Summary: Facts:The petitioner, Tri-Star Industries, has been manufacturing toothbrushes and hairbrushes in Pakistan since 1983, using the trade mark "TRISA" registered in 1985.Tri-Star filed a civil suit in 1997 to restrain respondent No.1, TRISA Burstenfabrik AG, from using the "TRISA" trademark, securing an injunctive order in 1999.Respondent No.1 applied for a similar trademark in 1997, which was advertised in 2000. The petitioner sought an extension to file opposition, which was granted by the Registrar of Trademarks, condoning a 108-day delay.Respondent No.1 challenged this decision, leading to the High Court setting aside the Registrar's decision, prompting this appeal.Issue: Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the Registrar of Trademarks' decision to grant an extension to the petitioner for filing opposition against the trademark registration by respondent No.1.---Holding: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the High Court's judgment.---Reasoning:The Supreme Court found no fault with the High Court's judgment, noting that the Registrar of Trademarks must not grant extensions in a mechanical manner without proper justification.The Court emphasized that the law and rules must be followed as prescribed, and any deviations from the prescribed procedures are not permissible.The Court highlighted that the Registrar's power to grant extensions is not automatic and must be exercised with due consideration and within the bounds of the law.The petitioner's failure to provide justifiable reasons for the extension and the Registrar's decision to condone the delay without proper consideration were deemed improper.Conclusion: The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, finding that the Registrar of Trademarks had erred in granting an extension to the petitioner without sufficient justification, and thus the appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.---- (1) Section 15 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 and Rule 30 & 76 of Revised Trade Marks Rules 1963. (2) The word ?satisfied? requires mental persuasion with existence of reasonable ground. (3) The Registrar T.M cannot extend time for filing opposition without following the prescribed procedure. (4) If a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner.

Summary: The appellant, Shezan Services (Private) Limited, filed the appeal against Shezan Bakers & Confectioners (Private) Limited and another.The dispute revolved around the registration of the trade mark "Shezan" by the respondent. The appellant, who held various trade marks including "Shezan," opposed the registration, claiming ownership and prior use of the mark. The appellant argued that the respondent's registration violated the Trade Marks Act, 1940, and the Revised Trade Mark Rules, 1963. The case involved the interpretation of an agreement dated 19 February 1975 between the parties' alleged predecessors. The agreement granted certain rights to the respondent to use the "Shezan" name within the territorial limits of Lahore Division for their businesses. The Registrar of Trade Marks and the High Court relied on this agreement to dismiss the appellant's opposition and allow the respondent's registration. The appellant contended that the agreement did not permit the registration of the trade mark by the respondent and that the goodwill associated with the "Shezan" mark belonged to them. They argued that subsequent registration of a similar mark violated the Trade Marks Act. During the hearing, the Supreme Court considered the relevant provisions of the Trade Marks Act and the Agreement. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine the issues related to the agreement's interpretation, the ownership of the trade mark, and the legality of the respondent's registration. Appeal was allowed, judgement was set aside. Application of the respondent was dismissed.

Summary: The case revolves around the registered trademark "Ranchers," jointly owned by the petitioner, Muhammad Multazom Roza, and respondent No.1, Muhammad Ayub Khan. The trademark was registered under the Trade Mark Ordinance 2001 in Pakistan. The petitioner and respondent No.1 had formed a partnership firm called Zakori International, which operated successful brands like "Mr. COD" and "Ranchers" in the country. The Intellectual Property Tribunal, in its order dated 11.03.2020, returned the petitioner's plaint under Order VII Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). The tribunal concluded that since respondent No.2 had not physically used the trademark in the course of trade, the suit was not maintainable under section 46(1) and (2) of the Trade Mark Ordinance 2001. The tribunal also stated that the dispute between the co-owners of a trademark could not be agitated before the tribunal.The petitioner appealed the tribunal's decision before the Islamabad High Court. The court, through its judgment dated 26.02.2021, dismissed the petitioner's appeal, affirming the tribunal's decision. The court held that the acts complained of by the petitioner fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal, as prescribed by the Intellectual Property Organisation at Pakistan Act, 2012 (IPO Act 2012). The case highlights the significance of intellectual property protection for businesses operating in Pakistan. By registering trademarks and enforcing their rights, businesses can safeguard their brand identities and prevent unauthorised use. It is essential for businesses to understand the legal framework surrounding intellectual property laws and seek legal remedies in case of infringement or passing off. Petition was converted into an appeal, and the same was allowed. The impugned judgment was set-aside and the case was remanded back to the tribunal.

Summary: Civil Procedure Code CPC (Order VII R.11), TRADE MARK By moving an application under order VII rule 11 a litigant does not surrender to the jurisdiction of the Court. The jurisdiction is conferred by law based on facts. A litigant may be right or wrong in asserting that the Court had no jurisdiction or that the suit is barred by law. But, this act of litigant would neither confer and/or bestow nor take away any jurisdiction which in fact is conferred by law. Actions of parties prior to litigation leads to constitution of a cause to initiate proceedings in Court of competent jurisdiction.- If the two applications were not moved simultaneously and would have been filed one after the other, will a litigant still be debarred from filing the other application such as Order VII Rule 10 CPC.A simple answer to this proposition is No as rejection of plaint has its own reasons whereas return of plaint has its own. In an application under order VII rule 11 a litigant has only to show that it does not disclose a cause of action; the relief claimed is undervalued or is not properly valued and that the suit appears to be barred by law. None of these rational is available while entertaining an application under order VII rule 10 CPC, which is for return of plaint on numerous counts including but not limited to pecuniary jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction. Courts when plaint is presented are required to see whether they are bestowed with pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction whereas under Order VII Rule 11 CPC Courts are required to see whether it is barred by law. The Court had to apply law to decide the issue of jurisdiction; it is the law that confers or takes away the jurisdiction of the Court and not based on moving of application under the aforesaid provision of law. Another proposition is that while entertaining and hearing application under order VII rule 11 CPC Court is empowered to return the plaint if the circumstances so warrants as required under the law.-Section 86(3) of the Trademark Ordinance, 2001 provides that owner of the trademark which is entitled to protection under the Paris Convention as a well-known trademark shall be entitled to restrain by injunction the use in Pakistan of a trademark which, or the essential part of which, is identical or deceptively similar to the well-known trademark in relation to identical or similar goods or services, where the use is likely to cause confusion or where such use cause dilution of the distinctive quality of the well-known trademark.- At the very outset there is nothing in the instant case which could attract Section 81 of Trademark Ordinance, 2001. The proprietor of the mark never gave up their right or it has not been demonstrated that for continuous period of five years from the date of alleged registration (in favour of user) in the use of registered mark in Pakistan, the proprietor was aware of it and that the proprietor ceased to be entitled on the basis of that earlier trademark or other rights. The engagement of the appellant with the respondent itself is enough to understand that there was no case of acquiescence at all. In fact the appellant conceded when they assumed the role of a distributor.-The appellate Court normally avoid interfering in the orders of the interlocutory nature involving exercise of discretion as the appellate Court cannot substitute its own discretion unless when the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely or where the Court has ignored certain principles regulating grant or refusal of injunction. The appellate Court is not required to reassess the material to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the trial Court/learned Single Judge on the consideration that another view is possible.

Summary: The case involved a dispute between the petitioner and Respondent No. 2, Ms. Zeeshan Zia Raja, who were previously married and jointly established "American Lycetuff (Pvt) Limited" under the Companies Ordinance, 1984. They are equal shareholders of the company, but their marriage ended in 2017 through Khula. Disputes over movable and immovable properties, including intellectual properties of the company, emerged post-divorce. The petitioner alleged that Respondent No. 2 conducted the company's affairs illegally and fraudulently, contrary to the Memorandum and Articles of Association, thereby excluding the petitioner from the company's management. The petitioner claimed that the Respondent No. 2's actions are detrimental to the business and the petitioner's rights. On the other hand, the Committee of Directors (Respondent No. 3) contends that it was constituted with mutual consent through a Director's Agreement. They assert that the committee has effectively managed the company's affairs, and its decisions are being complied with by both parties. The legal dispute primarily revolved around Section 286 of the Companies Act, which outlines the requirements for seeking intervention from the court regarding the conduct of a company's affairs. The court examined whether the company's affairs are being conducted unlawfully, fraudulently, oppressively, or prejudicially to any member or creditor. The court cited several legal precedents from Pakistan, such as Dr. Muhammad Imran Qureshi vs. Muhammad Asif and others (2020 CLD 1060 (Sindh)) and Malik Aziz ul Haq vs. Crystal Line Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. (2016 CLD 970), to emphasize the criteria for invoking Section 286. These cases underscored the importance of demonstrating unfair prejudice or oppression against minority shareholders and mismanagement by majority shareholders. Additionally, the court compared the statutory provisions in the UK and India related to protection against oppression and mismanagement in companies. Ultimately, the court dismissed the petitioner's claims, noting the absence of substantial evidence to prove unlawful conduct by Respondent No. 2 and the Committee of Directors. The court highlighted the petitioner's failure to satisfy the requirements under Section 286 of the Companies Act and concluded that the petition lacks merit.

Summary: SRO 170(I)/2017 dated 17.03.2017 is for "imported goods only" and was not applied to parallel or grey market imports and de-minimis imports.Powers to take action, detention, seizure, confiscation of goods imported into or taken out of Pakistan were/are always available with the customs officials and it is not that SRO 170(i)/2017 that has empowered them, it only set the process to be initiated by custom officials in relation to goods being imported. What was amended by virtue of SRO 768(I)/2014 is also very material. In Section 3CC and 3E of Customs Act, 1969 formation of the Director General of Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement was redesigned along with its functions, jurisdiction and powers. In the present case Tribunal could only pass order to the extent of trade mark being an infringed one or otherwise and to restrain it from being violated. The Procedural action of custom officials was not questioned independently by respondent. Once the effect of infringement was determined by tribunal the customs officials would definitely have followed it.Color and color scheme also at time claimed to be an inventive one but that is not the case here as no one has claimed livery or color scheme or get up to be a mark of distinction under any intellectual property rights. Both parties are contesting over one mark i.e Tabiat and no one has claimed any exclusive right over livery or dress up of mark. So everything is a disclaimer except "Tabiat". If there are deceptive liveries of common product like rice, with one trade mark "Tabiat" in the absence of a right claimed under the liveries, the buyer would definitely get confuse and jump to some other brand as a natural course.In terms of Section 5(2) of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 goods even if not meant for a local consumption but only to enter the port for onwards journey, would mean the use of mark within jurisdiction. Unless goods in transit are defined otherwise, only aforesaid meaning is deducible. Construction of our Trade Mark Ordinance, 2001 is also based on same scheme and there is no inconsistency as far as framing of relevant provision trade mark is concerned.The word import or export (exclusively or inclusively) not defined under the law in hand differently that is dealing with goods in transit. The case of the appellant is on better footing since the attempt is made to export the goods from the territory where the mark is registeredThe word "use" as explained above is also applicable to goods "for export only" and hence Section 5(2) read with section 40 of Trade Mark ordinance 2001 would be interpreted accordingly as use within territory of Pakistan.

Summary: 1.Effect of disclaimer made under section 21 of the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 from exclusive use of a name. 2.The principle that registration of a trade mark gives rise to a prima facie case, balance of convenience and likelihood of irreparable loss, that principle would be applicable where the trade mark was registered without a disclaimer. 3.In view of section 42(3) of the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, the use of the disclaimed feature of the mark in question would not constitute trade mark infringement. 4.An action for passing-off is essentially to protect property in goods based on the reputation of those goods, as distinct from an action to protect a trade mark which is a property in itself. ---- Issue: Whether the use of "by Junaid Jamshed" by Jazaa Foods constitutes trademark infringement or passing-off against U&I Garments' "JunaidJ.Jamshed" trademark.Holding: The court dismissed U&I Garments' application for a temporary injunction (CMA No. 933/2020) and granted Jazaa Foods' application for a temporary injunction (CMA No. 745/2020), thereby allowing Jazaa Foods to continue using "by Junaid Jamshed" in conjunction with their registered trademark "Jazaa."Reasoning:The court noted that U&I Garments' trademark registration included a disclaimer denying exclusive rights to the use of the name "Junaid Jamshed," indicating that the name could be used by others in a non-deceptive manner.The court found no substantial similarity in the use of "Junaid Jamshed" by Jazaa Foods to that of U&I Garments, thus no trademark infringement occurred.The court also found no evidence of passing-off since U&I Garments had not established a reputation in the food products market that could be confused with Jazaa Foods' products.The balance of convenience and potential for irreparable harm favored Jazaa Foods, as they had been using "by Junaid Jamshed" since 2016 without objection, and Junaid Jamshed himself had authorized the use of his name for Jazaa Foods during his lifetime.Order: The Defendants in Suit No. 94/2020 (U&I Garments and others) are restrained from interfering with Jazaa Foods' use of "by Junaid Jamshed" in conjunction with their registered trademark "Jazaa."

