Summary: (a) Illegal Dispossession Act (XI of 2005)--- ----S. 3---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.417(2-A)---Illegal dispossession---Appeal against acquittal---Appreciation of evidence---Scope---Complainant was aggrieved of Trial Court's order whereby his complaint filed under S. 3 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, was dismissed and accused were acquitted---Validity---Complainant alleged that he was owner in possession over his inherited property; that accused persons/ respondents dispossessed him, occupied the said property and cut-downed crops planted on the same---Record showed that complainant in his cross-examination had stated that the suit property was their inherited property, however, in his statement before Investigating Officer he had come up with another claim that the disputed land was purchased by him from one "AK"---In order to clarify that ambiguity about ownership of very disputed land, during the course of trial, appellant/complainant could not produce any documentary evidence in terms as to whether the disputed land had become ownership of appellant on account of being his inherited property or it had fallen into their ownership in view of any sale or deed---Likewise, Muharir deposed in his cross-examination deposed that during trial complainant could not produce any ownership document qua purchase of property in dispute---Same was the case with testimony of Investigating Officer, who deposed in his cross-examination that complainant had not produced any document in the form of deed in respect of ownership of the property in dispute---Another alleged eye-witness of occurrence deposed in his cross-examination that he did not remember as to whether at the time of recording of his statement any other persons were present with him or not---In the same breath, said witness also deposed that at the time of harvesting of crops he was present in his house and as soon as he came out therefrom, he had seen accused cutting crops---Said witness further clarified that he neither informed complainant in respect of cutting of crops by one of the nominated accused nor any other person of locality apprised him, in that regard---Similarly, eye-witness deposed in his Court statement that both the parties were cousin inter-se and he had no knowledge about ownership and possession of both the parties---Likewise, it was also claimed by complainant that when nominated accused had entered into his landed property they had allegedly cut-downed barely crops cultivated on the same and said harvested crops had subsequently been taken by accused to their houses without his permission---However, during the course of investigation neither cut-downed pieces of crops had been taken into possession by Investigating Officer in order to verify and substantiate claim of appellant nor any incriminating recovery in that regard had been made from personal possession of accused/respondents nor on their pointation, therefore, that alleged claim of complainant qua harvesting/cutting of barely crops was shrouded in mystery---Even otherwise, alleged testimonies of both the eye-witnesses would be of no help to complainant/prosecution because they had not uttered a single word in respect of dispossession of complainant from the property in dispute---In view of the depositions of star witnesses of appellant/complainant including his own testimony before the Court, it was crystal clear that neither appellant could produce any documentary evidence about ownership of property in dispute wherefrom he was allegedly dispossessed nor his witnesses could utter a single word in their testimonies before Court that in their presence the alleged offence of dispossession of appellant took place---Thus, the whole allegation of appellant/complainant in terms that he had been dispossessed from property in dispute was standing in vacuum---Circumstances established that the case of appellant/complainant was a case of no evidence---Appeal being bereft of any merits was dismissed, in limine. (b) Illegal Dispossession Act (XI of 2005)--- ----S. 3---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss.417(2-A) & 540-A---Illegal dispossession---Appeal against acquittal--- Appreciation of evidence---Complainant was aggrieved of Trial Court's order whereby his complaint filed under S. 3 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, was dismissed and accused were acquitted---Accused was acquitted in absentia---Validity---Section 540-A, Cr.P.C., mandated and allowed a Court to dispense with personal attendance of an accused if he was represented by a pleader and there were multiple accused, or if the accused was incapable of appearing before Court---In view of said provisions of law, Trial Court was justified to make an order in respect of acquittal of said accused/respondent in absentia, when otherwise, on the available record, no prima facie case was made-out against him, even if he would have been forced to face a full-fledged trial before Trial Court---More particularly, when on the same set of evidence, other nominated accused/respondents had earned a honourable acquittal during trial proceedings---Appeal being bereft of any merits was dismissed, in limine. Appellant in person (who have submitted written arguments on behalf of his learned counsel Nasir-ud-Din. Respondents are not represented being a motion case. Date of hearing: 28th March, 2025.

Summary: (Against the orders dated 10.03.2022 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court Larkana in 2nd Civil Appeal No. S-06 of 2019). (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 11---Res judicata, doctrine of---Maxim "Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa" and "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium"---Applicability---Far-sightedness or prudence ingrained in doctrine of res judicata protects against never ending litigation and ensures finality, thereby saving parties from rigors of protracted or multiplicative proceedings---Cause of action finally adjudicated on merits must not be re-litigated---Doctrine of res judicata so connotes "claim preclusion" whose indispensable elements include that the erstwhile judgment must be valid and final between the parties and the same issue must not be brought again for re-litigation---As such the rule is essential to avert repetitive litigation and to ensure justice, equanimity and dependability in judicial proceedings by curbing frivolous and vexatious litigation often initiated with mala fide intention or ulterior motives just to drag opponents in Courts for reopening matters already conclusively decided---Simultaneously, principle of res judicata also lightens the Court's docket and helps eliminate time consuming and meritless litigation---Maxim "nemo debet bis vixari pro una et eadem causa" i.e. no man should be vexed twice for the same cause and "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium" i.e. it is in best interest of state to put an end to litigation---What is generally done or believed along the lines of conventional astuteness is that one judicial contest is sufficient for litigants to lodge their claims or put forward a defense rather than litigating for one and the same cause of action between the same parties for the same subject matter again and again. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 149---Court fee, deficiency of---Expression "at any stage"---Scope---Expression "at any stage" alluded to in section 149 C.P.C. accentuates that deficiency if any on account of court fee can be ordered to be made good by Appellate Court at any stage of proceedings in appeal. (c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 42 & 54---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss. 100, 115 & O.VII, R.11---Suit for declaration and injunction---Concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below---Principle---Petitioners were aggrieved of judgments and decrees passed by all Courts below against them---Validity---If concurrent findings recorded by lower fora were found to be in violation of law, or based on misreading or non-reading of evidence, they could not be treated as so sacrosanct or sanctified that they could not be reversed by High Court in its revisional or Constitutional jurisdiction or in a second appeal, as a corrective measure come what may---Where glaring errors, non-reading or misreading of evidence or any legal and jurisdictional issues arise, the stumbling block of doctrine of concurrent findings cannot shield a flawed or erroneous decision---Trial Court possesses distinctive position to adjudge trustworthiness of witnesses and cumulative effect of evidence led in the lis---Appellate Court accords deference to such findings, which are not overturned unless found erroneous or defective---It is also not within the domain or function of Appellate Court and or High Court to re-weigh or re-interpret evidence but they can examine whether jurisdiction or order attains benchmark of an unflawed judgment and whether it is in consonance with the law and evidence and free from unjust and unfair errors apparent on the face of record---If the concurrent findings are found to be in violation of law or are based on flagrant and obvious defect floating on the surface of the record then it can be reversed as a corrective measure without undue regard to the fact that matter culminated in concurrent findings---Supreme Court set aside concurrent findings of facts by all Courts below and remanded the matter to Trial Court for decision afresh on merits---Appeal was allowed. Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakoor Khan PLD 1984 SC 289; Abdul Hamid and another v. Dilawar Hussain alias Bhalli and others 2007 SCMR 945; Mian Nawaz Sharif's case PLD 1993 SC 473; Mst. Iqbal Begum's case PLD 1993 Lah. 183; Deepchand v. Land Acquisition Officer AIR 1994 SC 1901; Alcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. Celem S.A. AIR 2017 SC 1; Sayyed Ayaz Ali v. Prakash G. Goyal 2021 (7) SCC 456; Diwan Bros. v. Central Bank of India, Bombay AIR 1976 SC 1503; Ahmed Ali Talpur v. Sub-Registrar Latifabad, Hyderabad PLD 2025 SC 302; Kh. Muhammad Fazil v. Mumtaz Munnawar Khan Niazi (decd.) through L.Rs. 2024 SCMR 1059; Meeru Khan v. Mst. Naheed Aziz Siddiqui and others PLD 2023 SC 912; Government of K.P.K. v. Mehmood Khan 2017 SCMR 2044; Homoeo Dr. Asma Noreen Syed v. Government of the Punjab through its Secretary Health Department and others 2022 SCMR 1546; Rana Muhammad Asif Tauseef v. Election Commission of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 1344; Muhammad Aamir Khan v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2019 SCMR 1021 = 2019 PLC (C.S.) 1014; Chairman, NAB v. Muhammad Usman PLD 2018 SC 28; Iffat Jabeen v. District Education Officer (M.E.E), Lahore 2011 SCMR 437 = 2010 PLC (C.S.) 451; Muhammad Shehzad Malik v. Muhammad Suhail and another 2010 SCMR 1825; Fasih-ud-Din Khan and others v. Government of Punjab and others 2010 SCMR 1778; Section Officer, Government of Punjab, Finance Department v. Ghulam Shabbir 2010 SCMR 1425 = 2010 PLC (C.S.) 641; Government of NWFP v. Akbar Shah 2010 SCMR 1408; Land Acquisition Collector and 6 others v. Muhammad Nawaz PLD 2010 SC 745; Muhammad Shahban and others v. Falak Sher and others 2007 SCMR 882; Raja Hamayun Sarfraz Khan and others v. Noor Muhammad 2007 SCMR 307; Almas Ahmad Fiaz v. Secretary Government of the Punjab Housing and Physical Planning Development, Lahore 2007 PLC 64 = 2006 SCMR 783; Muhammad Gulshan Khan v. Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad PLD 2003 SC 102 = 2003 PLC (C.S.) 201;B.I.S.E v. Salam Afroze PLD 1992 SC 263; Mst. Faheeman Begum (deceased) through L.Rs. v. Islam-ud-Din (deceased) through L.Rs. 2023 SCMR 1402 = PLJ 2024 SC 75 = PLJ 2024 SC 326;Ahmed Ali Talpur v. Sub-Registrar Latifabad, Hyderabad PLD 2024 SC 302 and United Bank Limited v. Jamil Ahmed 2024 SCMR 164 = PLC 2024 SC 50 rel. Nazar Akbar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. Habib ur Rehman Jiskan, Advocate Supreme Court and Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Nemo for Respondents Nos. 3 and 4. Date of hearing: 28th March, 2025.

Summary: (a) Colonization and Disposal of Government Lands Act (V of 1912)--- ----S. 10---Sindh Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S. 164---Sindh Revenue Jurisdiction Act (X of 1876), S. 11---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XLI, R. 31---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A---State land, grant of---Cancellation of grant by the revenue authorities---Scope---Grant of State land cannot be cancelled after acquisition of proprietary rights---Order passed by Board of Revenue cancelling the grant challenged before the civil court---Jurisdiction of civil court---Scope---Civil court as the court of ultimate jurisdiction---Order passed by Board of Revenue could be challenged before the civil court---Right of fair trial---Issuing notice to affected party and affording opportunity of hearing, principle of---Facts in brevity were that the applicant was granted few acres of agricultural land by the colonization officer in 1991-92 upon full payment of tenancy installments, with subsequent survey, issuance of T.O. Form, and entry in revenue records, however, in 2003, the executive district officer (revenue)/respondent No. 2 cancelled the land grant without issuing notice or affording a hearing, claiming the land was within 20 chains of the village site and reserved for villagers---Petitioner upon facing dispossession threats from private respondents filed a civil suit for declaration along with permanent and mandatory injunction which the Trial Court decreed in his favor---On appeal by private respondents, the appellate court reversed the decree, dismissing the suit as barred under S. 11 of the Sindh Land Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876---The applicant then filed a revision petition before the High Court asserting that the cancellation was illegal, done without jurisdiction and in violation of natural justice, and that civil court jurisdiction was not barred in such cases---The moot point involved in the present matter was "the grant of land to the petitioner and its cancellation by the authorities"---Held: The Colonization and Disposal of Government Lands (Sindh) Act, 1912 (the Act 1912) provided a mechanism for grant of state land on harap conditions and cancellation of grants in case of any violation by the allottee---Grant in favor of the applicant was not cancelled on account of any deficiency or breach envisaged in subsection (5) of the S. 10 of the said Act, instead, it was cancelled on the ground that the suit property fell within 20 chains of the village site, hence was not permissible for grant as envisaged in condition 13 of the Statement of Conditions of 1989 issued by Land Utilization Department Government of Sindh for grant of state land---The respondent No. 2 while passing the impugned order lost sight of the important aspect of case that the grant had already matured and applicant had become full owner of the suit property, after issuance of T.O Form, whereby, entries in the record of rights were also maintained in his favor---Moreover, since the omission of S. 30 of the Act, 1912 through Sindh Repealing and Amending Act, 1975 the revenue/colonization authorities did not enjoy the power to cancel grants after acquisition of the proprietary rights as the grant was made prior to such omission of the said provision---The impugned order dated was passed in violation of mandatory provisions of S. 164 of the Sindh Land Revenue Act, 1967---Applicant was condemned unheard and the impugned order was passed behind his back, which violated his rights as to the fair trial thus perverse to the law---The applicant had an inalienable right of hearing and impugned order was passed in violation of principles of natural justice and doctrine of audi alterm partem was applicable to it; on that score alone the impugned order was not sustainable under the law---With regards the jurisdiction of the civil court, since the order of a revenue authority passed under its revision jurisdiction attained finality and no rights of appeal, second revision or review was provided under the law, the petitioner had no other remedy available under the law except to file a civil suit, therefore, embargo contained in S. 11 of the Sindh Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876 did not apply---Respondent No. 2 exercised jurisdiction not vested in it under the law and the Appellate Court failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it---The wrong committed by the respondent No. 2 was rectified by the civil court but the appellate court failed to comprehend the legal sustainability of the impugned order and authenticated the same which resulted in miscarriage of justice---Though the appellate court passed the impugned judgment and decree dated violating the mandatory provisions of R. 31 of O. XLI of C.P.C. without framing the points for determination, however the issue involved in the lis was a legal controversy and an elaborate discussion was made on the said legal controversy in the impugned judgment, therefore it was not in the fitness of things to remand this matter back for decision afresh on appeal, as the parties were under litigation since last about more than 22 years and mere non-mentioning of the points under issue would not otherwise render the judgment nullity when the specific question came under consideration while dealing with the appeal---Judgment and decree passed by the appellate court were set-aside and the revision petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Sindh Revenue Jurisdiction Act (X of 1876)--- ----S. 11---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 9---Jurisdiction of civil court in revenue matters---Scope---There is no doubt that ordinarily a party in revenue matters should exhaust all his remedies by way of appeal before invoking the aid of the civil court---But there are different considerations where the allegation of party is that the impugned order is nullity in the eye of law---There is ample authority that in such cases the jurisdiction of the civil court is not barred. Mian Mohammed Latif v. Province of West Pakistan through Deputy Commissioner Khairpur and others PLD 1970 SC 180 rel. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court---Suo motu powers of High Court under revisional jurisdiction, exercise of---Concurrent findings of the courts below---Scope---To ensure that the subordinates Courts or quasi-judicial forums exercise jurisdiction vested in them in accordance with and within the bounds of law, the High Court has been bestowed with supervisory jurisdiction of superintendence---This supervisory role has its own significance in the dispensation of justice---Whenever it appears to the High Court that the subordinate courts have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or exercised jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, it can take cognizance of the matter in exercise of its revision jurisdiction under S. 115 read with S. 151 of C.P.C. in matters relating to civil disputes to rectify the illegalities or/and irregularities in the judgments and orders of the subordinate courts, to secure the ends of justice---If the concurrent findings recorded by the lower fora are found to be in violation of law, or based on misreading, non-reading of evidence, then they cannot be treated as being so sacrosanct or sanctified that cannot be reversed by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction, which is pre-emptively corrective and supervisory in nature---In fact, the Court in its revisional jurisdiction under S. 115 of C.P.C. can even exercise its suo moto powers to correct any jurisdictive errors committed by a subordinate Court to ensure strict adherence to the safe administration of justice---The jurisdiction vested in the High Court under S. 115 C.P.C is to satisfy and reassure that the order is within its jurisdiction---The scope of revisional jurisdiction is restricted to the extent of misreading, non-reading of evidence, jurisdictional error or an illegality in the judgment of the nature which may have a material effect on the result of the case, or if the conclusion drawn therein is perverse or conflicting to the law. Mst. Faheem Begum (deceased) through Legal Heirs v. Islamuddin (deceased) through Legal Heirs and others 2023 SCMR 1402 rel. (d) Sindh Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--- ----S. 164---Revisional jurisdiction of Board of Revenue---Suo motu powers, exercise of---Scope---No doubt the Board of Revenue may pass appropriate orders at any time of their own motion regarding any of the proceedings pending or disposed of by the subordinate revenue forum but such powers are not unfettered and are subject to certain limitations---Exercise of such powers without affording opportunity of hearing to an interested party would not only be violation of the principles of natural justice but also contrary to the provisions of S. 164 of the Sindh Land Revenue Act, 1967 itself. Ali Gul Abbasi for Applicant. Soomer Das R. Permani for Respondents Nos. 6 to 8. Ghulam Abbas Kuber, Additional Advocate General for Respondents Nos. 1 to 5. Date of hearing: 24th March, 2025.

Summary: Bail denied ---- Keeping in view that the vehicle was being driven by petitioner Syed Noman Ali Shah and was under his direct and immediate control, his claim of lack of conscious knowledge regarding the presence of opium concealed in the door panel, as well as his purported ignorance of the other petitioners' possession of chars, appears to be devoid of plausible justification at this stage. The collective recovery of narcotics from the same vehicle, and the manner in which the drugs were found in close proximity to each petitioner, reasonably suggests a joint enterprise aimed at the transportation of narcotics. Such a coordinated arrangement, particularly involving bulk of contraband, cannot be readily disbelieved or dismissed as implausible in a tentative assessment at the bail stage. Furthermore, there is no material on record indicating any prior enmity, mala fide or ill-will on the part of the Seizing Officer or any member of the ANF that could suggest false implication.

Summary: 1. In light of Article 46 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 no specific form or forum is required for a dying declaration. 2. The postmortem report, particularly the timeline regarding the arrival of the deceased at the hospital in an injured condition and the subsequent time of death, lends ample corroboration to the prosecution version. It supports the assertion that the deceased had made a conscious and voluntary statement identifying the petitioner as the assailant while enroute to the hospital. 3. In this case, the initial report (Murasila), which directly implicates the present petitioner on the basis of the deceased's dying declaration, constitutes a material piece of evidence, hence cannot be summarily discarded or treated as inconsequential at this stage. 4. The presence of the petitioner at the scene of the incident is prima facie established in light his own report, which is purportedly the cross version of the FIR lodged by complainant Bilal. 5. Although the cross-versions of a case may be considered for granting bail to accused but the rule is not universally applicable as it is settled law that mere existence of a cross-version cannot • alone be considered a sufficient ground to grant bail to an accused. 6. Clause (c) of Section 10(7) of the Act ibid lays certain limitations for exercising the discretion. According to said provision, if the Court would come to the conclusion that reasonable grounds were available to believe that such child was involved in an offence which in its opinion was serious, heinous, gruesome, brutal, sensational in character or shocking to public morality or he was a previous convict of offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, then he would not be entitled to that concession. 7. It is a well-settled principle that, in bail matters, the application of the rule of consistency requires the Court to carefully examine the nature, extent and specificity of the role attributed to each accused. Parity is not to be deduced as a matter of course but only where the allegations and circumstances are materially similar.

Summary: (a) Scope and extent of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. (b) Act of 2005 envisages two distinct and different provisions i.e. quasi-criminal and quasi-civil, therefore, proceedings under this Act could not be termed to that of exclusively criminal in nature, in view of certain powers, such as, attachment of property and to pass an order as an interim arrangement to evict an accused from disputed property and hand it over to aggrieved party i.e. complainant. (c) Act of 2005 provides for two eventualities i.e. firstly: - learned trial Court U/S 8 (1) of Act can restore possession to an aggrieved person i.e. complainant without awarding punishment of imprisonment to an accused person and secondly: - learned trial Court U/S 6 of Act as an interim arrangement can evict a trespasser or an illegal occupier from disputed property and hand it over to complainant. Even upon conclusion of trial, nominated accused can be provided punishment up to ten years U/S 3 of Act and if a Court comes to a conclusion that an owner or occupier of property has illegally been dispossessed, then in such eventuality, trial Court can render direction to nominated accused to restore possession of a property to an owner or occupier, as the case may be.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- S. 11, O. VII Rr. 11 & 13, S. 149 ---- Res judicata --- Rejection of plaint --- Fresh suit --- Scope and limitations Where a plaint is rejected under Order VII Rule 11, CPC, the rejection does not constitute adjudication on merits and, by fiction of law, is considered a “decree” appealable under Section 2(2), CPC. The Court held that such rejection does not preclude the institution of a fresh suit under Order VII Rule 13 CPC, provided it is not barred by limitation or the principle of res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata under Section 11 CPC requires a judicial determination that the matter was directly and substantially in issue in a previous suit between the same parties, and conclusively decided. Mere observations on title in a prior suit for damages do not bar a subsequent suit for possession and declaration, unless the ingredients of res judicata are strictly met. (b) Limitation Act, 1908 ---- Ss. 3, 5, 14 to 16, Art. 142 ---- Condonation of delay --- Applicability to suits --- Misconception of law --- Mixed question of law and fact The Court clarified that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to appeals and applications, not suits. Delay in filing a suit cannot be condoned under Section 5, but exclusion of time may be claimed under Sections 14 to 16 where applicable. In the instant case, the plaintiffs erroneously filed an application under Section 5 for condonation of delay in instituting the suit for possession. Nonetheless, the Court held that under Article 142 of the Limitation Act, the limitation period was twelve years from the date of dispossession, and the suit was within time. Dismissal of the suit by the Trial Court for being time-barred, without properly examining the cause of action, was declared a grave illegality. (c) Court Fees Act, 1870 ---- Ss. 4 & 6; Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ---- Ss. 148, 149 ---- Deficiency in court fee --- Discretion to allow cure --- Harmonious construction The Court held that a deficient court fee does not render a proceeding fatally defective. Under Section 149 CPC, the Court may allow payment of deficient court fee at any stage of the proceedings. Section 149 acts as a proviso to Sections 4 and 6 of the Court Fees Act, permitting the court to regularize proceedings upon payment of deficient court fee subsequently. The dismissal of the petitioners' appeal by the First Appellate Court without providing an opportunity to cure the deficiency was held to be erroneous and contrary to the principles laid down in PLD 1984 SC 289 (Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakoor Khan) and AIR 1976 SC 1503 (Diwan Bros. case). (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- Ss. 2(2), 96; O. VII R. 11 ---- Rejection of plaint vs. dismissal of suit --- Decree by fiction --- Scope of appealability The Court reiterated that rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is deemed a decree under Section 2(2) CPC, appealable under Section 96 CPC. However, such rejection must be based on a proper examination of whether the plaint discloses a cause of action, and whether the suit is barred by law or limitation. The Trial Court’s mechanical dismissal of the suit, without applying Section 3 of the Limitation Act or giving the plaintiff an opportunity to correct procedural defects, was declared unjustified. (e) Judicial duty --- Application of correct law --- Responsibility of judges irrespective of parties’ errors The Court emphasized that judges are duty-bound to apply the correct law, even if the parties or their counsel fail to point it out. Misguided legal advice or poor pleading does not absolve courts of their responsibility to administer justice according to law. The judge must “wear all laws on the sleeve of his robe.” Failure to address key legal provisions, such as limitation or res judicata, in a reasoned manner vitiates judicial orders. (f) Concurrent findings --- When revisable --- Misreading or non-reading of law or evidence --- Corrective jurisdiction of higher courts Concurrent findings of lower courts are not immune from interference where they suffer from legal infirmities, misreading, non-reading, or flawed application of law. The Supreme Court held that when lower courts ignore binding legal provisions or dismiss a suit on misconceived grounds, such findings must be set aside in exercise of appellate jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice. Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed; impugned orders set aside; matter remanded to Trial Court for decision on merits within six months. Cited Cases: • Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakoor Khan (PLD 1984 SC 289) • Abdul Hamid v. Dilawar Hussain (2007 SCMR 945) • Ahmed Ali Talpur v. Sub-Registrar Latifabad, Hyderabad (PLD 2025 SC 302) • Kh. Muhammad Fazil v. Mumtaz Munnawar Khan Niazi (2024 SCMR 1059) • Meeru Khan v. Mst. Naheed Aziz Siddiqui (PLD 2023 SC 912) • Diwan Bros. v. Central Bank of India (AIR 1976 SC 1503) • Deepchand v. Land Acquisition Officer (AIR 1994 SC 1901) Cited Provisions: • Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Ss. 2(2), 3, 5, 11, 96, 148, 149, O. VII Rr. 11 & 13 • Limitation Act, 1908, Ss. 5, 14–16, Art. 142 • Court Fees Act, 1870, Ss. 4 & 6

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----Ss. 16, 17 & 21---Territorial jurisdiction---Administration suit---Partition of immovable property situated in different districts---Scope---Suit filed by respondent for administration, partition, and declaration in respect of several properties, including a house situated in Rawalpindi---Petitioners challenged jurisdiction of the Islamabad Civil Court based on location of the suit property---Held, under S.17, CPC, where immovable properties are situated in different jurisdictions, a composite suit may be instituted in any Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any portion of the property is located---Further held, objection to jurisdiction must be raised and actively pursued at the earliest stage; mere mention in written statement without subsequent agitation constitutes waiver---Objection raised for the first time at appellate stage barred under S.21, CPC. Cited Cases: • Amjad Khan v. Muhammad Irshad (Deceased) 2020 SCMR 2155 (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----O. XVI, R. 14---Summoning of documents---Scope---Application to summon record of gift deed from Cantonment Board Rawalpindi allowed by Trial Court---Petitioners challenged the order on ground that plaintiff had previously withdrawn claim on certain properties and that second application was barred under O.II, R.2, CPC---Held, O.II, R.2 applies to suits, not applications---Earlier withdrawal did not pertain to the suit property in question---Plaintiff had disclosed intent to rely on the record in her list of documents---Summoning of record necessary for just adjudication---Trial Court rightly exercised its discretion. Cited Cases: • Amjad Khan v. Muhammad Irshad (Deceased) 2020 SCMR 2155 (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----S. 21---Objection to jurisdiction---Waiver by conduct---Scope---Petitioners failed to pursue jurisdictional plea before Trial Court and participated in trial proceedings including submission of written statements and framing of issues---Held, jurisdictional objection must be raised at earliest possible opportunity and pursued diligently; in absence thereof, party is deemed to have waived such objection---Belated objection not maintainable. (d) Evidence / Procedural Law ----Summoning of official record---Scope---Suit involved challenge to gift deed of disputed property---Cantonment Board Rawalpindi, custodian of record, had not produced the same---Held, production of relevant documents essential to ensure complete and fair adjudication---Allowing application to summon record neither illegal nor prejudicial---Impugned order upheld. Disposition: Writ petition dismissed.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 435, 439-A, 526 & 190---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 337-A, 337-D, 337-F, 147, 148 & 149---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, causing shajjah, jaifah and causing different types of "ghayr-jaifah, rioting, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Transfer of case---Scope---Grouse of the petitioner was that the Sessions Court vide impugned order dated 23.11.2023 had transferred the case for want of jurisdiction to the Judicial Magistrate without any legal justification---Main ground which prevailed upon the Sessions Court for transfer of the case to the Judicial Magistrate was that the injuries were not caused on the vital parts, despite the fact that the accused persons were armed with knives, thus it was held that provisions of S.324 of P.P.C were not attracted in the instant case---Held: Section 324 of P.P.C evidently manifested that if any act was done by anyone with the intention or knowledge that by such act he could be held guilty of committing qatl-i-amd of any person, then he would be punished for a term, which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine and if any hurt is also caused to any person by such offender, he shall also be liable to the punishment provided for such hurt caused by him---Perusal of the Medico-Legal Certificates demonstrated that petitioner had received a stab wound on the right side of his abdomen, whereas injured “MS” had also received a stab wound on the right side of his chest, beside the other injuries, which were obviously on the vital parts and could have caused death due to penetration into any of their organs or result of excessive bleeding, thus the observations of the Sessions Court were misconstrued and contrary to the record---Bare perusal of S.190 (3) of Cr.P.C. clearly enunciated that a Magistrate taking cognizance under subsection (1) of an offence triable exclusively by a Court of Session shall, without recording any evidence, send the case to the Court of Session for trial---In the instant case, it was done twice i.e., firstly, when Judicial Magistrate after receipt of the final report under S.173 of Cr.P.C transmitted the case file to the Sessions Court, who on 21.02.2020 framed the charge and then when the case was once again transferred by the Judicial Magistrate on 27.07.2023, thus there was absolutely no occasion for the Sessions Court to have had transferred the case vide impugned order dated 23.11.2023---So be it, the Sessions Court while framing charge on 21.02.2020 indicted the respondents under Ss.324, 337-ADF, 147, 148 & 149 of P.P.C after applying judicious mind, whereafter the said Court had no justification for transferring the case, because ultimately on conclusion of the trial, it could have acquitted the accused respondents from the charge for the indictment of attempt to murder as contemplated under S.324 of P.P.C---Had it been a case of a attack of 'an accused' upon 'a person', then repeating of the blows could have been a ground, but not in the peculiar circumstances of the instant case, where more than four persons were indicted for making assaults with knives, causing stab wounds on the abdomen and chest to the injured persons according to their capability and force, which clearly demonstrated that it could have been a fatal blow---Thus at such a belated stage, transfer of the case for want of jurisdiction was unwarranted---Sessions Court for assumption of jurisdiction had prima facie ample material for proceeding with the trial, thus the Sessions Court had erred in law as well as in facts---Consequently, the impugned order dated 23.11.2023 drawn by the Sessions Court was set aside and the case file was directed to be transferred from the file of Judicial Magistrate to the file of Sessions Court with the direction to proceed with trial in accordance with law on its merit---Petition was allowed, accordingly. Bilal Hussain v. The State 1982 SCMR 1141 and Wajahat Ikram v. The State 1999 SCMR 1255 rel. Kabeer Khan Bareech and Jahanzaib Khan Kakar for Petitioner. Mubashir Hassan for Respondents Nos. 1 to 5. Ms. Amna Hashmi, District Public Prosecutor (“DPP”) for the State. Date of hearing: 21st March, 2025.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), S.10---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Deferred dower, demand of---Subsisting marriage---Effect---Husband bound to pay Mehr-e-Mu’wajjal on demand without awaiting dissolution of marriage---Rational---Briefly, the petitioner/wife instituted a constitutional petition challenging the judgment passed in family appeal by the district court, whereby the district court set aside, to the extent of deferred dower, the judgment and decree of the family court---The petitioner had earlier filed a family suit seeking restitution of conjugal rights, maintenance for herself and a minor child, recovery of unpaid dower, provision of separate accommodation, and recovery of delivery expenses amount, asserting that her marriage with respondent No.1/husband took place with agreed haq mehr comprising prompt dower and deferred dower along with gold; After pleadings, the family court framed issues, recorded evidence, and partly decreed the suit, granting restitution of conjugal rights, separate accommodation, recovery of dower, and maintenance---Respondent No.1 preferred an appeal limited to the grant of deferred dower, which was accepted by the appellate court, leading the petitioner/wife to the file the present constitutional petition---Held: In the present case, the parties in the nikahnama had agreed to have received seven tola gold and Rs.10,000/- being Mehr-e-Mu’ajjal and Rs.25,00,000/- to be paid as Mehr-e-Mu’wajjal---The parties had no controversy in respect of consideration of dower amount except that whether Rs.25,00,000/- was to be paid on demand or upon dissolution of marriage---Admittedly, uptill date the parties were tied with the thread of marriage as husband and wife---No ambiguity was found in holding that respondent No. 1 (husband) was obliged to pay Rs.25,00,000/- to her wife on demand and she needed not to wait to receive the said amount until dissolution of marriage---Impugned judgment and decree of the appellate court was set aside to that extent---Constitutional petition filed by wife was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), S.10 ---Dower, withholding of---Prompt and deferred dower---Scope and distinction---Mode and time of maturity---Obligation of husband to pay dower---Nikahnama being silent as to mode of payment---Presumption---Prompt dower is to be paid wither at the time of marriage or on demand, whereas, deferred dower is to be paid at such date or time as may be mutually agreed between the parties and in the absence of any date, it is to be paid on the happening of a certain event like divorce---Practice of husband delaying payment of dower amount is deprecated and dower can be demanded anytime during the subsistence of marriage and the husband is under obligation to pay it---Where no detail about the mode of payment of dower are specified in nikahnama or the marriage contract, the entire amount of dower shall be presumed to be payable on demand. Saadia Usman v. Muhammad Usman Iqbal Jadoon 2009 SCMR 1458 and Khalid Pervaiz v. Samina 2024 SCMR 142 rel. Abdul Sattar Khan for Petitioner. Murtaza Butt and Mudassir Nadeem for Respondent No. 1. Arbab Nasr Minullah, A.A.G. for Official Respondents. Date of hearing: 24th March, 2025.