Summary: Bail granted ---- (a) Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA), 2016 ----Secs. 10 & 11, read with S. 109, Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----Hate speech and dissemination of fake information against government institutions through social media----Post-arrest bail----Maintainability. Accused was charged with spreading hate speech and fake information against government institutions via social media (Facebook and Twitter). The FIR was registered after a thorough investigation, and the accused remained behind bars following his arrest. The court observed that the offenses under PECA were punishable with imprisonment, fine, or both. In cases where the potential punishment includes only a fine, an under-trial detention would amount to double jeopardy. Cited Cases: Sher Ahmad v. State (PLD 1993 Peshawar 104) Ameer Ullah v. The State (2012 P.Cr.L.J 1858) Mustafa Ali v. State (2014 P.Cr.L.J 1464) Tariq Bashir v. The State (PLD 1995 SC 34) Muhammad Hayat Khan v. The State & another (2019 P.Cr.L.J 472) (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----Bail considerations ----S. 497(2)----Delay in registration of FIR----Question of further inquiry----Scope. The complaint in the present case was lodged four months after the alleged occurrence, which raised concerns about the credibility of the prosecution's case. Additionally, whether the accused actually used the purported social media accounts was a question of evidence to be determined at trial. Given the requirement for further inquiry, the accused was entitled to bail under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C. (c) Criminal Law----Bail vs. acquittal ----Grant of bail does not amount to acquittal----Presumption of innocence prevails. The court reaffirmed the principle that granting bail does not mean acquittal but only a change in custody from state authorities to sureties, who are responsible for ensuring the accused’s appearance in court whenever required. Cited Cases: Haji Muhammad Nazir v. State (2020 SCMR 807) (d) Discretion of Court in Bail Matters ----Accused no longer required for investigation----No prior criminal record----Status as a university lecturer considered in favor of bail. The court noted that the accused was no longer needed for investigation and had no prior criminal history. Additionally, his status as a lecturer at Abdul Wali Khan University weighed in favor of granting bail rather than continued incarceration. Cited Cases: 2012 SCMR 573 ------ Disposition Bail petition was allowed. Accused was granted post-arrest bail upon furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 100,000/- with two sureties of like amount, subject to verification of local, reliable, and financially sound sureties. Observations made in the bail order were declared tentative and not binding on the trial court.

Summary: Bail in case registered under section 3/21/24 of prevention of electronic Crimes Act, 2016 read with section 419 PPC.Held: Objectionable pictures which were uploaded through a cell phone on whatsapp were recovered form possession of the petitioner which stigmatized the honour of not only the complainant but her whole family. The offence is of moral turpitude which badly affects the society at large.The petitioner is charged with an offence which does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 CrPC however, the concession is to be extended having regards to the facts and circumstance of each case and in appropriate cases, the Court justifiably depart from the rule.

Summary: Method of production for video or audio evidence in court --- Court acceptance of audio tapes or videos is contingent upon establishing their authenticity and integrity. Forensic analysis from the Punjab Forensic Science Agency can automatically be considered admissible under the provisions of the Punjab Forensic Science Agency Act, 2007. Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, grants courts discretion in admitting evidence obtained through audio tapes or videos.Even when permitted, presenting audio tapes or videos requires compliance with evidentiary laws. The accuracy of recordings must be demonstrated, with direct or circumstantial evidence ruling out tampering. The submitted material must genuinely reflect the conversation or event and be authenticated by the person who recorded it.The individual recording the audio or video must appear in court to present the material. The playback in court should ensure clarity, and the voices or persons involved must be correctly identified. Additional testimony from individuals present during the recording or event may support the audio or video's credibility.Relevance and admissibility are crucial; the evidence should pertain to the dispute at hand. Proper custody, disclosure of the source, and the date of acquisition must be proven, avoiding suspicion when introduced late in judicial proceedings. Formal applications are required for inclusion in the case record, preventing misuse of audio tapes or videos for trap purposes.---- There cannot be two opinions about the legal position that during the pendency of an appeal, after conviction and sentence, it is the Court of Appeal alone which can maintain, alter or set aside such conviction and sentence on the basis of the evidence brought on the record. Any Commission constituted by the Government or by this Court, any inquiry or investigation conducted by the police or by any other agency and any probe into the matter (of video recording of the trial judge purportedly showing him stating that he was pressurized into convicting the accused) by any other institution or body can only render an opinion in the matter of the relevant video which opinion is treated by the law as irrelevant and it cannot per se be treated as evidence for the benefit of the convict in his pending appeal. --- ''With the advancement of science and technology it isnow possible to get a forensic examination, audit or testconducted through an appropriate laboratory so as to get itascertained as to whether an audio tape or a video isgenuine or not and such examination, audit or test can alsoreasonably establish if such audio tape or video has beenedited, doctored or tampered with or not. In the present casethe learned Judge had asserted through his press releasethat the conversation shown to be taking place in the abovementioned video (the ?subject video?) had been distorted andtwisted. The advancement of science and technology has nowmade it very convenient and easy to edit, doctor,superimpose or photoshop a voice or picture in an audiotape or video and, therefore, without a forensic examination,audit or test of an audio tape or video it is becoming moreand more unsafe to rely upon the same as a piece ofevidence in a court of law. It must never be lost sight of thatthe standard of proof required in a criminal case is beyondreasonable doubt and any realistic doubt about an audiotape or video not being genuine may destroy its credibilityand reliability.''

Summary: Bail Matters (under Section 498 Cr.P.C r/w Section 561-A Cr.P.C), Criminal Procedure Codea) S.498, 561-A Cr.P.C--- Scope: Application of proper procedure;S.498, 561-A Cr.P.C--- Order under S.497(5) Cr.P.C passed by the District & Sessions Judge cancelling the bail of accused charged under Cyber Crime was assailed before High Court---The Court observed that the proceedings filed were half criminal bail application and half criminal Miscellaneous Application. It was further observed that surprisingly the Counsel who was protecting the liberty of his client was unaware of the law and nature of proceedings. As the proceeding under both the provision are distinguished in nature, in fact Deputy Registrar Judicial had to check that whether the instant application under Section 498 Cr.P.C was in the prescribed format for such an application or not. And if it was not the Deputy Registrar should have raised objection to bring it in the proper form.b) Supreme Court.16, 20, 21, PECA 2016 r/w 49, 420, 109 PPC (Prevention of Electric Crimes Act) ---S.497(5) Cr.P.COrder:In fact in Cyber Crime the accused cannot allege malafide in associating/ connecting him in the crime. The complainant was not aware of the applicant. He had only noticed certain fake pages on internet and Facebook carrying objectionable. FIA by using scientific technics reached to the accused through cell phone number which has been used to the Facebook carrying offensive material. Held--- Since the complainant party was never aware of the person behind this misuse of internet, it cannot be said that complainant had malafidely named the accused and arrested or associated with the offence. The Cell phone was in use of Accused and sufficient documentary evidence appeared against him connecting him with commission of offence. Application dismissed.

