Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Constitution of Azad Jammu & Kashmir— ----Sections 3, 33, 41, 42, 43, 44 & 56-C— Vires of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Shariat Court (Amendment) Ordinance XVIII of 2014 challenged—Ordinance promulgated contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bashir Ahmed Mughal v. Azad Govt. (PLD 2015 SC (AJ&K) 31)—Failure of the official respondents to provide constitutional cover to the Shariat Court as directed by the apex Court—The Ordinance, instead of amending the Constitution Act, was issued to circumvent the judgment—Held, under Section 41(1) of the Constitution Act, 1974, an Ordinance cannot be promulgated when the Assembly is in session—The Ordinance was placed before the Legislative Assembly but was subsequently promulgated after prorogation of the session, making it an act of mala fide intent—Further, appointments made under the impugned Ordinance were non-transparent, against the principle of judicial independence, and in violation of precedent. ----Cited Cases: • Bashir Ahmed Mughal v. Azad Govt. (PLD 2015 SC (AJ&K) 31) • Muhammad Younas Tahir v. Shoukat Aziz (PLD 2012 SC (AJ&K) 42) • Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 483) • S.P. Gupta v. President of India (AIR 1982 SC 149) (b) Judiciary—Independence of Judiciary—Appointments of Judges— ----Consultation process for appointments—Principle of effective and meaningful consultation— Recommendations and appointment notifications for Judges of the Shariat Court were issued in contravention of Supreme Court directives—Failure to consult the Chief Justices in a meaningful and result-oriented manner—Judges appointed under the impugned Ordinance were previously removed by the Supreme Court for political favoritism and lack of merit—Held, independence of the judiciary requires a transparent, merit-based, and non-political appointment process—Appointments made under the Ordinance lacked essential procedural safeguards and were, therefore, void ab initio. ----Cited Cases: • Muhammad Younas Tahir v. Shoukat Aziz (PLD 2012 SC (AJ&K) 42) • Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 483) (c) Writ of Quo Warranto—Maintainability— ----Challenge to the appointment of Judges of the Shariat Court through writ petition— Respondents contended that under Section 44(5) of the Interim Constitution Act, 1974, recommendations of Chief Justices were immune from judicial review—Held, writ of quo warranto was maintainable as the Supreme Court and High Court were excluded from the definition of "person" under Section 44(5), but the Shariat Court was not—Appointments could be reviewed by the High Court to ensure compliance with constitutional provisions—Fraud vitiates the most solemn proceedings; therefore, even appointments made through recommendations can be challenged when procured through misrepresentation or undue political influence. ----Cited Cases: • Ghulam Mustafa Mughal v. The Azad Govt. (1992 MLD 2083) • Amjad Hussain v. Ghulam Rasool Mir (1991 PCr.LJ 685) • Dr. Azim-ur-Rehman Khan Meo v. Government of Sindh (2004 SCMR 1299) (d) Ordinance-Making Power—Scope & Limitations— ----Legislative process and procedural irregularities— The impugned Ordinance was promulgated despite the fact that a Bill on the same subject had already been placed before the Legislative Assembly—Held, Ordinance-making power under Section 41(1) of the Constitution Act, 1974, is subject to preconditions, including the absence of a session of the Assembly—Promulgation of an Ordinance after placing a Bill before the Assembly undermines legislative authority and constitutes an act of bad faith—Where an Ordinance is promulgated a day before or after an Assembly session, it raises serious questions about its legality and necessity. ----Cited Cases: • Bidya Chaudhary v. Province of Bihar (AIR 1950 Patna 19) • Reference No.01 of 2012 by the President of Pakistan (PLD 2013 SC 279) -----Disposition: The writ petition was accepted—The impugned Azad Jammu and Kashmir Shariat Court (Amendment) Ordinance XVIII of 2014 was declared unconstitutional and set aside—Appointments of respondents No. 5 and 6 to the Shariat Court were declared void—The respondents ceased to hold office forthwith.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Background: The appellant was convicted under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) for committing zina-bil-jabar (rape) with the complainant, Mst. Ajmair Bibi, who was a minor at the time. The incident occurred on August 8, 2000, when the complainant was grazing cattle in the fields. The appellant and his father allegedly approached her, with the appellant committing the rape after the complainant refused his advances. The complainant reported the incident to the police, and the appellant evaded arrest for over 12 years until he was apprehended in January 2013. After a trial, the appellant was convicted and sentenced to 25 years of rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 300,000, or three years of simple imprisonment in default. ----Issues: 1- Whether the trial court's conviction of the appellant under Section 376 PPC was legally justified, given that the case was initially registered and prosecuted under the Hudood Ordinance. 2- Whether the prosecution's evidence, including the testimony of the complainant and medical reports, was sufficient to sustain the conviction. 3- Whether the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant to 25 years of rigorous imprisonment, considering the appellant's age at the time of the offense. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The appellate court upheld the conviction of the appellant under Section 376 PPC, despite the initial charges being under the Hudood Ordinance. The court clarified that after the promulgation of the Women Protection Act in 2006, Section 376 PPC was reinstated, and the trial court was authorized to convict the appellant under this section. The court found that the prosecution had successfully proven the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The testimony of the complainant was consistent and credible, and it was corroborated by the medical examination, which confirmed the occurrence of rape. The recovery of blood-stained earth and the complainant's clothing further supported the prosecution's case. The appellate court, however, considered the appellant's age at the time of the offense (approximately 11-12 years old) and reduced the sentence from 25 years to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment. The fine of Rs. 300,000 and the default sentence of three years' simple imprisonment were upheld. ----Citations/Precedents: Section 376 PPC: The conviction was upheld under this section, which was revived by the Women Protection Act of 2006. Section 237 Cr.P.C.: The court's power to convict under a different section of the law than the one initially charged. Benefit of Doubt: The appellant's age was considered, leading to a reduction in the sentence from 25 years to 10 years.

