Summary: Core legal question is to examine whether there is any prohibition in the law against the splitting of works in a tender or the procuring agency is under an obligation to consider the division of the tendered works into smaller contracts and if the procuring agency has chosen to club or bundle different works in different sites, in one contract, is it obliged to give reasons for doing so? Held that there is no legal obligation on the procuring agency to split the work into smaller parts rather the obligation is otherwise under the law. Following directions were passed to the procuring agencies for the purpose of bringing transparency and fairness in the procurement process: (i) It is imperative in terms of Regulation 5 of the Regulations 2024 and Rule 8 of the Rules 2014, that annual development plan by each procuring agency with respect to the procurement to be carried out in that fiscal year is devised within one month of the beginning of fiscal year and the same must be made public. This would rule out possibility of tinkering and/or manipulation in any tender at the time of inviting bids; (ii) There is an administrative and executive discretion vested in the procuring agency to formulate and design the procurement plan by grouping and/or splitting the works for the purposes of ensuring widest possible competition and obviating the possibility of favouritism, however, once the said discretion is exercised, through an annual development plan, the procuring agencies are obligated to adhere to the same without splitting and/or regrouping the same in terms of Rule 9 of the Rules 2014; (iii) Adherence to Rule 8 of the Rules 2014 as to announcement of proposed annual procurement plan in a financial year is a legal obligation which stands as a bar and check upon the procuring agency to arbitrarily split and/or regroup the subject matter of procurement to tailor-make the same to extend favouritism; and (iv) A procuring agency should at least, at the planning stage, consider splitting of the work when it is tendering the same that are comprised of different geographical locations and different types of services/activities; and if it still decides to group them together in one contract then it should, at a minimum, state its reasons for doing so. This should be encouraged as a "best practice" amongst the procuring agencies to avoid any such challenges during the procurement process. 741Crl. Appeal- Against Conviction- PPC 583-23 SAJID ALI VS THE STATE ETC Mr. Justice Sadiq Mahmud Khurram 29- 01- 2025 2025 LHC 1689 2025 PCr.LJ 1412 [Lahore (Rawalpindi Bench)]

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act, 1964 — S. 25A(2b) — Transfer of cases — Scope of Supreme Court's power — Jurisdiction to transfer family matters from one province to another Applicant-mother sought transfer of guardianship petition and respondent-father's appeal from Islamabad to Karachi, citing hardship. Held, that under S. 25A(2b), the Supreme Court has the authority to transfer any suit, appeal, or other proceedings under the Family Courts Act, 1964, from one province to another. Such transfer is permissible upon application by any party, after notice and hearing, or suo motu. The instant application fell within the ambit of S. 25A(2b), and the Supreme Court was competent to grant relief. (b) Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 — S. 4A — Transfer of guardianship cases — Competence of courts — Distinction between transfer of guardianship cases under GWA and FCA Respondent-father contended that only High Courts are empowered to transfer guardian proceedings under S. 4A, GWA. Held, that while S. 4A empowers High Courts to transfer guardianship cases within a district, S. 25A(2b) of FCA provides an overriding jurisdiction to the Supreme Court for inter-provincial transfers of family matters. Guardianship proceedings, being a subject under the Family Courts Act, 1964, fell within the Supreme Court’s purview under S. 25A(2b). (c) Constitutional Jurisdiction & Article 175(2) of the Constitution — Jurisdictional bar under the Constitution — Whether Supreme Court can transfer guardianship cases Respondent-father argued that neither the Constitution nor the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, vests the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to transfer guardianship matters. Held, that Article 175(2) bars courts from exercising jurisdiction not conferred by law. However, the Family Courts Act, 1964, specifically confers jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court to transfer cases under S. 25A(2b). Since the Family Court is deemed to be a District Court for GWA purposes (per S. 25, FCA), the Supreme Court’s authority to transfer family matters under S. 25A(2b) overrides any conflicting interpretation of GWA. (d) Welfare of Minors & Judicial Precedent — Consideration of hardship — Principle of welfare of minors Applicant-mother faced difficulties due to the absence of family support in Islamabad. Respondent-father was a permanent resident of Karachi and could conveniently follow proceedings there. Reliance was placed on Anne Zahra v. Tahir Ali Khilji (2001 SCMR 2000), affirming that matters related to minor custody fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of Family Courts under FCA. Held, that transfer of proceedings to Karachi was justified in the best interest of minors. Disposition: Application allowed — Guardianship petition and family appeal transferred from Islamabad (East) to Karachi (East).

