Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --- S. 115 --- Revisional jurisdiction --- Preference to appellate court findings --- Scope. In a suit for possession under S. 8 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, the trial court dismissed the suit while the appellate court reversed the decision and decreed possession in favour of the plaintiff. In revision, the High Court held that it is a cardinal principle of law that appellate court findings—based on proper appraisal of evidence—are to be preferred unless shown to suffer from legal infirmity or material irregularity. No such defect was established in the appellate judgment. Hence, the revisional court declined interference and upheld the decree passed by the appellate court. Cited cases: Muhammad Nawaz through L.Rs. v. Haji Muhammad Baran Khan through L.Rs. (2013 SCMR 1300) Madan Gopal v. Maran Bepari (PLD 1969 SC 617) Muhammad Shafi v. Sultan Mahmood (2010 SCMR 827) Amjad Ikram v. Mst. Asiya Kausar (2015 SCMR 1) Muhammad Hafeez v. District Judge, Karachi East (2008 SCMR 398) (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) --- S. 8 --- Possession --- Dispossession by encroachment --- Suit maintainability --- Title undisputed. Plaintiff sought possession of 8 Marla land on the basis of title and alleged dispossession following encroachment. Defendants admitted plaintiff's title but claimed possession was delivered from another Khasra number (745) under a separate sale. Held, where title is not in dispute and plaintiff alleges unlawful dispossession, a declaratory suit under S. 42 is not necessary. Suit for possession alone is maintainable when ownership is admitted and only possession is denied. (c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) --- Art. 142 & 144 --- Trespass --- Recurring cause of action --- Possession not adverse. The petitioners' plea of limitation was rejected by the appellate court, holding that encroachment came to plaintiff's notice after demarcation proceedings in 2002 and suit filed thereafter was within time. Held, possession of petitioners being unauthorized and without title cannot be considered adverse. A trespasser does not acquire rights merely by passage of time, particularly when adverse possession under Articles 28 and 144 of the Limitation Act has been declared repugnant to Islamic injunctions. Cited cases: Muhammad Zaman v. Nazir Ahmed (2003 CLC 1628) Malik Muhammad Hussain v. Saadullah Khan (2014 CLC 311) Anjuman-e-Islamia v. Government (PLD 1982 SC 308) 1991 SCMR 2063 (declaring adverse possession provisions repugnant to Islam) (d) Adverse possession --- Conceptual clarity --- Not applicable to permissive or unauthorized possession. Held, adverse possession requires possession to be continuous, hostile, open, and known to the true owner. Mere long-standing occupation or possession by mistake of boundaries does not qualify. Definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary, Webster’s Dictionary, and K.J. Aiyar’s Judicial Dictionary reaffirm that only when possession is inconsistent with owner’s rights and hostile in intent can it ripen into adverse possession. In the present case, petitioners’ possession, being unauthorized and not hostile, is mere trespass, not adverse possession. (e) Trespass --- Unlawful possession --- No legal protection. Held, no person can seek judicial protection for unlawful possession of another's property. Courts are not to reward trespassers or allow long-standing unlawful occupation to defeat valid title. The judicial system cannot validate continued illegal possession merely on grounds of passage of time. (f) Declaratory relief --- Not necessary where title is undisputed --- Suit for possession alone sufficient. Where the defendants do not dispute the plaintiff’s title and only assert continued possession on mistaken boundaries, a suit for possession is not required to be accompanied by a declaratory relief. Declaratory relief becomes relevant only when title is seriously challenged. Cited cases discussed but distinguished: Muhammad Iqbal v. Mati ur Rehman (2022 SCMR 859) Wazir Khan v. Qutab Din (PLD 2009 SC 95) Sultan Mahmood Shah v. Muhammad Din (2005 SCMR 1872) Disposition: Petition dismissed. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code ( V of 1908)--- ----O. VII, R. 11---Rejection of plaint---Scope---Plaintiffs challenged the legality / authenticity of a number of mutations, however, their plaint was rejected under O.VII, R.11 C.P.C.---Defendants filed revision as the Appellate Court set-aside the plaint-rejecting order passed by the Trial Court---Validity---Admittedly, both the parties were siblings inter se and dispute pertained to legacy of their father---Whether the disputed gift mutation(s) were validly made or the same was the result of any fraud, were the questions, which would be determined by the Trial Court after recording of pro and contra evidence---Thus, rejecting such a plaint at the initial stage would not meet the ends of justice---High Court maintained the impugned order and judgment passed by the Appellate/ District Court being in accordance with law---Revision filed by the defendants, being merit-less, was dismissed in limine, in circumstances. (b) Civil Procedure Code ( V of 1908)--- ----O.VII, R. 11---Litigation between legal heirs---Rejection of plaint---Limitation---Scope---Plaintiffs challenged the legality / authenticity of a number of mutations, however, their plaint was rejected on ground of limitation, under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C.---Defendants filed revision as the Appellate Court set-aside the plaint-rejecting order passed by the Trial Court---Validity---Principle of limitation law, acquiescence as well as estoppel cannot be strictly adhered to in the cases of legal heirs who are deriving their title(s) from a common predecessor------High Court maintained the impugned order and judgment passed by the Appellate/ District Court being in accordance with law---Revision filed by defendants, being merit-less, was dismissed in limine, in circumstances. (c) Civil Procedure Code ( V of 1908)--- ----O. VII, R. 11---Cause of action, accrual of---Rejection of plaint---Scope---Plaintiffs challenged the legality / authenticity of a number of mutations, however, their plaint was rejected under O.VII, R. 11, C.P.C.---Defendants filed revision as the Appellate Court set-aside the plaint-rejecting order passed by the Trial Court---Validity---While deciding the application filed under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C., the Court has to just see that as to whether the plaintiff has disclosed a cause of action or not and as such at the initial stage it should not be the concern of the Court to record any finding that the plaintiff does not have a cause of action or that he would not be able to prove the cause of action, as such aspect of the case is to be determined after recording of pro and contra evidence---In the present case, notably, that the respondents/plaintiffs had successfully disclosed a cause of action, therefore, the suit of the respondents/plaintiffs was liable to proceed in accordance with law---High Court maintained the impugned order and judgment passed by the Appellate/ District Court being in accordance with law---Revision filed by defendants, being merit-less, was dismissed in limine, in circumstances. (d) Civil Procedure Code ( V of 1908)--- ----O.VII, R. 11---Rejection of plaint---Scope---Contents of plaint, considering of---Plaintiffs challenged the legality / authenticity of number of a mutations, however, their plaint was rejected under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C.---Defendants filed revision as the Appellate Court set-aside the plaint-rejecting order passed by the Trial Court---Validity---While deciding the application under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C., it is only the contents of the plaint which are to be considered and even a plea taken in the written-statement or any document appended with the written-statement cannot be considered at such initial stage---At the time of deciding an application filed under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C., for the rejection of a plaint, the Court has to just consider the "contents" of the plaint and every fact mentioned in the plaint has to be consideredas true and correct and even the written-statement or a plea taken in the written statement cannot be taken into consideration---High Court maintained the impugned order and judgment passed by the Appellate/ District Court being in accordance with law---Revision filed by defendants, being merit-less, was dismissed in limine, in circumstances. Assistant Director Mines and Mineral Department, Swabi v. Fazal Sadiq and others 2022 CLC 1392 ref. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. VII, R. 11---Rejection of plaint---Grounds---Plaintiffs challenged the legality / authenticity of a number of mutations, however, their plaint was rejected under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C.---Defendants filed revision as the Appellate Court set-aside, plaint-rejecting order passed by the Trial Court---Validity---Even the fact/ apprehension that the plaintiff may not ultimately succeed in establishing the averments made in the plaint, cannot be a ground for rejecting the plaint under O.VII, R.11 C.P.C.---High Court maintained the impugned order and judgment passed by the Appellate/ District Court being in accordance with law---Revision filed by defendants, being merit-less, was dismissed in limine, in circumstances. Jewan and 7 others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Revenue, Islamabad and 2 others 1994 SCMR 826 ref. Aqil Malik and Gul Faraz for Petitioners. Khalid Rehman Qureshi for Respondents. Date of hearing: 28th November, 2024.

Summary: (a) Land Revenue Law – Charagah Land vs. State Land: ---- Punjab Land Revenue Laws – Charagah Policy – Notifications of 2001, 2006, 2013 – Nature and Character of Charagah Land---Charagah land is distinct from state land and historically reserved for communal grazing purposes, serving collective benefits for the residents of a village---Charagah land cannot be treated as state land nor can it be converted into state land for proprietary rights or indefinite leasing purposes---Notifications over time, including the Notification of 2001 and Notification of 2013, clearly specify that charagah land may only be leased under strict conditions, limited time frames, and with express permission from the Board of Revenue (BOR)---Held, treating charagah land as state land for indefinite allotment under the lambardari grant is misconceived and contrary to the established legal framework. (b) Lambardari Grant – Scope and Limitations: ---- Punjab Land Revenue Laws – Notification of 2006 – Lambardari Grant---Lambardars may be granted state land for temporary cultivation under specific schemes, but charagah land does not fall within the definition of state land under the Notification of 2006---The grant of charagah land under lambardari provisions violates established legal principles and policies governing land usage---Held, lambardars cannot claim charagah land as part of their entitlement under the lambardari grant, especially without express permission from the BOR. (c) Board of Revenue – Permission for Allotment of Charagah Land: ---- Punjab Land Revenue Laws – Board of Revenue – Notification Compliance---Charagah land cannot be leased, allotted, or transferred without prior explicit approval from the Board of Revenue (BOR)---In the instant case, no approval was sought or granted by the BOR for the allotment of charagah land to the respondent under the lambardari grant---Held, the absence of BOR approval renders the allotment illegal and void ab initio. (d) Judicial Interpretation – Misconstruction of Legal Notifications: ---- Land Revenue Law – Notification of 2006 vs. Notification of 2013 – Misinterpretation by Lower Forums---The High Court erroneously interpreted Notification of 2006, treating charagah land as equivalent to state land---This interpretation disregarded subsequent notifications explicitly excluding charagah land from temporary or long-term leasing under lambardari grants---Held, charagah land retains its distinct legal character and cannot be allotted under general state land leasing provisions. (e) Protection of Charagah Land – Public Interest Doctrine: ---- Land Revenue Law – Public Purpose Doctrine---Charagah land serves a collective and public purpose, primarily grazing, and cannot be leased or allotted for private gain under any pretext---All policies and notifications over time have emphasized the preservation of charagah land for communal purposes unless a compelling public interest justifies its temporary usage under BOR supervision---Held, converting charagah land into private holdings undermines public interest and violates land usage policies. -----Cited Notifications and Policies: Notification No.1997-2001/1174-CLI, Dated 09.07.2001 Notification No.917-2013/932-CL(I), Dated 26.11.2013 Memorandum No.50-98/151-CS-V, Dated 04.02.1998 Charagah Policy (Para 321, Punjab Colony Manual, 1933 Edition) -----Disposition: Civil Petitions converted into appeals and allowed. The impugned order of the Lahore High Court is set aside. The allotment of charagah land to the respondent under the lambardari grant is declared void and illegal. The land is resumed in favor of the State. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005, S. 28(4) Limitation—Filing of complaints—Application of the Limitation Act, 1908 The petitioner’s complaint regarding missing family baggage was dismissed on the ground of limitation. The Supreme Court affirmed that under section 28(4) of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005, a claim must be filed within 30 days of the cause of action. While the proviso allows a Consumer Court to condone delays upon showing sufficient cause, the petitioner failed to provide a valid justification. The Court clarified that section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which provides for condonation of delay, does not apply to the Consumer Court proceedings under the Act of 2005. The argument that section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable was based on a misconception of law. (b) Limitation Act, 1908, Ss. 3 & 29(2) Exclusion of Limitation Act provisions in special or local laws The Supreme Court reiterated that section 29(2) of the Limitation Act excludes the application of section 5 for condonation of delay in cases governed by special or local laws, such as the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005. The Consumer Protection Act provides its own mechanism for addressing delays, rendering the Limitation Act inapplicable in these circumstances. Disposition: The petition was dismissed for lack of merit, and leave to appeal was refused. ----- Legal Principles: Section 28(4) of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act governs limitation for filing complaints and allows condonation of delay only if sufficient cause is shown. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings under the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005, as it is excluded by section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----Ss. 3 & 5---Appeal filed before the Supreme Court---Appeal time- barred by 22 days---Condonation of delay, application for---Wrongadvise/confusion of counsel not sufficient cause for condonation of delay---In the application seeking condonation of delay it was stated that initially the legal advice received was that a leave petition ought to be filed before the Supreme Court---In the said application in another paragrapgh it was stated that thereafter the legal advice was that an appeal lay as of right---It was this confusion or conflict in legal advice that led to the delay in the filing of the appeal---Wrong legal advice such as appeared to be involved in the present case did not constitute sufficient cause within the meaning of law---Since it was the appellant's own position that an appeal lay as of right with the present appeal being barred by time, the delay could not be condoned---Application seeking condonation of delay was dismissed, with the result that the appeal also stood dismissed. Khushi Muhammad through LRs and others v Mst. Fazal Bibi and others PLD 2016 SC 872 distinguished. (b) Precedent--- ----Any case, whether of the Supreme Court or of a High Court, that establishes binding precedent turns on facts proved or admitted. Sh. Zameer Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant. Sanaullah Zahid, Addl. A.G. Punjab for Respondents Nos. 1-3. Date of hearing: 15th November, 2024.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----Ss. 3 & 5---Appeal filed before the Supreme Court---Appeal time- barred by 22 days---Condonation of delay, application for---Wrongadvise/confusion of counsel not sufficient cause for condonation of delay---In the application seeking condonation of delay it was stated that initially the legal advice received was that a leave petition ought to be filed before the Supreme Court---In the said application in another paragrapgh it was stated that thereafter the legal advice was that an appeal lay as of right---It was this confusion or conflict in legal advice that led to the delay in the filing of the appeal---Wrong legal advice such as appeared to be involved in the present case did not constitute sufficient cause within the meaning of law---Since it was the appellant's own position that an appeal lay as of right with the present appeal being barred by time, the delay could not be condoned---Application seeking condonation of delay was dismissed, with the result that the appeal also stood dismissed. Khushi Muhammad through LRs and others v Mst. Fazal Bibi and others PLD 2016 SC 872 distinguished. (b) Precedent--- ----Any case, whether of the Supreme Court or of a High Court, that establishes binding precedent turns on facts proved or admitted. Sh. Zameer Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant. Sanaullah Zahid, Addl. A.G. Punjab for Respondents Nos. 1-3. Date of hearing: 15th November, 2024.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O.IX, R.13---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5---Ex parte decree, setting aside of---Limitation---Non-service due to incorrect/incomplete address---Decision of miscellaneous and ancillary applications before passing final judgment---Scope---Not deciding application for condonation of delay before passing final judgment was not fatal---Courts below conscious of its pendency---Delay deemed impliedly condoned---Implied condonation of delay permissible in view of proprietary rights and absence of prejudice to the opposite party---Substantial justice overrides technical objections---The pivotal legal issue that invited the consideration of the High Court was as to "Whether the concurrent findings of the courts below, whereby the ex parte proceedings and decree were set aside and the suit was revived, could be sustained in law despite the admitted pendency of an application for condonation of delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which remained undecided, and whether such omission constituted a material irregularity vitiating the legality and propriety of the impugned orders"---The factual backdrop was that the petitioner (now deceased) filed a suit for cancellation of mutation (pertaining to 4-kanals land) and recovery of gold ornaments against his wife, (respondent No. 3), alleging she deserted him after receiving these benefits---The suit was decreed ex parte on 11.07.2015 after proceedings against her were initiated ex parte on 04.10.2014---Respondent No. 3 (wife) filed an application under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C. to set aside the ex parte proceedings and decree, asserting she only came to know of the decree on 22.02.2022 and filed the application on 29.06.2022---Her plea was that an incorrect/incomplete address was provided, which led to non-service---Application for setting aside ex-parte judgment and decree was accepted and the suit was revived---Revision petition filed thereagainst by the petitioner was dismissed---The petitioner, since deceased, filed constitutional petition through legal heirs and made challenge to the concurrent findings of both the courts below on the grounds that the respondent's application was barred by time; her application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, for condonation of delay was not expressly decided, therefore, setting aside the ex parte decree without adjudication of the limitation issue was legally flawed---Held: Notwithstanding the disposal of appeal on merits without dealing with the question of limitation in express words, it would be deemed that there was implied condonation of delay---No one should be condemned unheard and parties should not be knocked out on the basis of technicalities---By revival of the suit the petitioners would still have the right to pursue the remedy available to them under the law, hence, no serious prejudice would have been caused to them by setting aside of the ex-parte judgment and decree---Balance to avoid prejudice to the rights of the parties tilted in favour of maintaining the decision of setting aside the ex parte proceedings and decree and revival of suit for its decision on its own merits---Even if application for condonation of delay was not decided, as proprietary rights of the parties were involved, hence it was appropriate to condone the delay in filing application for setting-aside ex parte decree and consequently order passed by both the courts below were interpreted in the manner that as while setting aside ex parte decree the courts below were conscious of pendency of the application for condonation of delay, hence the delay in filing the application for setting aside ex parte proceedings and decree although not dealt with in express terms had been impliedly condoned---Ex-parte proceedings and decree were set-aside and the suit filed by the petitioners was revived---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Ashiq Hussain Shah v. Province of Punjab through Collector District, Attock and 6 others 2003 SCMR 1840 and Tehsil Nazim TMA, Okara v. Abbas Ali and 2 others 2010 SCMR 1437 rel. Muhammad Sadiq v. Administrator, Residual Properties, Multan Division, Multan/Additional Commissioner (Revenue), Multan Division, Multan and another 1985 CLC 369 ref. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---Not every procedural irregularity warrants interference by the High Court---No writ where substantial justice has prevailed---Discretionary nature of Constitutional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of courts below, principle of---It is pertinent to mention that the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction is not required to interfere in each and every case, where the court or forum below has proceeded with some irregularity while deciding the matter---An order in the nature of a writ of certiorari or mandamus is a discretionary order---Its object is to foster justice and right a wrong, therefore, before a person can be permitted to invoke this discretionary power of a court, it must be shown that the order sought to be set aside had occasioned some injustice to the parties---Although it is general practice of procedural law that where an application going to the root of the matter remains undecided usually the courts remand the matter for decision of the same afresh, while also keeping in view the contents of the said application, but the same is not an absolute rule of law and the courts may refuse to set aside the decision inter alia for the reasons that prejudice has not been caused to the rights of the parties or by the said decision justice has been done and to set aside the said decision would result in prejudice to the right(s) of any of the parties---Where substantial justice has been done, it is not necessary for the High Court to interfere in Constitutional jurisdiction on the basis of technicalities alone for the reason that Constitutional jurisdiction is discretionary in character and where courts below have given concurrent conclusions, Superior Courts generally do not interfere in the conclusions arrived at by Courts and Tribunals below. Raunaq Ali and others v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others PLD 1973 SC 236 rel. Atta ul Manan Malik for Petitioner.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 10---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 42---Suit for declaration---Res judicata, doctrine of---Scope---Claim of the plaintiffs (two in number) was concurrently dismissed on the ground that the matter regarding suit-property was already settled by the Court of competent jurisdiction---Validity---It transpired from the record that against the present petitioners / plaintiffs (cited as defendants Nos. 27 and 26 respectively in previous suit), present respondents / defendants had earlier filed a suit for declaration that they were having a right to graze their cattle in the suit property according to the Wajb-ul-Arz and entries in the revenue record mentioning the suit-property as Khud Kasht were wrong---Said dispute had already been decided and had attained finality; but the present petitioners / plaintiffs ( who were then defendants Nos. 26 and 27) again brought the same matter before the court by challenging the entries of Wajib-ul-Arz being Dhaka Charagah rather than Dhaka Rakh---Suit-property was Dhaka Charagah and not Dhaka Rakh and the entries pertaining to Khud Kasht were wrong which were rightly corrected by the court --- Perusal of the previous litigation revealed that the entries to the extent of Khud Kasht in the revenue record qua khasra number 983 was challenged claiming it to be Dhaka Charagah which had already culminated into a decree in favour of the present respondents / defendants, therefore, the matter-in-issue, the parties, cause of action and parties in both the suits were the same which had been finally adjudicated and decided upon by the court of competent jurisdiction and was hit by the principle of res judicata and could not be re-opened---Petitioners failed to point out any illegality or irregularity in the impugned findings of the Courts below warranting interference of the High Court in limited revisional jurisdiction---Revision, being merit-less, was dismissed. (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S. 42---Suit for declaration---Entries in revenue record---Wajib-ul-Arz---Correction sought---Scope---Claim of the plaintiffs (two in number) was concurrently dismissed --- Validity --- Wajib-ul-Arz carries presumption of truth because Wajib-ul-Arz is part of the Record of Rights, and strong, unimpeachable evidence is required to counter and rebut such entries---Grazing rights of the inhabitants of the locality were duly embodied in the Wajib-ul-Arz and no evidence had been provided from either side suggesting any changes in the consistent entries of Wajib-ul-Arz--- Petitioners / plaintiffs failed to point out any illegality or irregularity in the impugned findings of the Courts below warranting interference of the High Court in limited revisional jurisdiction --- Revision, being merit-less, was dismissed. (c) Limitation--- ---- Entries in Revenue record---Wajib-ul-Arz---Correction sought---Limitation ---Claim of the plaintiffs (two in number) was concurrently dismissed --- Petitioners through the present suit had challenged the entries of Wajib-ul-Arz for the year 1965/1966 by filing a suit for declaration in the year 2000 which made the suit of the plaintiffs/petitioners hopelessly time barred--- Petitioners failed to point out any illegality or irregularity in the impugned findings of the Courts below warranting interference of the High Court in limited revisional jurisdiction ---Revision, being merit-less ,was dismissed. Malik Mahmood Akhtar and Gul Sherin Khan Jadoon for Petitioners. Khalid Rehman Qureshi for Respondents. Date of hearing: 11th November, 2024.

Summary: The petitioner, a banking institution, filed a Civil Petition challenging the dismissal of its writ petition by the Lahore High Court. The case arose from the dismissal of a bank employee on charges of misconduct in 1982. The employee successfully contested his dismissal before the Punjab Labour Court, which ordered his reinstatement in 1985. However, the employer delayed filing an appeal and approached the Labour Appellate Tribunal in 1996 after being granted indulgence by the High Court. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal in 2013, citing a time-bar. The High Court subsequently upheld this decision in 2023. Meanwhile, the jurisdiction of the Labour Appellate Tribunal over trans-provincial establishments, like the petitioner, had been ousted by the enactment of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 (IRA), transferring such matters to the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC). ------- Issues: ------- 1) Did the Labour Appellate Tribunal have jurisdiction to hear the appeal after the enactment of the IRA, 2012? ------- 2) Was the dismissal of the appeal by the Tribunal justified due to a time-bar? ------- 3) Should the appeal have been transferred to the NIRC for adjudication? ------- 4) What is the legal status of the orders passed by a court or tribunal lacking jurisdiction? ------- Holding, Reasoning, Outcome: The Supreme Court converted the Civil Petition into an appeal, which was allowed. The decisions of the Labour Appellate Tribunal (13.03.2013) and the Lahore High Court (21.02.2023) were set aside. ------- Jurisdiction of the Labour Appellate Tribunal: The enactment of the IRA, 2012, transferred jurisdiction over trans-provincial establishments to the NIRC, rendering the Labour Appellate Tribunal's decision coram non judice (beyond its legal authority). Section 57(5) of the IRA explicitly prohibits provincial labour courts and tribunals from exercising jurisdiction in such cases. As the petitioner’s appeal involved a trans-provincial establishment, it should have been adjudicated by the NIRC. ------- Effect of Lack of Jurisdiction: Any decision rendered by a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is null and void. The Tribunal should have returned the appeal for proper presentation before the NIRC instead of dismissing it outright. The High Court erred in failing to recognize this jurisdictional defect. ------- Procedural Change and Retrospective Application: The IRA, being procedural law, applied retrospectively to all pending matters. A mere change in the forum of appeal does not prejudice substantive rights. As such, the Tribunal was obligated to acknowledge the IRA’s procedural changes and transfer the case to the NIRC. ------- Implementation of Procedural Law: Procedural laws like the IRA are designed to streamline judicial processes without affecting substantive rights. The petitioner retained the right to appeal; the forum for adjudication merely shifted to the NIRC. ------- Outcome: The Supreme Court directed the Labour Appellate Tribunal to return the appeal file to the petitioner’s authorized representative for immediate presentation before the NIRC. The NIRC was instructed to adjudicate the matter on merits, ensuring both parties are given a fair opportunity to present their case. ------- Citations/Precedents: Industrial Relations Act, 2012 (Sections 57(5) & 33): Establishes exclusive jurisdiction of the NIRC for trans-provincial disputes and individual grievances. ----- Case Law: Pakistan Telecommunication Co. Ltd. v. Member NIRC (2014 SCMR 535): Affirmed the NIRC’s exclusive jurisdiction over trans-provincial matters. Muhammad Shabbir v. Quaid-e-Azam University (2022 SCMR 487): Procedural changes in jurisdiction are retrospective unless they affect substantive rights. Videocon International Ltd. v. SEBI (AIR 2015 SC 1042): Procedural laws, including changes in appellate forums, operate retrospectively. Legal Maxim: Coram non judice decisions are void and without legal effect.

Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (XI of 1987) –----S. 31---Limitation period for pre-emption suits---Computation of time---Appellant’s pre-emption suit, filed 122 days after attestation of mutation, was barred by the 120-day limitation period prescribed under Section 31 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987---High Court correctly set aside concurrent findings of lower courts and dismissed the suit for being time-barred---Pre-emption claims must be strictly within statutory limitations, and any lapse in adhering to the prescribed timeframe is fatal to the case.(b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (XI of 1987) –----S. 32---Notice of sale---Failure to plead and prove concealment of sale---Appellant attempted to argue that the sale was concealed and no notice was issued as required under Section 32 of the Act of 1987---However, no such plea was raised in the plaint at the time of filing the suit, and no evidence was led to establish fraudulent concealment---A party must plead material facts from the outset and prove them through evidence; mere assertion is insufficient to establish a claim.(c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) –----Ss. 18 & 29---Fraudulent concealment of sale---Effect on limitation period---Appellant belatedly attempted to invoke Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908, arguing that fraud prevented him from knowing about the sale in time---However, fraud must be pleaded with full particulars at the initial stage and then proved through evidence---Since no such plea was taken before the Trial Court, nor were full particulars of fraud provided, the argument was rightly rejected by the High Court---A fresh plea not raised before lower courts, except on pure questions of law, cannot be entertained at the appellate stage.Cited Case: Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh 2007 SCMR 1446(d) Civil Procedure-------New grounds on appeal---Limitations on raising fresh arguments---A party cannot raise a fresh ground of attack or defense for the first time before the Supreme Court unless it is a pure question of law---Appellant, having failed to contest limitation in earlier proceedings, could not introduce new arguments at the Supreme Court stage except where mixed questions of law and fact required consideration---High Court’s decision, setting aside concurrent findings of the lower courts, was based on sound legal reasoning and did not warrant interference.----Disposition: Civil appeal dismissed; pre-emption suit held to be time-barred.