Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 337-A(i), 337-F(i), 337-L(2), 427, 147, 148 & 149---Shajjah-i-khafifah, ghayr-jaifahmudihah, causing hurt, mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees, rioting,rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appeal against acquittal---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Prosecution case was that the accused andunknown co-accused while armed with deadly weapon assaulted on complainant party, dueto which, the companion of complainant sustained injuries---Record transpired that injuredwitness stated in his statement before the Trial Court that his both hands were fractured dueto beating but on the other hand medical certificate produced by Medical Officer was silentto that effect---Complainant stated in his report that he received deep injuries due to beatingbut on the other hand Medical Officer admitted during cross examination that she did notfind any injury on the body of complainant---Victim/injured had not challenged the acquittalof accused persons as the appeal had been filed by the complainant, who had not receivedany injury in the incident as provided under S.417(2-A), Cr.P.C.---Report of the complainantrevealed that victim had received injuries, which showed that the victim was not minor ratherhe was having sense and was alive---Complainant, who was not an injured, could not file theappeal---Injured alone was competent to file appeal being an aggrieved person---Injuredperson being the aggrieved was neither insane nor minor, did not come forward to challengethe judgment impugned---Appeal filed by the complainant was incompetent, in circumstances---Trial Court had considered all the material present on record properly and arrived to theconclusion which was based on proper appreciation of the facts and law, thus did not needinterference by High Court---Appeal against acquittal was dismissed in limine.Mir Gul's case 1999 PCr.LJ 1507 and Jallan v. Muhammad Riaz PLD 2003 SC 644rel.(b) Appeal against acquittal-------Double presumption of innocence---Interference---Acquittal carried with it doublepresumption of innocence---Such order could only be reversed when found blatantlyperverse, resting upon fringes of impossibility and resulting into miscarriage of justice---Order of acquittal could not be set aside merely on the possibility of a contra view.

Summary: (a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-------Ss. 11-F(2), 11-F(5) & 11-F(6)---Membership, support and meetings relating to aproscribed organization, collection of money for proscribed organization---Appreciation ofevidence---Prosecution case was that accused was working for proscribed organization andcollecting chanda/donation for the said organization---Accused pleaded guilty and confessedhis guilt---Record revealed that accused was intimated about the charge and its consequencesand show cause notice was also given to him under S.243, Cr.P.C. but accused remainedconsistent with his statement---Trial Court after fulfilling codal formalities recorded hisconfessional statement---Once a person, involved in a criminal case, wanted to plead guiltyto the charge levelled against him and placed himself at the mercy of the court, he became afriend of the court and the court always took lenient view in respect of his sentence---TrialCourt had rightly taken a lenient view in respect of the sentences recorded against theaccused, which were neither illegal nor contrary to the punishments provided under therelevant law---Even otherwise, by virtue of the provisions of S.412, Cr.P.C. accused, whopleaded guilty to the charge, had no right of appeal against his conviction but he couldmaintain an appeal only to the extent of the legality of the sentence passed against him by theTrial Court---Appeal against conviction was dismissed accordingly.(b) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-------Ss. 11-F(2), 11-F(5), 11-F(6)& 25---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5---Membership,support and meetings relating to a proscribed organization, collection of money forproscribed organization---Appeal---Condonation of delay---Scope---Appeal was time barredby five months and seven days as it was required to be filed within a period of fifteen daysfrom the date of impugned order as per S.25 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Said Act wasa special statute and it overrode the general law---Accused had also filed an applicationunder S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, for condoning the delay---Section 5 of Limitation Act,1908, would be applicable subject to provision 29 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 whichprovided that if time was provided under any statute for filing appeals etc, which wasdifferent from the time mentioned in the Schedule attached to the Limitation Act, 1908, thenS.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 would not be applicable unless it was made applicable by thestatute under which the appeal was filed---No provision in the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997authorized the court to invoke the provisions of S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908---Timeprovided under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 for filing the appeal was different from thetime provided in the Schedule attached to the Limitation Act, 1908, for filing such appeal---Section 5, Limitation Act, 1908 would not be applicable in the present case, hence the delaycould not be condoned by invoking S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908---Appeal against conviction was dismissed accordingly.

Summary: Background:The case involves a challenge to a judgment by the High Court of Sindh, which ordered the trial of a criminal case to be conducted by the Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) instead of an ordinary criminal court. The dispute arose from an incident allegedly stemming from a tribal rivalry.---Issues:Whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to set aside the ATC's order before the framing of charges.Whether the offense reported in the case constituted "terrorism" under the Anti-Terrorism Act.Whether the ATC had the authority to transfer the case to an ordinary criminal court.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The High Court's inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) allowed it to entertain challenges to orders made by a trial court, even before the framing of charges. (Shahnaz Begum v. The Hon'ble Judges of Sindh, Citation: 2015 SCMR 1)The offense reported in the case did not constitute "terrorism" under the Anti-Terrorism Act, as it arose from a private dispute over tribal leadership and did not meet the criteria outlined in section 6 of the Act. (Ghulam Hussain v. The State, Citation: 2018 SCMR 1121)The ATC had the authority to transfer the case to an ordinary criminal court under section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, provided it had taken cognizance of the case and determined that the offenses did not fall within its jurisdiction. (Hidayatullah v. The State, Citation: PLD 2019 SC 123)Outcome: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the ATC's order to transfer the case to an ordinary criminal court.---Citations/Precedents:Shahnaz Begum v. The Hon'ble Judges of Sindh, 2015 SCMR 1Ghulam Hussain v. The State, 2018 SCMR 1121Hidayatullah v. The State, PLD 2019 SC 123

Summary: Background:The appellant, an Inspector in the Income Tax Department, faced departmental proceedings under The Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000, citing persistent public complaints of harassment, corruption, inefficiency, failure to achieve budgetary targets, and failure to furnish Annual Declarations of Assets and Liabilities. The Competent Authority imposed a major penalty of reduction to the lowest of the time-scale on the appellant. The appellant filed a departmental appeal and later appealed to the Service Tribunal under Section 4 of the Service Tribunal Act, 1973, which was dismissed. The issue arose regarding the absence of a specified time period for the imposed major penalty.---Issues:Whether the major penalty of reduction to the lowest time scale can be imposed without any specified time period.Whether the absence of a specified time period for such penalty complies with relevant rules and precedents.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The court referred to Section 3(1)(e)(iii) of the Ordinance, which does not specify a duration for the reduction in post or pay scale. However, it invoked Fundamental Rule 29, which mandates the authority ordering such reduction to state its effective period. The court emphasized that such penalties should be time-bound, citing various precedents. It asserted that the purpose of such penalties is not to reset the officer's career but to punish the lapse committed. Therefore, imposing a major penalty without a specified time period is disproportionate and defeats the penalty's purpose. Considering the appellant's case pending since 2001, the court specified a three-year period for the imposed major penalty. The respondent department was tasked with adjusting the appellant's service record accordingly. Consequently, the appeal was partially allowed.---Citations/Precedents:Muhammad Sadiq v. Superintendent of Police and others (2008 SCMR 1296)Member (A.C.E. & S.T.) Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad and others v. Muhammad Ashraf and 3 others (2008 SCMR 1165)Secretary Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas Division, Islamabad v. Saeed Akhtar and another (PLD 2008 S.C. 392)Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and others v. Muhammad Umer Morio (2005 SCMR 436)Tanvir Ahmed v. Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab, Lahore (2004 SCMR 647)Sabir Iqbal v. Cantonment Board, Peshawar through Executive Officer and others (PLD 2019 SC 189)Secretary to Government of the Punjab Food Department, Lahore and another v. Javed Iqbal and others (2016 SCMR 1120)Muhammad Ali S. Bukhari v. Federation of Pakistan through Establishment Secretary, Islamabad and 2 others (2008 SCMR 214)---Quote:Major penalty like reduction to lower post or lower time scale ought to be time specific.

Summary: Arrest and Seizure by an officer below the rank of Sub Inspector: Section 28 KP CNSA.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.XXIII, R.1(3) & O.VII, R.11---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.42, 12 & 54---Suitfor declaration, possession and permanent injunction---Institution of second suit whenprevious suit was withdrawn unconditionally---Rejection of plaint of subsequent suit---Scope---Held, that when there was total withdrawal of the suit then such suit was dismissedas withdrawn and was finally disposed of, bringing an end to the litigation under O.XXIII,R.1(3) of Civil Procedure Code, 1908---No subsequent suit (for declaration, possession andpermanent injunction) in respect of same cause of action, between the same parties, could befiled---No illegality or irregularity was found in the impugned order passed by the AppellateCourt rejecting the plaint of second suit filed by the plaintiff---Constitutional petition wasdismissed, in circumstance.Hashim Khan v. National Bank of Pakistan PLD 2001 SC 325 ref.