Summary: (a) Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001: ----Ss. 14, 17, 30, 39 & 73(b)---Registered trademark---Interim injunction---Restraint on use of registered mark---Maintainability--- During pendency of opposition proceedings before Registrar, the respondent instituted a civil suit seeking, inter alia, an injunction to restrain the appellant from using its registered trademark “RAMI”, alleging it was deceptively similar to “RANI”---Trial court granted interim injunction restraining appellant from using its registered trademark---Held, registered trademark is a recognized form of personal property under S. 39 of the Ordinance and may only be invalidated or revoked after adjudication by the competent forum---Grant of final relief through an interim order, without determination of merits by either the Registrar or the trial court, amounts to denial of due process---Interim order that restrains use of registered mark during pending adjudication is premature and unsustainable. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908): ----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Interim relief---Scope---Principles--- Interim relief under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 & 2, C.P.C. is preventive in nature, intended to preserve status quo or corpus of litigation---Court cannot grant final relief at interlocutory stage---Held, trial court exceeded jurisdiction by granting relief tantamount to final adjudication—i.e., declaring trademark deceptively similar and restraining use—without resolving underlying dispute pending before Registrar and in main suit---Relied on Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Zaman Khan (1997 SCMR 1508) and Rahat Khan v. Tahir Naveed (2009 CLC 433). (c) Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001: ----S. 73(b)---Revocation of registration---Non-use of trademark--- Appellant argued that respondent’s trademark “RANI”, though registered in 1986, had not been used since 1995 and thus had become voidable under S. 73(b) due to prolonged non-use---Held, question of revocation based on non-use must be determined by the Registrar, and pending opposition proceedings must be allowed to conclude prior to adjudicating such claims in civil court. (d) Trademark infringement---Proceedings before Registrar versus civil suit---Jurisdiction--- Where parties have instituted opposition proceedings under S. 30 before Registrar, civil court must exercise restraint and avoid parallel adjudication or interference unless absolutely necessary---Trial court’s intervention during pendency of Registrar's proceedings, especially through an order restraining trademark use, was found unjustified---Reliance placed on Aldo Group International AG v. Aldo Shoes (2016 CLD 229). ----Disposition: Appeal allowed---Interim order dated 24.09.2018 set aside---Appellant's application (CMA No. 13341 of 2017) restored to stage prior to order---Matter remanded to be re-heard afresh by learned Single Judge after due hearing.

Summary: (a) Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act (XXII of 2012)-------Ss. 17, 18 & 13---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 561-A, 249-A & 417---Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974 (VIII of 1975), Preamble & S. 3---Inherent powersof High Court---Intellectual Property dispute (pirated books)---Power of Magistrate to acquitaccused at any stage---Constitution of the Agency---Powers, functions and jurisdiction ofIntellectual Property Organization---Dispute between private parties---Scope---Accused wasalleged to have been engaged in selling pirated books---FIR was created under FederalInvestigation Agency Act, 1974, Preamble of which showed that the agency was created forinvestigation of certain offences committed in connection with the matters concerningFederal Government and for matters connected thereto---Dispute in the present case wasbetween the private parties in respect of pirated books and their alleged sale in the openmarket---Complainant was a private organization which was doing business in Pakistanprivately and no government work was involved, therefore, FIA had no jurisdiction in respectof infringement of copyright between the private parties as dispute was civil in nature---Tribunal created under Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012 had theexclusive jurisdiction to try the offences with respect to Intellectual Property laws---Cognizance taken by FIA was illegal and beyond their jurisdiction---Appeal filed under S.417, Cr.P.C. was converted into an application under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C. and the FIR wasquashed.Syed Iqbal Raza v. Justice of Peace, Islamabad 2019 PCr.LJ 1059 ref.(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------Ss. 561-A, 249-A & 265-K---Inherent powers of High Court---Power of Magistrate toacquit accused at any stage---Power of Court to acquit accused at any stage---Scope---Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. confers upon High Court inherent powers to make such orders as maybe necessary to give effect to any order under the Criminal Procedure Code or to preventabuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice---Such powers arevery wide and can be exercised by High Court at any time---High Court ordinarily does not quash proceedings under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C. unless Trial Court exercises its powers under S.249-A or 265-K, Cr.P.C. which are incidentally of the same nature and in a way akin to andco-related with quashing of proceedings as envisaged under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C.---High Courtcan, in exceptional cases, exercise its jurisdiction under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C., without waitingfor Trial Court to pass orders under S. 249-A or 265-K, Cr.P.C. if the facts of the case sowarrant to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

Summary: Appeal Allowed---The appellant is restrained from using its registered trademark "Rami" due to the proceedings before the Registrar of Trademarks initiated by the respondent. The respondent sought an interim injunction against the appellant's use of the trademark while the opposition proceedings were pending. The appellant's counsel argues that the trademark "Rani" had not been in use for a substantial period, while the appellant's trademark "Rami" had been in use since 2008. The counsel also points out that the proceedings before the Registrar were ongoing and that the injunction granted by the Single Judge effectively stymied those proceedings. The respondent's counsel, on the other hand, contends that the appellant's trademark is deceptively similar to theirs and that the appellant's trademark should never have been registered. Ultimately, the Judges concluded that the interim injunction granted by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable. They determine that the order goes beyond preserving the status quo and grants final relief at an interim stage, which is not justifiable. Therefore, they set aside the Impugned Order and revive the application for the determination of the injunction, directing that it be re-evaluated by a learned Single Judge in accordance with the law.