Summary: Acquittal ---- (a) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961----S. 6(5)(b)---Second marriage without prior permission---Jurisdiction of court---Corum non-judice---Petitioner contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of first marriage without seeking permission from the Arbitration Council or the first wife as required under S.6(5)(b) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961---Complaint was filed by the first wife nearly 3½ years after the second marriage and post-divorce---Learned Magistrate Section 30 tried and convicted the petitioner---Held, proceedings before Magistrate Sec-30 were corum non-judice as the court had not been conferred powers of a Family Court, which alone has jurisdiction to take cognizance and try offences under the Ordinance---Head-note of the original judgment revealed no designation or authority of the learned Magistrate as a Judge Family Court---Since trial was conducted by a court lacking lawful jurisdiction, entire proceedings were void ab initio and stood vitiated---Complaint was also held to be mala fide in light of delayed filing and family participation in second marriage.(b) Family Courts Act, 1964 (as amended by Punjab Amendment Act XI of 2015)----S. 5 & S. 20(3)---Exclusive jurisdiction of Family Court---Offences under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance---Cognizance of complaint---Complaint to be made by aggrieved party or Arbitration Council before Family Court---Only Family Courts designated under law have jurisdiction to try such matters as Judicial Magistrates of First Class---Amendments confer exclusive authority to Family Courts to entertain, adjudicate, and try such criminal matters---Since no proof existed that the trial Magistrate had been notified as a Family Court Judge, the assumption of jurisdiction was illegal---Established principle that when law prescribes a mode, it must be followed, and no alternative method is acceptable.(c) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973----Art. 175(2)---Jurisdiction of courts---Bar on exercise of jurisdiction without lawful conferment---No court shall exercise jurisdiction unless conferred by the Constitution or law---Any judicial proceedings conducted without lawful authority are null and void---In the present case, the court conducting the trial lacked jurisdiction under both statutory law and the Constitution.(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S. 561-A---Quashing of proceedings---Where trial was initiated by a court lacking jurisdiction, entire proceedings including judgments of appellate court stand vitiated---Jurisdictional defect goes to the root of the matter and renders trial a nullity in law.Cited Cases:• Muzaffar Nawaz v. Ishrat Rasool and others 2022 YLR 1920• PLD 2010 SC 585• PLD 1985 SC 62Disposition:Petition allowed---Judgments of both the trial court and appellate court set aside---Petitioner acquitted of charge---Bail bond discharged.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Art. 189---Precedent---Binding effect of Supreme Court decisions---Scope--- Judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal (“Tribunal”) was set aside for relying upon an earlier judgment [Appeal No.1815(R)CS/2017] that had already been reversed by the Supreme Court prior to the impugned decision---Held, once the Supreme Court has set aside a judgment, it ceases to be binding or authoritative for future reference---Tribunal’s reliance on a judgment no longer in the field was declared per incuriam and contrary to binding precedent under Art.189 of the Constitution---Even obiter dicta of the Supreme Court carries significant persuasive value---Legal principle reiterated that judgments rendered in ignorance of binding authority are not valid precedents. Cited Cases: • Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2010 SC 483 • Huddersfield Police Authority v. Watson, (1947) 2 All ER 193 • Morelle Ltd. v. Wakeling, (1955) 2 QB 379 • Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., (1944 KB 718) (b) Civil Service---Service Tribunals Act, 1973 ----Fixation of pay---Rounding off---Point-to-point formula---Tribunal’s jurisdiction--- Federal Government employees sought re-fixation of pay under the Basic Pay Scales, 2007, asserting denial of a 15% increase as approved by the President---Tribunal allowed the appeal by relying on earlier precedent---Held, fixation was carried out as per point-to-point formula and international accounting standards involving rounding off to nearest 5th or 10th increment---Such rounding practices are valid under IFRS and GAAP and cannot be termed arbitrary or discriminatory---Tribunal has no jurisdiction to interfere in policy matters unless the policy is shown to be patently illegal or unreasonable---Respondent’s claim was unsupported by law or evidence. Cited Cases: • Federation of Pakistan v. Abdul Rasheed Memon, SC Judgment dated 28.04.2022 (CPLA No.947/2019 & 974/2019) • Founding Minds, “Rounding Numbers in the Financial Domain”, [Online Source] • CPLA No.1815(R)CS/2017, FST Judgment (relied upon but set aside) (c) Evidence Act / Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ----Undertaking---Estoppel---Refund of monetary benefits--- Respondent employee had submitted a written undertaking agreeing to refund excess pay if the earlier Tribunal judgment (on which his case was based) was set aside---Despite this, respondent sought to benefit from the reversed ruling---Held, in view of the binding undertaking, respondent was estopped from claiming entitlement to revised fixation and consequential benefits---Court stressed enforceability of such acknowledgments and rejected subsequent contrary claims. (d) General Clauses Act, 1897 ----S. 21---Reversal of administrative benefit---Scope--- Tribunal misapplied S.21 of the General Clauses Act by holding that reduction of pay increase from 15% to 14.92% violated Presidential orders---Held, marginal rounding during fixation as per accounting standards does not amount to reduction of the sanctioned benefit---Administrative rounding aligned with financial policy, and no illegality was shown in the method adopted. (e) Limitation & Judicial Conduct ----Review petition---Concealment---Finality of judgments--- Respondent failed to disclose before Supreme Court that a review petition against the impugned Tribunal judgment had been dismissed---Such concealment was material and affected adjudication---Held, judgments attain finality unless challenged properly and transparently---Attempt to seek relief by suppression of material facts undermines judicial integrity. Disposition: Civil Petition converted into appeal and allowed. Judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dated 27.07.2023 set aside. Service Appeal No.134(K)CS/2021 dismissed.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan – Article 130(6) Cabinet Approval – Regularization of Posts – Financial Sanction Required The Supreme Court held that regularization of posts requires mandatory approval from the provincial cabinet under Article 130(6) of the Constitution. Cabinet approval is a collective responsibility and cannot be substituted by recommendations from cabinet sub-committees or any individual authority. Without proper budgetary sanction and adherence to the Rules of Business, such approvals lack legal validity. Cited Case: Mustafa Impex v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 2016 SC 808) (b) Punjab Government Rules of Business, 2011 – Rules 15(1), 19(1), and 19(3) Financial Consultation – Prerequisites for Regularization – Sanctioned Posts Required Under the Punjab Government Rules of Business, 2011, no new posts can be created, nor can financial expenditures be authorized, without consultation and approval from the Finance Department. Rule 19(1) specifically mandates consultation when financial implications are involved. In this case, no such approval was obtained, rendering the claims for regularization unsustainable. Cited Case: Government Of Balochistan v. Attock Cement Pakistan Ltd. (2024 SCMR 876) (c) Regularization – No Vested Right – Judicial Overreach The Court reaffirmed that regularization of contractual employees is not a vested right. It is contingent upon statutory or policy backing, budgetary allocations, and institutional needs. Courts cannot assume the role of appointing authorities or direct regularization without adherence to established procedures and approvals. Cited Cases: Vice-Chancellor, Bacha Khan University v. Tanveer Ahmad (2022 PLC (C.S.) 85) Khushal Khan Khattak University v. Jabran Ali Khan (2021 SCMR 977) Vice-Chancellor Agriculture University v. Muhammad Shafiq (2024 PLC (C.S.) 323) (d) Judicial Interference – Separation of Powers The Court emphasized that judicial interference in executive functions, particularly in policy matters like employee regularization, risks disrupting governance and violating the trichotomy of powers. Courts must respect institutional autonomy and refrain from encroaching upon executive prerogatives. Cited Case: Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Sher Aman (2022 SCMR 406) (e) Financial Implications – Budgetary Constraints The regularization of posts carries long-term financial implications. Without proper budgetary provisioning, sanctioned posts, and compliance with financial regulations, courts cannot compel the government to create posts or allocate funds through supplementary grants. Disposition: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Lahore High Court's impugned order. It ruled that the directions issued by the High Court for regularization and supplementary financial provisioning were beyond its jurisdiction and contrary to established legal principles.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) ----Arts. 25(3), 25A, 35 & 37(e)—Child Justice—Rights of children—Best interests of the child—Maintenance allowance—Role of judiciary in child-centered justice. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of a child justice approach in cases involving children, prioritizing their rights, well-being, and best interests in all judicial processes. In the present case, a minor filed a suit for maintenance against his father after the death of his mother. The trial court decreed maintenance at Rs. 5,000 per month with a 10% annual increment, effective from 2009 until the child attained majority. Appeals by the petitioner were dismissed by the Additional District Judge and the Lahore High Court. The Court underscored that child justice demands sensitivity to children’s circumstances, ensuring access to education, shielding them from exploitation, and fostering an environment conducive to their growth. The constitutional framework, including Articles 25(3), 25A, 35, and 37(e), mandates the State to safeguard children’s rights, ensure free education, and protect them from exploitative practices. Furthermore, the judiciary must employ a rehabilitative rather than punitive approach in matters concerning children, aligning with both national and international standards, including the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). ------Cited Documents and Principles: United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) Nelson Mandela Children's Fund Address (1995) ------(b) Family Law—Maintenance of child—Responsibility of parents—Scope and determination. The father’s duty to provide maintenance to his child is a fundamental legal and moral obligation. The Court held that financial responsibility towards a child remains unaffected by parental separation or divorce. The judicial determination of maintenance must ensure adequacy, fairness, and consistency with the child’s best interests, providing increments to adjust for inflation and changing financial needs. ------(c) International Law—United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC)—Child rights framework. As a signatory to the UNCRC, Pakistan is obligated to adopt measures prioritizing the best interests of the child in judicial, administrative, and legislative processes. The guiding principles include fair treatment, participation rights, protection from abuse, and restorative justice. Courts must uphold these principles while adjudicating cases involving children. ------(d) Administration of Justice—Child-centered justice—Judicial sensitivity and responsibility. The judiciary must adopt a child-centered approach in cases involving minors, recognizing their vulnerabilities and developmental needs. Judicial processes must be rehabilitative rather than punitive, ensuring dignity, fairness, and a focus on the child’s long-term well-being. Courts must create an enabling environment for children, ensuring their voices are heard and their rights are protected. ------Disposition: Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal dismissed. Impugned order upheld in light of the best interests of the child and adherence to constitutional and international obligations.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) ----Arts. 185(3), 114, 151 & Order XLVII, Rule 1, C.P.C. Review application—Consent order—Scope and maintainability—Limitation—Grounds for review—Presumption of correctness attached to judicial proceedings. Petitioner filed a Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal under Art. 185(3) of the Constitution against an order passed by the Sindh High Court dismissing the review application filed under Order XLVII, Rule 1, C.P.C., read with Sections 114 and 151, C.P.C. The petitioner challenged an earlier consent order disposing of a Civil Revision Application, arguing that neither the petitioner nor his counsel gave consent for such disposal. The review application was filed after the statutory limitation of 20 days provided under Article 162 of the Limitation Act, 1908, and no application for condonation of delay was submitted. Furthermore, no affidavit from the petitioner or his counsel was attached to substantiate the claim that consent was not given. The Supreme Court held that consent orders recorded in open court cannot be reviewed without substantial evidence proving the absence of consent. It emphasized that judicial orders enjoy a presumption of correctness and sanctity, and mere allegations without supporting affidavits or evidence cannot be grounds for review. The review jurisdiction under Order XLVII, Rule 1, C.P.C., is limited to errors apparent on the face of the record, which was absent in this case. ---- Cited Cases: Dr. S.M. Qaim v. Raisul Hassan Naqvi (1981 SCMR 950) Allah Dita v. Bashir Ahmed (1997 SCMR 181) Muhammad Yaqoob v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Land) (1981 SCMR 519) Faizur Rehman v. Rahman Ud Din alias Mirza (1997 SCMR 1301) (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----Order XLVII, Rule 1 & Sections 114, 151—Scope of Review—Consent orders—Error apparent on the face of record. The Court reaffirmed that the scope of review under Order XLVII, Rule 1, C.P.C., is narrow and confined to correcting errors apparent on the face of the record. It cannot serve as a substitute for an appeal or re-hearing of the case. In cases of consent orders recorded in open court, subsequent claims of lack of consent must be supported by affidavits from the parties or their counsel. Mere allegations, unsupported by evidence, cannot form the basis for reviewing a consent order. (c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) ----Art. 162—Limitation for review application—Condonation of delay. The limitation period for filing a review application under Article 162 of the Limitation Act is 20 days. Failure to file within this period without seeking condonation of delay renders the application liable to dismissal. (d) Administration of Justice—Sanctity of judicial orders. Presumption of correctness and sanctity is attached to judicial proceedings, orders, and judgments. Such orders cannot be lightly impeached unless there is clear evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, or error apparent on the face of the record. Allegations without affidavits or supporting documents are insufficient to challenge the validity of judicial orders. ---- Disposition: Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal dismissed in limine.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 63A Defection from political party---Restoration of membership---Authority of the Election Commission. The Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) does not have the authority to confirm the declaration of defection made by the party head without adherence to the procedural safeguards under Art. 63A of the Constitution. In this case, the appellant's membership in the National Assembly from NA-262 was restored as an independent member after the Court found procedural irregularities in the ECP's decision to confirm the party head's declaration of defection. -------- (b) Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) Scope of powers under Art. 63A---Procedural fairness. The ECP’s role under Art. 63A is quasi-judicial, requiring adherence to principles of natural justice. The Court emphasized that the confirmation of defection declarations must follow due process, including providing the accused member an opportunity to contest allegations of defection. Cited principles: Procedural fairness Right to due process -------- (c) Parliamentary membership Restoration of seat---Independent status post-defection. Where defection from a political party is not validly established, the member retains their parliamentary seat as an independent member. The Court held that the appellant, despite being disassociated from the Parliamentary Party of PML(N), was entitled to continue as a member of the National Assembly. -------- (d) Interpretation of party head's declaration Binding nature of declarations---Judicial oversight. Declarations of defection by party heads are subject to judicial scrutiny to ensure compliance with constitutional and legal safeguards. The party head’s authority under Art. 63A does not override the member’s right to due process and a fair hearing.

Summary: (a) Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973) ----S. 22---Pay protection---Employees of autonomous bodies---Scope---Respondent, initially employed in Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) under Special Pay Scales (SPS), was appointed through proper channel as Assistant Director (Admin) (BS-17) in the Department of Libraries, Ministry of Education (Defunct)---Claim for pay protection was allowed by the Federal Service Tribunal (FST) but challenged by the government on the ground that PAEC employees were not entitled to pay protection under the applicable policy framework---Supreme Court held that employees of autonomous organizations, which do not adopt the Basic Pay Scale (BPS) in totality, are not entitled to pay protection upon appointment in government service---PAEC employees, being under a separate Special Pay Scale (SPS) regime, did not qualify for pay protection under Finance Division’s Office Memorandums (OMs) dated 12.08.2002 and 08.06.2010---Impugned FST judgment set aside accordingly. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Azam Chaudhry v. Federation of Pakistan (C.A. No. 1158 of 2009) • The Ministry of Finance through Secretary, Government of Pakistan v. Atiq-ur-Rehman (C.P. No. 5046 of 2017) • Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 483) (b) Fundamental Rules & Supplementary Rules (FR&SR) ----F.R.22---Initial substantive pay---Scope and applicability---Under F.R.22, an employee appointed to a new post involving greater responsibilities is entitled to initial pay protection under prescribed conditions---Supreme Court held that F.R.22 applies strictly to civil servants and does not extend to employees of statutory autonomous bodies transitioning to government service unless the autonomous body has adopted the Basic Pay Scale (BPS) scheme in totality---Employees under Special Pay Scales (SPS) or other non-BPS frameworks cannot claim pay protection under F.R.22 or relevant Finance Division policies. (c) Administration of Justice ----Federal Service Tribunal (FST)---Decision per incuriam---Binding precedent under Article 189 of the Constitution---FST had relied on its earlier decision in Muhammad Banaras v. Secretary Finance, which was later challenged in the Supreme Court but dismissed on technical grounds without deciding any legal question---Supreme Court held that FST failed to consider binding precedent from a five-member bench in Muhammad Azam Chaudhry v. Federation of Pakistan, which categorically excluded pay protection for employees of statutory autonomous bodies joining government service---Impugned judgment passed by FST was declared per incuriam as it ignored settled law. (d) Constitutional Law ----Article 189 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973---Precedent---Stare decisis---Scope---Supreme Court reiterated that where the Court deliberately settles a question of law, such pronouncement is binding on all other courts in Pakistan under Article 189 of the Constitution---Legal principles established in Muhammad Azam Chaudhry v. Federation of Pakistan and The Ministry of Finance v. Atiq-ur-Rehman were found to be binding and applicable to the present case, rendering the FST's decision erroneous in law.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Azad Jammu and Kashmir—Arts. 4(1) & (2), 17, 18, 19, 21 & 42-A ----Legislative competence — Reasonable restrictions — Judicial review— Challenge to Peaceful Assembly and Public Order Ordinance, 2024—Petitioners contended that several provisions curtailed constitutionally guaranteed rights of life, liberty, movement, association, assembly, and speech, and conferred judicial powers of review upon the executive. It was argued that although the legislature may regulate fundamental rights through reasonable restrictions, it cannot enact laws that abrogate or override the Constitution. Courts retain inherent authority under Article 42-A to test legislation for constitutional consistency. (b) Constitutional Law—Right to be heard ----Dismissal of writs in limine — Violation of audi alteram partem— Petitioners alleged that the High Court dismissed their writ petitions without hearing, thereby denying procedural fairness. Supreme Court held that the question involved substantial issues of constitutional interpretation and public importance meriting full hearing. (c) Reasonable restrictions—Public order and fundamental freedoms ----Balance between individual liberty and societal interest— Advocate General submitted that regulation of assemblies is necessary to protect life, property, and rights of others, and that the impugned Ordinance served that purpose within constitutional bounds. The Court observed that while reasonable regulation is permissible, its validity must ultimately be examined in light of constitutional guarantees. (d) Judicial conduct—Remarks from the bench ----Allegation of impropriety— Petitioners also sought inquiry into alleged remarks by the Chief Justice of the High Court said to have maligned the Supreme Court. The matter was noted but not adjudicated at this stage; focus remained on constitutional questions raised. Cited Cases: 2014 SCR 43; PLD 1983 SCAJK 95; PLD 1965 Lahore 42; PLD 1964 SC 673; PLD 2011 Karachi 99. Disposition: Leave to appeal granted in both petitions on questions of constitutional and public importance, subject to deposit of Rs. 1,000 security in each within one month; operation of Peaceful Assembly and Public Order Ordinance, 2024 suspended pending final decision of appeals.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Art. 189 --- Supreme Court decisions --- Binding effect --- Departmental consistency --- Applicability of precedents --- Tax authorities directed to respect binding judgments of Supreme Court and ensure uniform implementation across cases. The Supreme Court reiterated that its decisions under Article 189 of the Constitution are binding on all executive and judicial authorities in Pakistan. It was observed that inconsistent application or selective disregard of binding precedent by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) and field formations undermines rule of law. The Court emphasized the obligation of tax authorities to follow settled law laid down by the Supreme Court uniformly in similar matters. Authorities failing to do so may be exposed to contempt proceedings or internal disciplinary action. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --- S. 12(2) --- Finality of judgments --- Allegation of fraud or misrepresentation --- Proper remedy --- Scope. The Court clarified that once a matter has been adjudicated up to the level of the Supreme Court, it attains finality and cannot be reopened except through a valid review or a properly instituted application under Section 12(2), C.P.C., which must establish fraud or misrepresentation on the face of the record. No such allegation or evidence was available in the present appeals. (c) Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 & 2001 --- SRO 881(I)/2008 --- Amnesty scheme --- Scope and benefit --- Disputed eligibility --- Determination by tax authorities --- Jurisdiction of High Court. The appeals arose from disputes over eligibility of taxpayers under the tax amnesty scheme notified through SRO 881(I)/2008. The Supreme Court held that the FBR was bound to treat similarly placed taxpayers equally and could not arbitrarily extend or deny benefits. In cases where a factual inquiry was necessary to determine eligibility or compliance, the matter should be resolved by the tax authorities through a proper factual and legal inquiry. The High Court's interference without such inquiry was deemed inappropriate. (d) Supreme Court jurisdiction --- Appellate vs. review scope --- No second appeal permissible --- Court's jurisdiction limited to review in case of alleged error. Supreme Court noted that once civil appeals are decided, no further appellate remedy lies against its own decision. Only a review may be sought under Article 188 of the Constitution or relevant rules. Attempting to seek reopening of already adjudicated matters through new civil appeals amounts to circumventing finality of judgments and cannot be entertained. Disposition: All Civil Appeals (No. 350 to 698 of 2016) dismissed; Supreme Court reaffirmed earlier binding decisions and directed FBR to ensure consistent and lawful implementation thereof.