Summary: Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)--- ----S. 14 (3) & 15---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. I, R. 10----Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Eviction petition---Parties to suit---Impleading of necessary party in ejectment proceedings---Intervener mala fides of---Petitioner, in post-remand proceedings, filed application under O. 1, R. 10, C.P.C. in ejectment proceedings on ground that as tenancy agreement was executed between respondents/landlord and tenant through the petitioner being attorney of the landlord, he had interest in ejectment proceedings and being intervener was to be impleaded as proper and necessary party in the proceedings for effectual and complete adjudication of ejectment petition---Landlord had revoked said power of attorney due to misuse of powers by petitioner---Trial court dismissed said application holding that Intervener/petitioner had no right or interest in the matter and the application was filed only to linger on the matter to harass landlord and to waste time of the court---Appellate court upheld the order of the Rent Controller---Ejectment application was accepted both by Rent Controller and appellate court---Contention raised by petitioner was that he had obtained possession of rented property from tenant and was still in possession---Validity---Petitioner had been unlawfully and illegally interfering in affairs of rented property, and caused prolonged delay in ejectment of tenant despite court ejectment orders---Petitioner, in the previously filed petitions, had specifically been declared not to be owner of rented property, but through the present petition he had frustrated the ejectment orders of courts below by obtaining injunctive order against concurrent findings of courts below on pretext of dismissal of his application under O. I, R. 10, C.P.C.---Petitioner had malafidely caused more than six years delay in execution of ejectment order by abuse of process of court---Such was mala fide and illegal interference of a stranger into rented property in ejectment proceedings---Petitioner had neither claimed possession of rented property nor had he the right to obtain the same from tenant---Landlord was entitled to the fruits of ejectment orders and whosoever was in possession of rented property was to be removed---High Court dismissing the present petition ordered that possession of rented property to be handed over to the landlord---Constitutional petition was dismissed with cost.

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. XXI, Rr. 89 & 26---Execution petition---Auction of property---Objections---Suit seeking declaration that proceedings before Executing Court were illegal---Scope---Objection was raised that the property to be auctioned was never allotted to the judgment-debtor---Executing Court dismissed the objection petition---Validity---Petitioner was not owner of suit shop to be auctioned by the Executing Court---Executing Court could not consider any document or orders passed in any other suit subsequently filed by the objector---Similar controversy could not be raised through another civil suit with regard to the same property---Objector could seek relief in a separate suit---Civil Court could neither declare proceedings of Executing Court as illegal nor regulate the property involved in the execution proceedings---Judgment and decree of one civil Court could not be nullified by another---Official Assignee (Nazir) had neither issued any notice to any of the judgment-debtor before inspection of property to be auctioned nor he appeared to have been physically present at the inspection---Report of Nazir did not disclose as to how and who identified suit shop to the inspection team---Proceedings in civil suit filed subsequently could not have any bearing on the orders of Executing Court---Applicant had no right to retain possession nor any order of civil Court passed in other civil suit would have effect of setting aside any of the orders of Executing Court for auction and possession to auction purchaser---Auction of suit shop was lawful and auction purchaser was entitled for possession being lawful owner under authority of Court order/decree---Official Assignee (Nazir) was directed to take possession of suit shop and hand over its possession to the auction purchaser---Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

Summary: Acquittal---The appellant is challenging the lower court's judgment, which had convicted and sentenced them based on charges related to the possession of 1200 grams of charas (a type of cannabis resin). The document summarizes the arguments presented by both the appellant's advocate and the Deputy Prosecutor General (D.P.G.) representing the State. The High Court examines the evidence and witnesses presented during the trial. There are discussions about the reliability of the prosecution's evidence, including contradictions between the statements of witnesses, concerns about the recovery process, and the delay in sending the recovered substance for examination by the chemical examiner. Ultimately, the High Court finds that the prosecution has not proven the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court highlights discrepancies in the evidence and points out that the prosecution has not adequately addressed various issues. As a result, the High Court sets aside the conviction and sentence, acquits the appellant of the charge, and orders the appellant's release from custody if they are not required in any other case.

