Summary: Criminal Appeal Held: Principal- A man may lie, but circumstances rarely do- the universal standard is that circumstantial evidence must lead to a singular, inescapable conclusion of guilt, excluding all other possibilities. The convergence of telecommunication records, geo-location, and recovery from possession eliminates the likelihood of mere coincidence. In the circumstances of the case, the Call Data Record (CDR) data speaks volumes, forming a strong and unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence that establishes the accused`s connection with the planning and execution of the offence. For every offence, the mens rea and actus rea needs to be independently proved against each accused, if there are more than one. Of the element of motive and intention is lacking against either of the accused, that accused must be given the benefit of such. Cr.A No. 456-P/2024 is dismissed, Cr.A No. 536-P/2024 is allowed while Cr.R No. 161-P/2024 stands infructuous)

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Arts. 4, 9, 18, 25 & 199 --- Civil Aviation Authority Ordinance, 1982 ---- S. 21(1) --- CAA Service Regulations, 2000 --- Contract Employment --- Regularization --- Ultra Vires --- Maintainability --- Aforesaid Civil Petitions for leave to appeal are directed against judgment dated 12.01.2021, passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi, in Constitutional Petitions No. D-2576 and D-3167 of 2020 --- Short-lived facts of case are that respondent No. 2 is statutory body incorporated under Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority Ordinance, 1982 ("Ordinance") --- CAA Service Regulations, 2000 ("Regulations") was framed pursuant to provisions of Ordinance --- Regulations were revised first in year 2014 and then in year 2019 --- Respondent No.2 advertised certain vacancies in newspapers and petitioners applied against vacant posts on merit, and after qualifying written test and interview, they were appointed on contract basis for two years --- Contract period was subsequently extended, and after being granted extension of their last contract, Departmental Head recommended their case for further extension --- However, vide letter dated 20.05.2020, petitioners were informed that they will not be allowed further extension --- According to revised Regulations in 2019, maximum time limit for contract service was fixed as five years --- Petitioners, in serious apprehension that their period of contract service will not be extended, filed CP No. D-3167/2020 for relief that their appointment may be declared regular appointment and that Regulation 21(1) of Regulations is ultra vires Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 ("Constitution") and fundamental rights guaranteed under it --- High Court clubbed CP No. D-2576/2020 and CP No. D-3167/2020 together and dismissed both petitions vide consolidated judgment dated 12.01.2021 on ground that Civil Aviation Authority ("CAA") has no statutory rules --- However, High Court failed to consider that vires of Regulations were also under challenge, on which there was no discussion --- Learned counsel for petitioners argued that under rules and statutes of CAA, there is no mention of Contract or Project post, and no procedure laid down to fill such post --- It was further contended that contract appointments, without any backing of law, are not only unlawful but also amount to exploitation --- He further argued that neither plea of vires of regulations was considered nor any other crucial questions raised were taken into consideration, and though case law was noted in impugned judgment, but without appreciating same, High Court found it distinguishable --- It was further averred that if contract appointment is made against permanent post involving duties/work of permanent nature through transparent selection process, then it would be considered regular appointment --- According to learned counsel, revised Regulation 21(1) of Regulations are ultra vires fundamental rights guaranteed under Constitution, but High Court had dismissed petitions without considering or giving any findings on whether aforesaid Regulation is ultra vires or intra vires --- Learned counsel for CAA argued that petitions were not maintainable before High Court and fully supported impugned judgment --- He further argued that this Court, in various dicta, already held that contract employees cannot invoke constitutional jurisdiction for their regularization or otherwise, and proper remedy for contract employee, if there is any breach of contract, is to file civil suit --- However, when we confronted learned counsel on whether question of vires raised by petitioners was decided by High Court, learned counsel frankly conceded that no such issue was dealt with or decided in impugned judgment --- Heard arguments --- According to facts narrated in CPLA No.407-K of 2021 (CP.No.D-3167/2020 before High Court), petitioner No.1 (Syed Saad Ali) applied