Summary: Every citizen and political party had the right to assemble and protest provided such assembly and protest was peaceful and complied with the law imposing reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order---Right to assemble and protest was circumscribed only to the extent that it infringed on the fundamental rights of others, including their right to free movement and to hold and enjoy property--Protestors who obstructed people's right to use roads and damaged or destroyed property must be proceeded against in accordance with the law and held accountable. (e) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 184(3)---Suo motu action regarding Islamabad-Rawalpindi sit-in protest by members of a religious political party---Failure of State in protecting its citizens---Political party in question and its followers, from all accounts, were determined to disrupt civic life; they sowed discord and dissension, resorted to mob-rule, rioting and the destruction of property---To meet such challenge there was little preparation or preplanning by the government, the police and other law enforcement agencies---No plan was apparently prepared to attend to the different eventualities likely to emerge---Leadership of the political party paid no heed to the District Magistrate's letter, which prevented public gatherings and required prior permission for a long march protest, yet no prosecution was launched against the leadership in such regard---State had to ensure that its citizens' fundamental rights were upheld; they were kept safe, their properties protected and they were allowed to move freely---By being unable to manage and control the protest in question the State let its citizens down---Threatening another, violating the law, occupying public roads, destroying property, injuring or causing death did not emulate the example of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), his 'akhlaq' and 'aadab'--Persons who employed such tactics could not be the standard bearers of the Muslim faith---Supreme Court directed that the police and other law enforcement agencies were to develop standard plans and procedure with regard to how best to handle rallies, protests and dharnas, and ensure that such plans/procedures were flexible enough to attend to different situations; that though the making of such plans/procedures was not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court however it was expected that in the maintenance of law and order every effort would be taken to avoid causing injury and loss of life; and that the Federal and Provincial governments shall monitor those advocating hate, extremism and terrorism and prosecute the perpetrators in accordance with the law. (f) Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)--- ----S. 211---Elections Rules, 2017, R. 161(2)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 7(3) & 184(3)---Suo motu action regarding Islamabad-Rawalpindi sit-in protest by members of a religious political party---Political parties---Disclosure of source of funding and election expenses---All political parties had to account for the source of their funds in accordance with the law---Election Commission confirmed that the political party in question which was protesting did not account for its funds and election expenses---Constitution earmarked the responsibilities of the Election Commission which it must fulfil---Supreme Court directed that if a political party did not comply with the law governing political parties then the Election Commission must proceed against it in accordance with the law. (g) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 16---Right to assembly peacefully---Scope---Right of assembly was recognized as a right to preserve the democratic order, but it could not be used to overthrow a lawful government---Nor could the right of assembly be used to bring about a revolution or insurrection. Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Abdul Wali Khan PLD 1976 SC 57, 104 ref. (h) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 15, 16, 17 & 19 & Pt. II, Chapt. 1 [Arts. 8 to 28]---Protest on roads--Right of assembly, the freedom of association and the freedom of speech---Scope--Said rights could not be exercised by infringing the fundamental rights of others--Without obtaining permission public meetings could not be held on roads---Nor could a road be used as a camping ground or to assemble on it indefinitely---Roads were for vehicular use and pavements were for the use of pedestrians to enable the travelling public to move freely, which was their fundamental right [Art.15 of the Constitution]. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Jones (Margaet) and another [1999] 2 AC 240 and In re: Ramlila Maidan Incident (2012) 5 SCC 1 ref. (i) Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XIII of 2002) -- ----Ss. 20(c) & 27(a)---Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (XL of 2016), Ss. 11 & 12---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 19 & 184(3) --- Suo motu action regarding Islamabad-Rawalpindi sit-in protest by members of a religious political party--Hate speech and incitement to violence spread through electronic media---Failure of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority to fulfil its statutory duty--Leadership of the political party in question created hatred amongst the people, they abused, threatened and advocated violence; and this was broadcasted by some private television channels---Reports of an intelligence agency revealed that a particular TV channel supported the political party in question and its owners had supplied food to the protestors---Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority ("the Authority"), however, did not take action under the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 ('the Ordinance') against any of its licencees for violating the terms of their licences---Authority abdicated its statutory duty, a duty which it was legally obliged to fulfil---Authority also failed to protect the legitimate rights of two of its licensed broadcasters---Broadcasts by said two licencees were stopped/interrupted in certain areas of the country; complaints stating this were acknowledged by the Authority---Authority looked the other way and did nothing to protect the interests of its licencees nor took action against those cable operators who were responsible---Hate which was spread and the violence which was incited through electronic means appeared not to have been investigated, let alone the violators prosecuted and punished---Supreme Court directed that broadcasters who broadcasted messages advocating or inciting the commission of an offence violated the Ordinance and the terms of their licences and must be proceeded against by the Authority in accordance with the law; that cable operators who stopped or interrupted the broadcast of licenced broadcasters must be proceeded against by the Authority in accordance with the Ordinance, and if this was done on the behest of others then the Authority should report those so directing the cable operators to the concerned authorities; and that those spreading messages through electronic means which advocated or incited the commission of an offence were liable to be prosecuted under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016. (j) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 19---Censorship of the television channels and newspapers--Constitutionality and legality---Overt and covert censorship was unconstitutional and illegal---Nebulous tactics, such as issuing advice to self-censor, to suppress independent viewpoints, to project prescribed ones, to direct who should be hired or fired by media organisations was also illegal---No one, including any government, department or intelligence agency could curtail the fundamental right of freedom of speech, expression and press beyond the parameters mentioned in Art.19 of the Constitution. Dr. Shahid Masood v. Federation of Pakistn 2010 SCMR 1849 at pages 1860-1861 and Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Speeches, Statements, Writings, Letters, etc.), Muhammad Haneef Shahid (1st edn., Sang-e-Meel 1976) 51 ref. (k) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 184(3) & 245---Suo motu action regarding Islamabad-Rawalpindi sit-in protest by members of a religious political party---Interference of intelligence agencies in politics and manipulation of the media---When participants of the protest received cash handouts from men in (army) uniform the perception of the latter's involvement (in politics) gained traction---Director General of the InterServices Public Relations ("ISPR") had also taken to commenting on political matters---Armed Forces, and all agencies manned by the personnel of the Armed Forces, served the country, and thus all its citizens---Such agencies must never be perceived to support a particular political party, faction or politician---Persons who resorted to abuse, hate and violence should never be pampered, instead they should fear the State, its police and intelligence agencies---If any personnel of the Armed Forces indulged in any form of politicking or tried to manipulate the media he undermined the integrity and professionalism of the Armed Forces---Duties of the Armed Forces were clearly spelt out in the Constitution, that they,"shall under the direction of the Federal Government defend Pakistan against external aggression or threat of war, and, subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so" [Art.245 of the Constitution]---When institutions stayed within their designated constitutional boundaries and there was an effective system of check and balance, citizens stayed safe and the State prospered---Law was applicable to all, including those who were in government and institutions must act independently of those in government---Supreme Court directed that all intelligence agencies and the ISPR must not exceed their respective mandates; that such agencies could not curtail the freedom of speech and expression and did not have the authority to interfere with broadcasts and publications, in the management of broadcasters/publishers and in the distribution of newspapers; that intelligence agencies should monitor activities of all those who threatened the territorial integrity of the country and all those who undermined the security of the people and the State by resorting to or inciting violence; that to best ensure transparency and the rule of law it would be appropriate to enact laws which clearly stipulated the respective mandates of the intelligence agencies; that the Constitution emphatically prohibited members of the Armed Forces from engaging in any kind of political activity, which included supporting a political party, faction or individual; and that Federal Government through the Ministry of Defence and the respective Chiefs of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force were to initiate action against the personnel under their command who were found to have violated their oath. Air Marshal (Retd.) Muhammad Asghar Khan v. General (Retd.) Mirza Aslam Baig, Former Chief of Army Staff PLD 2013 SC 1 ref. (l) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 124-A---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (XL of 2016), Ss. 11 & 12---'Edict' or 'fatwa'---Person issuing an edict or fatwa, which harmed another or put another in harm's way---Such person must be criminally prosecuted under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and/or the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016. ------ known as the "Dharna Judgement", addresses a series of protests that erupted following a legislative change in the Elections Act, 2017. The controversy began when the wording in the declaration for Muslim candidates was altered from "I solemnly swear..." to "I believe...", leading to widespread protests. The government eventually reverted to the original wording, but the Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP) continued its protests, culminating in a significant sit-in at the Faizabad Interchange, disrupting life in Islamabad and Rawalpindi.Justice Qazi Faez Isa highlighted the constitutional requirements for Muslim candidates and the subsequent government actions to restore the original declaration text. The judgment extensively reviewed the events surrounding the TLP's protest, including its impact on public life and the state's response. It discussed the legal framework under which the protests were evaluated, particularly focusing on the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution of Pakistan, such as the right to life, freedom of movement, right to education, and the right to a fair trial.The judgment also delved into the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, emphasizing the court's role in protecting fundamental rights and ensuring that its jurisdiction is exercised within constitutional limits. The court critically analyzed previous protests and government responses, drawing parallels and distinctions to contextualize the TLP's dharna.The court's directives aimed to establish a framework for handling protests, ensuring political parties' accountability, and delineating the roles of state institutions, including intelligence agencies, the Election Commission, and law enforcement, in maintaining public order and protecting citizens' rights. The judgment underscored the sanctity of fundamental rights, the importance of upholding the rule of law, and the need for all state institutions to operate within their constitutional boundaries.This landmark judgment serves as a reference point for addressing the complex interplay between the right to protest, public order, and the state's responsibility to protect fundamental rights, emphasizing a balanced approach that respects democratic principles while ensuring public safety and order.---- Suo motu action regarding Islamabad-Rawalpindi sit-in protest by members of a religious political party--Constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 184(3) of the Constitution---Question as to whether the Supreme Court could invoke its jurisdiction under Art.184(3) of the Constitution with regard to the matter---Held, Supreme Court may invoke its power under Art.184(3) of the Constitution provided the matter was one of public importance and pertained to the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights---Members of political party and its supporters occupied a road junction (interchange), which was one of the main entry-exit points to the Capital city of the country---Sit-in protest effectively paralyzed the Capital city and its neighbouring city---Whole country effectively came under lockdown--Protestors had converged on major roads and highways, they pelted stones, damaged and burnt vehicles and properties---Ambulances, doctors, paramedic staff and other organizations providing emergency services, including those of firefighters, bomb disposal and rescue services were prevented from rendering emergency assistance or got unreasonably delayed searching for alternative routes to the emergency---Deprived of access to doctors and medical facilities countless people suffered---Preventing the sick from reaching doctors and hospitals infringed their right to life (guaranteed under Art.9 of the Constitution) which required enforcement---Blocking roads for long durations prevents citizens from exercising their right to freedom of movement (guaranteed by Art.15 of the Constitution) and such right of theirs required enforcement---When students could not attend schools and educational institutions their right to education (guaranteed under Art.25A of the Constitution) required enforcement---Litigants' access to courts was blocked, therefore, their right to fair trial and due process (guaranteed by Art.10A of the Constitution) required enforcement---Abusing, threatening and attacking people undermined their right to live a life of "dignity" (guaranteed under Art.14(1) of the Constitution) which also required enforcement---Shops and businesses were forced to shut, people could not pursue their vocation, poor daily workers were denied the possibility of earning a livelihood, thus, their right to work (guaranteed by Art.18 of the Constitution) needed enforcement---Since property was damaged or destroyed the right to hold and enjoy property (guaranteed under Art.23 of the Constitution) was required to be enforced---Present matter undisputedly was one of public importance and required the enforcement of the fundamental rights of nearly every citizen---Supreme Court therefore invoked its jurisdiction under Art.184(3) of the Constitution. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 184(3)---Constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 184(3) of the Constitution---Matter of 'public importance'---Scope ---Mere importance of a matter was not, in itself, sufficient to invoke jurisdiction under Art. 184(3) of the Constitution---Matter must be one of public importance, that was, it must involve the rights of the public too---Before an order was made under Art.184(3) of the Constitution it would be appropriate if the Supreme Court identified the public importance of the matter and the fundamental right/s requiring enforcement. ------- (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 184(3)---Constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 184(3) of the Constitution---Scope---Every possible care should be taken before making an order under Art.184(3) of the Constitution since there was no right to appeal such an order. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 15, 16, 17(1), 17(2), 19 & 23---Right to assemble and protest---Scope--Constitution did not specifically stipulate a right to protest, however, democracy recognized such a right, and it was through democratic means that Pakistan was achieved---Right to protest was also implied in "the right to assemble peacefully" [Art.16 of the Constitution], in the "right to form associations or unions" [Art.17(1)], in the "right to form or be a member of a political party" [Art.17(2)] and in the "in the right to freedom of speech and expression [Art.19]---

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------Ss. 497 & 164---Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (XL of 2016), S. 21---Offencesagainst modesty of a natural person and minor---Bail, refusal of---Crime against society---Scope---Prohibitory clause of S. 497, Cr.P.C.---Scope---Complainant, a lady alleged thatthe petitioner, through Facebook messenger, demanded money bythreatening/blackmailing her to upload her private objectionable pictures which wouldcause her character assassination and damage to her reputation---Petitioner contended thatoffence with which he had been charged did not fall within prohibitory clause of 497,Cr.P.C.---Complainant contended that two mobile phones had been recovered from thepetitioner through which he made number of messages---Validity---Record revealed thatmessages in question suggested that the petitioner had threatened the complainant toupload her objectionable pictures on the website in case she would fail to pay certainamount to him---Apart from conversation made in between the parties regarding demandof money, said messages also carried the request on the part of complainant for deletingsaid pictures---Such dissolute act had put a young lady, being a mother and wife, intoperennial embarrassment and ridicule within and outside family fold---Investigationrevealed that not only the petitioner had recorded his disclosure admitting his guilt ofcapturing objectionable pictures of the complainant without her knowledge, but also hadrecorded his confessional statement under S. 164, Cr.P.C. before the concernedMagistrate, whereby once again he had confessed his guilt---Offence with which thepetitioner was charged though did not fall within the ambit of prohibitory clause of S.497, Cr.P.C., but the fact remained that merely on the basis of said ground the petitionercould not claim his release on bail as a matter of right---Charged offence being not onlyheinous in nature, but also dangerous and harmful for society coupled with the fact thatthe same would give courage to others to play with the modesty of public-at-large---Boththe Courts below had rightly restrained themselves in enlarging the petitioner on bail---Bail was refused to the petitioner, in circumstances.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan—Art. 199—Writ jurisdiction—Enforcement of fundamental rights—Obligations of the State regarding Islamic injunctions and blasphemy laws—Scope and judicial review. The Islamabad High Court examined the alarming issue of blasphemous content disseminated through social media platforms, particularly Facebook, and its implications for Pakistan’s Islamic identity, constitutional obligations, and societal peace. The petitioner invoked constitutional jurisdiction seeking enforcement of State duties to safeguard Islamic tenets, prevent blasphemy, and regulate digital content in accordance with the law. The Court held that under Articles 2-A, 19, 31, and 227 of the Constitution of Pakistan, the State has an explicit obligation to protect the honor of Prophet Muhammad ﷺ, the sanctity of religion, and the moral values of Islamic society. The State’s failure to fulfill these obligations invites judicial scrutiny and appropriate directions to enforce constitutional and statutory mandates. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)—Ss. 295, 295-A, 295-B, 295-C, 296, 298—Blasphemy and offenses against religion—Responsibility of State functionaries to prevent and prosecute such offenses—Directive to law enforcement agencies. The Court directed the Federation of Pakistan, Ministry of Interior, and Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) to take immediate, effective, and coordinated steps to identify and prosecute all individuals involved in the creation, promotion, or dissemination of blasphemous content. Emphasis was laid on the use of available legal instruments, including FIRs, prosecution under Sections 295 to 298 of the Pakistan Penal Code, and collaboration with international stakeholders for evidence and extradition, if necessary. The Court ordered strict enforcement of existing cybercrime and blasphemy laws to prevent exploitation of digital platforms for sacrilegious activities. (c) Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016—Ss. 20, 22, 37—Application to blasphemous content—Regulatory role of Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA)—Judicial oversight and accountability. The Court observed that PTA, under Section 37 of PECA 2016, is empowered to remove or block online content deemed offensive to religious sentiments or repugnant