natural witnesses of the occurrence in whose presence the occurrence took place were not produced by the prosecution during the trial---Said witnesses were also the witnesses of recovery of empties from the spot and taken into possession by the Investigating Officer of the case through recovery memos, whereas those witnesses were also the witnesses of recovery of blood stained earth taken into possession by the Investigating Officer of the case through recovery memo from the place where murder of deceased was committed and also the recovery witnesses of blood stained earth taken into possession by the Investigating Officer of the case through recovery memo from the place where injured witness sustained injuries at the hands of appellant---Therefore, the prosecution withheld best available evidence and in view of Art.129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, adverse inference that had said witnesses been produced before the Trial Court they would not have supported the prosecution case, could safely be drawn against the prosecution---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Lal Khan v. The State 2006 SCMR 1846 and Muhammad Rafique and others v. The State and others 2010 SCMR 385 rel. (j) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 109 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, abetment, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Motive not proved---Accused were charged for making indiscriminate firing upon the complainant party, due to which one person died and one person sustained firearm injury---Complainant had disclosed the motive stating that prior to the happening of the occurrence, the appellants and his co-accused beat the prosecution witness as his cow grazed in the field of the accused persons---From the perusal of whole prosecution evidence, it was nowhere available on record that the deceased had any enmity with the appellants rather the witness should have been the prime target of the assailants whereas the deceased had no concern or dispute with the assailants which could have led to his murder at the hands of the appellants and their co-accused---Furthermore, according to the complainant and injured witness, they were in clear view at a meager distance from the assailants and unarmed, whereas the appellants and their co-accused were allegedly armed with firearm weapons---There was no dearth of ammunition nor intent and opportunity on part of the appellants or their co-accused for doing away with the injured witness, their main adversary, but it who the deceased who was killed---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (k) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---Single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind about guilt of accused would be sufficient to make him entitled to benefit of doubt. Khial Muhammad v. The State 2024 SCMR 1490 and Muhammad Ijaz alias Billa and another v. The State and others 2024 SCMR 1507 rel. Muhammad Bashir Paracha, Azhar Hameed and Muhammad Rab Nawaz Sajid for Appellants with Saqib Ali (Appellant) on bail (in Criminal Appeal No. 702 of 2024). Syed Azmat Ali Shah Bukhari for the Complainant/Respondent No. 2 (in Criminal Appeal No. 702 of 2024 and Petitioner in Criminal Revision No. 315 of 2024). Khawaja Sohail Iqbal, DPP for the State. Date of hearing: 2nd July, 2025.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 17.10.2018 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Civil Revision No. 2220 of 2016). (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 12 & 22---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 55---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell---Failure to establish payment of earnest money by the vendee---Non-performance of contractual obligation by the vendee within stipulated time was fatal for his case of specific performance---Time being essence of contract---Principle and applicability---Explicit mention of consequences for non-performance of contractual terms in the agreement would infer that time would be of essence of the contract---Facts in brevity were that the appellant (vendee), a tenant of the suit shop, filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 17.02.2009, under which the respondents (vendors) had agreed to sell the shop for Rs. 800,000, with full payment to be made by 31.10.2010, failing which possession was to revert to the vendors---Appellant (vendee) alleged having paid Rs.200,000 in installments, but the vendors stated to have avoided execution of the sale deed---The Trial Court decreed the suit subject to deposit of Rs. 800,000, and the appellate court upheld the decree, however, in revision, the High Court set aside both judgments by dismissing the suit---Primary question for determination before the Supreme Court was as to “Whether a vendee, who failed to perform contractual obligations within the stipulated period where time was expressly made the essence of the contract, was entitled to a decree for specific performance?”