against one vacancy of Assistant Director (IT) (Data Base Administrator -EG-01), while petitioner No.2 (Syed Zia-ul-Haq) applied against vacancy of Assistant Director (IT) (Oracle Functional Consultant -EG-01) --- Both petitioners, in their writ petition, sought declaration that their appointment by way of direct recruitment in EG-01 is regular appointment and they further challenged vires of Regulation 21 (1) of Regulations, same being ultra vires their fundamental rights, and prayed to High Court to strike it down as unreasonable --- Moreover, Office Memorandum dated 20.05.2020, issued pursuant to Regulation 21(1) of Regulations, was also challenged, with prayer that since they were performing their duties against permanent post for last 5 years, hence directions be issued against respondents to regularize their services --- Whereas, in CP No. 449-K of 2021 (CP No.D-2576 of 2020 before High Court), claim of petitioner (Javed Iqbal) was that he was commissioned in Pakistan Air Force in year 1993 and having more than 17 years of service at his credit, he was sent on deputation to CAA on 29.08.2001 and was posted as ADC to Deputy DG (Ops. CAA) --- He remained on deputation till 16.12.2005 and also submitted application, as per Regulations, for his permanent absorption, which was processed and he was consequently asked to seek retirement from his parent organization --- It is further stated by said petitioner that he was appointed as Airworthiness Safety Inspector, Ex-Cadre "B" (PG-10), on 25.01.2008 after fulfilling all codal formalities for regular appointment in CAA, but he was appointed on contract basis --- He had also prayed to High Court for declaration that he is regular employee and is entitled to serve till age of superannuation, and that respondents may be directed to issue his notification as regular employee --- Bone of contention before High Court in CP No.D-3167/2020 was challenge to alleged vires of revised Regulation 21 (1) of Regulations, whereby it was articulated that "subject to upper age limit criteria, authority may fill regular post or temporary post, or project post on contract basis for specified period, initially for two years to be renewed, upon satisfactory performance --- Provided that fresh yearly contract to be executed up to maximum of five years" --- Learned counsel for petitioners collectively argued that plea of ultra vires was not taken into consideration by learned High Court and impugned judgment, in this regard, is silent --- It is translucent from impugned judgment that while jotting down other relevant facts in CP No.D-3167/2020, learned High Court also mentioned that petitioner has prayed for declaration to effect that revised Regulation 21(1) of Regulations is ultra vires fundamental rights of petitioners and same be struck down being unreasonable --- It is further reflected from arguments of Mr. M. M. Aqil Awan, Sr. ASC (mentioned in impugned judgment) that he strongly objected to decision of respondent (CAA) of introducing Regulation 21(1) of revised Regulations --- Learned Division Bench of High Court acknowledged and noted that petitioners also attacked revised Regulation 21 (1) of Regulations, under which time limit was provided for contractual appointment, but learned High Court, in paragraph 10 of impugned judgment, without adverting to plea of vires raised by petitioners and argued by their learned counsel, confined judgment to question of regularization in service of CAA alone, and in same scenario, held that contractual employees have no vested right to be regularized unless it has specifically been provided for under terms and conditions of appointment and law --- Ultimately, writ petitions were not found maintainable either on facts or in law --- Terms "intra vires" and "ultra vires" are both Latin phrases, and diametrical opposites --- Expression ultra vires means "beyond powers" --- If act entails legal authority and it is done with such authority, it is symbolized as intra vires, that is, within precincts of powers, but if it is carried out shorn of authority, it is ultra vires --- It is well-settled that constitutionality of any law, rules, or regulations, can be scrutinized and surveyed, and law can be struck down if it is found to be offending Constitution due to absence of law-making and jurisdictive competence, or found in violation of fundamental rights enshrined therein --- At same time, it is established precept of interpretation of laws, one backed by judicial sagacity and prudence in form of numerous precedents of superior courts, that law should be saved rather than be destroyed and court must lean in favour of upholding constitutionality of legislation unless it is ex facie violative of constitutional provision --- Function of judiciary is not to legislate or question wisdom of legislature in making particular law, nor can it refuse to enforce law --- Doctrine of severability permits court to sever unconstitutional portion of partially unconstitutional statute in order to preserve operation of any uncontested or valid remainder --- Words contained in statutes, rules, or regulations, are first to be understood in their natural, ordinary, or popular sense, and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in context, or in object of statute, to suggest contrary --- Vires of law, rules, or regulations can be challenged if its provisions are ex facie discriminatory, in which case actual proof of discriminatory treatment is not required to be shown, but there is also presumption in favour of constitutionality of enactments, unless it is ex facie violative of constitutional provision --- Reference can be made to judgment of this Court rendered in case of Lahore Development Authority v. Ms. Imrana Tiwana and others (2015 SCMR 1739), wherein this Court summarized applicable rules while determining constitutionality of statute and also referred to various other judicial precedents --- It is well settled exposition of law that each case has to be decided on its own facts --- Every litigant deserves fair chance of being heard and decision of court must be founded and structured on facts of case --- It is admitted position that learned High Court neither considered plea of vires of Regulation under challenge nor discussed anything in this regard in impugned judgment which completely ignored and overlooked same --- Doctrine of "sub-silentio" accentuates legal principle where judgment is rendered without specifically and precisely avowing or attending to exact question of law raised for determination --- In fact, sub silentio, Latin term, literally translates to "under silence" or "in silence" --- In legal milieus, it points towards incidence where Court decides lis without appreciating or deliberating particular point of law raised before it, which disturbs precedential value of judgment --- This doctrine often denotes that if court, in its judgment, overlooked or dispensed with crucial point of law raised before it, then precedential value of such decision is seriously disturbed --- Decision is not binding if it was reached at without argument, without reference to critical terms of law, and without citation of authority --- Such decision, taken as sub silentio, lacks authoritative weight --- This Court, in case of Uch Power (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (2010 PTD 1809), explained that decisions sub silentio have no precedential value --- Such decisions are defined as "those which are given on point of law not perceived by Court or present to its mind" --- Whereas, in case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur ((1989) 1 SCC 101), Supreme Court of India, while quoting Salmond on Jurisprudence, explained that decision passed sub silentio in technical sense is when particular point of law involved in decision is not perceived by court or present to its mind --- Aforesaid Civil Petitions were converted into appeal and allowed vide our Short Order dated 12.06.2025 --- As consequence thereof, impugned consolidated judgment dated 12.01.2021, passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi, in Constitutional Petitions No.D-2576 and D-3167/2020, was set aside and matter was remanded to High Court for fresh adjudication, expeditiously, preferably within period of three months, excluding period of summer vacations --- Above are reasons assigned in support of our Short Order --- Petitions were allowed accordingly.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Provincial Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965 ---- Ss. 2(8)(f), 20 & 71; Provincial Employees’ Social Security (Contributions) Rules, 1966, R. 4(3) ---- Minimum wages notifications --- Social Security contribution --- Benchmark wage determination --- Invalidity of administrative substitution The Court held that social security contributions under the Ordinance must be calculated based solely on wages determined and notified under Section 71 of the Ordinance. The impugned Notifications dated 20.09.2024, 19.07.2022, and 17.10.2023—fixing contribution benchmarks based on minimum wages under the Punjab Minimum Wages Act, 2019—were declared nonconformist and without legal effect. Section 71 provides a self-contained mechanism, requiring recommendations from the Governing Body followed by government notification. The Notifications bypassed this process, thereby undermining the Ordinance and rendering its provisions, particularly Sections 2(8)(f) and 20, ineffective. The Court observed that importing wage benchmarks from another statutory framework without compliance with Section 71 constitutes legislative overreach. (b) Provincial Employees' Social Security (Contributions) Rules, 1966 ---- R. 4(3) --- Subordinate legislation --- Cannot override primary statute --- Interpretation The Court rejected the argument that Rule 4(3) of the 1966 Rules validated the impugned Notifications. It held that rules cannot override the parent statute, and Rule 4(3) merely ensures contributions are calculated at a minimum threshold where actual wages are below the Ordinance-prescribed level. It does not authorize substitution of the statutory benchmark with wage levels fixed under external statutes like the Punjab Minimum Wages Act, 2019. Post-amendment provisions introduced by the 2013 Amendment Act further narrowed the scope for deviation from Section 71. (c) Constitutional jurisdiction ---- Judicial review --- Beneficial legislation --- Scope of judicial deference to legislative scheme The Court emphasized that while the Ordinance is a beneficial piece of legislation, the Court cannot expand or supplement its provisions under the guise of beneficial interpretation. Judicial review cannot be invoked to fill legislative gaps where the scheme is unambiguous. The delay by the Government in acting on recommendations of the Governing Body cannot be judicially corrected through recognition of otherwise unlawful Notifications. Any hardship to employees resulting from such delay must be remedied through legislative action, not administrative substitution or judicial indulgence. (d) Administrative law ---- Ultra vires executive action ---- Invalidity of notifications contradicting statutory scheme The Notifications directing computation of social security contributions on the basis of revised minimum wages, without proper invocation of Section 71, were held to be ultra vires and a direct affront to the statutory mandate. Executive instructions or circulars cannot override, amend, or substitute statutory procedures. The impugned Notifications effectively rendered Section 71 redundant, which is impermissible in law. (e) Interpretation of statutes ---- Principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius ---- Procedure prescribed by law must be followed Where the law prescribes a specific method for determining wage benchmarks (i.e., through Section 71), the same must be strictly followed. The principle that what is not explicitly permitted is forbidden was reaffirmed. Resort to wage levels under the Minimum Wages Act 2019 cannot substitute the express mechanism under the Ordinance, and any attempt to do so constitutes a violation of the separation of powers and the integrity of the statutory framework. Disposition: Writ petition and connected petitions allowed; impugned Notifications declared invalid to the extent they directed computation of social security contributions on the basis of minimum wage rates fixed outside the scope of Section 71 of the Ordinance. Cited Provisions: • Provincial Employees’ Social Security Ordinance, 1965, Ss. 2(8)(f), 20, 71 • Provincial Employees’ Social Security (Contributions) Rules, 1966, R. 4(3) • Punjab Minimum Wages Act, 2019 Cited Cases (selected): • Pioneer Cement Ltd. v. Government of the Punjab (2017 PLC 199) • PLD 2020 SC 641, PLD 2016 SC 995, PLD 2005 SC 842 • Messrs Mehraj Flour Mills v. Provincial Government (2001 SCMR 1806) • Ahmed Ali Talpur v. Sub-Registrar Latifabad (PLD 2025 SC 302) • PLD 2012 SC 553 (Suo Motu Case No. 4 of 2010) "Determination of benchmark wage under the provisions of Provincial Employee's Social Security Ordinance, 1965, is essential for determining the quantum of contribution payable thereunder."

Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre‑emption Act, 1987 --- S. 13 (Talbs) --- Talb‑i‑Muwathibat—Proof of informer—Failure fatal— Appellant claimed he proclaimed his intention to pre‑empt immediately upon learning of the sale from one Akbar Shah, yet never produced the informer in evidence. Supreme Court held the foundational requirement of naming and examining the informer is mandatory; non‑production leaves time, place, and mode of knowledge uncorroborated, attracting an adverse presumption. Concurrent findings upholding performance of Talb‑i‑Muwathibat were founded on mis‑reading of evidence and were rightly reversed in revision. Cited cases: Abdul Rehman v. Haji Ghazan Khan 2007 SCMR 1491; Subhanuddin v. Pir Ghulam PLD 2015 SC 69. (b) Pre‑emption—Shafī‑e‑Khalīt (contiguous owner) —Requirement of strict contiguity— Local commission and CWs confirmed Khasra No. 225, recorded as “Chair Mumkin Nijji Raasta” (private passage), lay between appellant’s Khasra No. 226 and the suit Khasra No. 223/1. Mere building a retaining wall or exercising possessory control over part of another Khasra does not create contiguity absent ownership. Trial and appellate courts ignored this critical fact; High Court correctly held appellant was not a Shafī‑e‑Khalīt. (c) Pre‑emption—Shafī‑e‑Jār (common irrigation) —Topographical bar— Appellant’s field lay at a markedly higher elevation than the communal water channel; irrigation from the claimed source was physically impossible. Absence of common source negated status as Shafī‑e‑Jār. Findings of courts below were perverse and liable to correction. (d) Talb‑i‑Ishhād—Statutory mode of notice— Appellant admitted he did not dispatch the notice himself; alleged intermediary (Akbar Shah) not produced; notice was not sent by registered post with acknowledgment‑due as expressly required by S. 13(3) of the 1987 Act. Procedural non‑compliance rendered Talb‑i‑Ishhād invalid. (e) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 --- S. 115—Revisional jurisdiction—Scope to upset concurrent findings— Where trial and first appellate courts commit non‑reading, mis‑reading, or misconstruction of material evidence, High Court may justifiably exercise revisional powers to rectify the error and prevent miscarriage of justice. Impugned revision fell squarely within this ambit. Disposition: Appeal dismissed; High Court judgment dated 15‑06‑2016 upheld; appellant’s suit for pre‑emption finally dismissed.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: When a minor's interests are at stake in litigation, the court may override parental consent for DNA test if it observes that such consent is not in the best interest of the minor.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ---- Ss. 439, 561-A—Illegal Dispossession Act (XI of 2005), Ss. 3 & 7—Restoration of possession—Functus officio—Scope Petitioner sought restoration of possession under Section 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 after acquittal in complaint proceedings—Bailiff had already delivered possession to complainant during pendency of proceedings in compliance with trial court’s order dated 21.07.2006—Held, after acquittal on 20.07.2011, trial court had become functus officio and could not entertain or decide a restoration application filed later in 2019—Court found no statutory provision empowering petitioner to revive or agitate the same—Petition was thus misconceived and barred by law. Cited cases: Ali Kuli Amin-ud-Din v. Muhammad Zafar & others (2012 PCrLJ 1136); Iqbal v. The State & another (2001 PCrLJ 1634). (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ---- S. 203—Dismissal of complaint—Effect—Subsequent restoration application Petitioner filed application under S. 203 Cr.P.C. seeking suspension of restoration order during pendency of complaint—However, possession had already been delivered prior to such application—Upon acquittal of accused in complaint under S. 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, the application became infructuous—Petitioner’s failure to pursue or press for decision at relevant time rendered subsequent petition after years legally untenable. Principle reaffirmed: Once relief is granted and complied with, and complaint is finally decided, further criminal remedy cannot be entertained absent explicit statutory authority. (c) Civil and criminal jurisdiction—Parallel proceedings—Pending civil suit regarding ownership—Effect on criminal claim for possession Petitioner’s claim of ownership was already sub judice in a civil suit filed in 2007 by legal heirs of original owner challenging sale deed—Petitioner had also admitted in civil pleadings to having sold the land onward—Held, during pendency of civil proceedings, criminal courts cannot be invoked for recovery or restoration of possession—Proper remedy lies before civil forum—Criminal court rightly declined to entertain belated request for possession. Principle: Civil disputes over title or possession must be adjudicated through appropriate civil forum and not through revival of disposed criminal proceedings. Disposition: Criminal revision petition dismissed—Petitioner’s application found to be legally incompetent, barred by delay, and filed before a court that had become functus officio—No ground for interference made out.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan––Art. 199; Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010, S. 7; Elections Act, 2017, S. 230––De-notification of Ombudsperson by Caretaker Government––Validity––Jurisdictional limits of Caretaker Government and Election Commission. Appointment of the petitioner as Ombudsperson was for a fixed tenure, later extended to four years under the Amendment Act, 2021––Such tenure could not be curtailed in absence of proven misconduct or incapacity established through due process––Neither the Act nor the General Clauses Act, 1897 provided the Caretaker Government with lawful authority to remove the Ombudsperson––Held, that Caretaker Government lacked legal competence under S.230 of the Elections Act, 2017 to issue the impugned de-notification; its powers were limited to routine, reversible, non-controversial matters essential for day-to-day governance––Removal of a statutory office-holder appointed for a fixed tenure amounted to a substantive and irreversible act beyond its mandate––Furthermore, absence of due process in the removal violated the guarantee of fair trial and due process under Art. 10A of the Constitution. Cited cases: • Badshah Gul Wazir v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2015 SCMR 43) • Naveed Asghar v. The State (PLD 2021 SC 600) (b) Constitution of Pakistan––Arts. 218, 219 & 220; Elections Act, 2017, Ss. 4, 5, 8 & 230; Election Rules, 2017, R. 170––Powers of Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP)––Scope––Whether ECP could direct permanent removal of officials. Held, that ECP has the authority to issue directions necessary to ensure free and fair elections and to seek assistance from executive authorities––However, permanent removal of office bearers not falling within core electoral processes was not within its express mandate––While ECP may recommend transfers or temporary postings to prevent election influence, its direction for removal must be specific, justified, and tied directly to electoral integrity––No material was shown demonstrating that the petitioner’s continued service as Ombudsperson would influence electoral outcomes––Impugned direction from ECP and subsequent action by Caretaker Government held to be ultra vires. Cited cases: • Workers’ Party Pakistan v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2012 SC 681) • Khawaja Muhammad Asif v. Federation of Pakistan (2013 SCMR 1205) (c) Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010, S. 7––Security of tenure of Ombudsperson––Legislative silence regarding removal procedure––Effect. Held, that the Act provides a fixed tenure of four years and permits only voluntary resignation under S. 7(6)––The legislative silence on removal implies intent to ensure independence of the office––Allowing arbitrary removal without due process would render the fixed tenure meaningless––Such interpretation would compromise the impartiality of the office, which performs quasi-judicial functions––Reliance on S.16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 for removal was found misplaced in this context. Cited cases: • Messrs Khurshid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2020 SC 641) (d) Constitution of Pakistan––Art. 175(3) & 10A––Separation of powers and due process––Quasi-judicial functions––Ombudsperson’s independence. Office of the Ombudsperson performs functions similar to those of judicial forums, such as adjudication of complaints and issuance of binding orders––Such functions require independence from executive interference––Subjection of the office to the whims of Caretaker Government undermines constitutional separation of powers and violates due process requirements enshrined in Art. 10A––Security of tenure serves as a safeguard for judicial independence in quasi-judicial roles. (e) Interpretation of statutes––Retrospective effect––Commencement clause––Applicability of amended tenure to sitting office-holders. Held, that the Amendment Act came into force at once as per its commencement clause––No expression limiting application to future appointees was present––Thus, petitioner, who was serving at the time of enactment, lawfully continued under the extended four-year term––Notification dated 01.04.2022 was validly issued to apply the amendment to her case. Cited case: • Messrs Khurshid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2020 SC 641) (f) Appointment process––Lack of statutorily defined procedure for appointment of Ombudsperson––Need for reform. Court noted absence of any statutory framework for the appointment of the Ombudsperson under the Act––Such omission allows discretion without transparency or equal opportunity––Given the quasi-judicial nature of the office, it is imperative that a comprehensive, public, merit-based process be adopted for future appointments––Directions issued to Chief Secretary Punjab to formulate such a procedure involving public advertisement and evaluation by an impartial body such as the Public Service Commission. Cited case: • Mushtaq Ahmad Moral and others v. The Honourable Lahore High Court (1997 SCMR 1043) Disposition: Writ Petition allowed––Impugned notification dated 04.08.2023 declared null and void––Petitioner deemed to have remained in office uninterruptedly.

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S.109---Tax avoidance---Scope---Tax planning to minimize tax liability is not prohibited under Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Exception to such rule is where a transaction is structured such that it falls foul of provisions of law including S.109 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 for being designed to indulge in tax avoidance in an impermissible manner. (b) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----S.228---Holding company---Consolidated financial statement---Scope---Holding company, under S.228 of Companies Act, 2017 is required to file consolidated financial statements of the group presented as a single enterprise---Requirement that a company’s financial statements present a true and fair view of its state of affairs is coupled with an additional requirement in case of a holding company, which is required to ensure that the financial statements of its subsidiary or subsidiaries also comply with such requirement. (c) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss. 174, 176 & 177---Books of accounts, maintaining of---Scope---Taxpayer under Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is obliged to maintain its books of account and financial statements and furnish them to the Commissioner to enable him/her to determine tax liability of taxpayer while taking into account such financial statements. (d) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S. 97---Disposal of assets between wholly-owned companies---Principle---Where a parent company does not hold all shares of a subsidiary company, such parent, even where it holds more than three-fourths of the shares of the subsidiary company, cannot be considered a part of a wholly owned group---Provision of S.97(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is a tax deferral provision that allows intra group transfer between resident companies constituting a wholly owned group in a tax-neutral manner---As transfer takes place between companies comprising a wholly-owned group, there is no real change in ownership of transferred asset---Transferred asset also undergoes no change in terms of its character and tax basis by virtue of the requirement of S.97 (2) (b) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 that transfer of a depreciable asset must be recorded by transferee as written down value of asset in the hands of transferor (even in case of an asset that is not depreciable, the transferee’s cost must be the same as the transferor’s cost at the time of disposal, in terms of S.97(2)(b)(iii) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---In cases of tax-neutral intra-group transfers, often shares of subsidiary company are issued in lieu of consideration for the transfer, which is catered for by S.97 (2) (d) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 requiring that any consideration in kind received by transferor may not be greater than the transferee’s cost in respect of the acquisition (which, in turn, is the written down value of the asset in the hands of the transferor or cost of the transferor)---This is the principle applicable where an asset changes hands between wholly-owned resident companies, in circumstances where the character and tax basis of the asset undergoes no change and the transaction is recorded in terms of written down value or transferor’s cost at the time of disposal, such transaction gives rise to no taxable event---Any gain or loss by virtue of such transaction is neither booked by transferor nor by transferee---Any gain or loss by virtue of such transfer is not realized at the time of transfer and is deferred to be realized at subsequent time, when asset is disposed of, if at all, by transferee company at its fair market value. (e) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss. 2(29C), 9, 11, 97 113, 113C, 122, 133 & First Schedule, Division II, Part-1---Re-assessment---Turn over and accounting income---Distinction---Telecommunication companies---Status---Assets between wholly-owned companies---Benefit---Alternative Corporate Tax---Applicant / taxpayer was aggrieved of order passed by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue in holding that all shares of applicant / taxpayer were held by a non-resident company, therefore, it did not fulfill the requirements for the transaction to fall within the ambit of S.97 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Validity---What is taxable in terms of S.4 read with Ss.9 and 11 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and other related provisions, is the income of a taxpayer---Provision of Ss. 113 and 113C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 are exceptions to the rule that only income as determined in accordance with provisions of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 can be subjected to tax---Provisions of Ss. 113 and 113C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 are in the nature of deeming provisions, where under S.113 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 turnover of a taxpayer is used as a measure to determine tax liability on a deeming basis, and under S.113C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 the accounting income of a taxpayer is used as a measure to determine tax liability on a deeming basis---As such Ss.113 and 113C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 are artificial rules that impose a liability on a taxpayer to pay tax even where no real income arise in the hands of the taxpayer---Taxpayer under S.113C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is accordingly liable to pay taxes calculated in terms of income of the company subject to tax under Division II of Part 1 of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 or the minimum tax due in terms of S.113 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 or the alternative corporate tax determined on the basis of accounting income in terms of S.113C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 whichever is greater---Exclusions for the purpose of calculating Alternative Corporate Tax are mentioned in S.113C (8) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and do not state that any accounting income in relation to a S.97(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 as disposal of asset transaction is required to be excluded therefrom---If it was determined by the Commissioner that applicant / taxpayer had generated income from imports in relation to which advance tax was collected in terms of S.148(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 only then the question of applicant / taxpayer being an industrial undertaking would become relevant---Applicant / taxpayer did not qualify as an industrial undertaking for purposes of tax year 2018---Transaction of disposal of tower business by applicant / taxpayer to its wholly owned subsidiary company, did not qualify for tax deferral in terms of S.97 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Applicant / taxpayer did not qualify as an industrial undertaking in terms of S.2 (29C) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 in tax year 2018---High Court directed the Commissioner to undertake an analysis regarding advance tax collected under S.148 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 before generating any demand in terms of S.148(7) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---High Court further declared that appeals effect order passed in terms of S.124 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 did not include no demand in relation to S.148(7) read with S.148(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 without such prior inquiry---Reference was disposed of accordingly. Muhammad Rafiq v. State 2019 SCMR 846; Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2011 SC 811; Huth v. Clarke 25, QBD 391; Gordon, Dadds & Co v. Morris [1945] 2 All E.R. 616; Abdullah v. Crown PLD 1955 Sindh 384; Nasim Fatima v. Governor of West Pakistan PLD 1967 Lahore. 103; Daya Shankar Malaviya v. Emperor AIR 1948 All. 321; W.P. Land Commission v. Fatehullah PLD 1971 SC 393; Majid v. Qutb-ud-Din 1982 SCMR 212; Haji Muhammad Ismail v. Government of Punjab 1987 MLD 2457; Tanvir Ahmed Khan v. Deputy Commissioner, Islamabad 1992 MLD 2146; Dilshad Kausar v. Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government 2005 PLC (C.S.) 1048; Blackpool Corporation v. Locker [1948] 1 KB 349; Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs v. Robertson and others [2004] ICR 1289; [2005] EWCA Civ 138; Allied Bank Limited v. CIR 2023 SCMR 1166; Bank of Punjab v. Haris Steel Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2010 SC 1109; Saif-ur-Rehman v. Additional District Judge 2018 SCMR 1885; Commissioner for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v. UBS AG and another 2016 SCMR 1098; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. IGI Insurance Company Ltd. 2018 PTD 114; Cape Brandy Syndicate v. Inland Revenue Commissioner [1921] KB 64; Commissioner of Agriculture Income Tax v. B.W.M. Abdul Rahman 1973 SCMR 445; Government of Pakistan v. Hashwani Hotel Ltd. PLD 1990 SC 68; A&B Food Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax 1992 SCMR 663; Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Duke of Westminster [1936], AC 1; W.T. Ramsay Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1982] A.C. 300; Furniss v. Dawson [1984] AC 474; Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 55 S.Ct. 266 [1935]; Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985); McDowell & Co. Ltd. v. CTO `AIR 1986 SC 649; Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan AIR 2004 SC 1107; Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India (2012) 341 ITR 1 SC; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Pakistan Industrial Engineering Agencies Ltd. 1992 PTD 954; B.S.C. Footwear Ltd. v. Ridgway (Inspector of Taxes) [1972] 83 I.T.R. 269; J.K. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (2007) 13 SCC 673; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shoorji Vallabhdas and Co. [1962] 46 ITR 144(SC); C.I.T Central v. M/s Excel Industries Ltd. 2014(13) SCC 459; State Bank of Travancore v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1986] 158 ITR 102 SC; Sutlej Cotton Mills Limited v. C.I.T. West Bengal (1979) 116 I.T.R. 1 (SC); Mashreq Bank v. C.I.R. 2012 PTD (Tribunal) 1544; Telenor Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue 2017 PTD 1181 and M/s Telenor Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue I.T.R No. 63 of 2015 ref. Sardar Ahmed Jamal Sukhera and Sikandar Sukhera for Applicant. Asma Hamid, Mustafa Khalid, Saima Kamila, Zulqarnain Bhatti, Shehr Yar Khan and Khayyam Mushir for Respondents. Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, D.G (Law) FBR. Amjad Zubair Tiwana, Commissioner Inland Revenue. Date of hearing: 19th March, 2025.