Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S. 37A & First Schedule, Part-1, Division-VII, first proviso [as amended/inserted through the Finance Act, 2022]---Disposal of securities---Capital gains accrued---Chargeability to tax---Scope---Vested rights of taxpayer---Petitioner/taxpayer acquired the securities in the year 2011 and disposed them of in the year 2023---Plea of the petitioner / taxpayer was that the securities were retained for over one year, hence, disposal thereof could not be subjected to capital gains under the provisions of S. 37A of the Ordinance, 2001, applicable at the time of acquiring said securities---Stance of the Department was that question of applicability of S. 37A of the Ordinance, 2001 would be the date of disposal of securities and by then impugned amendment was in place, effective and enforceable---Validity---In the present case, the securities were acquired in the year 2011 and sold during Tax Year 2023 and amendment was introduced through Finance Act, 2022---Apparently, petitioner failed to underpin significance of omission of proviso to subsection (1) of S. 37A of Ordinance, 2001, through Finance Act, 2014---As per text of S. 37A of the Ordinance, 2001 (being applicable at the time of disposal of securities - during tax year 2023), it was evident that no protection was available to the petitioner at the time of disposal of the securities, a triggering point for the determination of tax under S. 37A of the Ordinance, 2001---In absence of the proviso to S. 37A omitted since 2014, no question of inapplicability of S. 37A arises---Petitioner failed to show any statutory representation/ promissory estoppel, allegedly extended before amendment was introduced in Division VII---No question of availability, let alone accrual of vested right, was made out---No inconsistency between S. 37A of the Ordinance, 2001 and impugned amendment was found, since proviso to subsection (1) of S. 37A was earlier omitted through Finance Act, 2014, and even the expression "held for a period of less than a year" appearing in S. 37A of the Ordinance 2001 stood omitted through Finance Act, 2015---At the time of leviability of tax, for the purposes of gain tax accrued, no protection was available to support claim of any exemption or concession, whatsoever---Right to claim zero percent of tax on the securities acquired in 2011 cannot be recognized or granted perpetually---There is no cavil that legislature is otherwise competent to tax capital gains by changing the benchmark requirements, in absence of any promise made [which promise based on proviso to subsection (1) of S. 37A was omitted since 2014, save past and closed transactions]---No case for interference was made out---Constitutional petition, being merit-less, was dismissed. Anwar Yahya and 3 others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary and 4 others 2017 PTD 1069; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Federation of Pakistan and others (Civil Appeals Nos. 930 and 931 of 2017); Dr. Muhammad Anwar Kurd and 2 others v. The State through Regional Accountability Bureau, Quetta 2011 SCMR 1560; D.S Nakara and others v. Union of India 1983 SC 305; Mohabat Khan and 77 others v. Road Transport Board N.W.F.P, Peshawar through its Chairman and 4 others 1993 SCMR 833; Pakistan through Chairman FBR and others v. Hazrat Hussain and others 2018 SCMR 939; Collector of Customs Model Customs Collectorate, Peshawar v. Waseef Ullah and another 2023 SCMR 503 and Sapphire Textile Mills Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2024 PTD 955 distinguished. (b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S. 37A & First Schedule, Part-1, Division-VII, first proviso [as amended/inserted through the Finance Act, 2022]---Disposal of securities---Capital gains accrued---Chargeability to tax--- Scope---Petitioner/taxpayer acquired the securities in the year 2011 and disposed them of in the year 2023---Petitioner/taxpayer challenged constitutionality of the first proviso to Division-VII of Part-1 of First Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance, 2001') inserted through the Finance Act, 2022 ('impugned amendment')---Held: Table qua rate of tax with impugned amendment showed that in terms of the proviso, added through the Finance Act, 2022, the criterion for availing benefit of zero percent of rate of tax was made permissible, where holding period exceeded six years but condition of acquisition of securities on or after first day of July 2002 was imposed---The period of holding of securities and date of acquisition for availing benefit percent tax was prescribed---No vested right could be claimed against the right of the legislature to tax, when neither any vested right had conclusively accrued, nor subject matter transaction graduated to achieve status of a past and closed transaction---No case for interference was made out---Constitutional petition, being merit-less, was dismissed. (c) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S. 37A & First Schedule, Part-1, Division-VII, first proviso [as amended/inserted through the Finance Act, 2022]---Disposal of securities---Capital gains accrued---Chargeability to tax as per rate prevalent at time of disposal---Discrimination---Scope---Discrimination was asserted by the petitioner/taxpayer who acquired the securities in the year 2011 and disposed them of in the year 2023---Validity--- Different rates of tax were provided against variously prescribed periods of holdings of securities, where each of the category manifested diverse periods---This was the pattern of rates prescribed for different period of holdings since addition of S. 37A from 2010---Provisioning of different slabs for retention of securities was not a novel or discriminatory practice---Categorization of slabs for holdings and prescribing rate of tax for each slab met the criterion of providing intelligible differentia, distinguishing classes of securities held and varied retention period prescribed in the context of concession in rate of tax---Element of commonness amongst each category of securities held, root cause of discrimination, was conspicuous by its absence---Though there was no occasion to comment on the rational and efficacy of the policy, still ex-facie offering of discounted rates of tax regarding securities acquired on or after first day of July 2022 in fact encouraged and incentivized the investment, which satisfied the test of proximity between rationality and objective intended to be achieved encouraging roll-over of securities / investment---Thus plea of discrimination was misconceived---No case for interference was made out---Constitutional petition , being merit-less, was dismissed. Mian Ashiq Hussain, Muhammad Arshad and Najia Noreen Maitla for Petitioner. Mirza Nasar Ahmad, Addl. Attorney General. Ahmad Pervaiz for CIR. Muhammad Bilal Munir for FBR. Muhammad Adil Chattha for Respondent No.3.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 561-A, 265-K & 249-A—Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 365-B, 494, 496-A, 420, 468, 471, 109 & 34— —Acquittal—Scope of inherent jurisdiction—Petition for acquittal during trial—Maintainability— Petitioners sought acquittal under S.561-A, Cr.P.C. after rejection of earlier application under S.265-K, Cr.P.C.—Held, final challan had been submitted, charge was framed, and trial was underway with prosecution witnesses yet to be examined—Main accused were absconding and recovery of vehicle used in commission of alleged offence had been effected from petitioners’ premises—Court observed that criminal trials should ordinarily proceed to conclusion on merits, and extraordinary jurisdiction under Ss. 265-K or 561-A should not be invoked when trial has commenced—Preemptive acquittal of some accused may prejudice the prosecution case against absconding co-accused—Petition dismissed. Principle: Where trial has commenced, the Court should refrain from short-circuiting proceedings through premature acquittal under inherent or statutory provisions. (b) Criminal Trial—Multiple accused—Effect of acquitting some accused during trial—Prejudice to prosecution— Two co-accused had absconded and their trial was yet to be conducted—Held, in cases involving multiple accused, allowing acquittal of some accused at an early stage could adversely affect prosecution of others—Prosecution had listed around 20 witnesses—Premature acquittal would obstruct evaluation of collective liability under Ss.34 & 109, P.P.C.—Court must adopt cautious approach in such cases. Principle: Acquittal of one accused during pendency of trial may prejudice case of co-accused, particularly when trial is incomplete and evidence is yet to be recorded. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 561-A—Scope—When not to be invoked— S.561-A, Cr.P.C. confers inherent powers to secure ends of justice or prevent abuse of process—However, such powers are not a substitute for trial and must be exercised sparingly—Held, where factual controversy exists and trial is in progress, accused must be tried in accordance with law—Assessment of guilt or innocence should be left to trial court after full evidence is led. Held, petition under S.561-A dismissed as misconceived. Petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (C.P.C.): ---Order IX, Rule 13, and Order V, Rule 20---Setting aside ex-parte proceedings and orders---Court held that before resorting to substituted service under Order V, Rule 20, it is mandatory to attempt personal service with due diligence. Substituted service is permissible only when the Court is satisfied that service cannot be effected through ordinary means. Failure to comply with these procedural requirements nullifies the ex-parte proceedings and orders. Substituted service serves as a tool to ensure fair communication within the justice system but must strictly follow procedural requirements. (b) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (C.P.C.): ---Section 115, Order IX, Rule 13, and inherent powers---Restoration of civil revisions---Although Section 115 does not expressly provide for restoration of revisions, inherent powers under Section 151 can be invoked to ensure justice. Courts are empowered to restore revisions under principles derived from Order IX, Rule 13, and principles of natural justice, ensuring parties are heard fairly. Restoration is permissible unless expressly prohibited by law. (c) Writ of Certiorari---Judicial discretion of revisional court: ---The revisional court invoked Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C., to restore civil revision by setting aside ex-parte proceedings and orders, providing an opportunity for hearing to the respondent. The Court held that revisional courts may adopt procedures not specifically barred, ensuring adherence to justice and fairness principles. Certiorari is not warranted unless a lower court flagrantly disregards the law. -----Disposition: The petition was dismissed, upholding the revisional court's decision to restore the civil revision for adjudication after hearing both parties in compliance with natural justice principles.

Summary: Declaration under section 42 of Specific Relief Act 1877: Relief u/s 42 of the Specific Relief Act of 1877 could only be granted to a person who approaches to the Court of law with clean hands in accordance with the maxim that one who seeks equity must do equity. In the case of ?Atta Muhammad vs. Maula Bakhsh and others? (2007 SCMR 1446) it was held that the Courts should also keep in mind that relief of declaration is discretionary and a plaintiff who seeks discretionary relief must come to the court with clean hands. In the matter in hand, the respondents/ plaintiffs have concealed the entire facts and succeeded in getting a decree in their favour from the learned trial Court. No doubt, certain decisions were made by this Court and by the apex Court as well but the decision in any other case could not determine the eligibility, requisite qualification and the appointment of the present respondents/ plaintiffs in accordance with law, as such, the impugned decisions of the learned Courts below are not in accordance with law, irrespective of the fact that the findings are concurrent.

Summary: The acceptance of DNA reports is grounded in the doctrine of the law of individuality, which posits that every object, natural or man-made, possesses a unique identity that is not duplicated elsewhere. This principle is exemplified in the field of fingerprint analysis, where no two fingerprints are identical.The passage refers to the case of Regina v. Onufrejczyk (1955), where Lord Goddard, CJ of England, established the principle that the fact of death in a murder trial can be proven through circumstantial evidence. Even in the absence of witnesses or direct evidence, the corpus delicti (body of the crime) can be established through circumstances that leave no room for doubt.In the context of DNA evidence, the doctrine of individuality is complemented by the doctrine of analysis. The latter underscores the importance of impeccable sampling, correct packing, safe custody, and reliable transmission to the expert's office. The passage emphasizes that improper sampling, unsafe custody, or doubtful transmission can undermine the reliability and credibility of a positive DNA report, rendering it unworthy of reliance in legal proceedings. --- The foundation of the "last seen together" theory was based on principles of probability, cause and effect, and required cogent reasons to establish that the deceased was supposed to be with the accused. Critical factors included the proximity of the crime scene, a small time gap between the sighting and the crime, the absence of third-party interference, motive, and the time of the victim's death. However, the circumstance alone did not necessarily implicate the accused; additional evidence connecting them to the crime was deemed crucial.The judgement referenced legal cases to support this theory, emphasizing the need for careful scrutiny due to the potential for the fabrication of evidence. It highlighted a case where last seen evidence had to be corroborated by independent sources, as uncorroborated evidence was considered weak in cases involving capital punishment.The judgement then delved into a specific case, scrutinizing the evidence of last seen together and the recovery of the victim's body. It pointed out various shortcomings in the witness testimony, including discrepancies in the time and place of the sighting. It also questioned the delay in reporting the incident and highlighted inconsistencies in the witness's statements during cross-examination.Furthermore, the judgement discussed the recovery of the corpse on the accused's disclosure, emphasizing the legal limitations on using confessions made to the police. It underscored the importance of proper documentation, such as memos, to establish the admissibility of such statements. In this case, the lack of a memo raised doubts about the reliability of the recovery process.The judgement concluded by questioning the evidentiary value of a positive DNA report, highlighting issues related to sampling, custody, and transmission. It argued that the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the accused, leading to the appeal court's decision to acquit the appellant based on the benefit of the doubt. The death sentence was not confirmed, and the Murder Reference was answered in the negative.

Summary: Bail granted---Background:Muhammad Usman, son of Muhammad Arshad, the petitioner, was arrested on 29.04.2021 based on his involvement in FIR No.139/2021, dated 30.3.2021, at Police Station Phularwan, District Sargodha, allegedly for offenses under sections 302, 148, 149, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (PPC).The petitioner made several attempts to secure bail:His first bail application was dismissed on 27.9.2022.He filed another petition but withdrew it to base his plea on the fresh ground of delay in trial, which hadn't ripened at the time of the earlier petitions.A subsequent petition solely on the ground of seeking bail on statutory delay was dismissed on 10.8.2023 due to non-prosecution.The petitioner then filed a fresh petition, leading to the impugned judgment dated 03.10.2023, against which the present appeal is filed.---Issues:Whether the petitioner is entitled to bail based on statutory delay in the conclusion of the trial.Whether the dismissal of previous bail petitions precludes the petitioner from seeking bail on new grounds.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The court elucidated that while a second bail petition repeating earlier grounds is not competent, an exception exists for bail on statutory grounds, provided the accused hasn't hindered trial conclusion.The petitioner's right to seek bail based on statutory delay accrued when the conditions of the third proviso of section 497(1) of the Cr.P.C. were met, i.e., two years had passed, and trial wasn't concluded.The delay wasn't attributable to the petitioner; it resulted from the actions of co-accused. The court emphasized that an accused can't be held responsible for co-accused's actions unless complicity is proven.As the prosecution failed to attribute delay to the petitioner, the petitioner was granted bail.The petition was converted into an appeal, and bail was allowed upon furnishing a bail bond.---Citations/Precedents:Shahbaz Akmal v. The State and another (2023 SCMR 421)Nazir Ahmed & another v. The State & another (PLD 2014 Supreme Court 241)Syed Ayesha Subhani v. The State and others (PLD 2023 Supreme Court 648)Nazir Hussain v. Zia-ul- and others (1983 SCMR 72)Sher Ali alias Sheri v. The State (1998 SCMR 190)Akhtar Abbas v. State (PLD 1982 SC 424)Moundar and others v. The State (PLD 1990 SC 934)Abdul Rashid v. The State (1998 SCMR 897)Zahid Hussain Shah v. The State (PLD 1995 SC 49)Muhammad Siddique v. Muhammad Behram and another (1998 PCr.L.J. 358)

Summary: Messrs MARI GAS COMPANY LIMITED, ISLAMABAD and others-Respondents C.P. 2007/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Tax Ref. No. 6 of 2008). C.P. 2008/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Tax Ref. No.7 of 2008). C.P. 2009/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Tax Ref. No. 15 of 2008). C.P. 2010/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Tax Ref. No. 75 of 2008). C.P. 2011/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Tax Ref. No. 41 of 2009). C.P. 2012/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Tax Ref. No. 42 of 2009). C.P. 2013/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Tax Ref. No.39 of 2012). C.P. 2014/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Tax Ref. No. 40 of 2012). C.P. 2015/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Tax Ref. No.41 of 2008). C.P. 2016/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Tax Ref. No. 42 of 2020). C.P. 2017/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Tax Ref. No. 11 of 2022). C.P. 2178/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabed in Tax Ref. No. 13 of 2019). C.P. 2179/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.272 of 2011). C.P. 2180/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.273 of 2011). C.P. 2181/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.274 of 2011). C.P. 2182/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No. 275 of 2011). C.P. 2183/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.276 of 2011). C.P. 2184/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.277 of 2011). C.P. 2206/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.39 of 2013). C.P. 2207/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.40 of 2013). C.P. 2208/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.41 of 2013). C.P. 2209/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.42 of 2013). C.P. 2210/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No. 43 of 2013). C.P. 2211/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.46 of 2013). C.P. 2212/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.50 of 2013). C.P. 2213/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.51 of 2013). C.P. 2214/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.53 of 2013). C.P. 2345/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No. 48 of 2013). C.P. 2377/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No. 1 of 2008). C.P. 2378/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.58 of 2007). C.P. 2379/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.56 of 2018). C.P. 2380/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.2 of 2008). C.P. 2381/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.57 of 2018). C.P. 2570/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.80 of 2007). C.P. 2571/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.81 of 2007). C.P. 2572/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.38 of 2009). C.P. 2573/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.39 of 2009). C.P. 2575/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.62 of 2007). C.P. 2576/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.63 of 2007). C.P. 1746/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.1 of 2012). C.P. 1747/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.2 of 2012). C.P.1748/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.3 of 2012). C.P. 1749/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No. 135 of 2014). C.P. 1750/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No. 134 of 2014). C.P. 1751/2022 (Against the judgment dated 31.3.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.4 of 2012). C.P. 2903/2022 (Against the judgment dated 23.6.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.44 of 2013). C.P. 2904/2022 (Against the judgment dated 23.6.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.54 of 2013). C.P. 2905/2022 (Against the judgment dated 23.6.2022, passed by the islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.49 of 2013). C.P. 2906/2022 (Against the judgment dated 23.6.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.46 of 2013). C.P. 2907/2022 (Against the judgment dated 23.6.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in IT Ref. No.55 of 2013). C.P. 1472/2023 (Against the judgment dated 23.6.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in C.M. No. 383 of 2022). Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) [since repealed]- -S.62 & Fifth Sched., Part I, R.3-Pakistan Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Rules, 1986, Rr.2(k), 36(1) & 38-Depletion allowance-Well-head value-Royalty-Whether royalty paid to Government is deductible while computing well-head value-Determination-Depletion allowance equal to 15% of gross receipts representing well-head value-Computation-Scope-Briefly, the facts were that the respondent company filed its return for tax year 1999-2000 showing gross receipts of Rs.694,187,000 from petroleum sales and claimed depletion allowance of Rs.104,128,050 (15%) under Rule 3, Part I, Fifth Schedule, Income Tax Ordinance, 1979; the assessing officer, under Section 62, held that royalty paid to Government had to be deducted while computing wellhead value/allowance; the Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the first appeal and the second appeal was also dismissed by the Tribunal-On reference, the High Court held royalty as not deductible for computing depletion allowance, giving rise to the present petitioner for leave to appeal by the Department-Primary question requiring determination before the Supreme Court was as to-Whether, for calculating depletion allowance under Rule 3, Part I of the Fifth Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, the amount of royalty was to be deducted from the wellhead value?-Held: Merely because the definition of well-head value incorporated by reference the mechanism for calculation of market value that was employed for purposes of calculation of royalty under Rule 38, it did not automatically incorporate within the definition of well-head value the quantum of royalty payable to the Government as a cost that was to be excluded from market value for purposes of determination of well-head value-What the Tribunal had essentially done was to treat the royalty payable by petroleum exploration and production companies as an equity interest of the Government in the value of remaining product which was to be measured under the definition of the well-head value-The definition of well-head value did not allow reading into such definition the exclusion of royalty payable by petroleum exploration and production companies to the Government for purposes of calculation of depletion allowance pursuant to Rule 3, Part I of the Fifth Schedule to the 1979 Ordinance-Thus, the amount of royalty paid by a taxpayer to the Government had to be viewed as a separate component which was entirely independent on its own and was not to be deducted while computing the well-head value-Therefore, impugned judgment of the High Court warranted no interference by the Supreme Court-Present petitions were dismissed, in circumstances.

Summary: Sufi NAZIR AHMED and others-Respondents (On appeal against the judgments dated 09.10.2013 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench in Writ Petitions Nos.104-A, 159-A, 165-A of 2007 and 183-A/2008 and 685-A of 2010). Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act (XIII of 1975)- -S. 4(2)(f)-Scheme for the Management and Disposal of Urban Evacuee Trust Properties, 1977, Clasues 10 & 11-Evacuee trust properties-Tenants-Assessment/re-assessment of rent-Amendment to clauses 10 and 11 of the Scheme for the Management and Disposal of Urban Evacuee Trust Properties, 1977, (the Scheme), vide SRO No.13KE/2006 dated 13th of February, 2006-Vires of-Evacuee Trust Property Board (‘Board’) is empowered under section 4(2)(f) of the Act, to assess or reassess the rent of the evacuee trust properties-Although it is not specifically mentioned in the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975, nevertheless, it is implied that the rent payable by the tenant shall be just, equitable, impartial, dispassionate, uncoloured and objective-It is desirable that some protection should be provided to the tenants in order to ensure that they are not exploited-At the same time, the rent has to be revised periodically, as it is normal for the market rent to become marginal or insignificant every three to four years with the prevailing rate of inflation-Protection of legitimate expectation is present in the Scheme for the Management and Disposal of Urban Evacuee Trust Properties, 1977 (‘Scheme’), and its existence brings procedural fairness in two ways: first, a policy or practice that dictates a particular procedure to be followed gives rise to the right of the tenant to demand that the procedure for assessment or reassessment of rent be followed; and secondly, if there is a legitimate expectation of a reasonable benefit, it may give rise to a right for a fair procedure before the benefit is withheld-It is clear from clauses 10 and 11 of the Scheme that the District Officer is mandated to fix the rent of the evacuee trust property, keeping in view the market rent and rent of other properties in the vicinity in similar circumstances-This means that his powers are not unbridled; he cannot act on his whims while assessing the rent; he is bound to observe the standards mentioned in the Scheme, so as to eliminate any improper motive and possibility of coercion-It is also evident that to bring transparency in the rent assessment procedure, the existing clause 10 ensures that not only the proposed assessment is open to inspection by the tenant but also provides them an opportunity for objections and hearings-An additional measure to prevent unfairness in the determination of rent is provided by empowering the Chairman of the Board or the Administrator concerned to suo moto examine the correctness or propriety of the determination of rent-At that, it has been mandated to periodically reassess the rent every six years and increase it at the rate of eight per cent per annum-Clauses 10 and 11 of the Scheme (as amended) are neither arbitrary nor oppressive or unreasonable-Appeals were allowed. Muzzafar Khan v. Evacuee Trust Property 2002 CLC 1819 and McInnes v. Onslow-Fane (1978) 1 WLR 1520 ref.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan- -Art. 25-Civil service-Employees of Solicitor Office, Law Department, Peshawar ('the respondents')-Special allowance and utility allowance, denial of-Discrimination-Two allowances in question were also drawn by the respondents but later payment of such allowances was discontinued by the Government on the ground that the employees of the Solicitor Office were not part of the Civil Secretariat, therefore, not entitled for such allowances-Legality-High Court rightly allowed said allowances to the respondent by holding that that the classification so made by the Government qua granting of said two allowances to specified employees while denying the same to other employees who were also posted inside the walled premises of the Civil Secretariat, could not be termed as reasonable and amounted to offend the principle of equity before the law-High Court correctly noted that the office of the Solicitor having a separate entity in the Law Department was situated within the premises of the Civil Secretariat, therefore, the employees of the Solicitor Office were similarly placed and were entitled to the grant of special allowance and utility allowance-Counsel for the Provincial Government could not point out any illegality or perversity in the impugned judgment of the High Court, which was maintained-Resultantly, appeal was dismissed.

Summary: WOLVERHAMPTON CITY COUNCIL and others-Respondents Decided on 29th November, 2023. Injunction- -Newcomer injunction-, concept of-Scope and principles-Injunction against persons unknown-Whether the court has the power to grant injunctions against persons who are unknown and unidentified at the date of the grant of the injunction, and who have not yet performed, or even threatened to perform, the acts which the injunction prohibits-Held, that court has power to grant newcomer injunctions-However, it should only exercise this power in circumstances where there is a compelling need to protect civil rights or to enforce public law that is not adequately met by any other available remedies-Furthermore, newcomer injunctions should only be made subject to procedural safeguards designed to protect newcomers’ rights-Detailed principles and pre-requisites related to grant of a newcomer injunction stated. The claimant local authorities successfully applied for a series of injunctions which were aimed at the gypsy and traveller community and targeted unauthorised encampment or use of land. The majority of the injunctions were against-persons unknown-, with varying descriptions. In some cases only interim injunctions had been granted and in others final injunctions had been made. Following applications by some of the local authorities to extend or renew their injunctions, a group of 38 claims was identified in which similar issues arose for determination, in particular whether a final injunction granted against persons unknown was subject to the principle that final injunctions would only bind the parties to the proceedings or whether final injunctive relief could be granted to a local authority against-newcomers-who could not be identified as parties by the date when the application for a final injunction was heard. The judge held that, whilst interim injunctions could be made against persons unknown, final injunctions could only be made against parties who had been identified and had had an opportunity to contest the final order sought, so that the court could not grant final injunctions that prevented persons unknown and unidentified at the date of the order (ie newcomers), from occupying and trespassing on local authority land. The Court of Appeal held that the court had the power to grant newcomer injunctions, and allowed the local authorities’ appeal. The court’s power to grant injunctions is not limited to pre-existing, established categories. Injunctions may be granted in new circumstances as and when required by the principles of justice and equity which underpin them. This is demonstrated by the courts’ development of several new kinds of injunction over the last 50 years, including freezing injunctions, search orders, third party disclosure orders, internet blocking orders, and anti-suit injunctions. Newcomer injunctions are a wholly new form of injunction, which are granted without prior notice against persons who cannot be known at the time the order is made. They therefore potentially apply to anyone in the world. The court has jurisdiction (in the sense of power) to grant an injunction against ‘newcomers’, that is, persons who at the time of the grant of the injunction are neither defendants nor identifiable, and who are described in the order only as persons unknown. The injunction may be granted on an interim or final basis, necessarily on an application without notice. Such an injunction (a-newcomer injunction-) will be effective to bind anyone who has notice of it while it remains in force, even though that person had no intention and had made no threat to do the act prohibited at the time when the injunction was granted and was therefore someone against whom, at that time, the applicant had no cause of action. It is inherently an order with effect contra mundum, and is not to be justified on the basis that those who disobey it automatically become defendants. The court has jurisdiction, or power, to grant newcomer injunctions because its power to grant injunctions is unlimited, subject to any relevant statutory restrictions. The power is equitable in origin, and has been confirmed and restated by Parliament in section 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. Spry, Equitable Remedies, 9th ed (2014) (-Spry-), p 333; Broadmoor Special Hospital Authority v Robinson [2000] QB 775, paras 20-21; Cartier International AG v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 658; [2017] Bus LR 1, para 47; Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd [2021] UKPC 24; [2023] AC 389 (-Broad Idea-), para 57; Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd [1993] AC 334, 360-361 and Castanho v Brown & Root (UK) Ltd [1981] AC 557 ref. The court should, as a matter of principle and practice, grant newcomer injunctions subject to certain safeguards i.e. equitable principles. In deciding whether to grant a newcomer injunction and, if so, upon what terms, the court will be guided by principles of justice and equity and, in particular, that equity provides a remedy where the others available under the law are inadequate to vindicate or protect the rights in issue; that equity looks to the substance rather than to the form; that equity takes an essentially flexible approach to the formulation of a remedy, and that equity has not been constrained by hard rules or procedure in fashioning a remedy to suit new circumstances. In principle there is no reason why newcomer injunctions should never be granted. Newcomer injunctions are a valuable and proportionate remedy in appropriate cases. However, this does not mean that it will be appropriate for the court to grant a newcomer injunction in every case. In deciding whether it should grant a newcomer injunction, the court should have regard to the equitable principles mentioned above, which require that newcomer injunctions should only be granted in certain circumstances, and subject to certain safeguards. Meux v Maltby (1818) 2 Swans 277, 281-282; Adair v The New River Co (1805) 11 Ves 429, 445; CPR rule 19.8(4)(a) and Parkin v Thorold (1852) 16 Beav 59, 66-67 ref. In regard to present case concerning gypsies and travellers, newcomer injunctions are generally made in cases where the affected gypsies and travellers are unlikely to have any right or liberty to set up unauthorised encampments on the relevant local authority land. The injunctions therefore seek to enforce the local authorities’ legal rights in proceedings where there is no real dispute to be resolved. Experience has shown that the usual processes of eviction, or even injunction, against named gypsies and travellers are inadequate because, by the time the local authority has commenced proceedings, the original group will often have left and been replaced by others, against whom the proceedings are of no effect. Local authorities therefore seek newcomer injunctions because they provide an effective means of vindicating their legal rights. Even when they are interim in form, newcomer injunctions operate in substance against newcomers on a medium to long-term basis, rather than as an emergency short-term measure to protect local authorities’ rights pending a later trial process. The applicable principles and safeguards for grant of newcomer injunctions will evolve over time in the light of the experience of the courts where applications for such injunctions are made. However, newcomer injunctions to prohibit unauthorised encampments by gypsies and travellers are only likely to be justified if, first, the applicant local authority has demonstrated that, on the available evidence, there is a compelling need to protect civil rights or enforce public law that is not adequately met by any other remedies. Secondly, because newcomer injunctions are made without notifying the affected newcomers, procedural safeguards must be built into both the application and the court order. The application for the injunction should be advertised widely so that those likely to be affected by it (or bodies representing their interests like the appellants) are given a fair opportunity to make representations before the injunction is made. Once the injunction has been granted, it must be displayed in a prominent location at the affected site. Newcomers who become aware of it should have notified clearly to them the right to apply to court to have it varied or set aside, without having to show that circumstances have changed. Thirdly, because the interests of gypsies and travellers are not typically represented at the hearings where newcomer injunctions are granted, the applicant local authorities will be obliged to comply with a strict duty which requires them to disclose to the court (after due research) any matter which a newcomer might raise to oppose the making of the order. Fourthly, newcomer injunctions should be limited so that they do not apply for a disproportionately long time period or to a disproportionately wide geographical area. Finally, the court must be satisfied that it is, on the particular facts of the case, just and convenient that a newcomer injunction is granted. Appeal was dismissed. Mark Anderson KC and Michelle Caney (instructed by Wolverhampton City Council Legal Services) for Ist Respondent. Nigel Giffin KC and Simon Birks (instructed by Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council Legal Services) for 2nd Respondent. Caroline Bolton and Natalie Pratt (instructed by Sharpe Pritchard LLP and London Borough of Barking and Dagenham Legal Services) for 3rd to 10th Respondents. Stephanie Harrison KC, Stephen Clark and Fatima Jichi (instructed by Hodge Jones & Allen LLP) for 1st Intervener. Jude Bunting KC and Marlena Valles (instructed by Liberty) for 2nd Intervener. Richard Kimblin KC and Michael Fry (instructed by HS2 Ltd Legal Department and the Government Legal Department) for 3rd and 4th Interveners. Dates of hearing: 8th and 9th February, 2023.