---Held: Comparison of the pleadings and the testimony of the appellant/vendee revealed that the amount in question was not paid to the vendors as earnest money---Even the agreement to sell was completely silent about any such payment---During cross-examination, it was admitted by the vendee that no earnest money was paid to the vendors, which clearly demonstrated that he had misstated in the plaint about the factum of payment of earnest money---High Court, therefore, correctly observed that the vendee had not come to the Court with clean hands and thus was not entitled to discretionary relief---In the present case, prior to the execution of the agreement, its terms were admittedly discussed and read over to both parties---The vendee willingly undertook the burden of obtaining clearance within the time stipulated in the agreement---It was clear from the terms of the agreement that time was the essence of the contract, and this was understood by both parties, particularly, in view of the fact that the consequences of non-performance of the contractual terms by the vendee were also explicitly set out in the said agreement---Thus, such default on the part of the vendee was fatal to his suit---Present case related to a contract in commercial transaction and the Court could take judicial notice of the fact that the price of real estate was constantly escalating---The clear intention of the parties, as it appeared from the stipulation of the agreement, was to treat time as essence of the contract---Exercise of jurisdiction, under these circumstances in favour of the vendee when character of the property or other circumstances would render such exercise likely to result in injustice, would be against the settled norms of justice---Both the Courts below failed to consider the above legal and factual aspects of the case, thus arrived at a wrong conclusion, decreeing the suit of the appellant, but the High Court rightly took notice of the same while setting aside the judgments and decrees of the Courts below---Appeal lacking any merit was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)--- ----S.55---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.12---Time being essence of the contract---Principle---Applicability---Determinative factor---Intention of the contracting parties---Where there is a clear intention of the parties, as appears from the stipulation of the agreement, to treat time as essence of the contract then the Court cannot attribute a different intention to the parties and cannot specifically enforce the contract at the instance of the vendee, who has failed to perform his part of the obligation within the stipulated time---In cases relating to specific performance, equity, which governs the rights of the parties, does not rigidly adhere to the express terms of the contract---Instead, the Court examines the substance of the agreement to ascertain whether the parties intended that performance be completed within a specific time period and whether the parties in substance intended that the completion should take place within a reasonable time. Ghulam Hussain Awan, Advocate Supreme Court and Mian Ghulam Hussain, Advocate-on-Record / Absent for Appellant. Ch. Naseer Ahmed Bhutta, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (via VL from Lahore). Date of hearing: 2nd July, 2025. SHAKEEL AHMAD, J.--- This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 17.10.2018 passed in Civil Revision No. 2220 of 2016 by the Lahore High Court, Lahore (“the High Court”), whereby and whereunder the concurrent judgments and decrees of the Courts below were set aside. While dismissing the suit of the appellant, he was held entitled to get back the amount of Rs. 700,000/- deposited by him in pursuance of the interim order of the trial Court dated 07.07.2011.

Summary: Contract Act (IX of 1872)--- ----S. 126---Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), Ss. 6 & 118---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, Rr. 1 & 2---Suit for recovery of amount---Dishonored cheque---Terms contract of “guarantee”, “surety”, “principal debtor” and “creditor”---Guarantee cheque---Proof---Suit filed by respondent / plaintiff was decreed against appellant / defendant as the cheque given by him was dishonored on presentation---Contention of appellant / defendant was that the cheque issued by him was of guarantee---Validity---There are three distinct parties in a contract of guarantee: the “surety,” the “principal debtor,” and the “creditor”---Appellant/defendant did not qualify either as a surety or a third-party guarantor but he squarely fell within the definition of the “principal debtor”---Subject cheque, was a negotiable instrument under S. 6 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and was governed by the statutory presumptions enshrined in S. 118 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881---No material illegality, irregularity, misreading, or non-reading of evidence was pointed out by appellant/defendant---Trial Court rightly appreciated the evidence and correctly applied settled legal principles in decreeing the suit under O.XXXVII, C.P.C.---High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decreed passed against appellant / defendant---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Azizur Rehman v. Liaquat Ali 2007 SCMR 1820; Haji Karim and another v. Zikar Abdullah 1973 SCMR 100; Rab Nawaz Khan v. Javed Khan Swati 2021 SCMR 1890; Muhammad Arshad and another v. Citibank N.A. Lahore 2006 SCMR 1347; Col. (Retd.) Ashfaq Ahmed and others v. Sh. Muhammad Wasim 1999 SCMR 2832; Najaf Iqbal v. Shahzad Rafique 2020 SCMR 1621; Messrs State Engineering Corporation Ltd. v. National Development Finance Corporation and others 2006 SCMR 619; Khizar Hayat v. Malik Akhtar Mehmood 2024 SCMR 1208; Bazm-e-Salat and others v. Messrs United Bank Ltd PLD 1989 Kar. 150; ICDS Ltd. v. Beena Shabbeer and another (2002) 6 SC Cases 426; Muhammad Akhtar v. Zahar Khan 2006 CLD 737 and Muhammad Nawaz v. Qazi Muhammad Rashid 2018 CLD 104 ref. Ch. Umar Hayat Kamran Rajoka for Appellant. Naseer Ahmad Jaura for Respondent. Date of hearing: 19th June, 2025. (e) as to order of endorsement: that the endorsements appearing upon a negotiable instrument were made in the order in which they appear thereon;

Summary: Effect of Repeal of Rule 17-A of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment & Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974.

Summary: When a Cheque is Admitted, the Law Presumes the Truth Liability Cannot Be Escaped by Mere Words. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (S. 118); Contract Act, 1872 (S. 126); CPC, 1908 (Order XXXVII) Where execution of a cheque is admitted, Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 raises a statutory presumption that it was issued for consideration. The burden to rebut this presumption lies on the drawer, who must do so through independent, cogent, and reliable evidence. A cheque issued by the drawer himself cannot be termed a ?guarantee? in the absence of a third-party principal debtor, and such defence is legally untenable under Section 126 of the Contract Act, 1872. Similarly, the defence that the cheque was issued blank carries no weight in law, as execution implies authority to complete the instrument, unless fraud or coercion is proved. A cheque voluntarily issued during arbitration or panchayat, in acknowledgment of liability, is valid and enforceable. In this case, the appellant admitted issuance of the cheque, receipt of foreign remittances, and failed to produce any FIR, complaint, or substantive document to rebut the statutory presumption. Mere oral assertions and unauthenticated documents were insufficient. The trial court rightly decreed the suit under Order XXXVII CPC, and the appellate court found no legal or factual infirmity in its reasoning. Appeal was thus dismissed. Ratio Decidendi: An admitted cheque invokes statutory presumption of consideration under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The drawer cannot escape liability by claiming the cheque was a mere guarantee, especially where no third-party debt exists. Rebuttal requires credible proof, not unsubstantiated assertions.

Summary: During the pendency of the suit, when an interlocutory order authenticated by higher forums attains finality, such order cannot be challenged again alongwith the final order/judgment as same is exception to the general principle that interim order merges into final order.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Held that the integrity and sanctity of judicial proceedings form the bedrock of the justice system. The authenticity of judicial orders is not a matter of procedural formality?it is the very essence of rule of law. No person?natural or juristic?can be permitted to forge, manipulate, or misuse judicial orders for personal or institutional gain. The Courts are not mere dispute-resolution forums; they are vested with the solemn duty to uphold the public confidence in the administration of justice. Any assault on the credibility of their proceedings strikes at the very soul of justice and cannot be tolerated under any circumstance. The judicial process cannot and shall not be permitted to be reduced to an arena of strategic deceit. Judicial orders carry the imprimatur of the rule of law, and any tampering therewith strikes at the very heart of the institutional integrity. When such tampering is committed and benefit thereof is drawn in a commercial context, the act transcends the bounds of private fraud and becomes a direct assault on the public interest in relation to the function of the judiciary. Therefore, this Court is under a duty not merely to resolve disputes, but to protect the authenticity of its own record and the confidence that litigants and society repose in it. Further held that the newly engaged counsel for the petitioner company has conducted himself with candour by expressly conceding that he finds no ethical or legal ground to justify the fraudulent conduct of his client?petitioner company, and has accordingly tendered an apology on its behalf. While this professional stance is appreciated, it must be underscored that such an apology, however gracefully made, cannot become basis to persuade the Court to overlook deliberate and intentional fraud committed on behalf of the petitioner company. The process of administration of justice cannot be compromised through post-facto contrition when the offence strikes at the integrity of the judicial process itself. In present case, the gravity of the fraud committed on behalf of the petitioner company transcends private regret and demands institutional response.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Effect of Repeal of Rule 17-A of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment & Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974. 334Civil Revision 59135/22 Muhammad Siddique Vs Talib Hussain Mr. Justice Masud Abid Naqvi 01- 07- 2025 2025 LHC 6611