Summary: The petitioner, representing the legal heirs of the deceased husband, opposed the claim. After trial and appeal, the current Civil Revision petition challenges the lower courts' judgments and decrees. The petitioner argued that the entries in the Nikah Nama are based on collusion and malafide and that the courts failed to consider the alleged tampering of crucial documents. Additionally, they contest the jurisdiction of the Family Court to adjudicate matters related to immovable property given as dower, asserting that such disputes should be resolved in the Civil Court. The court examined the evidence, emphasizing that when immovable property is documented as dower in the Nikah Nama, it becomes the property of the wife. It asserted that the deceased husband's lack of objection during his lifetime strengthens the credibility of the dower claim. The court relied on legal precedence and concluded that the judgments of the lower courts are in line with the evidence and the law. Moreover, it dismissed the petition, noting that the Family Court holds the jurisdiction to decide on dower matters, whether movable or immovable. The court also highlighted the lack of statutory provision for revision against judgments of the Appellate Court in the Family Courts Act, and subsequently dismissed the petition for lacking merit. The court dismissed the Civil Revision petition, upholding the lower courts' judgments regarding the dower property claimed by the respondent.

Summary: Industrial Relations Act (IV of 2008)-------Ss. 2(viii)(xxix), 41 & 55---Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders)Ordinance (VI of 1968), S.2(c), (i) & S.0.12---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutionalpetition-- Termination of employment---Grievance application---Relationship of employer andemployee---Respondents, claiming themselves to be employees of the petitioner-company, filedgrievance application challenging termination of their services by the company---Grievance ofthe respondents was, that they were appointed by the company on permanent basis and wereplaced under probation for a period of three months and that after completion of the probationperiod they had become permanent employees of the company, but they were not issued anyappointment letters by the company with terms and conditions of employment and wereterminated from their services, without any lawful justification---Grievance application by therespondents, was contested by the company by filing written statement, contending that,respondents had no cause of action against the petitioner, as they were never hired by thecompany, but were employees of the contractor/consultant of the company; that no relationshipof "employer and employee" existed between the company and the respondents---Company also clarified that respondents were engaged by the consultant/contractor intermittently for thepurpose of contractual work in the premises of company's factory and that agreement was arrivedat between the company and the consultant/contractor, that the company would provide suitableworking place/facility to the consultant, and the consultant would employ, hire, engage technicalcompetent employees to discharge the contractual obligations under the agreement---Soleproprietor of 'The Consultants' had acknowledged execution of said agreement with thecompany---Labour Court dismissed grievance application, but Appellate Tribunal set aside thejudgment of the Labour Court, directing the company to reinstate the respondents by means ofpermanent appointment letters---Validity---No appointment letter had been issued to any of therespondents by the company---No pay-roll existed on record to prove that the respondents wereemployees of the company-Nothing was on record to show that the respondents were paidwages/salaries/remuneration by the company as an employer of the respondents---Record,however, revealed of the pay roll of "the consultants" mentioning the names of the respondentsas the employees of "the consultants" against whom no grievance had been agitated by therespondents---Labour Court had rightly concluded that there existed no relationship of "employerand employee" between the company and the respondents; that the respondents were employeesof the contractor "the consultants", who were engaged in pursuance of an agreement between thecompany and "the consultants" and that no cause of action had accrued to the respondents againstthe company---Appellate Tribunal, while passing impugned judgment, had erred in facts as wellas law and had failed to properly appreciate the evidence available on record---AppellateTribunal, had erred in allowing the appeals of the respondents and issuing directions to thecompany to reinstate the respondents by issuing their permanent appointment letters---Constitutional petition against judgment of Appellate Tribunal, was allowed---Impugnedjudgment passed by Labour Appellate Tribunal, was declared null, void and of no legal effect---Judgment passed by the Labour Court dismissing the grievance application of the respondents,was upheld, in circumstances.Messrs Allied Precision Engineering Products v. J. Handa Khan Maree 2011 PLC 286distinguished.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending.