Summary: INSPECTOR GENERAL POLICE PUNJAB, LAHORE and others-Respondents (Against the judgment dated 17.11.2021 passed by Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No. 1674/2021). Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975- -R. 12-Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act (XII of 2006), S. 17-Punjab Service Tribunals Act (IX of 1974), S. 4-Revision-Scope-No vested right to file a revision is available under Section 17 of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 and Rule 12 of Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975-Powers of revision in both the aforesaid provisions are suo motu i.e. on its own motion and not on application 'of any aggrieved person' - However, one thing is common in both the aforesaid provisions that in the case of any enhancement of sentence or punishment intended in exercise of revisional powers, the said authority may provide opportunity of showing cause to such person as to why the punishment should not be enhanced-In case of any adverse findings or punishment or enhancement of punishment imposed in exercise of suo motu powers of revision within the time frame, the aggrieved person may approach the service tribunal for redress but the fact remains that revision cannot be filed as a matter of right and in case of rejection or dismissal of departmental appeal, the aggrieved employee should file the appeal before the Tribunal rather than filing revision petition or waiting for the decision of revision by the competent authority which is in fact detrimental and prejudicial to the own interest of such person who despite having in hand an adverse order passed against him in the departmental appeal, prefers to file revision petition which is not a vested right but such provision is provided to exercise suo motu powers and is not based on the condition of application 'of any aggrieved person'-In case any adverse order is passed under suo motu powers of revision against any person then obviously, he can approach the Tribunal against the adverse order being an original one but it is not meant as a remedy to cure the orders passed by the competent authority in the departmental appeal to hear it as a second appeal for which the direct remedy in the form of appeal is already provided before the concerned Service Tribunal. Ahmad Ali v. Inspector-General, Punjab Police and others 1990 SCMR 1450 and Muhammad Yaqoob v. District Police Officer, District Sahiwal and others 2006 SCMR 310 ref.

Summary: As per prosecution's own case, initially petitioner was not implicated in the alleged offence, however, after his arrest 116 claimants came forward and got recorded their statements disclosing some incriminating material against the petitioner. The petitioner was sent to face the trial before the Accountability Court. He was charged under sections 9 (a)(iii), (iv), (ix) and (xii) read with section 10 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as "Ordinance") on 24th November, 2022. Section 16 of the "Ordinance" as amended by Act No.XI of 2022 dated 22nd June, 2022 mandates that the trial of accused under the "Ordinance" shall be completed within one year. Previously in the first writ petition, trial Court was directed to conclude the trial within period of four weeks from the date of receipt of copy of order even on day to day basis. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner has not attributed to the delay in conclusion of trial. Needless to observe that delay in prosecution of accused amounts to abuse the process of law. Guidance in this respect can be sought from CHAIRMAN, NAB through P.G., v. NASAR ULLAH and 5 others (PLD 2022 Supreme Court 497). After having an overview of the principles laid down hereinabove, we are of the considered opinion that it is an inalienable right of every accused to have expeditious and fair trial, which right is even guaranteed under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.

Summary: If blood group of deceased of the case is noted by the doctor in the post-mortem examination report, then it would be helpful for ascertaining blood group available on blood stained cotton secured from the place of occurrence, blood stained clothes of the deceased and blood stained weapon as well as for D.N.A. test.

Summary: For the expeditious settlement and disposal of disputes relating to the marriage and family affairs and for matters connected therewith, Family Courts were established under the Family Courts (Act XXXV of 1964) (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1964"). Section 7 of the "Act, 1964" prescribes the manner of institution of suits before the Family Court whereas section 8 deals with the procedure of intimation to defendant on presentation of plaint before the Family Court. Section 9 deals with the written statement and sub-section 5 of section 9 postulates that if the defendant fails to appear on the date fixed by the Family Court for his appearance, and it is proved that summons or notice was duly served on the defendant, the Family Court may proceed ex-parte. Since the suit was decreed ex-parte, so sub-sections 6 and 7 of section 9 of the "Act, 1964" would be quite relevant for the resolution of matter in issue. It is an oft repeated principle that when law provides a specific manner for performing an act, then it should be performed in such manner but in no other way. Needless to mention that limitation of 30 days for filing an application for setting aside ex-parte decree would start from the service of notice under sub-section 7 as added by the Ordinance LV of 2002. Though Rule 13 of the Family Court Rules, 1965 postulates that an ex-parte decree or proceeding may for sufficient cause shown be set aside by the Court on application made to it within 30 days of the passing of the decree or decision but this rule is apparently showing scorn and derogative of the basic provision of "Act ,1964". It is trite law that whenever there is an inconsistency between the rule and the basic provision of statute, the latter will prevail. NATIONAL ELECTRIC POWER REGULATORY AUTHORITY versus FAISALABAD ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY LIMITED (2016 SCMR 550).

Summary: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Government Act (XXVIII of 2013)--- ----S. 40---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Government Ordinance (XIV of 2001) S.124---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 42---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 47---Consent decree---Execution---Fresh lease of property---Suit for declaration was filed by respondents/plaintiffs challenging notice issued by petitioners / Local Government relating to enhancement of rent/ lease amount---Trial Court decreed the suit and during execution of decree, petitioner / Local Government offered to issue fresh lease contract---Respondents/ plaintiffs objected to issuance of fresh lease---Executing Court and Lower Appellate Court allowed objections of respondents / plaintiffs---Validity---In the present case the consent decree was not executable---Decree passed in favour of respondents / plaintiffs was a nullity in the eye of law and its operation ran contrary to express provisions of law---High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction set aside orders passed by two Courts below and relief was moulded to the effect of giving declaration, that judgment and decree of Trial Court could not be executed against express provisions of law i.e. S.124 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Government Ordinance, 2001 and S.40 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Government Act, 2013---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Messrs Haji Ahmed and Co v. Muhammad Siddique and others PLD 1965 (W.P) Karachi 293; Cantonment Board v. Kishan Lal AIR 1934 All. 609; Fakir Abdullah and others v. Government of Sindh through Secretary to Government of Sindh, Revenue Department, Karachi and others PLD 2001 SC 131 and Haji Sher Muhammad and others v. Aftab Ahmad and another C.O.C. No.105/2022, decided on 31.11.2022 ref. Sabah-ud-Din Khattak for the Petitioners. Hassan U.K. Afridi for Respondents. Date of hearing: 10th October, 2023.

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.12(2), & O. VI, R.4---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.42---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art. 181---Suit for declaration---Revenue entries, correction of Application under S.12(2), C.P.C.---Limitation---Consent decree passed on the basis of compromise arrived at between the predecessors of the petitioners and respondents---Failure of the predecessors-in-interest of the respondents to challenge the consent decree in their life time---Estoppel---Petitioners filed a time barred application under S.12(2), C.P.C., after more than 04 decades, which was dismissed by the Trial Court, whereafter civil revision was filed by the respondent, which was accepted while remanding the application back to the Trial Court for decision afresh on merits after framing of issues---Validity---Once consent judgment/decree/order, as the case may be, has been passed by a competent court of law, then the parties cannot resile from it without any cogent and valid reasons---Consent decree operates as estoppel by judgment---When a person raises the ground of fraud or concealment to allege his claim or defend his stance, the same has to be specifically pleaded with clear particulars, which in the present case were not detailed by the respondents in their application---Framing of issues in an application under S.12(2), C.P.C., depends on the circumstances of each case, nature of alleged fraud and the decree so, obtained---Framing of issues in every case to examine the merits of the application would certainly frustrate the very purpose and object of S.12(2), C.P.C., which is to avoid protracted and time consuming litigation in order to save the genuine decree holder from grave hardships, ordeal of further litigation, extra burden on their exchequer and simultaneously to reduce unnecessary burden on the courts below---Respondents had filed the application under S.12(2), CPC, after more than four long decades and that too without mentioning any specific date of knowledge therein, which was not maintainable being barred by law in terms of Art.181 of the Limitation Act, 1908---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Sailendra Narayan v. State of Orissa AIR 1956 SC 346; Warriach Zarai Corporation v. F.M.C. United (Pvt) Ltd 2006 SCMR 531 and Basher Ahmad through LRs and others v. Muhammad Hussain and others PLD 2109 SC 504 rel. Asghar Ali for Petitioners. Rashid Rauf Swati for Respondents. Date of hearing: 23rd November, 2023.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ----S. 12(2)---Consent decree---Challenge on grounds of fraud and misrepresentation---Delay of over four decades---Framing of issues---Bar of limitation---Scope---Respondents challenged a consent decree dated 15.05.1975, passed in Civil Suit No.306/1, through an application under S.12(2), C.P.C., alleging fraud, misrepresentation, and concealment of facts---Learned Revisional Court set aside the dismissal of said application by the Trial Court and remanded the matter for decision on merits after framing of issues and recording of evidence---Held, that the consent decree was passed after compromise between parties duly recorded and acknowledged in court and had attained finality, having never been challenged during the lifetime of the respondents’ predecessors---Once a consent decree is passed by a competent court, it operates as estoppel by judgment unless cogent reasons to the contrary are pleaded and established---Framing of issues is not mandatory in every case under S.12(2), especially where the application is barred by limitation or devoid of specific particulars of fraud---Respondents failed to mention any definite date of knowledge or plead fraud with the necessary specificity---Application filed after more than forty years held to be hopelessly time-barred under Art. 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908---Revisional Court’s interference was based on misreading of law and facts and suffered from material irregularity. (b) Limitation Act, 1908 ----Art. 181---Application under S.12(2), C.P.C. filed after inordinate delay of over forty years without explaining the date of knowledge---Held, barred by time and liable to be dismissed without need for detailed inquiry or framing of issues. Cited Cases: • Sailendra Narayan v. State of Orissa AIR 1956 SC 346 • Warriach Zarai Corporation v. F.M.C. United (Pvt) Ltd. 2006 SCMR 531 • Bashir Ahmad through LRs v. Muhammad Hussain PLD 2019 SC 504 Disposition: Petition allowed. Judgment of Revisional Court dated 02.12.2021 set aside; Trial Court’s dismissal of S.12(2), C.P.C. application restored.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Property Law--- ----Co-ownership---Right of co-owners to access joint property---Blocking of joint thoroughfare---Relief under civil law. In cases of joint ownership, no co-owner can claim exclusive ownership over a shared thoroughfare or obstruct another co-owner's access. The appellate court correctly decreed the suit, holding that the respondent, as a co-owner, had the right to access the joint thoroughfare, which was temporarily blocked by the petitioner. The thoroughfare must remain open until partition proceedings are finalized, as determined by the commission's report and site plan evidence. (b) Easement of necessity vs. co-ownership rights--- ----Applicability of doctrines in joint ownership disputes. The appellate court erred in applying the doctrine of easement of necessity in a dispute between co-owners. The right to access a joint thoroughfare arises from co-ownership itself, not from the doctrine of easement. The relief granted by the appellate court remains valid on the basis of co-ownership and the proven existence of the thoroughfare. (c) Civil vs. criminal jurisdiction--- ----Section 133, Cr.P.C.---Constructive res judicata in civil suits. The dismissal of a complaint under Section 133, Cr.P.C., does not bar a civil suit addressing private or individual rights. Criminal proceedings under Section 133, Cr.P.C., deal with public nuisance, while civil suits are meant to enforce private rights. The principle of constructive res judicata is not applicable in such cases. ----Cited Precedent: Madan Gopal v. Maran Bepari (PLD 1969 SC 617) ----Disposition: Revision dismissed. The judgment of the appellate court was upheld, ensuring the respondent’s access to the thoroughfare as a co-owner until the conclusion of partition proceedings.

Summary: Summary pending.