Summary: Quo warranto --maintainability of this petition on the ground that private respondents were appointed in the year 2013 in Lyari Development Authority.alleged cause of action accrued to the petitioner in the year 2013 when the aforesaid appointments were made by the Lyari Development Authority and now he has approached this Court on 09.12.2020 after a delay of approximately 07 years from the date of the alleged cause of action. Thus his case falls within the ambit of the doctrine of laches.

Summary: [Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997 (Section 31 (7)) In light of the foregoing, we reach to an irresistible conclusion that the exercise of passing monthly FCA on to the petitioners on the basis of NEPRAs determination dated 27.12.2019 is in accordance with law and the timeline provided under Section 31(7) of the Act, 1997 be adhered to, unless any party is restricted for a reason beyond its control, which is a case at hand. The Petitioners clearly failed to avail statutory remedies under the law while the impugned determination was being made and even thereafter, nonetheless there is no cavil that the petitioners owe FCA component to K-Electric and liable to satisfy this debt. These instant Petitions being devoid of merit are accordingly dismissed.

Summary: Appeal Allowed---The appellant cited relevant sections of the Succession Act, 1925, and the Sindh Chief Court Rules to emphasize that investigative proceedings against a financial institution were not contemplated in succession proceedings. The appellant also pointed out that earlier orders had already sought the balance amount of the deceased's accounts with the appellant, and such information had been provided to the Court. On the other hand, Mr. Asim Mansoor Khan, representing the respondents, contended that since the deceased's accounts had been under restraint before his demise, any activity in those accounts could prejudice the interests of the legal heirs. He cited a circular to argue that legal heirs were entitled to obtain statements of account in the same manner as the deceased account holder. The respondents also emphasized that the Act was silent on seeking the kind of information requested by the impugned order. After hearing arguments from both sides, the Court set aside the impugned order, ruling that the order seeking statements of account from the financial institution was unmerited and not just and proper. The Court emphasized that succession proceedings were not adversarial in nature and that the legal heirs could seek appropriate proceedings in the appropriate forum if they had concerns about the deceased's accounts. The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order.

Summary: Acquittal granted-----Background: The appellant filed a criminal appeal under Section 417 of the Cr.P.C. against the judgment passed by the Magistrate 1st Class, Bahawalpur, which acquitted the respondent in a case registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). The allegation against the respondent was that he borrowed Rs. 1,500,000 from the complainant on 29.12.2011, issuing a cheque for repayment, which was dishonored upon presentation. The prosecution produced multiple witnesses, but the trial court acquitted the respondent. -----Issues: 1- Whether the respondent issued the cheque dishonestly for the repayment of a loan or to fulfill an obligation. 2- Whether the prosecution successfully proved the essential elements of Section 489-F PPC, particularly the existence of a loan or obligation. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court upheld the trial court’s acquittal of the respondent, stating that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of dishonesty or an obligation. The complainant did not produce the loan agreement as evidence, nor did they bring key witnesses, such as one of the signatories to the alleged loan agreement. The court also noted that the prosecution did not establish the exact circumstances under which the cheque was issued. The court reaffirmed that for an offence under Section 489-F PPC, it must be proven that the cheque was issued dishonestly, for the repayment of a loan or to fulfill an obligation, which was not proven in this case. The appeal was dismissed, and the acquittal was upheld. -----Citations/Precedents: Shah Jehan Khetran vs. Sh. Mureed Hussain and others (2005 SCMR 306) Naseeb Gul vs. Amir Jan and another (2013 P.Cr.L.J. 175) Maj. (Rtd.) Javed Inayat Khan Kiyani vs. The State (PLD 2006 Lahore 752) Shaikh Muhammad Aamir and another vs. Government of Sindh (PLD 2013 Sindh 488) Jalaluddin vs. Dileep and another (2018 YLR 697) Madawa through President vs. I.G.P. and others (PLD 2013 Lahore 442) Muhammad Saleem vs. The State (2011 P.Cr.L.J 428) Mehmood Khan vs. Sohail Khan and another (2017 P.Cr.L.J. 1305) Usman Ali vs. ASJ/JOP and others (2016 P.Cr.L.J. 323) Muhammad Ayub vs. Rana Abdul Rehman and another (2006 YLR 1852) Malik Safdar Ali vs. Syed Khalid Ali and others (PLD 2012 Sindh 464) Rashid Ahmed vs. Muhammad Masood and another (2020 P.Cr.L.J 1126) Muhammad Iqbal vs. Station House Officer and others (2009 CLD 1149) Muzaffar Ahmad vs. The State and others (2021 P.Cr.L.J. 1393) Muhammad Saleem vs. Muhammad Azan and another (2011 SCMR 474) Haji Amanullah vs. Munir Ahmed and others (2010 SCMR 222) Nawazul Haq Chowhan vs. The State and others (2003 SCMR 1597) Muhammad Azam and others vs. The State (2009 SCMR 1232)

Summary: Appeal under Section 70(13) of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015. The term "High Court" is nowhere defined in the "Act". This prompted the parties to raise the moot point. Part VII of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 deals with the judicature and Chapter 1 defines the Courts. In terms of Article 175(1), there shall be a Supreme Court of Pakistan, a High Court for each Province and a High Court for Islamabad Capital Territory and such other courts as may be established by law. Chapter 3 deals with the High Courts and Article 192 provides the composition and jurisdiction of a High Court. It would not be out of context to mention here that initially, Islamabad High Court was not in existence and it was ultimately established through Act No.XVII of 2010, dated 2nd August, 2010. By virtue of Section 4 of the said Act, jurisdiction of Islamabad High Court was extended in respect of the Islamabad Capital Territory, original, appellate, revisional and other jurisdiction, as under the constitution or the laws in force immediately before the commencement of the Act ibid, which was previously exercisable in respect of the said territory by the Lahore High Court. It is trite law that the Court cannot assume jurisdiction on the whims of the parties or to facilitate any of them. We cannot ignore the doctrine of forum non conveniens. It is founded on the principle that if some other forum is more appropriate and the interest of justice would be served better, the Court may decline to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a case could be suitably tried by another Court. The above doctrine has come under discussion before this Court in HASSAN SHAHJEHAN vs. FPSC through Chairman and others (PLD 2017 Lahore 665). The crux of above discussion is that word "High Court" used in sub-section (13) of Section 70 of the "Act" corresponds to Islamabad High Court and, as such, this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to ponder upon the decision of the "Appellate Tribunal".

Summary: Interpretation and scope of Order XXXII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Held that in a suit instituted against the minors, the plaintiff failed to seek appointment of Guardian ad Litem of such minors and the mother of the minors, who was a co-defendant, assumed the role of a guardian and appeared and filed the written statement and later on disappeared, the learned Trial Court erred in initiating ex-parte proceedings against the minors and passing an ex-parte judgment and decree as such an order/decree is against the mandate of Order XXXII, Rule 3 read with Rule 11 of the CPC. In the instant case, the learned Trial Court rectified the said error and set aside the ex-parte proceedings as well as ex-parte judgment but the finding was reversed by the learned Revisional Court without appreciating the principles enunciated by the Superior Courts in general and the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in particular in the terms that a minor should not be proceeded ex-parte and even if the Guardian ad Litem appointed by the Court fails to discharge his obligation, in defending the interest of the minors, he should not only be removed but in his place, the Court is obligated to appoint its own official as the guardian. It has been further held that the minors are vulnerable citizens and the Courts had inherent power, being parens patriae, to protect the interest of the minors, who require proper protection of the Court in terms of Principles of Policies enshrined in the Constitution, which envisage special protection to women, children as well as the marginalized citizens as per Article 35 thereof. Case reported as "Muhammad Amjad Khan Afridi and others v. Shad Muhammad and others" (PLD 2022 SC 27) is referred in this regard.

Summary: Background: The decree-holder, MCB Bank Limited, filed an execution application seeking recovery of Rs. 109.460 million based on a settlement agreement with the judgment-debtor, M/s. MAZCO Industries Private Limited. The initial consent decree was passed on 12.05.2017, which was later modified, reducing the decretal amount to Rs. 64.900 million. The judgment-debtor filed an application under Sections 19(7) and 2(b) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, seeking to transfer the execution proceedings to the Banking Court, claiming that the Lahore High Court lacked pecuniary jurisdiction after the reduction of the decretal amount. -----Issues: 1- Whether the Lahore High Court retains pecuniary jurisdiction to execute the decree after the reduction of the decretal amount to Rs. 64.900 million. 2- Whether the judgment-debtor is estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction after benefitting from the settlement agreements. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court dismissed the judgment-debtor’s application, holding that the pecuniary jurisdiction is determined by the original amount claimed in the plaint, which in this case was Rs. 109.460 million. The consent decree, though reduced, was conditional, with the original claim still intact in case of default by the judgment-debtor. The court emphasized that once jurisdiction is assumed based on the value fixed in the plaint, it cannot be lost due to a subsequent reduction in the amount. The court also invoked the doctrine of approbate and reprobate, noting that the judgment-debtor cannot claim the benefits of the settlement agreements and later challenge the court’s jurisdiction to delay payment. The application was dismissed, and the court retained jurisdiction over the execution proceedings. -----Citations/Precedents: Habib Bank Limited vs. Messrs Rehmania Textiles Mills (Pvt.) Limited (2003 CLD 689) Mashraq Bank vs. Messrs Amtul Rehman Industries (Pvt.) Limited (2002 CLD 336) MCB Bank Limited vs. Eden Developers (Pvt.) Limited and others (2019 CLD 219) Muhammad Khalid alias Khalid Mehmood vs. Muhammad Yousaf and others (2017 YLR 2347) Muhammad Yousaf vs. Mrs. Muhammad Mohsin and others (1986 MLD 342) Dr. Pir Muhammad Khan vs. Khuda Bukhsh and others (2015 SCMR 1243) Sardar Ali Khan vs. State Bank of Pakistan and others (2022 SCMR 1454)

Summary: [Companies matters (Companies Ordinance, 1984)] Incorporation does not fully cast a veil over the personality of a limited company through whichthe courts cannot see. The courts can, and often do, pull off the mask.They look to see what really lies behind. A corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule but when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime the law will regard the corporation as an association ofpersons

Summary: Subsequent enhancement of pecuniaryjurisdiction of the Civil Courts of district Karachi including DistrictEast will not attract the jurisdiction in this case since at the relevanttime the pecuniary jurisdiction was lawfully and rightly invoked.Consequential amendment under the ibid Act will not have aretrospective effect unless otherwise legislated accordingly

Summary: [Specific Relief Act, (Section 42 & 12 of Specific Relief Act)] Nil.Declaration, cancellation, damages, mandatory/ permanent injunction.Order 1 Rule 9 of CPC, Section 39,42 of Specific Relief Act.Necessary and non-necessary parties have to be distinguished.Registered Document can only be cancelled in terms of Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act.