Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969) — Ss. 25A, 25D — Determination and revision of customs value — Interpretation of “any person” — Scope of revisional power of Director General (Customs Valuation). Held, the phrase “any person” in s. 25A(1) is of widest amplitude and includes local manufacturers of goods identical or similar to imported goods under valuation. Such manufacturers are not strangers to the process and may provide relevant material to assist in fair determination of customs value; exclusion of local manufacturers from that expression is unwarranted. The subsequent insertion of the words “a local manufacturer” in s. 2(pa) by the Finance Act 2018 merely clarified existing law and overcame the restrictive interpretation adopted by the High Court. (b) — Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015, distinction from customs valuation — Remedies compared. Anti-dumping investigations under the 2015 Act address injury caused by goods exported at “dumped” prices below their normal value in the exporting country, whereas customs valuation under ss. 25–25D seeks to ascertain the true transaction value for duty assessment and to prevent under-invoicing. These are parallel but distinct regimes; resort to the National Tariff Commission is no substitute for participation in proceedings under s. 25A. (c) — Local manufacturers — Standing. A local manufacturer affected by under-invoiced imports may validly make a reference to the Director of Customs Valuation under s. 25A and furnish evidence such as price lists, catalogues, comparative market data, or production-cost information to aid determination. Their role is facilitative and does not convert the valuation process into protectionism. (d) — Revision under s. 25D — Extent of power. Revisional jurisdiction of the Director General (Customs Valuation) under s. 25D is broader than that under s. 115 C.P.C.; it is not confined to mere remand. The DG-CV may, on revision, revise or rescind the determination made under s. 25A, and may substitute, modify, increase or decrease the assessed customs value on the basis of material available, provided he acts within law. The High Court erred in holding that the DG-CV could only set aside and remand. (e) Statutory interpretation — Word “any” — Scope. The expression “any person” ordinarily denotes universality and is to be construed broadly unless the context compels restriction; inclusion of local manufacturers is therefore consistent with the object of s. 25A to ensure accurate and transparent valuation. ------ Disposition — Appeals allowed; impugned judgment of the High Court of Sindh dated 19-03-2018 set aside to the extent inconsistent herewith. Civil Miscellaneous Applications for impleadment and stay dismissed as infructuous.

Summary: (a) Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015 ----Ss. 20, 23, 36, 37, 39 & 70 Final determination—Validity of anti-dumping proceedings—Initiation of investigation based on application filed during interregnum between lapse of repealed Ordinance and enactment of new law—Challenge to jurisdiction of National Tariff Commission (NTC) in initiating and completing anti-dumping investigation without a valid application under S. 20 of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015—Petitioner alleged entire proceedings, including provisional and final determinations, were void ab initio, coram non judice and in violation of natural justice—Plea taken that Ordinance had lapsed on 26.06.2015, Act enacted on 08.09.2015, and during this legislative vacuum, application dated 29.06.2015 lacked lawful basis—Held, Resolution of National Assembly dated 30.07.2015 validly extended the Ordinance retrospectively, ensuring continuity of law and protecting proceedings—Majlis-e-Shoora competent to enact law with retrospective effect under Article 89(2)(a)(ii) of the Constitution—NTC's proceedings found lawful and valid—Delay in provisional determination beyond 180 days held directory, not fatal, in absence of statutory consequence—Petitioner also had alternate statutory remedy under S. 70 by filing appeal before Anti-Dumping Appellate Tribunal—Petition dismissed. Cited Cases: • Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation v. Muhammad Azeem Katper, 2002 SCMR 1023 • Commissioner of Income Tax v. Eastern Federal Union Insurance Co., PLD 1982 SC 247 • Hassan v. Fancy Foundation, PLD 1975 SC 1 • Federation of Pakistan v. M. Nawaz Khokhar, PLD 2000 SC 26 • Lahore Development Authority v. Imrana Tiwana, 2015 SCMR 1739 • Ghulam Hassan v. Jamshaid Ali, 2001 SCMR 1001 (b) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 18 & 89 Legislative power—Retrospective legislation—Scope—Challenge to anti-dumping framework based on alleged gap between ordinance and enactment—Held, Constitution permits Parliament to legislate retrospectively, except where expressly prohibited—Article 89 provides that Ordinance laid before Parliament shall be deemed to be a Bill and, once enacted, may provide continuity of law—Article 264 ensures consequences of repeal do not affect validity of prior acts done—Petitioner’s claim of legislative vacuum rejected as being contrary to constitutional scheme—Fundamental rights under Art. 18 (freedom of trade) not absolute and subject to lawful regulation in public interest, including international treaty compliance—No violation found.

Summary: (a) Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015 ----S. 70(13)----Appeal to High Court----Scope and limitations----Appellate jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 70(13) of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015, is akin to a second appeal under S. 100 CPC and is limited to questions of law----Reappraisal of evidence by the High Court is not warranted unless a decision is contrary to law, fails to determine a material issue, or suffers from a substantial procedural error leading to an erroneous conclusion. Cited Case: • Sohail and Company v. Anti-Dumping Appellate Tribunal, Islamabad (2024 PTD 872) (b) Anti-Dumping Duties----Nature of anti-dumping duty----Purpose and legal framework ----Anti-dumping duty is not a tax but a trade remedial measure aimed at offsetting injurious effects of dumped imports and protecting the domestic industry----Under S. 3 of the 2015 Act, such duties are imposed only after a determination that (i) dumping is taking place, and (ii) it is causing material injury to domestic industry----Domestic industry is defined under S. 2(d) to include domestic producers of the like product, excluding those related to exporters or importers of the allegedly dumped product. (c) Dumping Determination----Causal relationship requirement----Scope ----S. 18 of the 2015 Act mandates that injury to domestic industry must be attributed only to dumped imports, and other possible causes must be excluded----Commission’s determination must be based on an examination of all relevant evidence, including factors like contraction in demand, trade restrictions, technological developments, and industry productivity----Commission found that increased imports of Duplex Board at dumped prices led to price depression, reduced market share, and profitability loss for domestic producers. Cited International Case: • European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina (WT/DS 473/R) (d) Judicial Review of Anti-Dumping Determinations----High Court’s power to interfere----Scope ----Findings of the Commission and Appellate Tribunal on anti-dumping determinations will not be disturbed unless they violate the 2015 Act or fundamental principles of justice----Commission found that M/s Century Paper, the domestic complainant, met the statutory definition of "domestic industry" despite being related to an importer (Merit Packaging), as the relationship did not affect competitive behavior----High Court declined to interfere, holding that no legal infirmity was present in the Appellate Tribunal’s decision. (e) Procedural Compliance----Timelines under Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015----Scope ----S. 39 requires final determination within 180 days of the preliminary determination----Commission issued its final determination within the prescribed timeframe----S. 29 requires the entire investigation to conclude within 12-18 months; Commission’s investigation was completed within this period despite extensive litigation. Disposition: Appeal dismissed. High Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the National Tariff Commission and the Anti-Dumping Appellate Tribunal. No costs awarded.

Summary: Background:In Writ Petition No. 26907 of 2024 filed in the Lahore High Court, M/s A & A Pipe Industries contested the continuation of definitive Anti-Dumping Duties imposed by the National Tariff Commission (NTC). The duties in question pertained to the import of galvanized coils and sheets from the People's Republic of China, which were deemed to be dumped in Pakistan, thereby harming the domestic industry. The petitioners challenged the sunset review decision dated August 30, 2022, and the subsequent notice issued on August 31, 2022, which extended these duties for an additional five years starting February 8, 2022.----Issues:The petition raised a key legal issue regarding the composition of the NTC at the time of the decision. The petitioners argued that the decision of the sunset review was invalid as it was made by a three-member panel instead of the five members mandated by the National Tariff Commission Act, 2015. They claimed this constituted a defect in the Commission?s constitution, rendering the decision unsustainable by law.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition in limine (at the threshold without further hearing). The court held that the objection regarding the composition of the Commission was untenable based on Section 4(4) of the National Tariff Commission Act, which explicitly states that no act, proceeding, or decision of the Commission shall be invalidated solely due to a vacancy or defect in its constitution. Additionally, the court observed that the statute provided a specific remedy of appeal under Section 70 of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015, which the petitioners could utilize. This section details a comprehensive appellate process for challenging decisions of the NTC, emphasizing that the availability of this remedial route precludes the necessity for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court when an efficacious alternative remedy exists.----Citations/Precedents:National Tariff Commission Act, 2015, specifically Section 4 concerning the constitution of the Commission and the safeguard in subsection 4 regarding the validity of the Commission's decisions.Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015, with emphasis on Section 70, which provides a detailed appellate procedure for parties aggrieved by decisions of the Commission.Case references:Shaheen Merchant Versus Federation of Pakistan/National Tariff Commission and others (2021 PTD 2126), which supports the principle of exhausting available remedies.Rana Aftab Ahmad Khan v. Muhammad Ajmal (PLD 2010 SC 1066), outlining the necessity of utilizing prescribed remedies before seeking constitutional relief.MIAN AZAM WAHEED AND 2 OTHERS V. THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS THROUGH ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, KARACHI (2023 PTD 1571), discussing the principle of exhaustion of remedies and the inadvisability of bypassing available legal processes to seek writ jurisdiction.

