Summary: The proviso to rule 1 of Order VIII C.P.C. provides discretion to Court to bind defendants to file written statement within thirty days or permit them to file the same beyond the said time period but the same does not curtail, in any manner, the power of the Court to allow a party to file written statement beyond thirty days.

Summary: Background: The petitioner was absorbed into service on 20.09.1995 in Pay Scale 2. Sixteen years later, on 15.03.2011, the petitioner served a grievance notice, claiming that his initial appointment should have been in Pay Scale 5. The grievance petition was dismissed by the Labour Court V Karachi on the grounds that there was no entitlement to engagement in a higher pay scale and the grievance notice/petition was barred by limitation. The Labour Appellate Tribunal Sindh reversed this decision, granting the petitioner the pay scale sought, arguing that similar treatment must have been given to others and the petitioner should not be non-suited due to delay. This led to the current petition. ----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioner is entitled to a higher pay scale based on the claim raised sixteen years post-appointment. 2- Whether the grievance petition is barred by limitation. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the petitioner's claim for a higher pay scale was not substantiated by evidence and was barred by limitation. The court reasoned that the petitioner was aware of his pay scale at the time of his appointment in 1995 and admitted to receiving the salary as fixed. The petitioner's first grievance regarding the pay scale was raised sixteen years post-appointment, which was well beyond the three-month limitation period prescribed by law. The court found that the Labour Appellate Tribunal had disregarded uncontroverted evidence and based its decision on unsubstantiated surmises and conjectures. The tribunal's assumption that documents not presented must be adverse to the respondent was deemed an incorrect approach. The court emphasized that limitation laws are not mere technicalities and must be strictly adhered to. The disregard of limitation laws would render the entire law of limitation meaningless. Consequently, the court allowed the petition and set aside the impugned judgment of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, declaring it predicated upon erroneous assumptions of facts and misapplication of the law. ----Citations/Precedents: Labour Court V Karachi order dated 23.07.2015 Mehmood Khan Mahar vs. Qamar Hussain Puri & Others, 2019 MLD 249 LDA vs. Sharifan Bibi, PLD 2010 SC 705 Awan Apparels (Private) Limited & Others vs. United Bank Limited & Others, 2004 CLD 732 Lt. Col. Nasir Malik vs. ADJ Lahore & Others, 2016 SCMR 1821 Section 34 of the Sindh Industrial Relations Act 2013

Summary: Background: The appellant, Deputy Commissioner/Collector Quetta, challenged the decision of the Referee Court, which enhanced the compensation for the acquisition of land from Rs. 690 per sq.ft to Rs. 18,000 per sq.ft. The land in question, located in Quetta, was acquired for establishing a police station. The respondent landowner claimed compensation of Rs. 20,000 per sq.ft and argued that he was not served notice or present at the time of the announcement of the award by the Collector. -----Issues: 1- Whether the reference for enhancement of compensation was filed within the prescribed limitation period under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. -----2- Whether the compensation awarded by the Referee Court was justified based on the market value and evidence presented. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court dismissed the appeal, holding that: The reference was filed within the six-month limitation period as the respondent was not present at the time of the announcement of the award and had not been served notice under Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Therefore, the reference was valid. The Referee Court rightly considered both oral and documentary evidence to assess the market value of the land. The enhanced compensation of Rs. 18,000 per sq.ft was based on the potentiality of the land and prevailing market rates, as corroborated by property dealers and unrefuted documentary evidence. The court found no misreading of evidence or legal error in the Referee Court's judgment. The appeal was dismissed. -----Citations/Precedents: Land Acquisition Collector and others v. Mst. Iqbal Begum (PLD 1990 Lahore 472) Province of Punjab through Land Acquisition Collector and another v. Begum Aziza (2001 SCMR 682) Land Acquisition Collector, Lahore and another v. Mst. Surraya Mehmood Jan (2004 SCMR 444) Sarhad Development Authority NWFP v. Nawab Ali Khan and others (2007 SCMR 619)

Summary: [Order XI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980. (Constitution of Benches] The petitioner argued that the original suit filed by Respondent No.1 in the High Court was time-barred and the court failed to consider the bona fide ownership claim of the Dollar Bearer Certificate. The SBP also sought clarification on the joint liability of the petitioner and Respondent No.2 to pay the amount mentioned in the judgment. The respondent argued that the original judgment was modified based on a consensual statement and that the evidence presented supported the cause of Respondent No.1. They contended that the High Court judgment was correctly disposed of with some modifications. The review petition was brought before the Supreme Court, and it was observed that no leave to appeal was granted, although the judgment was modified based on the statement of Respondent No.1's counsel. The Court noted that according to the Supreme Court Rules, every cause or appeal should be heard and disposed of by a bench consisting of not less than three judges. Therefore, the Court concluded that the review petition should have been referred to a three-member bench for further consideration. The Court reviewed the order dated 04.09.2020 and allowed the review petition. CPLA No.146-K/2019 was restored to its original number and directed to be heard before a three-member bench for leave to appeal.

Summary: Background: The petitioner, Rehmdil, filed a constitutional petition challenging the judgments and decrees issued by the lower courts regarding a suit filed by the respondents (his wife and children) for recovery of dower and maintenance allowance. The trial court decreed the suit ex parte on 02.02.2021, awarding the respondents 250 misqal of gold as dower and maintenance payments. The petitioner appealed this judgment, but his appeal was dismissed as time-barred under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964. The petitioner then approached the High Court, seeking to overturn the decrees on the grounds that he was not given adequate opportunity to present his case and that the judgment was based on biased witness testimony. ----- Issues: ----1) Whether the ex parte judgment and decree passed by the trial court were justified. ----2) Whether the petitioner was denied adequate opportunity to defend his case before the trial court. ----3) Whether the decrees regarding the payment of dower and maintenance allowance should be upheld. ------ Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The High Court upheld the trial court’s decision, finding that the petitioner had engaged counsel and appeared in court but later deliberately absented himself, leading to the ex parte decree. The petitioner's appeal was time-barred, and no reasonable justification was given to condone the delay. The petitioner did not contest the dower amount of 250 misqal of gold, and there was no evidence to suggest that the dower was deferred. Consequently, the decree regarding dower and maintenance was affirmed. The court emphasized that Family Courts are not bound by the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), allowing for a more expedient process. The trial court had acted within its authority by proceeding ex parte when the petitioner failed to appear. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. ----- Citations/Precedents: West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964: Section 14: Governs appeals in family matters. Section 17: Excludes the application of the CPC and Evidence Act to expedite family litigation. Farzana Rasool v. Dr. Muhammad Bashir: Established that Family Courts are designed to provide swift resolution of matrimonial disputes and are not bound by the technicalities of CPC and Evidence Act. Muhammad Tabish Naeem Khan v. Additional District Judge, Lahore: Affirmed that Family Courts have the inherent power to proceed ex parte if the defendant fails to file a written statement after being duly served.

Summary: (a) Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908) ---- O. XX Rr. 1(2), 3 & 7; O. XLI Rr. 30 & 31 Judgment must always state the exact date on which it is written, signed and pronounced in open court—failure to do so frustrates the statutory scheme, obscures limitation periods and wastes judicial time; such omission is contrary to the mandatory wording of the cited rules and cannot be condoned. Cited cases: Iftikhar‑ud‑Din Haidar Gardezi v. Central Bank of India Ltd. 1996 SCMR 669; Muhammad Bakhsh v. State 1989 SCMR 1473; Fatima v. Sardara PLD 1956 (W.P.) Lah 474. (b) Supreme Court Rules, 1980 ---- O. X R. 1; O. XII R. 2; O. XIII; O. XXVI R. 2 Limitation for appeals, petitions for leave (60 days) and review (30 days) is computed from the date the judgment is actually pronounced; where that date is missing, courts must examine surrounding circumstances—upload date, certified‑copy applications, blue‑slip verification—to ensure litigants are not prejudiced. Petitions found to have been filed within time despite the office’s contrary note. (c) Administration of justice ---- Delay in writing judgments—Judicial misconduct A reserved judgment should ordinarily be delivered within 90 days and, in any event, no later than 120 days; excessive delay or back‑dating amounts to breach of Article X of the Judges’ Code of Conduct and may warrant rehearing. Cited cases: MFMY Industries Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2015 SCMR 1550; Muhammad Ovais v. Federation 2007 SCMR 1587; Bashir Ahmad Khan v. Mumtaz Begum 1979 CLC 114; Walayat Hussain v. Muhammad Hanif 1989 MLD 1012; M.K. Zaman v. Matiar Rahman 1969 PCrLJ 361. (d) Practice & procedure ---- Court directions Registrars of all High Courts directed to instruct every judge—of both superior and subordinate courts—to inscribe on each order and judgment the precise date of writing, signing and pronouncement, and to issue notice if pronouncement is deferred, so that future limitation disputes and waste of court time are avoided. (e) Civil miscellaneous applications—Condonation of delay In view of the undated High Court judgments and the evidence that they were first uploaded on 24‑3‑2022 and signed on 31‑3‑2022, the 60‑day period under O. XIII, Supreme Court Rules began on 31‑3‑2022; civil petitions filed well within time—applications allowed; Civil Petitions Nos. 1854‑L, 1855‑L, 1899‑L and 1900‑L of 2022 to be listed for regular hearing.

Summary: The duty of the Collector is to adjudge when the reference is made/submitted before him for its onward transmission to the Court, however, when it is filed u/s 18 of the Act of 1894 he has to see as to whether it is within time or not and when the matter was referred by the Collector to Referee Court, it shall be deemed that the reference was filed within time, as such, to the extent of section 18 of the Act of 1894, it is his bounden duty to determine the factor of limitation and if it is within time, then to send it to the Referee Court but when reference is u/s 30 of the Act of 1894, the Collector has got no authority either to hold it as time barred or to determine that the question of dispute pertaining totitle/apportionment/distribution of compensation amount or any portion thereof on the sole analogy that this is power of the Court to which the matter is referred. Whenever any person is claiming his entitlement in any portion of the property alleged by him to have been acquired or possessed by the acquiring agency under the shelter of award and the aggrieved person is seeking his entitlement for compensation of the property so acquired irrespective of this fact that it is properly measured and shown in the award or otherwise. The duty of Collector is only to refer it to the Court. In the instant matter, the findings of Collector that the objection petition does not cover section 30 of the Act of 1894 are beyond the scope and powers of the Collector.

Summary: Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 22(1), (2)---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 5 & 29(2)---Civil Procedure Code (V of1908), O. XLIII, R. 3---Appeal---Statutory limitation---Condonation of delay---Advancenotice, non-issuance of---Appellants/borrowers were aggrieved of judgment and decreepassed by Trial Court---Appeal filed by appellants / borrowers was barred by 12 days andthey did not issue advance notice to respondent/Bank---Validity---Appellants/borrowers didnot furnish any sufficient cause for condonation of delay of 12 days in filing of appeal, whichwas barred by time and was liable to be dismissed---Reason mentioned byappellants/borrowers in application for condonation of delay was baseless and false,therefore, delay could not be condoned even in absence of counter affidavit byrespondent/Bank---Special limitation prescribed by S. 22(1) of Financial Institutions(Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, itself was not subject to application of S. 5 ofLimitation Act, 1908, due to bar contained in S. 29(2)(a) & (b) of Limitation Act, 1908---Reliance on S. 5 of Limitation Act, 1908 for condonation of delay in filing appeal wasmisplaced---Provision of general law, (Limitation Act, 1908) did not apply to special law[Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001]---Appellants/borrowers didnot comply with the provision of S. 22(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances)Ordinance, 2001 before filing appeal, which provided for a notice of filing of appeal inaccordance with the provisions under O. XLIII, R. 3, C.P.C. to respondent/Bank, so that itcould appear to contest admission of appeal on the date fixed for hearing---Provisions of S.22(1) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, were mandatory andviolation thereof did not cure that illegality committed at filing of appeal---Appeal wasdismissed in circumstances. ----- Delay in Filing Appeal: The appeal was filed 12 days beyond the statutory limitation period, and the appellants did not issue an advance notice to the respondent bank as required by law.Condonation of Delay: The appellants sought condonation of the delay in filing the appeal, claiming they had no knowledge of the suit's institution. However, it was determined that their reason for the delay was false.Special Limitation: Section 22(1) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, provides a specific limitation period for filing appeals, and it was found that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, was not applicable due to the special nature of the ordinance.Failure to Comply with Notice Requirement: The appellants also failed to comply with the requirement of giving notice to the respondent bank before filing the appeal, as mandated by Section 22(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.Precedents: The judgment referenced previous cases, including Muhammad Khalid Naeem v. Habib Bank Limited (2018 CLD 1027) and Messrs Ashraf Agro v. H.B.L (2008 CLD 449), which emphasized the importance of complying with statutory limitations and notice requirements in such cases.Dismissal of the Appeal: In light of the above factors, the appeal was dismissed as it lacked merit.

Summary: If the statute governing the proceedings does not prescribe the period oflimitation , the proceedings are governed by limitation Act, 1908, butwhere limitation is prescribed in the statute itself, the benefit of S.5,limitation Act, 1908, is not available unless it has been made applicableas per S.29(2) of the limitation Act, 1908.

Summary: Background: The respondent filed a suit seeking the correction of his date of birth in his Matriculation certificate. His birth certificate and CNIC stated his birth date as 25.12.1990, but his Matriculation certificate showed 07.03.1985. The suit was filed after the petitioner (Board of Intermediate & Secondary Education, Multan) refused to correct the date. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court ruled in favor of the respondent. -----Issues: 1- Whether the suit was barred by limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908. ----2- Whether the evidence provided by the respondent, including his birth certificate, was sufficient to justify the correction of his date of birth in the Matriculation certificate. ----3- Whether the respondent's intentional filing of separate suits against NADRA and the Board demonstrates mala fide intent. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court ruled that the suit was barred by limitation. The respondent had more than 13 years to seek correction after the issuance of the Matriculation certificate on 15.07.2005 but filed the suit in 2019. There was no application for condonation of delay, and the right to sue had accrued immediately upon the issuance of the certificate. The suit was clearly time-barred under Article 120 of the Limitation Act. The court found that the evidence provided by the respondent, including his birth certificate, was insufficient to justify the correction of the Matriculation certificate. The birth certificate was issued in 2015, and there was no explanation as to why it was not used when applying for the respondent's first CNIC in 2005. Furthermore, the respondent himself had provided the date of 07.03.1985 in his admission forms for classes 9 and 10, and this same date appeared in his first CNIC. The court concluded that the respondent's filing of separate suits against NADRA and the Board indicated mala fide intent. The respondent first obtained a decree from NADRA to correct his CNIC and then filed another suit for the correction of the Matriculation certificate. This deliberate and planned approach undermined the respondent's credibility. The civil revision was accepted, and the judgments of the lower courts were set aside. The respondent's suit for the correction of his date of birth was dismissed. -----Citations/Precedents: Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education through Chairman v. Javed Iqbal Bajwa (2005 YLR 2114) Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Multan v. Rana Ishfaq Ahmad (2016 MLD 1723) Chairman, Federal Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education v. Kumail Khan (2022 SCMR 912) Muhammad Arshad and another v. Mian Noor Ahmad and others (2008 SCMR 713) Abdul Khaliq and another v. Maulvi Muhammad Noor and others (PLD 2005 Supreme Court 962)