Summary: 1. At the trial stage, Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. enables a defendant to seek setting aside of an ex-parte decree on proof that summons were not duly served or that sufficient cause prevented appearance. At the appellate stage, the corresponding remedy is provided under Order XLI Rule 21, C.P.C., which permits a respondent against whom an appeal has been heard ex parte to apply for rehearing of the appeal on similar grounds. The distinction between these two provisions of law is merely one of terminology/form, not of substance. An appeal is a continuation of the suit. When the appellate Court is satisfied that the respondent was not duly served, it may order rehearing of the appeal under Order XLI Rule 21, C.P.C. Such rehearing necessarily implies that the earlier ex-parte judgment cannot survive. It must first cease to operate. In effect, therefore, directing rehearing amounts to setting aside the earlier ex-parte judgment. If the previous order/judgment were to remain intact, there would be nothing left to rehear. 2. The Civil Law Court exercises plenary jurisdiction under section 9 of the Code of Civil Law Procedure, 1908 to try all suits of a Civil Law nature unless such jurisdiction is expressly or impliedly barred. The exclusion of jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred. Any provision seeking to oust the jurisdiction of a Court of general jurisdiction must be construed strictly. 3. Where a statute provides a special forum or bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Law Court, such bar operates only when the impugned action has been taken within the four corners of the statute. Where the authority acts without jurisdiction, in violation of the statute, or in disregard of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, the jurisdiction of the Civil Law Court remains intact. 4. Where the very competence of a public authority to impose a fiscal levy is questioned, the dispute strikes at the root of jurisdiction. In such a situation the Civil Law Court is not merely competent but duty bound to examine whether the demand has any foundation in law. If the statute does not authorize the levy, the bar of jurisdiction cannot be invoked to protect an action which itself is without lawful authority. 5. A Tehsil Municipal Administration has no independent authority to levy any tax, fee or cess. Its role is confined to proposing such levies to the Tehsil Council for approval. Even that power of proposal is not unlimited. It extends only to those taxes, fees and charges which are enumerated in Part-III of the Second Schedule to the NWFP Local Government Ordinance, 2001. Correspondingly, the Tehsil Council may approve only such levies as specified in part-III of the Second Schedule. The competence of TMA is therefore strictly confined to the entries appearing in Part-III of the Second Schedule. The statute draws the boundary of its taxing power. That is the full extent of its authority. Nothing beyond it. Nothing more. 6. Second Schedule to the NWFP Local Government Ordinance, 2001 authorizes the imposition of certain specified taxes, fees and charges, it does not provide for any cess on the transportation of timber from the jurisdiction of one Tehsil to another. A Tehsil Municipal Administration may propose only those levies which are enumerated in Part-III of the Second Schedule, and the Tehsil Council may approve only such levies as the statute itself contemplates. If imposition of the cess lacks statutory foundation as provided under NWFP Local Government Ordinance, 2001, the same would be ultra vires the statute and void ab initio. 7. The power to levy a tax or cess is not an inherent attribute of a public authority. It must flow strictly from the statute. A public authority cannot assume a taxing power which the statute itself does not confer. Where the legislature has specified the taxes and levies that may be imposed, the authority must act strictly within those limits. Any demand raised without statutory sanction is not merely irregular; it is without lawful authority and therefore void. The courts are bound, in such circumstances, to protect citizens from exactions unsupported by law.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss.8 & 42---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.115---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.172---Title dispute over property between former Ruler of Swat and Provincial Government---Present civil revision arose out of concurrent dismissal of the petitioners’ suit and appeal regarding suit property---Petitioners claimed to be legal heirs of the former Ruler of Swat and sought declaration, correction of revenue entries, injunction and possession while the respondents asserted Provincial Government ownership under the settlement record---Held: It was mentioned in the relevant notification that while the buildings were owned by the State of Swat, the land beneath them was the exclusive ownership of the Rulers of Swat---Mere possession as a licensee could not be considered as a proof of ownership of the Provisional Government---Respondents were required to justify the correctness of the revenue record through independent and reliable evidence but they failed to produce any record of lawful acquisition of the suit property---Concurrent judgments of the courts below suffered from misreading and non-reading of evidence and were not sustainable in law---Suit of the petitioners was decreed as prayed for---Civil revision was allowed, in circumstances. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Home and TAs and others v. Noorani Gul through LRs 2022 SCMR 1428 rel. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.172---Escheat---Unclaimed / ownerless property---The government has the right to take ownership of an unclaimed or ownerless property---It occurs when an individual dies or disappears with no will and no heirs and his property remains unclaimed for a considerable prolonged period of time. (c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss.8 & 42---Possession---Mere possession does not confer title. (d) Mutation--- ----Long-standing entries---Proof---Mere reliance on long-standing entries is of no avail when correctness and legality of those entries through independent, cogent and unimpeachable evidence is not proved. (e) Fraud--- ----Limitation---Fraud vitiates most solemn proceedings and thus period of limitation would not be an embargo upon justifiable claim directed against fraud---When the very foundational transaction is based on fraud and mala fide, the subsequent superstructure built thereon cannot be allowed to stand and ultimately collapses. Muhammad Rasheed v. Muhammad Ismail 2024 CLC 1451 and Mst. Nawab Bibi through LRs v. Hakim Ali and others 2024 CLC 895 ref. (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.115---Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court---Concurrent findings, interference in---Scope---High Court has got ample powers to upset concurrent findings of courts below. Nazim ud Din and others v. Sh. Zia ul Qamar and others 2016 SCMR 24 rel. Asghar Ali along with Nisar Ahmad, General Attorney for Petitioners. Haq Nawaz Khan, Addl: A.G for official Respondents. Date of hearing: 2nd March, 2026.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a)The learned counsel for the appellant endeavored to highlight certain omissions and discrepancies in the prosecution evidence; however, upon careful appraisal, such inconsistencies appear to be minor and confined to peripheral aspects of the occurrence. Variations of this nature are a natural consequence of human testimony and do not, by themselves, undermine the credibility of otherwise reliable and confidence-inspiring evidence. When the prosecution case is evaluated as a whole, the evidence forms a coherent and unbroken chain pointing towards the culpability of the appellant. Moreover, the complainant had prior acquaintance with the appellant, and the occurrence took place in broad daylight when the accused was in close proximity to the injured, thereby excluding any possibility of mistaken identity or false implication. (b) The absence or failure to establish motive is not fatal to the prosecution case where reliable ocular evidence otherwise establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The motive is often speculative and the real impetus behind the commission of an offence is best known to the accused himself; therefore, the absence of proof of motive does not impair credible eyewitness testimony. (c) The testimony of the complainant-injured remained unimpeached and found full corroboration from the medical evidence adduced by the doctor, while other corroborative circumstances further reinforce the prosecution narrative. It is equally well settled that the prosecution is not obliged to examine each and every witness to prove its case, and the learned trial Court, therefore, committed no illegality in recording the conviction of the appellant. (d) Section 337-N(2) PPC, containing a non obstante clause, confers overriding effect upon the provision in matters relating to punishment for hurt. The scheme of the section indicates that, in cases of hurt, the primary punishment ordinarily consists of payment of Arsh or Daman, while imprisonment by way of Ta’zir may only be awarded where the offender is a previous convict, habitual or hardened Criminal Law, a desperate or dangerous offender, or where the offence has been committed in the name or on the pretext of honour. The Honourable Supreme Court in Abdul Wahab and others v. The State clarified that where none of the aforementioned conditions exist, the imposition of imprisonment in addition to Arsh is not warranted. As regards the quantum of sentence, the record reflects that the appellant is an elderly person aged approximately between sixty-five to seventy years. The learned trial Court has already imposed a substantial financial liability upon him in the shape of Arsh amounting to Rs. 81,03,955/- along with additional amounts of Daman and compensation payable to the injured. In view of the appellant’s advanced age, the heavy pecuniary burden imposed, and the absence of any previous Criminal Law conviction, the circumstances appear to justify a degree of leniency in respect of the term of imprisonment.

Summary: The legal framework governing the transfer of immovable property mandates that an agreement to sell or an unregistered deed does not create any title, interest, or ownership in the property. Under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, documents affecting immovable property require mandatory registration, and Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, explicitly stipulates that a contract for sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. A party whose initial entry into the property was in the capacity of a tenant is legally estopped under Article 115 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, from denying the landlord’s title during the subsistence of the tenancy. It is a settled principle of law that a tenant cannot avoid eviction by merely asserting a claim of ownership based on an unregistered agreement.

Summary: Expert Opinion: For proper administration of justice and determination of authenticity, correctness, and legality of mutations, forensic comparison of admitted and disputed thumb impressions of Mst. Alia Zahir and signatures of Muhammad Zahir constitutes corroborative evidence through expert opinion. While courts are empowered under the provisions of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 to compare signatures and thumb impressions themselves, the absence of material witnesses necessitates reliance on expert opinion to reach a just conclusion. The foundational principle of jurisprudence is that law exists to foster justice, fairness, and protection of rights. Rules of evidence must be interpreted to advance justice rather than defeat it. Expert opinion, in this context, causes no prejudice to either party but aids the court in resolving disputes where direct testimony is unavailable. Dismissal of the application by the trial and appellate courts, without plausible justification, amounts to miscarriage of justice.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)----Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199----Dowry and bridal gifts---Recovery of alternate value of dowry articles---Scope of constitutional jurisdiction---Petitioner/wife challenged concurrent family court judgments whereby trial court had granted 30% alternate value of dowry articles but appellate court had set aside even that relief---Held, dowry articles and personal belongings of a wife remain her exclusive property and, where not returned in specie, she may claim their alternate value, subject to proof of existence, entrustment and retention---Appellate Court failed to appreciate material admissions and surrounding circumstances, including respondent/husband’s own stance that household articles were available in the house and his admission that no traditional dowry was given at the time of marriage, coupled with his assertion that he purchased various household luxuries during matrimony---Where original financial details were withheld by husband and wife’s bank record showed regular withdrawal of her salary for household consumption, presumption operated in favour of wife’s contribution---Appellate Court had, therefore, misdirected itself in discarding claim in toto merely on ground that wife had not produced her parents or further documentary proof. (b) Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act (LXXVIII of 1976)----Ss. 2 & 5---Dowry---Meaning and legal status---Property given to bride before or after marriage by her parents in connection with marriage constitutes dowry, excluding inherited property---Wife has absolute right in her dowry and bridal gifts---Any property rights available to a woman cannot be restricted, controlled or limited, and every gift becomes her exclusive property---There is no legal bar to a wife purchasing household articles herself after marriage and claiming them as dowry articles within the meaning of law, if such articles were acquired in connection with marriage and matrimonial home. Reliance placed on Ghulam Rasool v. Family Court 1991 CLC 1696 and Syeda Mehwish v. Additional District Judge, Islamabad (West) 2018 CLC 1337. (c) Family proceedings---Proof of dowry articles---Nature of evidence required---Strict rules of evidence---Held, wife’s solitary statement may be sufficient to prove existence of dowry items in a recovery suit, and oral testimony can substantiate a dowry claim because Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 does not apply in its strict sense to family proceedings---There is no rigid formula requiring receipts, shopkeepers’ details or production of parents in every case---Determination depends upon facts of each case and overall probabilities emerging from evidence. Reliance placed on Aziz-Ur-Rehman v. Mst. Bibi Jameela 2020 CLC 380 and Shafique Sultan v. Mst. Asma Firdous 2017 SCMR 393. (d) Dowry articles---Valuation of used household goods---Principles---Held, valuation of dowry articles is to be made case to case with reference to nature, quality, user period and prevailing market conditions---Judge, Family Court cannot adopt a bare rule of thumb without objective criteria---For assessing alternate value of used household articles, relevant factors include: present and past market value; years of use; average life of article; sentimental value attached to item; need to account for replacement at current price where article remains with husband; online market sources and auction platforms for valuation; reasonable depreciation; inflation and consumer price data; and average market prices supplied by parties---Used item may generally be considered at half price, but not below that level, unless marital breakdown occurred within first one or two years, in which case value may be considered around 80% in view of inflation and taxation---Family Court may use modern scientific tools, data, websites and market applications without requiring expert evidence in every case. Reliance placed on Mst. Ayesha Shaheen v. Khalid Mehmood 2013 SCMR 1049; Muhammad Zahid v. Mst. Ghazala Mazhar 2014 CLC 895; Mst. Samreen Bibi v. Judge Family Court PLD 2015 Lahore 504; and Haji Muhammad Nawaz v. Samina Kanwal 2017 SCMR 321. (e) Matrimonial property---Assets acquired during subsistence of marriage---Vehicle purchased in husband’s name---Claim of wife on basis of contribution---Islamic jurisprudence, comparative jurisprudence and equitable principles---Petitioner/wife claimed that vehicle bearing Registration No. AAK-478, Suzuki Cultus, though standing in husband’s name, was acquired with her financial contribution including initial seed money---Held, such asset required consideration not merely as dowry but as matrimonial property---Though under existing Pakistani law a wife does not automatically acquire ownership in husband’s assets merely by marriage, proprietary interest may still be established through proof of contribution, partnership, trust, gift or joint acquisition---Non-financial contributions such as homemaking, childcare and domestic management possess economic significance and can justify recognition of beneficial interest in assets accumulated during marriage---Marriage operates as a cooperative partnership and there should be no bias in favour of sole titled money-earner against homemaker or child-carer. (f) Islamic law---Marriage and property rights---Separate ownership of spouses---Legislative competence to protect women’s matrimonial rights---Held, under classical Islamic jurisprudence husband and wife remain distinct legal persons with separate property rights; wife retains control over her own property and does not, by marriage alone, become owner of husband’s property, nor does husband acquire wife’s property automatically---However, Islamic law does not prohibit legislation for protection of women in respect of matrimonial property where justice and prevention of hardship so require---Concepts of mut‘at al-talaq, maslahah, ijtihad and compensation for women’s contribution provide room for development of protective legal norms---Silence of classical law on community or matrimonial property does not bar modern legislation safeguarding women from post-divorce destitution and exploitation. (g) Comparative jurisprudence---Recognition of marital partnership and non-financial contribution---Held, in a number of jurisdictions including Malaysia, Indonesia, Iran, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Libya, Brunei, United Kingdom, United States and Canada, courts and legislation recognize direct and indirect contributions of spouses in distribution of matrimonial assets---Homemaking and childcare are treated as contributions of equal worth to financial input in appropriate cases---Principles of constructive trust, unjust enrichment, equitable distribution and community property regimes demonstrate a broader modern trend that marriage is an economic partnership and domestic contribution materially aids acquisition and preservation of wealth---Such comparative experience may legitimately guide development of family law principles in Pakistan. (h) Women’s rights---Constitutional protection---International obligations---CEDAW---Held, Pakistan, having ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), is under an obligation to reconsider its legal framework so as to eliminate discrimination against women in matters concerning ownership, acquisition, management and disposition of property, including consequences of dissolution of marriage---Equal protection of women, particularly homemakers and working wives, requires meaningful legal and policy safeguards in respect of assets acquired during marriage. (i) Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Writ jurisdiction---Limits on enhancement of relief---Held, High Court in constitutional jurisdiction does not ordinarily reappraise evidence to enhance relief granted by trial court---Although appellate court had erred in law and fact by denying wife’s rights altogether, High Court could not itself enhance trial court’s award from 30% to a higher quantified share on writ side---Proper course was to set aside both judgments and remand matter to Family Court for fresh decision after hearing parties and applying correct legal principles. (j) Recommendations/observations---Legislative reform---Nikahnama---Protection of wife’s property rights---High Court observed that every wife who cohabits with husband during subsistence of marriage should be deemed to have contributed, through domestic labour, childcare and household management, to establishment and maintenance of matrimonial home and family welfare---Recommended that Government initiate comprehensive legislation for equitable distribution of assets acquired during marriage, with enhanced protection for working wives and recognition of homemaker’s contribution---Further observed that Nikahnama may be amended, or appropriate condition inserted in existing form, to record agreement regarding equal division of property acquired after marriage, so as to better protect matrimonial property rights of women. Petition was allowed, judgments and decrees of Family Court and Appellate Court were set aside, and matter was remanded to Family Court for fresh decision after hearing parties, to be decided within two months.

Summary: Pending

Summary: In case of transfer of mortgagee rights through subsequent transaction in writing, the limitation would start running from that date.

Summary: (a) Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1974----R.11-A---Deceased son/spouse quota---Accrued right to appointment---Effect of subsequent declaration of invalidity of rule---Respondents, being spouse/children of deceased Sindh civil servants, sought appointment under Rule 11-A---Province contended that in view of General Post Office, Islamabad and others v. Muhammad Jalal (PLD 2024 SC 1276), Rule 11-A having been struck down, no appointment could thereafter be made, particularly when no formal appointment letters had yet been issued---Held, relevant event for accrual of right was death of civil servant, and as soon as death occurred, one of children and/or spouse acquired right to be appointed in service under the deceased quota---Submission of application and issuance of appointment letter were merely administrative acts and did not determine creation of right---Since right had already accrued in favour of respondents before abolition of the rule, subsequent judgment striking down Rule 11-A did not defeat such accrued entitlement. (b) Judgment of Supreme Court---Prospective operation---Accrued and closed rights---Held, judgments of the Supreme Court ordinarily operate prospectively and not retrospectively---Subsequent invalidation of Rule 11-A could not divest beneficiaries of rights already accrued prior to such pronouncement---Supreme Court had also clarified in a later decision that judgment reported as PLD 2024 SC 1276 did not wipe out accrued rights or disturb past and closed transactions---Therefore, respondents’ claims remained protected notwithstanding later declaration of invalidity of the enabling rule. Reliance was placed on Pir Bakhsh represented by his legal heirs v. Chairman Allotment Committee PLD 1987 SC 145 and Zahida Parveen v. The Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhawa and others (CPLA No.566-P/2024). (c) Constitution of Pakistan---Constitutional petition---Interference in appeal by Federal Constitutional Court---Held, Sindh High Court had rightly accepted writ petitions of respondents and directed Province to appoint them on deceased son/spouse quota, as no legal infirmity existed in its reasoning---Province’s objection that no right had culminated because appointment letters had not been issued was misconceived, since the substantive right had crystallized on death of employee and not on completion of administrative formalities---No case for interference was, therefore, made out. Petitions were dismissed, leave was refused, and appointments under deceased son/spouse quota were held protected on account of accrued rights arising prior to striking down of Rule 11-A.