Summary: Sentence upheld ---- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 302(b)—Qatl-e-Amd—Discretion in sentencing—Normal vs. alternate punishment—Appellant convicted for murdering his wife by firearm—Trial court sentenced appellant to life imprisonment considering mitigating factors, including his young age, first-offender status, and unproven motive—High Court enhanced sentence to death on the ground that trial court did not comply with S. 367(5), Cr.P.C.—Held, S. 302(b), P.P.C. provides two alternate punishments: death or life imprisonment as tazir, and the courts must exercise discretion having regard to the facts and circumstances—Appellate court may not interfere with trial court’s discretion where mitigating factors exist—Trial court had explicitly recorded reasons for not awarding death—High Court erred in treating death sentence as the normal punishment without appreciating the mitigating circumstances already judicially acknowledged— Cited Cases: • Ghulam Mohyuddin v. The State 2014 SCMR 1034 • Hassan v. The State PLD 2013 SC 793 • Dilawar Hussain v. The State 2013 SCMR 1582 • Muhammad Aslam v. The State 2007 SCMR 1412 • Khalid Mehmood v. The State 2011 SCMR 664 • Najiba v. Ahmed Sultan 2001 SCMR 988 • Khurram Malik v. The State PLD 2006 SC 354 (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 367(5)—Punishment other than death in capital offences—Requirement to record reasons—Held, where sentence of life imprisonment is awarded instead of death in an offence punishable under S. 302(b), P.P.C., trial court must record specific reasons—Trial court in present case complied with this obligation by noting age, lack of prior record, and lack of proven motive—High Court misapplied S. 367(5) and erroneously assumed reasons were absent—Provision applies to trial courts only and not to appellate or revisional courts. Cited Cases: • Ghulam Mohyuddin v. The State 2014 SCMR 1034 • Haji Muhammad Ilahi v. Muhammad Altaf 2011 SCMR 513 • Asad Mehmood v. Akhlaq Ahmed 2010 SCMR 868 **(c) Criminal Trial—Sentence— ----Principle of proportionality—Mitigating circumstances— Held, in sentencing for qatl-e-amd under S. 302(b), P.P.C., courts must balance retributive, deterrent, and reformative goals—Multiple precedents hold that even a single mitigating factor may justify awarding life imprisonment instead of death—Factors such as unproven motive, young age, lack of prior criminal record, and questionable recovery of weapon were present in this case—Appellant’s conviction was upheld, but sentence of death was not warranted in light of mitigating factors. Cited Cases: • Amjad Shah v. The State PLD 2017 SC 152 • Nadeem alias Nanha v. The State 2010 SCMR 949 • Zafar Iqbal v. The State 2017 SCMR 1721 • Muhammad Asif v. Muhammad Akhtar 2016 SCMR 2035 • Abdul Haque v. The State PLD 1996 SC 1 (d) Sindh Arms Act, 2013 ----S. 23(1)(a)—Conviction for unlawful possession of firearm—Sentence upheld—Recovery of firearm led by appellant was questioned due to simultaneous submission of spent bullets and weapon to Forensic Lab—Held, even if firearm recovery deemed doubtful, prosecution proved guilt through consistent and confidence-inspiring ocular and medical evidence—Conviction under Sindh Arms Act and corresponding sentence and fine maintained. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 544-A—Compensation to heirs of deceased—Amount of Rs. 200,000/- awarded to legal heirs by trial court—Held, compensation to remain intact and recoverable as arrears of land revenue—In case of default, appellant to undergo six months’ simple imprisonment. (f) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 9—Right to life—Judicial discretion in awarding sentence—Held, life and liberty are constitutionally protected rights—Exercise of sentencing discretion must favor preservation of life where justified—Recognition of mitigating circumstances aligns with constitutional principles protecting individual rights. **(g) Criminal Appeal—Scope of interference with acquittal— ----Standard of review—High Court had acquitted co-accused after reappraisal of evidence for lack of incriminating material—Held, presumption of double innocence attaches to acquittal—Supreme Court declined to interfere, finding acquittal to be well-reasoned and not perverse. Cited Case: • Haji Muhammad Ilahi v. Muhammad Altaf 2011 SCMR 513 Disposition: Appeal partially allowed—Conviction under S. 302(b), P.P.C. maintained—High Court’s enhancement of sentence from life imprisonment to death set aside—Life sentence awarded by trial court restored—Compensation under S. 544-A, Cr.P.C. upheld—In case of default, appellant to undergo six months’ simple imprisonment—Conviction and sentence under S. 23(1)(a) of the Sindh Arms Act also upheld—All sentences to run concurrently—Benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. extended to the appellant—Appeal against acquittal of co-accused dismissed.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan — Arts. 191A(4), 184(3) & 189 — Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court — Challenge to vires of sub-section (2) of Section 221-A of the Customs Act, 1969 — Competence of the Regular Bench to hear the matter Held, that under Article 191A(4) of the Constitution, Committees constituted under the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023, are the legal and constitutional fora to determine bench composition. The Regular Bench had assumed jurisdiction over the CPLAs without lawful authority. Orders dated 13.01.2025 and 16.01.2025 passed in these cases were declared void ab initio and recalled accordingly. (b) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 — S. 2(1) — Judicial functions of Committees in Bench assignment Held, that powers exercised by the Committees under the Act do not encroach upon judicial functions. Their role is limited to determining which Bench hears specific matters. Any order passed in violation of this framework is void. (c) Contempt Proceedings Against Additional Registrar — Criminal Original Petition No.1/2025 — Notice issued to Additional Registrar (Judicial) regarding contempt proceedings — Subsequently challenged in Criminal Intra Court Appeal No.1/2025 Held, that notice was withdrawn vide order dated 27.01.2025. Appeal disposed of by Larger Bench with a 4-2 majority. (d) Leave to Appeal & Notices to Attorney General — Leave to appeal granted — Notices issued to respondents — Attorney General for Pakistan directed to appear under Order XXVI-A, CPC — Appeals arising from the instant CPLAs to be placed before the Constitutional Bench for adjudication Disposition: Orders dated 13.01.2025 and 16.01.2025 declared void — Leave to appeal granted — Matter fixed before the Constitutional Bench.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 190, 191A, 5, 176, & 185(3); Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court regarding withdrawal of cases by Committees and reconstitution of Benches—Effect of judicial orders—Committees constituted under Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 and Article 191A of the Constitution were found to lack authority to withdraw part-heard cases where jurisdiction had been assumed by a regular Bench—Supreme Court held that such withdrawal undermines judicial independence and the sanctity of judicial proceedings—Judicial orders cannot be undone through administrative decisions, even by Committees constituted under law—Administrative orders attempting to bypass judicial authority were declared unlawful—Reconstitution or withdrawal of part-heard cases is a judicial function, not an administrative one. (b) Contempt of Court ----Sections 17(3) of the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003—Explanation of non-compliance with court orders—Failure to comply with court orders regarding the fixation of cases—Court accepted the explanation provided by the Additional Registrar (Judicial), holding that there was no deliberate or mala fide intent to disobey judicial orders—Held, no evidence of contumacy or malice was found—Show-cause notice for contempt of court discharged. (c) Judiciary—Independence and Integrity ----Practice of hearing part-heard cases—Judicial independence—Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that once a Bench has assumed jurisdiction and partly heard a case, it cannot be withdrawn or reassigned without judicial justification—Judicial propriety mandates continuity of Bench unless recusal, conflict of interest, or other valid reasons are present—Administrative interference in judicial proceedings is inconsistent with the principle of independence of the judiciary. (d) Committees under Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ----Authority of Committees—Administrative orders—Committees under the Act and Article 191A of the Constitution were found to have exceeded their jurisdiction by passing administrative orders contravening judicial orders—Such orders were declared without lawful authority and ineffective—Matter referred to the Full Court for authoritative resolution. ----- Cited Cases: Pir Sabir Shah v. Shad Muhammad Khan (PLD 1995 SC 66) Fazlul Quader Chowdhry v. Abdul Haque (PLD 1963 SC 486) Marbury v. Madison (5 US 137 [1803]) Human Rights Case No.14959-K of 2018 (PLD 2019 SC 183) Contempt proceedings against Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani (PLD 2012 SC 553) Raja Amer v. Federation of Pakistan (PLJ 2024 SC 114). ------ Disposition: Matter regarding contempt of court by Committees referred to the Full Court for collective deliberation—Additional Registrar’s explanation accepted—Show-cause notice discharged—Main case to be fixed before the original Bench in February 2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199—Concurrent findings of lower courts—Judicial review—Scope of interference—Held, concurrent findings of facts recorded by courts below are not sacrosanct and can be interfered with where found to be arbitrary, perverse, or contrary to law. Reliance placed on Hajid Wajdad v. Provincial Government (2020 SCMR 2046) and Subedar (Retd.) Jamil Khan v. Salim Khan (2017 SCMR 860). (b) Power of Attorney—Revocation ----Attorney's authority—Condition of prior permission—Held, an attorney acting on a General Power of Attorney cannot transfer property in favor of themselves or their kith and kin without obtaining specific written permission from the principal. Failure to meet this condition renders such transactions invalid. Relying on Mst. Naila Kausar v. Sardar Muhammad Bakhsh (2016 SCMR 1781) and Mst. Shumal Begum v. Mst. Gulzar Begum (1994 SCMR 818). (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----O.VII, R.11—Rejection of plaint—Effect—Dismissal of a prior suit for injunction or related proceedings does not bar subsequent suits seeking relief for distinct causes of action, such as cancellation of fraudulent transactions. Held, the doctrine of election or res judicata does not apply in such cases. (d) Fraudulent transactions ----Fraud—Effect on transactions—Fraudulent transfer of property by an attorney in favor of their real brother based on a revoked General Power of Attorney. Held, fraud vitiates even solemn proceedings, and a transaction executed in such circumstances cannot sustain. (e) Sale Deeds ----Proof of consideration—Burden of proof—Beneficiary of a sale deed is required to establish the validity of the transaction, including proof of consideration and transfer of possession. In the absence of evidence of consideration, the transaction is deemed invalid. Cited Cases: • Mst. Naila Kausar v. Sardar Muhammad Bakhsh (2016 SCMR 1781) • Mst. Shumal Begum v. Mst. Gulzar Begum (1994 SCMR 818) • Hajid Wajdad v. Provincial Government (2020 SCMR 2046) • Subedar (Retd.) Jamil Khan v. Salim Khan (2017 SCMR 860) ----- Disposition: Petition allowed. Concurrent judgments and decrees of the courts below set aside. Suit for cancellation of the sale deed decreed in favor of the petitioners. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---Arts. 175, 176, 191A, 204(c), and 187; Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023, Ss. 2 & 2A--- Judicial independence and administrative authority---Scope and interplay between judicial orders and administrative decisions of Committees constituted under Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023, and Article 191A(4) of the Constitution---Maintainability of Committees' administrative decisions affecting judicial proceedings---Registrar explained non-fixation of cases (CPLA 836-K/2020) based on decisions of two Committees dated 17.01.2025, which referred cases to a Constitutional Bench instead of a Regular Bench---Contention raised that judicial orders fixing cases for hearing before a Bench could not be overridden by administrative decisions of the Committees. Held: (i) Judicial orders, under the constitutional mandate of Articles 175 and 176, cannot be superseded by administrative decisions as this would undermine judicial independence; (ii) All cases pending before the Supreme Court must first be reviewed by the Committee constituted under Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023, and any jurisdictional questions must be referred to the Committee constituted under Article 191A(4) as per Section 2A; and (iii) Administrative orders inconsistent with judicial orders are void and have no legal standing. (b) Administration of justice ---Judicial power vis-à-vis procedural regulation by Committees--- Judicial orders fixing cases for hearing cannot be undone or varied by Committees exercising administrative and procedural powers---Judicial independence forms the cornerstone of constitutional governance and cannot be subordinated to administrative decisions. (c) Contempt of court ---Scope of judicial contempt--- Registrar's explanation of non-compliance with judicial orders evaluated---Court determined that the legality of the Registrar’s defense hinged on whether administrative orders of Committees could lawfully override judicial orders, raising substantial questions about judicial independence and procedural regularity. (d) Full Court hearing ---Serious constitutional implications warranting adjudication by Full Court--- Court held that questions concerning the scope of administrative Committees’ authority and their impact on judicial independence should be adjudicated by the Full Court for definitive resolution. ------ Cited Cases: Malik Asad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 161) Human Rights Case regarding disposal of infectious waste in KP (PLD 2019 SC 183) Muhammad Imtiyaz v. Ch. Muhammad Naeem (PLD 2023 SC 306) ------ Disposition: Hearing adjourned to 23 January 2025 for further arguments. Additional amici curiae appointed to assist the Court, with notice issued to ensure their participation.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---Arts. 190, 5 & 191A; Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023, S. 2--- Jurisdictional conflict between judicial orders and administrative decisions---Questions of public importance concerning the authority of Committees constituted under Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023, and Article 191A of the Constitution---Maintainability of administrative decisions overriding judicial orders---Registrar of the Supreme Court explained non-fixation of cases (CPLA 836-K/2020, etc.) based on decisions of the Committees under Section 2 of the Act and Article 191A of the Constitution---Cases challenging the vires of the 26th Constitutional Amendment were scheduled before the Constitutional Bench instead of the regular Bench as per the Committees' directions---Contention raised that the judicial orders fixing hearing dates before the regular Bench could not be nullified through administrative decisions of the Committees---Held, under Article 190 of the Constitution, all authorities must act in aid of judicial orders and not administrative orders---Article 5 mandates every citizen, including Court officers, to obey the Constitution and the law---The legality of the Registrar's explanation and the contempt proceedings depended on determining whether the Committees could withdraw cases from a regular Bench or override judicial orders through administrative decisions. (b) Administration of justice ---Judicial authority vis-à-vis administrative decisions--- Judicial powers of the Supreme Court cannot be curtailed or overridden by administrative decisions---Held, Committees acting on the administrative side lack authority to undo judicial orders regarding fixation of cases---Propriety demanded that the matter be referred to the Full Court for adjudication due to its implications for the judicial powers of all judges of the Supreme Court. (c) Contempt of court ---Compliance with judicial orders---Registrar's explanation for non-compliance evaluated--- Registrar presented justification for non-fixation of cases based on administrative decisions by the Committees under Section 2 of the Act and Article 191A of the Constitution---Court directed amici curiae to assist in determining whether administrative orders could override judicial orders and whether such actions amounted to contempt of court. Cited Cases: Malik Asad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan (1998 SCMR 15, 1998 SCMR 130, PLD 1998 SC 161) Human Rights Case No.14959-K (PLD 2019 SC 183) Nusrat Bhutto v. Chief of the Army Staff (PLD 1977 SC 657) Syed Zafar Ali Shah v. General Pervez Musharraf (PLD 2000 SC 869) CJP Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry v. President of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 61) Justice Qazi Faez Isa v. President of Pakistan (2019 SCMR 1875) ----- Disposition: Hearing adjourned to 22 January 2025 for arguments. Amici curiae appointed to assist the Court in addressing the substantial questions of law, with notice issued to the Attorney General for Pakistan for assistance.

Summary: (a) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act (XVII of 2023) ---S. 2--- Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 191A, 184(3), 190, 5, 176--- Part-heard cases---Authority to withdraw or reassign---Limits of administrative powers---Judicial independence---Jurisdictional questions---Effect of judicial orders--- Held, that once a Bench of the Supreme Court has taken cognizance of a matter and has partly heard it, that Bench assumes exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Neither the Chief Justice nor any Committee constituted under S.2 of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 or under Art. 191A of the Constitution has the authority to withdraw such part-heard cases or transfer them to another Bench, except upon a judicial order passed by the Bench seized of the matter or under express statutory provision. The principles of judicial independence, propriety, and continuity mandate that once a Bench is seized of a matter, it must ordinarily see it through to its conclusion unless a valid judicial reason—such as recusal or unavailability—necessitates reconstitution. Held further, that any act of reassigning or reconstituting a Bench once it has started hearing a matter partakes the character of a judicial act, and not merely an administrative function. Arbitrary reassignment without the Bench’s judicial order undermines judicial independence, the rule of law, and public confidence in the judiciary. Held also, that the Bench was validly hearing arguments on its own jurisdiction, which is a threshold matter distinct from adjudicating on the constitutionality of the impugned law, and this exercise did not attract the exclusionary scope of Art. 191A(3). —Cited Cases: • Pir Sabir Shah v. Shad Muhammad Khan PLD 1995 SC 66 • Fazlul Quader Chowdhry v. Abdul Haque PLD 1963 SC 486 • Marbury v. Madison (5 US 137 [1803]) • Asad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan 1998 SCMR 15, 130 • Human Rights Case No. 14959-K of 2018 PLD 2019 SC 183 • Raja Amer Khan’s case (judicial endorsement of Committee under Act XVII of 2023) • Muhammad Imtiyaz’s case • Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani’s contempt case PLD 2012 SC 554 • Registrar, High Court of Sindh v. Supreme Court PLD 2007 SC 578 (b) Constitutional Law---Judicial Orders vs. Administrative Directions ---Arts. 190, 5, 191A--- Effect of administrative order on judicial determination---Non-implementability plea---Scope and limitation--- Held, that no administrative authority, including the Committees under S.2 of the Act or Art. 191A of the Constitution, may issue directions that override or undo the effect of a judicial order. Administrative decisions that interfere with judicial adjudication violate constitutional safeguards under Arts. 190 and 5, and cannot be permitted. The Court reaffirmed the precedent that interpretation and enforcement of judicial orders fall exclusively within the judicial domain and cannot be disregarded or nullified by an administrative functionary or authority. (c) Contempt of Court---Suo Motu---Non-compliance with judicial order---Explanation by court officer---Effect--- Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003, S.17(3)--- Held, that the Additional Registrar (Judicial), to whom a show-cause notice had been issued, initiated compliance by forwarding the necessary note regarding constitution of the Bench but was constrained by the decisions of the Committees. He had no authority to constitute a Bench himself and thus could not have acted in deliberate defiance. His actions were not found to be contumacious or mala fide, and the show-cause notice was discharged accordingly. —Cited Case: Registrar, High Court of Sindh case, PLD 2007 SC 578 (d) Constitutional Procedure---Reference to Full Court---Institutional deliberation on judicial contempt---Scope and propriety--- Held, that although the alleged contemner (court officer) was exonerated, further proceedings may be warranted against the members of the Committees who, through administrative acts, unlawfully withdrew the part-heard cases from the Bench and thereby undermined judicial orders. However, due to the gravity and institutional nature of the matter, it was referred to the Hon’ble Chief Justice for constitution of a Full Court under Art.176 of the Constitution. The Full Court, unlike any Bench constituted by administrative order, derives its status from the Constitution and is the appropriate forum to authoritatively decide this issue. —Cited Constitutional Provisions: Arts. 176, 203J(2)(c), 203J(2)(d) Disposition: Legal questions (i) and (ii) were answered in the negative. The explanation of the alleged contemner was accepted, and the show-cause notice was discharged. The matter of potential contempt by members of the Committees was referred to the Full Court for consideration.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 185(3)---Master and servant---Contractual employment---Termination---Reinstatement---Maintainability of civil suit---Scope---Employees of petitioner-Bank were terminated under disciplinary proceedings---Suits for declaration and reinstatement were decreed by civil court, upheld in appeal and revision by High Court---Petitioner contended that relationship being purely contractual, reinstatement could not be ordered under well-settled rule that courts do not enforce contract of personal service---Held, the leading authority Malik and Haq v. Muhammad Shamsul Islam Chowdhury PLD 1961 SC 531 was cited in support of proposition that even if termination is unlawful, reinstatement cannot be granted---Court questioned continuing applicability of said principle in modern context of large impersonal corporate employers and formalized disciplinary regimes---Observed that rigid application of said rule fails to reflect evolution of employment law and economic realities, including the structure of multinational and state-owned corporations and vulnerability of wrongfully terminated employees---Noted that equity requires legal rules to remain adaptable and responsive to changing societal frameworks---Held, the principle laid down in Shamsul Islam Chowdhury requires reappraisal on basis of first principles and contemporary needs. Cited Cases: • Malik and Haq v. Muhammad Shamsul Islam Chowdhury PLD 1961 SC 531 • Jubilee General Insurance Co. Ltd. Karachi v. Ravi Steel Company, Lahore PLD 2020 SC 324 • Muhammad Yaqoob v. Mst. Sardaran Bibi and others PLD 2020 SC 338 (b) Employment law---Private sector employment---Reinstatement v. damages---Equitable jurisdiction---Scope---Held, modern employment with corporate entities governed by detailed service codes and internal hierarchies diverges from traditional notions of personal contract between master and servant---Application of rigid doctrine barring reinstatement may in fact amount to denial of justice in circumstances where wrongful termination renders employee effectively unemployable and damages offer inadequate redress---Equity and discretion of court cannot be restricted by ossified rules that prevent development of law---Courts must retain jurisdiction to grant effective and meaningful relief in appropriate cases. (c) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023, S.2---Reference to larger bench---Binding precedent by five-member bench---Scope---Held, judgment in Malik and Haq v. Muhammad Shamsul Islam Chowdhury PLD 1961 SC 531 was rendered by a five-member bench---Any reconsideration of principle laid down therein requires larger bench of appropriate strength---Matter directed to be placed before Committee constituted under section 2 of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 for appropriate orders. Disposition: Leave to appeal granted. Interim relief granted on 15.04.2024 to continue. Office directed to place matter before Committee constituted under section 2 of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 for referral to larger bench.