(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------S.12(2) & O.XXIII R.1---Withdrawal of previous suit unconditionally through counsel---Scope---Contention of the petitioner/plaintiff was that the previous suit was withdrawn byhis counsel without his permission/authority and such withdrawal of the suit by his counselwas based on fraud and result of misrepresentation---Held, that the petitioner/plaintiff was atliberty to file an application under S.12(2), Civil Procedure Code, 1908 before the CivilCourt to challenge the withdrawal of the said previous suit---No illegality or irregularity wasfound in the impugned order passed by the Appellate Court, rejecting the plaint of secondsuit filed by the plaintiff ---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Summary: Acquittal Denied---(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-----Ss. 302, 447, 109 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, criminal trespass, abetment, common intentionAppreciation of evidence---Appeal against acquittal---Accused was charged that he and coaccused committed murder of brother of the complainant by firing---Record showed that thecomplainant was not an eye-witness of the occurrence---Prosecution produced two eyewitnesses who stated in their statements that the accused and co-accused made firing upondeceased, who succumbed to the injuries---Role attributed to the accused and co-accused wasthe same---Co-accused, who allegedly had caused injuries to the deceased, had beenacquitted and there was no piece of evidence available against the accused, therefore, on thebasis of same set of evidence the accused could also be acquitted of the charge---If twoaccused persons were alleged to have committed murder of the deceased and one of them hadbeen acquitted of the charge on the basis of same evidence, then said evidence could not bebelieved to the extent of other accused for the reason that principle of "falsus in uno falsus inomnibus" would be applicable for deciding the case---Eye-witnesses, when were not believedto the extent of co-accused while applying the principle of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus"the other accused could not be held guilty in the case---No doubt there was abscondance onthe part of accused, yet abscondance by itself was not sufficient proof of guilt of accused, itought to be corroborated by other supporting evidence, which element was missing in thepresent case---Circumstances established that the Trial Court arrived at the conclusion whichwas based on proper appreciation of the facts and law, thus did not need interference by theHigh Court---Appeal against acquittal was dismissed, in circumstances. Mst. Sughra Begumand another v. Qaiser Pervez and others 2015 SCMR 1142; Shahbaz v. The State 2016SCMR 1763; Zafar v. The State and others 2018 SCMR 326; Haroon Shafique v. The Stateand others 2018 SCMR 2118; Altaf Hussain v. The State 2019 SCMR 274; PLD 2019 SC527 and Haji Palio Khan v. Sher Baz 2009 SCMR 803 rel.(b) Appeal against acquittal-------Double presumption of innocence---Interference---Scope---Acquittal carried with itdouble presumption of innocence---Acquittal could be reversed only when found blatantlyperverse, resting upon fringes of impossibility and resulting into miscarriage of justice---Acquittal could not be set aside merely on the possibility of a contra view.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 302---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Appeal against acquittal---Benefit ofdoubt---Accused was charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant byinflicting knife blows---Record transpired that no one came forward to furnish ocularevidence of the incident---No direct evidence available on record against the accused---Witness stated that he had seen a person lying in injured condition in a pool of blood in theguest room of accused---Witness and accused tried to take the injured to hospital onmotorcycle but due to his serious condition, they could not take him to hospital onmotorcycle---Later, they took the injured in the vehicle of a Thanedar/witness to hospital---Statement of said witness was further corroborated by Thanedar/witness---Statements of saidtwo witnesses showed that the accused was the person who informed the witness about theinjuries of the deceased and shifted the deceased to hospital in injured condition---Question,in circumstances, arose that if the crime was committed by the accused and the intention wasto murder the deceased then why did he (accused) called witness to help him to take thedeceased to the hospital---Not believeable that the accused first inflicted life threateningsevere knife blows on the person of the deceased that too in his own guestroom andthereafter called his neighbour to take him/injured to hospital in order to save his life---Accused was not only trying hard to take the deceased to hospital but he managed to take thedeceased in injured condition to hospital with Thanedar and others and above all remained atthe hospital without any fear of being involved in the case---Nothing came on record thatthere existed any kind of enmity between the deceased and the accused---Prosecutionobviously failed to set any motive, which could create reasonable dent in the veracity of theprosecution version---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to establishculpability of accused through reliable, trustworthy and confidence inspiring evidence---Appeal against acquittal was dismissed, in circumstances.(b) Criminal trial-------Circumstantial evidence---Scope---If the case is based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must ensure that the circumstances from which the inference of guilt was soughtto be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established---Circumstances must unerringly pointtowards the guilt of the accused and when taken cumulatively should form a chain socomplete, that it must demonstrate in all probabilities that the crime is committed by theaccused---Where the evidence was of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from whichthe conclusion of guilt was to be drawn was to be in the first instance be fully established andall the facts so established were to be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of theaccused---Circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should besuch as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved---Chain of evidencehad to be there, so far completed as not to leave any reasonable ground for conclusionconsistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such to show that within allhuman probability the act must have been done by the accused.Sheikh Muhammad Amjad v. State PLD 2003 SC 704 rel.(c) Criminal trial-------Benefit of doubt---Principle---One circumstance, which created reasonable dent in theveracity of the prosecution version, could be taken into consideration for giving benefit tothe accused not as a matter of grace rather as a matter of right.Tariq Pervaiz v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 and Riaz Masih v. The State 1995SCMR 1730 rel.(d) Appeal against acquittal-------Double presumption of innocence---Interference---Scope---Acquittal carried with itdouble presumption of innocence---Acquittal order could be reversed only when foundblatantly perverse, resting upon fringes of impossibility and resulting into miscarriage ofjustice---Acquittal order could not be set aside merely on the possibility of a contra view.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending