Summary: Section 5, Schedule Sr. 9 & Section 14 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Claim of personal property and belongings of wife. Respondent-wife claimed that on the second day of marriage, petitioner-husband took away certain amount of cash from her purse with the promise to return the same which was not done. Trial Court concluded that the cash was presumed to be personal property of the wife and the said Court had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. The said issue was to be determined on the basis of evidence to be recorded by the parties. Plaint could not be rejected or returned in piecemeal when some dispute required to be determined by the court still subsisted and it could be rejected only if all reliefs claimed were barred under the law. Constitutional petition, being premature, was dismissed.

Summary: Ss. 496-A, 109 PPCAllegation of contracting second Nikah in presence of earlier one.case of further inquiry.

Summary: Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)--- ----S. 6(5)(a)---Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S. 5 & Sched.---Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance and dower by wife---Allegation of wife was that Husband had contracted second marriage without her consent--Wife claimed recovery of dower incorporated in Nikahnama---Condition incorporated in Nikahnama---Scope--Payment of dower in case of second marriage by husband---Scope---Petitioner(husband) contended that both courts below had wrongly decreed the suit of respondent (wife) regarding recovery of gold ornaments and a house incorporated in Nikahnama as marriage was not dissolved---Respondent (wife) contended that under condition No.13 of Nikahnama, she was liable for decree of gold ornaments and the house in case of second marriage of husband---Validity---Decree had been passed in favour of the respondent (wife) as deferred dower and, admittedly, the marriage still persisted between the parties---Contention of the petitioner (husband) was that deferred dower would be payable only in the eventuality of dissolution of marriage, death of husband or divorce--Case of respondent (wife) was that petitioner had contracted marriage without her permission during subsistence of earlier marriage which version had not been controverter by petitioner in the statement recorded in the trial court---Section 6(5)(a) of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 stipulated that husband who contracted second marriage during the subsistence of earlier one, without the permission of the Arbitration Council was liable to pay entire amount of dower either prompt or deferred---No illegality or irregularity having been found, constitutional petition was dismissed. [Paras. 7, 8 & 9 of the judgment]

Summary: The case presented revolves around the petitioner's appeal against his conviction under section 6(5)(b) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, for contracting a second marriage without permission. The petitioner argues that under Muslim personal law, he has the right to marry up to four times without limitation and that his first wife had given him consent for the second marriage. The court first delves into the validity of section 6 of the Ordinance, which requires prior permission from the Arbitration Council for a man to contract another marriage during the subsistence of an existing one. They cite previous rulings and Quranic verses to establish that the condition of justice (adal) prescribed in Islam should be satisfied in polygamous situations. They conclude that section 6 of the Ordinance does not violate Islamic injunctions. Marbury v. Madison (1803): This landmark case established the principle of judicial review in the United States, empowering federal courts to review the constitutionality of legislative and executive actions. Brown v. Board of Education (1954): In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that racial segregation in public schools was unconstitutional, overturning the "separate but equal" doctrine established in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). Miranda v. Arizona (1966): This case established the requirement for law enforcement officials to inform suspects of their constitutional rights, including the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney, during custodial interrogations. Roe v. Wade (1973): In this case, the Supreme Court recognized a woman's constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy, legalizing abortion nationwide. Gideon v. Wainwright (1963): The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of legal counsel applies to state criminal defendants, establishing the principle that states must provide counsel for defendants who cannot afford to hire their own. These cases represent significant legal precedents that have shaped the development of law and influenced subsequent court decisions. They illustrate how judicial rulings can have far-reaching implications for society and the legal system as a whole.Regarding the specific case, the petitioner failed to seek permission for his second marriage as required by law. The court dismisses his claim of obtaining consent from his first wife due to lack of evidence.

Summary: The background of the case is that the petitioner and respondent No.2 were married in 1988 with certain financial arrangements, and they had a child named Muhammad Umair Tayyab. However, their relationship deteriorated, and respondent No.2 contracted a second marriage. The petitioner had previously filed various legal actions, including a suit for maintenance allowance and dowry articles, as well as appeals and writ petitions related to these matters. The main point of contention in this document is whether a DNA test is necessary to determine the parentage of Muhammad Umair Tayyab, who is now over 18 years old. The document cited relevant legal provisions, including Section 128 of Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, which deals with the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during a valid marriage. The document also references previous legal cases and their implications for the use of DNA tests in such situations. Ultimately, the document concluded by allowing the writ petition, setting aside the order for a DNA test, and directing the parties to continue their case before the learned Judge Family Court, where it is still pending.

Summary: Background: Petitioner No. 1) and Respondent No. 2 were married on 9th November 2010 and had a child, born on 19th August 2011. After Respondent No. 2 contracted a second marriage, Nosheen Agha filed for maintenance for herself and her daughter. The Family Judge initially set interim maintenance at Rs. 15,000 per month, but Respondent No. 2 failed to pay. Consequently, the Family Court struck off Respondent No. 2’s defense and decreed maintenance at Rs. 1,50,000 per month from August 2011. Respondent No. 2 appealed, resulting in the reduction of maintenance to Rs. 15,000 per month with a 15% annual increase. -----Issues: Whether the appellate court erred in reducing the quantum of maintenance without proper reasoning and consideration of statutory provisions. Whether the trial court’s decision to strike off Respondent No. 2’s defense and decree the suit was justified based on the respondent’s failure to pay interim maintenance. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Islamabad High Court set aside the appellate judgment and restored the trial court's decision to strike off Respondent No. 2's defense. The case was remanded to the trial court to reassess the quantum of maintenance after evaluating the financial status of Respondent No. 2. The court found that both the trial and appellate courts failed to properly assess the financial status of Respondent No. 2 and the needs of the minor child. It emphasized that decreeing a suit requires judicial determination based on evidence and law. The appellate court’s reduction of maintenance was deemed unwarranted as it did not consider these factors. The appellate judgment was set aside, and the case was remanded to the trial court for reassessment. The trial court was directed to resolve the matter within one month, with each party bearing their own costs. -----Citations/Precedents: Messrs A.R. Builders (PVT) Ltd. vs. Faisal Cantonment Board, etc., [PLD 2004 Karachi 492] Mst. Jannat Bibi vs. Sher Muhammad, etc., [1988 SCMR 1696] Noor Muhammad and another vs. Muhammad Ishaq and another, [2000 MLD 251] Khawaja Jameel Ahmad vs. Judge, Family Court, Multan and two others, [2007 YLR 1401] Arif Sana Bajwa vs. Additional District Judge (Mushtaq Ahmed Tarar), Lahore and four others Syed Zubair Shah vs. Mst. Shahnaz Anwar and two others, [2010 MLD 726] Lieutenant Iffat Kazmi, etc. vs. Shuja Akbar Shah, etc., [PLD 2005 SC 395] Javed Ahmad alias Javed Iqbal vs. Addl. District Judge Lahore and others, [2013 YLR 1362] M. Saleem Ahmad vs. Mst. Sabira Begum, etc., [2001 YLR 2329] Iftikhar Nazir Ahmad Khan, etc. vs. Ghulam Kibria and others, [PLD 1968 Lahore 587] Manzoor Hussain vs. Zahoor Ahmad, etc., [1992 SCMR 1191] Bashir and others vs. Ilam Din and others, [PLD 1988 SC 8] Shah Jahan and others vs. Syed Amjad Ali, Hawaldar and others, [2000 SCMR 88] Tariq Mehmood vs. Collector, District Gujranwala and two others, [1991 CLC 793] Faiz Ahmad and twenty-three others vs. Ahmad Khan and seven others, [PLD 2013 Lahore 234] Abdul Waheed through legal heirs and others vs. Mst. Mumtaz Gulshan and two others, [2013 YLR 239] The Province of East Pakistan vs. Muhammad Hussain Mia, [PLD 1965 SC 1] Syed Imtiaz Hussain vs. Muhammad Salim, etc., [2004 MLD 1548] Muhammad Salim vs. Lahore Development Authority, etc., [1993 MLD 2312] Syeda Sameera Akhlaq and another vs. Judge Family Court, Lahore, [2011 MLD 964] Awal Ameer vs. Additional District Judge and others, [2013 MLD 1342] Shah Nawaz and another vs. Nawab Khan, [PLD 1976 SC 767] Shafqat Abbas vs. Zabia Shafqat, [2003 YLR 2364] Hyderabad Development Authority through M.D vs. Abdul Majeed, etc., [PLD 2002 SC 84] Messers UBL vs. Messers Silver Oil Mills Ltd., [2003 SCMR 116]

Summary: (a) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)-------S. 7---West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), Ss.5 & 10, proviso---Dissolutionof marriage---"Talaq" and "Khula"---Non-return of benefits---Effect---Divorce on the basis ofKhula by wife is right at par with right of pronouncement of Talaq by husband, with onedifference that husband can pronounce Talaq himself but wife has to file suit in that behalf---Right of Khula is not contingent upon consent of husband but is dependent upon reachingconclusion on the part of Court that spouses could no longer live within the limits of AlmightyAllah---Wife is bound to return benefits which she received on account of marriage fromhusband but Family Court determines as to what benefits have been received by wife and also todirect their return---Return of benefits is not a condition precedent to dissolution of marriage---Decree of dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula, even though made condition upon returnof benefits, would operate to dissolve the marriage, when it is passed and effect thereof wouldnot be postponed till the benefits were returned---Failure on the part of wife to return benefitsreceived by her from her husband within stipulated period would not adversely affect factum ofdissolution and return of benefits by wife to husband remains merely a liability of civil nature, which can be enforced by husband through appropriate means---Similarly, dissolution ofmarriage effected through Khula is neither revocable nor appealable and only decision regardingdower is appealable.(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 561-A---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.494 & 493-A [as inserted by Protection of Women(Criminal Laws Amendment)] Act (VI of 2006)---Quashing of F.I.R.---Scope---Marrying againduring lifetime of husband---Respondent was ex-husband of petitioner, who got F.I.R. registeredagainst petitioner and her new husband---Plea raised by petitioner lady was that F.I.R. was basedupon mala fide and she contracted second marriage after the first one had been dissolved on thebasis of Khula---Validity---Investigation was right of police and should come to its naturalconclusion without interference, however, proceedings under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. werecompetent against any criminal inquiry or investigation, if the same had encroached upon anyfundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution or had violated some other law or wasmotivated by some mala fide reasons---Continuance of proceedings against petitioner in a caseunder S.494, P.P.C. read with S.493-A, P.P.C. [as added by Protection of Women (CriminalLaws Amendment) Act, 2006, would amount to unnecessary harassment---No Court on suchbaseless and misconceived allegation could convict petitioner---High Court in exercise of itsinherent jurisdiction quashed F.I.R. registered against petitioner---Petition was allowed incircumstances.Rizwana Bibi's case 2012 SCMR 94 rel.

Summary: The petitioner challenged the validity of judgments and decrees issued by the Family Court and the Additional District Judge. The background of the case involved the petitioner filing a composite suit for maintenance, dowry articles, and dower, while respondent No. 3 filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights. The trial court issued a judgment and decree which granted maintenance to the petitioner but dismissed her claims for gold ornaments, buffaloes, cows, and dower. The petitioner appealed the decision to the higher court (respondent No. 1) but was unsuccessful, leading to the current writ petition. The petitioner's counsel argued that both lower courts erred in law by not awarding the dower amount despite the husband's second marriage without the first wife's permission. They cited section 6(5) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, which states that a husband must immediately pay the entire amount of dower to the first wife in such cases. After examining the evidence and relevant legal provisions, the High Court judge concluded that the lower courts indeed overlooked the requirement to pay dower upon the husband's second marriage without permission. The court partially accepted the petition, setting aside the judgments and decrees of the lower courts concerning the dower amount and remanded the case to the trial court for reconsideration on this specific issue within two months. The judgments of the lower courts on other matters were upheld.

Summary: Background: Two writ petitions were filed concerning the alleged abduction and forced marriage of a woman. The first petition sought the production of the woman, claiming her life was in danger after being taken into custody under suspicious circumstances despite having pre-arrest bail. The second petition requested the quashing of an FIR accusing her of abduction and theft. The petitioner asserted that she had married a man of her choice against her family’s wishes and had fled to seek protection. The case involved competing claims of two marriages, alleged police misconduct, and questions of legal consent. -----Issues: 1- Can the High Court quash an FIR alleging abduction and theft based on evidence of mala fides and lack of legal grounds? -----2- Was the petitioner’s first marriage valid, and if so, is the subsequent marriage void under Islamic law? -----3- Did the police officials act beyond their lawful authority and violate the petitioner’s rights? -----4- Can a forced marriage without consent be considered valid under Islamic law and Pakistani legal principles? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The FIR alleging abduction and theft (FIR No. 601/1998) was quashed as it was found to be false, mala fide, and lacking evidence. The petitioner’s first marriage was declared valid, and the second marriage void due to lack of consent and its occurrence during the subsistence of the earlier marriage. Police officials involved in the misconduct, including illegal detention and forced actions against the petitioner, were convicted of contempt of court. --Consent and Validity of Marriage: The court reiterated that under Islamic law, a sui juris woman can contract a marriage only with her free consent. The evidence, including video footage of the alleged second marriage, showed clear signs of coercion, such as the petitioner crying and resisting during the ceremony. --Evidence of First Marriage: Testimonies, registration records, and witnesses confirmed the validity of the first marriage, which predated the second. The later marriage was found to lack authenticity and consent. Police Misconduct: The police actions, including forcibly taking the petitioner from a shelter and ignoring her pre-arrest bail, were deemed to reflect gross abuse of authority and mala fide intent. Role of Constitutional Jurisdiction: The court emphasized its role in protecting fundamental rights and quashed the FIR based on evident malice and lack of jurisdiction. The FIR was quashed. Police officials involved in the misconduct were penalized. The petitioner’s first marriage was upheld, and the second marriage declared void. -----Citations/Precedents: PLD 1971 SC 677 – High Court’s jurisdiction to intervene in mala fide investigations. PLD 1997 Lahore 301 (Hafiz Abdul Waheed v. Asma Jahangir) – Validity of a woman’s choice in marriage. PLD 1984 Supreme Court 95 – Coercion invalidates a marriage under Islamic law. PLD 1998 Lahore 287 (Asif Saigol v. Federation of Pakistan) – Protection of constitutional rights during investigations. 1997 PCr.LJ 928 (Muhammad Arshad v. SHO) – Presumption of marriage when acknowledged by both spouses. 1994 PCr.LJ 1111 – Quashing FIRs in Hudood cases when prima facie evidence supports the marriage. 1988 PCr.LJ 1576 (Mst. Sabai and Muhammad Sher v. The State) – Evidence of valid marriage justifying FIR quashment. 1996 SCMR 24 (Anwar Ahmad Khan v. The State) – High Court’s authority to correct mala fide investigations.

Summary: (1) Muhammadan Iaw.??????Marriage contracted during period of Iddat is invalid.A marriage contracted during the period of `Iddat' is not merely an irregular marriage,it has been termed by the Muslim Jurists as Batil (void). Even if is held to be irregular,it is still an invalid marriage, for both the irregular (Fasid) and void (Batil) marriagesfall in the category of `invalid marriage'.Ibn Abidin Raddul Muhtar, Vol. 2, p.482 and Ibn Ibidin, Vol. 2, p:835. ref.(m) Muhammadan Law????? Remarriage of a woman???Period of Iddat is 39 days. --- (a) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)???????S. 7???Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.2?A???Divorce would become effectiveeven in the absence of notice to the Chairman under S.7?? Ineffectiveness of divorce inthe absence of a notice to the Chairman, as envisaged by S.7, Muslim Family LawsOrdinance, 1961, was against injunctions of Islam.Mirza Qamar Raza v. Mst. Tahira Begum and others P L D 1988 Kar. 169 approved.Muhammad Sarwar and Mst. Shahida Parveen v. The State P L D 1988 FSC 42 ref.(b) Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979)???????S. 4???Zina???Definition???Intercourse in the case of a valid marriage cannot bedeemed to be Zina.(c) Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979)???????S. 4???`Valid marriage'???Meaning???If a marriage is valid in Shariah, it shall be heldvalid for the purposes of the Ordinance even though. it is not recognized as valid in anyother law for the time being in force.As the term of `valid marriage' has not been defined in the Ordinance, 1 the same shallbe construed in the light of the Islamic Injunctions keeping?in View the intention of thelaw?maker as emerges from the title and the preamble of the Ordinance.Both the title and the preamble of the Ordinance have disclosed the real intention of thelaw maker who wants to `modify' the law as it existed so as to bring it `in conformitywith the Injunctions of Islam'. All the provisions of the Ordinance, therefore, should beread and interpreted in the light of this title and preamble and terms not defined in theOrdinance itself, must be construed and interpreted in accordance with the `Injunctionsof Islam as set out in the Holy Qura'n and Sunnah'. The words `validly married'occurring in the definition of `Zina' in section 4 of the Ordinance have not been definedin the Ordinance. The definition, therefore, will be sought from the Injunctions ofIslam because the Ordinance intends to bring the existing law relating to Zina inconformity with them.Moreover, section 3 of the Ordinance has given the provisions of the Ordinance anoverriding effect on `any other law for the time being in force'.The logical result of this scheme of the provisions of the Ordinance is that if there is aclash between an existing law and the Injunctions of Islam with regard to the validityof a marriage, the Injunctions of Islam shall prevail for the purpose of this Ordinance.Thus, if a marriage is valid in Shariah, it shall be held valid for the purpose of thisOrdinance, even though it is not recognised as valid in any other law for the time beingin force.(d) Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979)???????Preamble???All the provisions of the Ordinance have to be read and interpreted inthe light of the title and preamble which are not defined in the' Ordinanceitself???Ordinance must be construed and interpreted in accordance with the Injunctionsof Islam as set out in the Holy Qura'n and Sunnah.(e) Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979)???????S. 4???`Zina'???Definition???Word `Zinc' having not been defined in the Ordinancethe definition of the word was to be sought from the Injunctions of Islam.(f) Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979)???????S. 4???Validity of marriage???Where there is clash between an existing law and theInjunctions of Islam with regard to the validity of marriage, the Injunctions of theIslam shall prevail for the purpose of the Ordinance.(g) Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979)?????S. 4???Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), S.7???Allegation ofZina???Plea of valid marriage by accused???Provision of S.7, Muslim Family LawsOrdinance, cannot affect the validity of a marriage contracted according to Shariah atleast to the extent of the criminal liability envisaged in the Ordinance.Mirza Qamar Raja v. Mst. Tahira Begum and others P L D 1988 Kar. 169 approved.(h) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1061)???????S. 7???Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979),S.4???Marriage contracted according to Shariah???Provisions of S.7, Muslim FamilyLaws Ordinance, 1965 could not affect the validity of such marriage at least to theextent of the criminal liability envisaged in the Offence of Zina (Enforcement ofHudood) Ordinance, 1979.Mirza Qamar Raza v. Mst. Tahira Begum and others P L D 1988 Kar. 169 approved.(i) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)???????S. 7???Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979),S.4???Allegation of Zina???Plea of valid marriage by accused???If a woman after,obtaining a divorce from the husband (pronounced or written by husband) and after thenecessary period of Iddat contracts a marriage with a third person such marriage couldnot be held as invalid marriage just because a notice of Talaq to the Chairman underS.7, Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1965 had not been given by husband???Notice ofTalaq to the Chairman was not mandatory under the Injunctions of Islam and anydivorce pronounced or written by a husband could not be ineffective or invalid inShariah merely because its notice had not been given to the Chairman.Mirza Qamar Raza v. Mst. Tahira Begum and others P L D 1988 Kar. 169 approved.(j) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)???????S. 7???Notice of Talaq to the Chairman is not mandatory under the Injunctions ofIslam and any divorce pronounced or written by a husband cannot be ineffective orinvalid in Shariah because its notice had not been given to the Chairman ???If a womanafter obtaining such a divorce from her husband and after the necessary period of Iddatcontracts a marriage with a third person, their marriage could not be held as invalidmarriage.Mirza Qamar Raza v. Mst. Tahira Begum and others P L D 1988 Kar. 169 approved.(k) Offence of?Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979)???????S. 4???Offence of Zina cannot be made out against a man and woman unless they`wilfully' have sexual intercourse???If a man and a woman had good reasons to believebona fide that they were husband and wife, the commission of intercourse under suchbelief could not be held as `wilful commission of Zina'.Mst. Bashiran and another v. Muhammad Hussain and another P L D 1988 S C 186 ref.