Summary: Criminal Pre Arrest Bail (Counter Version case of injury ) Criminal Pre Arrest Bail (Counter Version case of injury ) During incident both the parties sustained injuries but those injuries had not been disclosed andsuppressed in the FIRs lodged by both the parties. Challan in both the cases have already been submitted before the concerned court. It is also for the trial court to determine as to which party is aggressor and which party is aggressed upon of-course which can only be determined after recording evidence of both the parties.

Summary: NCNS Act, 1997 ((No legal bar or restriction to consider statement of official witnesses)) o direct enmity or ill will has been suggested by the appellants against the complainant or any of the officials who participated in recovery proceedings during cross examination and therefore in the circumstances the police officials were good witnesses and could be relied upon if their testimony remained un-shattered during their cross-examination.

Summary: Background: The petitioner, a private limited company, filed a writ petition challenging the classification of imported goods, “Aluminum Plates White with Black,” and sought enforcement of earlier decisions by the Customs Appellate Tribunal. The petitioner claimed that the goods were misclassified under a different PCT heading by the customs authorities, despite earlier Tribunal decisions settling the classification. The petitioner also requested the release of the consignment under Section 81 of the Customs Act, 1969, pending final assessment. -----Issues: 1- Whether the customs authorities erred in reclassifying the imported goods contrary to the earlier decisions of the Customs Appellate Tribunal. 2- Whether the petitioner has a right to provisional release of goods under Section 81 of the Customs Act, 1969, while challenging the assessment. 3- Can the petitioner bypass the statutory appeal process and invoke constitutional jurisdiction in this case? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Reclassification of Goods: The court held that the customs authorities were within their jurisdiction to reassess the imported goods under Section 80 of the Customs Act, 1969. The petitioner’s claim that the goods should be classified based on earlier Tribunal decisions was deemed a factual issue requiring a merits review, which should be pursued through an appeal, not constitutional jurisdiction. Provisional Release under Section 81: The court rejected the petitioner’s argument for provisional release under Section 81, ruling that Section 81 is applicable only when the customs officer cannot make an assessment under Section 80. In this case, the goods were already reassessed under Section 80, thus making Section 81 inapplicable. Constitutional Jurisdiction: The court emphasized that the petitioner had an adequate and efficacious remedy through the statutory appeal process under Section 193 of the Customs Act, 1969. Invoking constitutional jurisdiction was not appropriate since the dispute involved factual determinations regarding the assessment of duties and taxes. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit, and the court reiterated that judicial review is not a substitute for statutory remedies. -----Citations/Precedents: SUS Motors (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi v. Federation of Pakistan (2011 PTD 235) Collector of Customs, Customs House, Lahore v. Messrs S.M. Ahmad & Company (Pvt.) Ltd., Islamabad (1999 SCMR 138) Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone ‘B’ v. M/s Farrokh Chemicals Industries (1992 PTD 523) The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Lahore v. Messrs Lucky Stores & Zubair Medical Stores, Lahore Cantt (1981 SCMR 656) Commissioner of Income-Tax, East Pakistan, Dacca v. Wahiduzzaman (PLD 1965 SC 171) M/s Assam-Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, East Pakistan, Dacca (PLD 1962 SC 295) Karachi Properties Investment Company (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi v. Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal, Karachi and another (2004 PTD 948) Collector of Customs v. Messrs Fatima Enterprises Ltd. (2012 SCMR 416) Collector of Customs v. Universal Gateway Trading Corporation (2005 SCMR 37) Province of Punjab through Secretary Communication and Works Department v. Chief Engineer (North/Central) Punjab Highway Department, Lahore (2021 SCMR 624) Khalid Mehmood v. Collector of Customs, Customs House, Lahore (1999 SCMR 1881)

Summary: Background: A constitutional petition was filed challenging the appointment of the Advocate General of a province. The petitioner argued that the appointment was unconstitutional because the individual appointed was over 62 years old, which is the retirement age for a High Court Judge under Article 195 of the Constitution. The petitioner contended that since the qualifications for the Advocate General are the same as for a High Court Judge, the age limit for judges should also apply to the Advocate General. -----Issues: 1- Does the retirement age of 62 for High Court Judges, as stipulated in Article 195 of the Constitution, apply to the position of Advocate General? 2- Is the appointment of an Advocate General over the age of 62 unconstitutional under Article 140 of the Constitution? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the retirement age limit specified for High Court Judges under Article 195 does not apply to the position of Advocate General. It was reasoned that the positions of High Court Judge and Advocate General are distinct, governed by different constitutional provisions. While Article 140 refers to the qualifications of a High Court Judge for the Advocate General, it does not incorporate the retirement age limit. The court found that had the framers of the Constitution intended for the age limit to apply to the Advocate General, it would have been expressly included in Article 140. The court cited several judgments affirming that the Advocate General holds office at the pleasure of the Governor and is not subject to the same restrictions as High Court Judges. The petition was deemed to lack bona fides and was dismissed with costs of Rs.25,000, as the issue had already been settled in previous rulings. -----Citations/Precedents: Malik Hamid Sarfraz v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1979 SC 991) Secretary, Ministry of Law, Parliamentary Affairs, and Human Rights, Government of the Punjab, and others v. Muhammad Ashraf Khan and others (PLD 2011 SC 7) Syed Aziz-ud-Din Kakakhel v. Governor Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Principal Secretary, and others (PLD 2019 Peshawar 145) G.D. Karkare v. T.L. Shevde & others (AIR 1952 Nagpur 330) Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd, Sonepat v. Their Workmen [1962 Supp.(3) SCR 89: AIR 1962 SC 1100] State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal & others (AIR 2010 SC 2550) Javed Ibrahim Paracha v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2004 SC 482) Muhammad Shafique Khan Sawati v. Federation of Pakistan (2015 SCMR 851) Premier Battery Industries Private Limited v. Karachi Water & Sewerage Board and others (2018 SCMR 365) Sanjeev Bhatnagar v. Union of India & others (AIR 2005 SC 2841) Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra & others [2005 (1) RCR (Civil) 232: (2005) 1 SCC 590] Holicow Pictures Pvt. Ltd. v. Prem Chandra Mishra & others (AIR 2008 SC 913) Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab & others [(2005) 5 SCC 136]

Summary: Development Projects, within domain of Local Government, cannot be carried out by an Administrator on recommendation of any MNA or MPA. An Administrator can perform functions only to continue public service, but cannot exercise powers conferred upon elected office bearers, in absence of elected Local Government.

Summary: Held that the powers blessed upon members of FIA under section 5 (5) of the Act of 1974 are not unfettered, rather are subject to certain restrictions and limitations, required to be used sparingly and in cases of exceptional nature. Mere possession of local money is not a crime until and unless the same is proved to be derived from any illegal means and without the commission of a predicate offence there could be no offence of money laundering. The provisions of section 14 (2) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010 requires a mandatory prior permission from the Court before passing the seizure of the bank accounts. Under section 25 of the AMLA, 2010 the reporting entities are only required to provide assistance to the Investigating Officer if such assistance is reasonably required and the investigation is carried out in accordance with the provisions of AMLA, 2010, whereas, this provision neither empowers FIA to order qua seizure of accounts nor does it mandate or require the reporting entities to take any adverse action against the individuals without due course of law. It is not requirement of Sec. 35 that the new licensee has to first complete all its entire marketing infrastructure before having licence for undertaking marketing of petroleum product/refined establish retail outlets and filling stations during the initial license period which are a part and parcel of the work programme as the said provision of law no-where places any embargo that the licensee cannot operate retail outlets or its storages during the initial license term of three years.

Summary: Whether Complaint of a single individual falls within the definition of Public at Large so as to attract the provisions of Section 9(a) (ix) & (x) of the NAB Ordinance; Held No.