to Islamic values. The authority’s failure to promptly and effectively discharge its statutory functions was taken seriously. The Court directed PTA to establish a special cell dedicated to monitoring and blocking blasphemous content in real time, with a mechanism for public complaints and swift remedial action. (d) International cooperation—Mutual Legal Assistance—Request to international organizations and states to assist Pakistan in curbing blasphemy on global platforms. Recognizing the transnational nature of digital blasphemy, the Court urged the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to engage with Facebook, other social media platforms, and international organizations to ensure that such content is restricted or removed in compliance with Pakistan’s legal framework. The Court suggested that failure to cooperate may warrant blocking of the entire platform in Pakistan, as the honor of Prophet Muhammad ﷺ takes precedence over all conveniences of modern communication. (e) Judicial sensitivity—Status of the Holy Prophet Muhammad ﷺ—Expression of reverence and solemnity in judicial reasoning. The Court devoted considerable space to expressing reverence for the finality and sanctity of Prophet Muhammad ﷺ, stating unequivocally that any attack on his honor is the gravest possible offense for Muslims. The judgment reflected a deeply held view that love for the Prophet ﷺ is intrinsic to Islamic faith and Pakistani identity. The Court called for unity among all sects and schools of thought to defend the honor of Prophet Muhammad ﷺ and condemned sectarianism, terrorism, and vigilantism under the guise of religion. (f) Public and institutional responsibilities—Role of citizens, civil society, and media—Call for awareness, unity, and proactive action. The Court invited religious scholars, intellectuals, journalists, and civil society to play their role in preserving religious harmony and countering blasphemous narratives. It emphasized that such an offense cannot be countered by individual action or vigilantism, but must be dealt with through lawful institutional mechanisms. Citizens were urged to lodge complaints with the authorities rather than taking law into their own hands. (g) Orders issued—Institutional coordination—Protective measures—Follow-up directives. FIA and PTA were directed to identify culprits and ensure their arrest, prosecution, and punishment under relevant provisions of law. A dedicated task force was ordered to be constituted for ongoing monitoring and enforcement. Ministry of Foreign Affairs was directed to take diplomatic steps with host countries of social media platforms. Secretary Ministry of Interior was directed to submit periodic compliance reports to the Court. A follow-up hearing was scheduled to assess the progress of implementation. Disposition: Petition allowed with specific and binding directions issued to the Federation, PTA, FIA, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ensure comprehensive implementation of the blasphemy laws and digital content regulations.

Summary: Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016, Section 497 of Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) Unauthorized use of identity information, offences against dignity of a person, cyber stalking, abetment---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.4, 10-A, 23 & 24---Bank account---Deposited funds as property---Amounts maintained in a bank account constituted property protected by Constitution---Account holder could not be deprived of access to deposited funds except strictly in accordance with law---Arbitrary freezing, debit-blocking or operational restraint upon bank account, without lawful authorization, amounted to unjustified interference with proprietary, commercial and financial rights. (b) Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016---National Cyber Crime Investigation Agency (Functions) Rules, 2025---NCCIA---Freezing or attachment of bank account---Authority---National Cyber Crime Investigation Agency possessed no lawful power to direct freezing, cautioning or attachment of bank accounts or property in absence of express authority in parent statute---Any restriction affecting financial assets had to trace its source to clear statutory authorization. Cited Case: • Muhammad Uzair Anwar v. Federation of Pakistan and others, I.C.A. No.362 of 2025, Islamabad High Court (c) Banking law---Bank account---Debit block imposed without request of investigating agency---Bank admitted that NCCIA had only sought provision of banking record and had never requested freezing or blocking of petitioner’s account---Bank nevertheless imposed debit restriction on basis of its own precautionary assumption---Financial institution could not enlarge scope of an investigative communication or exercise a power which neither investigating agency had invoked nor law had conferred. (d) Banking law---Customer deposits---Duties of bank---Bank holding customer deposits was burdened with obligations of fidelity, due care, verification and lawful dealing---Cooperation with investigating agencies in prevention and detection of crime was necessary, but did not justify arbitrary interference with customer’s property or assumption of coercive powers beyond law---Internal apprehension, administrative caution or speculative concern could not constitute legal basis for freezing account. (e) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.4 & 10-A---Restriction on operation of bank account---Due process---Before imposing debit block, freezing order or any operational restraint, bank and investigating agency were required to ensure existence of lawful authority, reasonable justification, accurate identification of affected account and procedural fairness---Restriction could have serious civil consequences by impairing business activity, contractual payments, healthcare expenditure, education expenses and ordinary sustenance and therefore could not be imposed casually. (f) Constitutional law---Financial autonomy---Digital banking---Public confidence---As economic activity increasingly shifted towards digital payments and electronic banking, citizens possessed legitimate expectation that deposited funds would remain secure, accessible and protected from arbitrary restraint---Unauthorized freezing of accounts was capable of undermining public confidence in banking system and weakening trust in financial institutions. (g) State Bank of Pakistan---Regulatory responsibility---Unlawful debit blocks---State Bank, as banking regulator, was required to consider issuance of suitable circulars, advisories or guidelines emphasizing that no scheduled bank or financial institution should impose debit block, operational restraint or freezing except in accordance with law, upon lawful authorization and after due verification---Banks were also expected to develop internal compliance mechanisms to prevent inadvertent or precautionary restrictions unsupported by legal authority. (h) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Withdrawal of unlawful restraint during pendency of petition---Effect---Removal of debit block did not render controversy inconsequential where petition disclosed unlawful interference with constitutional property rights and raised issues of institutional practice requiring judicial guidance---Constitutional Court could record principles governing future conduct despite subsequent rectification of individual grievance. (i) Banking law---Inquiry concerning another individual---Account of unrelated person frozen---NCCIA inquiry related to another individual, yet petitioner was deprived of access to his own account without any freezing request by agency---Action reflected institutional carelessness and failure to verify scope of communication before restricting customer’s financial autonomy---Subsequent removal of block did not cure impropriety of original action. (j) Cost of Litigation Act, 2017---Constitutional petition---Costs against bank---Petitioner was compelled to invoke constitutional jurisdiction solely because of casual and unwarranted conduct of bank---Where unlawful debit block was admitted and later removed, bank was liable to reimburse actual litigation expenses established through affidavit---Amount of Rs.300,000 directed to be paid to petitioner within one month and compliance report to be submitted through Registrar. Disposition---Debit block having already been removed, no further direction for restoration of account operation was required---Observations issued to guide banks, NCCIA and State Bank regarding future restraints upon citizens’ bank accounts---State Bank directed to examine matter and consider regulatory guidance---Respondent Bank directed to pay Rs.300,000 as litigation costs within one month and submit compliance report---Petition disposed of. Muhammad Usman v. Federation of Pakistan and others, Writ Petition No.1553 of 2026, Islamabad High Court, heard on 21.05.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: Bail denied ---- (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 497---Post-arrest bail---Scope--- Petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 (PECA) and Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, alleging that he, along with co-accused, had captured, transmitted, and publicly disseminated sexually explicit videos and pictures of a minor girl for blackmailing and harassment---Held, that although ordinarily bail is granted in offences punishable with imprisonment of less than ten years, the Court may depart from this rule in exceptional circumstances, particularly in cases involving serious moral depravity, exploitation, or victimization---Offences involving online sexual harassment, blackmail, and dissemination of explicit material of a minor attract the prohibitory clause of S. 497, Cr.P.C., therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to concession of bail. (b) Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 ----Ss. 21, 22, 22-A & 24---Cyber harassment---Transmission of sexually explicit content---Blackmailing---Proof through digital forensics--- FIA investigation established through recovery of mobile phones, WhatsApp numbers, and digital forensic reports that the petitioner and co-accused had shared and uploaded nude photos and videos of the complainant’s 17-year-old daughter on social media platforms with intent to harass, threaten, and blackmail---Such conduct falls squarely under Ss. 21, 22, 22-A and 24 of PECA, 2016---Sufficient incriminating material was available to connect the petitioner with the alleged offence---Held, that the petitioner’s acts were deliberate, malicious, and highly injurious to the victim’s privacy and reputation, thus disentitling him from bail. (c) Criminal Law--- ----Offences against modesty and privacy---Rising trend of cyber exploitation of minors---Need for deterrence--- Court observed that crimes involving dissemination of sexually explicit material on social media are rapidly increasing and pose a grave threat to societal morality and youth---If not controlled, such offences could have far-reaching consequences on public order and safety---In such circumstances, leniency in bail matters cannot be extended to offenders who exploit minors through digital means. (g) Disposition --- Post-arrest bail petition dismissed. Observations made were tentative and would not prejudice the trial on merits.