Summary: Background: This case involves several appeals filed under Section 17(13) of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015 ("ADD Act"). The appeals fall into two categories. Category A consists of appellants who did not appeal before the Anti-Dumping Appellate Tribunal ("Tribunal") but directly approached the High Court, arguing that similar appeals were already pending. Category B includes appeals dismissed by the Tribunal due to the expiration of the limitation period. -----Issues: 1- Can the Tribunal condone delay in filing appeals under the ADD Act by applying the Limitation Act, 1908? 2- Does the High Court, as the second appellate court, have the authority to condone such delays and direct the Tribunal to hear the appeals? 3- Can the High Court entertain appeals from appellants who bypassed the Tribunal or whose appeals were dismissed on limitation grounds? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Tribunal’s Authority on Delay: The Tribunal lacks the authority to condone delays in appeals filed under the ADD Act. The limitation periods prescribed in the ADD Act are governed by special law, and Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply. High Court’s Role: The High Court, as the second appellate forum, also lacks the authority to condone delays where the Tribunal dismissed appeals on limitation grounds. It cannot interfere with the Tribunal’s rulings or bypass statutory limitation requirements. Appeals Without Tribunal Review: The High Court cannot entertain appeals that were never filed before the Tribunal or were dismissed for delay. Entertaining such appeals would undermine the statutory framework of the ADD Act, which establishes the Tribunal as the primary forum for appeals. The appeals were found non-maintainable and were dismissed. -----Citations/Precedents: Mohammad Ashraf and others vs. UBL and others (2019 SCMR 1004) M/s Spirit Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. National Tariff Commission (2021 PTD 647) M/s Al-Ahad Steel vs. National Tariff Commission (C.M.A. No.64/2023) Khushi Mohammad through LRs vs. Mst. Fazal Bibi and others (PLD 2016 SC 872) Taufiq Asif vs. General (Retd.) Pervez Musharaf and others (Civil Petition No.3797 of 2020) Sh. Mohammad Rashid vs. Majid Nizami and another (PLD 2002 SC 514) H.M. SAYA & Co. Karachi vs. Wazir Ali Industries Ltd. Karachi (PLD 1969 SC 65) Hameed Akhtar Niazi vs. Secretary, Establishment Division Government of Pakistan (1996 SCMR 1185)

Summary: Background:This judgment by the Islamabad High Court involves appeals under section 17(13) of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015 ("ADD Act"), filed by various appellants, including M/s Amal Steel, against the Anti-Dumping Appellate Tribunal and other entities. The appeals fall into two categories: Category-A includes those who did not appeal to the Tribunal under section 70(1) of the ADD Act but filed a second appeal directly to the Court, and Category-B includes appeals against Tribunal judgments dismissed due to being filed beyond the limitation period.----Issues:Whether the Tribunal has authority under the ADD Act and the Limitation Act to condone delays in filing appeals beyond the prescribed period of limitation.Can the High Court condone delay in filing an appeal against a Tribunal's final determination and direct the Tribunal to hear the appeal on merit?Can the High Court entertain a direct appeal against a Tribunal's final determination where the appellant did not avail the first appeal right, or decide an appeal on merits dismissed by the Tribunal on grounds of limitation?Holding/Reasoning/OutcomeThe High Court dismissed the appeals, finding them not maintainable based on the principles of law and limitations. It was determined that:The Tribunal does not have the authority to condone delays in filing appeals.The High Court cannot condone delays on behalf of appellants and direct the Tribunal to hear such appeals on their merits, as it would alter the adjudicatory scheme prescribed by the ADD Act.Parties who have not availed the right to file a first appeal before the Tribunal or whose appeals were dismissed on grounds of limitation do not have the right to a hearing in the High Court.-----Citations/Precedents:Mohammad Ashraf and others Vs. UBL and others (2019 SCMR 1004)M/s Spirit Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. Vs. National Tariff Commission, Islamabad and 2 others (2021 PTD 647)M/s Al-Ahad Steel Vs. National Tariff Commission and others (C.M.A. No.64/2023)Khushi Mohammad through LRs. and others Vs. Mst. Fazal Bibi and others (PLD 2016 SC 872)Taufiq Asif Vs. General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf and others (Civil Petition No.3797 of 2020)Mohammad Hussain Vs. Walayat Shah (PLD 1959 LHR 526)H.M. SAYA & Co. Karachi Vs. Wazir Ali Industries Ltd. Karachi and another (PLD 1969 SC 65)Government of Balochistan through Chief Secretary Quetta Vs. Dr. Mohammad Tariq Jafar (2020 SCMR 1689)Hameed Akhtar Niazi Vs. Secretary, Establishment Division Government of Pakistan (1996 SCMR 1185)

Summary: Background: This case involves a challenge to an anti-dumping determination by a tribunal and the national tariff commission regarding the import of offset printing ink. A complaint was lodged by a domestic producer alleging dumping of the product by foreign exporters, which caused material injury to the domestic industry. The national tariff commission initiated an investigation and issued a preliminary determination imposing provisional anti-dumping duties. However, the first final determination dropped the provisional duties. The domestic producer appealed the final determination, leading the tribunal to set aside the first final determination and remand the matter to the commission for a de novo determination. Importers of the investigated product, aggrieved by the decision, filed various appeals and a writ petition claiming they were not made parties to the appeal despite being interested parties and that fraud and misrepresentation occurred in the proceedings. ----Issues: 1- Whether the tribunal’s remand order was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation due to the non-impleadment of the importers. 2- Whether the proceedings under the anti-dumping laws were time-barred and conducted beyond the prescribed limitation period. 3- Whether the definition of "domestic industry" under the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015, applies to the respondent after they allegedly started importing the investigated product. 4- Whether the injury margin was properly quantified in the second final determination. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the non-impleadment of an interested party (the importer) constituted fraud or misrepresentation, entitling the party to challenge the tribunal’s decision. However, since the importer had already filed an appeal and the commission had issued a second final determination, the court found that no further remedy was necessary for the first remand order. The court rejected the argument that the second final determination was time-barred, citing that judicial review time is excluded from the calculation of the investigation timeline, making the determination within the allowable period. The argument that the domestic producer ceased to qualify as part of the "domestic industry" due to subsequent imports was dismissed, as the producer’s status was assessed during the relevant investigation period, during which no imports were made by them. The court found that the injury margin was properly calculated at 50.83% in the second final determination, and no failure in this regard was demonstrated. As a result, the court dismissed the writ petition and all connected civil miscellaneous appeals. ----Citations/Precedents: Rab Nawaz and others v. Additional District Judge and others, 2023 MLD 511 Moulana Atta ur Rehman v. Al Hajj Sardar Umar Farooq and others, PLD 2008 SC 663 Subeh Sadiq v. Mst. Rajan through Legal Heirs, PLD 2006 Lahore 585 Muhammad Suleman v. Abdul Rashid and 13 others, PLD 1987 Lahore 387 Mst. Maqbool Begum, etc. v. Gullan and others, PLD 1982 SC 46 Messrs Aimnaz (Pvt.) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan, 2018 PTD 1966 Shafi Muhammad and another v. Waseem Ahmed Khan and 11 Others, 2011 YLR 2576 Ahmed and others v. Nazir Ahmed and others, 2019 CLC 1841 Jubilee General Insurance Company Limited v. Ravi Steel Company through Proprietor, 2020 CLC 1440 Messrs Rupafil through Personnel Manager v. Deputy Director, Punjab Employees’ Social Security Institution and 2 others, 2003 PLC (Labour) 399

Summary: It is hereby declared that amendment made through section 15 of the Finance Act, 2019 in the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015, passed through Money Bill (and not through an Act of Parliament) does not fall within the parameters prescribed under Article 73 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, hence, is ultra vires to the Constitution, and is hereby struck down.----The determination revolved around whether the Anti-Dumping Duties Act 2015 ("Act") could be amended through the Finance Act 2019 ("FA 2019") within the bounds of Article 73 of the Constitution.Section 15 of the FA 2019 amended the Act, specifically section 51, which the petitioners challenged as unconstitutional. They argued that the Act's amendment couldn't be undertaken via a money bill, as Article 73 primarily concerns taxation matters, and anti-dumping duties (ADD) are not akin to taxes but penalties.The respondents contended that since ADD is a tariff, it qualifies as a tax, justifying its amendment via a money bill. The court examined whether the amendment complied with Article 73.The Act, aimed at mitigating dumping-induced injuries, doesn't impose a general revenue-raising burden but targets specific purposes. Previous legal interpretations highlight ADD as a penalty rather than a tax or regulatory charge. The court emphasized that not all financial matters relate to taxation and that inserting non-tax-related amendments in a Finance Act doesn't automatically classify it as a Money Bill. It upheld that ADD doesn't fit the definition of tax and cannot be equated with it. Furthermore, a prior court ruling categorized ADD as a penalty for dumping with injury to domestic industries. Consequently, amending the Act through a money bill, as done in FA 2019, was deemed unjustifiable under Article 73. The court's verdict, rendered in March 2021, declared the amendment ultra vires to the Constitution and struck it down, nullifying associated show cause notices/orders and discharging related securities/guarantees. Goods subject to pending ad-interim orders were to be released without demanding ADD. In summary, the court's decision rested on the conclusion that the FA 2019 amendment to the Act via a money bill did not align with the constitutional mandate under Article 73, thus rendering it invalid.

Summary: (a) Anti-Dumping Duties Act (XIV of 2015)-------S.70---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.18---Freedom of trade, business or profession---Appeal to Appellate Tribunal---Temporary injunction, grant of---Stop-gap arrangement---Scope---Petitioner complained of coercive measures being adopted by respondents under thegarb of impugned notices and contended that his fundamental rights of trade and businessguaranteed under Art. 18 of the Constitution would be infringed---Validity---High Court as astop-gap arrangement granted temporary relief to the petitioner by directing AppellateTribunal to decide the appeal of petitioner in accordance with law, within a period specifiedunder the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015---Tribunal was also directed to decide the interimrelief application of the petitioner at the first instance preferably within a period of oneweek---Till decision of application for interim relief by the Appellate Tribunal, no coercivemeasure was to be taken against the petitioner---Constitutional petition was disposed ofaccordingly.(b) Anti-Dumping Duties Act (XIV of 2015)-------Ss.70 & 73---Appeal to Appellate Tribunal---Power of the Appellate Tribunal to call forand examine record---Scope---Section 73 of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015, clearlystates that the Tribunal shall handle appeals as priority and issue direction within 30 days bygiving day to day hearing as per S.70(6) of the Act---Tribunal may pass order if it thinks fitwhile examining appeal under S. 70(7) and shall give decision in writing/detailing the issueraised in the appeal with the reasons as provided under S. 70(1)---After decision on the stayapplication as well as the Appeal the Tribunal shall provide copy of the order, which isappealable under S. 70(13) before High Court within 90 days.

Summary: The consolidated judgment addressed a petition challenging the vires of Section 14(2) & (4) of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015, and the Final Determination by the National Tariff Commission imposing anti-dumping duties on Polyester Filament Yarn ("PFY") imports into Pakistan. The petitioner argued that the determination was made in violation of the ADD Act and the National Tariff Commission Act, 2015, claiming the PFY is not produced in Pakistan. The petitioner raised concerns about the Commission's authority, the imposition of Anti-Dumping Duty without due process, and alleges violations of constitutional articles. The judgment dismissed these contentions, affirming the legality of the ADD Act and the Commission's actions, while also emphasizing the availability of an appeal as an alternate remedy. The court rejected the challenge to the Commission's constitutionality, stating that the judiciary's role is limited to examining constitutional violations. The connected petitions were dismissed with no order as to costs.