Summary: (a) Elections Act, 2017 --- S. 142(2)(a) & (3) --- Presentation of election petition --- Validity of presentation through counsel --- Scope of “authorized in writing” --- Whether personal presence of petitioner mandatory. Section 142(2)(a) of the Elections Act, 2017 does not mandate the physical presence of the petitioner for presentation of an election petition. The statutory phrase “authorized in writing” includes representation by a counsel through a duly executed power of attorney or vakalatnama. Additionally, Section 142(3) permits submission by registered post or courier, thereby negating any requirement of in-person presentation. The Tribunal held that the petition, presented on 30.03.2024 through duly authorized counsel with express authority to file pleadings, was competently filed in accordance with the Act. Cited Cases: Anju Singh v. Gauri (2017 (3) CDR 1627 (Raj)) Kalli Meena v. Rekha Devi Dhanka (2017 (3) CDR 1576 (Raj)) S. M. Ayub v. Syed Yusuf Shah (PLD 1967 SC 486) (b) Elections Act, 2017 --- S. 144(2)(a) --- List of witnesses and affidavits --- Requirement of “complete list” --- Nature and interpretation --- Doctrine of substantial compliance. Section 144(2)(a) requires a “complete list of witnesses and their statements on affidavits.” The Tribunal held that this requirement must be interpreted purposively, not pedantically. Minor clerical errors, typographical discrepancies, or absence of some affidavits do not render the petition non-compliant where the witness list is substantially complete and identity of witnesses is clear. The doctrine of substantial compliance applies, and minor deficiencies do not justify rejection of the petition. Cited Cases: Ali Madad Jattak v. Mir Muhammad Usman Pirkani (2025 SCMR 466) Mir Hammal Khan v. ECP (2025 SCMR 584) [Distinguished] Mir Tariq Mahmood Khan Khetran v. Mir Baz Muhammad Khetran (1992 CLC 1766) [Distinguished] (c) Election Rules, 2017 --- R. 145 --- Official witnesses --- Justification for summoning --- Whether failure to provide detailed rationale invalidates petition. Rule 145 of the Election Rules, 2017 requires a petitioner to justify the summoning of official witnesses and to list any documents to be proved. The Tribunal held that such justification need not be exhaustive and can be inferred from pleadings where irregularities at specific polling stations are identified. Rule 145 is procedural and its breach does not invoke penal consequences under Section 145 of the Act. Objections related to official witnesses may be raised at the appropriate stage during trial, not at the threshold. Cited Case: Abdul Rauf Mengal v. Moulvi Qamar-ud-Din (2014 CLC 687) (d) Election law --- Maintainability --- Dismissal of election petition on technical grounds --- When permissible --- Applicability of substantial compliance doctrine. Election petitions are not to be dismissed on hyper-technical grounds where substantial compliance with statutory provisions is evident and no prejudice is caused. Courts are to avoid mechanical rejection and ensure procedural rules do not defeat access to electoral justice. The Tribunal reiterated that only incurable and jurisdictional defects justify dismissal at the preliminary stage. Disposition: C.M. No.3/2025 dismissed; objections regarding maintainability of election petition rejected. Petition held to be validly presented and compliant with Sections 142 and 144 of the Elections Act, 2017 and Rule 145 of the Election Rules, 2017. Case to proceed to trial.

Summary: Acquittal granted ---- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- S. 302(b) ---- Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 382-B ---- Conviction for murder --- Sentence of death altered to life imprisonment by High Court --- Appeal before Supreme Court --- Acquittal on benefit of doubt. Petitioner was charged with murder under S. 302(b), PPC, and sentenced to death by the Trial Court. The Lahore High Court upheld the conviction but altered the sentence to imprisonment for life, while maintaining the compensation and granting benefit under S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. Upon reappraisal of evidence, the Supreme Court found the prosecution case doubtful due to several material deficiencies including unexplained delay in postmortem, absence of independent witnesses, contradictions in witness testimonies, non-production of relevant witnesses, and failure to prove motive. The recovery of weapon was not linked directly to the petitioner. Medical evidence confirmed multiple types of injuries caused by both firearms and sharp weapons, but the prosecution failed to conclusively prove petitioner’s exclusive role. Consequently, the petitioner was acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt. Cited Cases: • Sufyan Nawaz v. The State 2020 SCMR 192 • Safdar Mehmood v. Tanvir Hussain 2019 SCMR 1978 • Muhammad Rafique alias Feeqa v. The State 2019 SCMR 1068 • Muhammad Yaseen v. Muhammad Afzal 2018 SCMR 1549 • Irshad Ahmed v. The State 2011 SCMR 1190 (b) Criminal trial --- Delay in postmortem --- Effect --- Unexplained delay in medical examination of deceased as ground for doubting prosecution case. Delay of approximately 23 hours in conducting postmortem examination without a plausible explanation was treated as a serious infirmity in the prosecution case. The doctor (PW-10) admitted that the postmortem was delayed due to non-availability of police papers, a justification held insufficient by the Court. Such delay gave rise to the inference that the occurrence was not witnessed and prosecution used the time to fabricate eyewitness accounts. The delay in postmortem was held to damage the prosecution version and entitle the accused to benefit of doubt. (c) Criminal trial --- Prosecution witnesses closely related to deceased --- Conduct of witnesses --- Non-natural behaviour at time of occurrence --- Effect. The Court found the conduct of the complainant and eyewitnesses highly unnatural. None of them attempted to save the deceased or rush him to the hospital. Statements were inconsistent regarding the motive — some citing financial dispute while others referred to matrimonial issues. Witnesses admitted to raising a hue and cry, yet no independent local residents were attracted to the scene. No effort was made to associate Muhallah residents as witnesses. These factors cast serious doubt on their presence at the time of occurrence and weakened the prosecution case. (d) Criminal trial --- Motive --- Failure to prove motive --- Effect. Although motive was initially alleged to be a matrimonial grudge over the deceased’s marriage to petitioner’s daughter, the prosecution failed to establish any concrete motive during trial. No documentary evidence of financial dispute was produced. The High Court also noted the absence of proven motive. The Court reiterated that once motive is set up, failure to prove it weakens the prosecution case and benefits the accused. (e) Recovery of weapon --- Link with occurrence --- Incriminating material --- Significance. Prosecution claimed petitioner was arrested with a pistol; however, no hatchet (Kassi) allegedly used by him was recovered from his possession. Instead, it was found from the place of occurrence. Co-accused were declared innocent due to non-recovery of any incriminating material, and no appeal was filed against one of them. The lack of direct recovery from the petitioner was held to be a factor favouring his acquittal. (f) Medical evidence --- Cause of death --- Multiple injuries from various weapons --- Attribution of fatal injury --- Legal consequence. Postmortem report revealed injuries from both sharp and firearm weapons, with no single injury conclusively identified as fatal. The Court noted that the collective injuries caused death but there was no specific attribution of any particular fatal injury to the petitioner. Given the collective nature of injuries and prosecution’s failure to link the specific fatal blow to the petitioner, benefit of doubt was extended. Disposition: Appeal allowed. Judgments of Trial Court and High Court set aside. Petitioner acquitted by extending benefit of doubt. Released forthwith if not required in any other case.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: To prove the offence of Jurah Jaifa, prosecution must prove mark of wound extending to body cavity of trunk.

Summary: The prime question which emanates for the determination of this Court is related to the impleading of a person (subsequent vendee) who purchases the property, subject matter of the suit/proceedings.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Art. 199 Maintainability of writ petition by National Bank of Pakistan (NBP) employee—Scope—NBP Staff Service Rules, 1973—Statutory status—Rules, 2021 declared ultra vires by Peshawar High Court—Held, since the repeal of the 1973 Rules was declared without lawful authority and the Rules of 2021 had no legal effect, the petitioner’s service conditions continued to be governed by statutory rules—Writ petition maintainable—Petitioner’s claim that he was compelled to sign a blank stamp paper, used later as an Undertaking, was held plausible and relevant in light of Supreme Court precedent—Petitioner could not be estopped from pursuing legal remedies under Art. 199. Cited cases: Muhammad Tariq Badar v. NBP (2013 SCMR 314); Ikram Bari v. NBP (2005 SCMR 100); Muhammad Naeem v. Federation of Pakistan (W.P. No. 1418-P/2022; Peshawar High Court). (b) Civil Servant ---- Terms & conditions of deputation service—Deputation pay—APA evaluation—Substitution of remarks by borrowing department Employee of NBP deputed to NAB—Held, APAs during deputation were required to be completed by supervisory officer of NAB—Bank was not competent to substitute or alter the performance ratings provided by NAB—Preparation of duplicate APAs by the Bank, downgrading petitioner’s rating from ‘A’ to ‘C’, declared unauthorized and mala fide—APA for 2012 revised from category-C to B by countersigning authority, but Bank considered lower rating—Conduct held discriminatory and in breach of lawful procedure. Cited cases: None directly cited, but principle drawn from judgment text. (c) Administrative law ---- Mala fide conduct by public functionaries—Deprivation of due service posting—Disobedience of court orders Petitioner, despite being promoted as Vice President, was denied appropriate posting—Bank failed to comply with multiple High Court directions regarding proper posting and APA correction—Court held that denial of proper posting, despite policy requirements and court orders, reflected personal bias and administrative vendetta—Bank’s reliance on settlements and undertakings deemed insincere and contrary to record. Cited cases: Ikram Bari v. NBP (2005 SCMR 100); orders in W.P. Nos. 5373/2016, 25596/2019, and 45065/2022. (d) Service Law ---- Compromise agreement—Contingent contract—Enforceability—Effect of non-fulfillment of conditions NBP relied on compromise agreement dated 20.07.2020—Condition precedent included withdrawal of writ and contempt petitions—Petitioner failed to fulfill conditions—Held, compromise stood revoked automatically—Contract deemed contingent under S. 31 & 32 of Contract Act, 1872 and unenforceable upon failure of condition—Bank’s reliance thereon declared misconceived. Cited cases: Muhammad Anwar v. Muhammad Aslam (2012 SCMR 345); Ashfaq Ahmed v. Ch. Maqbool Raza (2008 CLC 1340). (e) Administrative Instructions ---- Posting policy—Vice Presidents—Regional Head / Executive postings—Discrimination in implementation Organizational Circulars required VPs to be posted as Regional Heads/Executives—Petitioner was not posted accordingly—Held, Bank could devise objective criteria (e.g., seniority) where postings exceed available seats, but cannot selectively deprive an employee without rationale—Posting to obscure branches without justification held unreasonable—Court directed appropriate posting. Cited references: Organizational Circulars No. 237/2010 and 21/2021. (f) Evidence ---- Performance evaluation—Mismatch between APA and conveyed grade—Improper APA completion APA for 2016 rated “Very Good” by Reporting Officer, but conveyed as “Good”—APA for 2020 completed by unauthorized officer not competent to report on petitioner—Held, such discrepancies violate service law principles—Reporting and countersigning roles must be strictly followed—Bank directed to rectify all flawed APAs for years 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2020. Cited principles: Drawn from reasoning in para. 19–21 of judgment. (g) Public sector bank employment ---- Deputation allowance—Entitlement—Scope Petitioner deputed to NAB from 2006–2012—Bank only paid 4 months’ deputation pay—Bank’s own Instruction Circular No. 66/02 entitled deputation officers to allowance @15% of basic pay—Court held petitioner entitled to deputation pay for entire deputation period—Non-payment declared unlawful. Cited internal circular: Instruction Circular No. 66/02 dated 28.10.2002. (h) Civil Procedure ---- Implementation of court directions—Failure to act on remand—Effect NBP failed to implement directions issued in W.P. No. 5373/2016 and other orders—President of the Bank ignored judicial observations while deciding representation—Held, action amounted to evasion of lawful directions and administrative misconduct—Impugned order set aside to extent of MTO dues, posting, APA correction, and deputation allowance. Cited judgments: Orders in W.P. No. 5373/2016, W.P. No. 25596/2019, W.P. No. 45065/2022. Disposition: Writ petition partially allowed—Impugned order of President NBP set aside to the extent of non-MTO charges, improper posting, APA corrections for 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2020, and unpaid deputation pay—President directed to ensure full compliance—Regional Head (Lahore Central) ordered to post petitioner against any seat reserved for VPs per policy.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 504, 506(ii) & 34---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace, criminal intimidation, common intention---Bail, grant of---Allegation against the accused-petitioner, was that along with co-accused made firing upon the complainant party, due to which son of the complainant sustained firearm injuries---Record showed that the crime report was lodged after an inordinate delay of 6 days---Delayed registration of FIR showed deliberation and consultation on the part of the complainant---Prosecution had failed to collect crime weapon in order to get it matched with the empties casing secured from the crime scene for corroboration---Case of the applicant fell within non-prohibitory clause of S.497, Cr.P.C---According to the medical report, the injured prosecution witness had received injuries which had been declared as gayr jaifah munaqqilah and mutalahimah, (Ss.337-F (iii) & (vi), P.P.C.), for which maximum punishment of sentence as prescribed by law was three and seven years which did not fall within the limb of prohibitory clause and thus the grant of bail was a right and the refusal was exception---Challan had been submitted before the Trial Court and the applicant was no more required for investigation, therefore, no fruitful purpose would be achieved by keeping the applicant in incarceration for an indefinite period of time---Prosecution had no apprehension that the applicant, if released, might damage or tamper with the prosecution's evidence---Prosecution had not highlighted circumstances, which would indicate that any exceptions to the said rule applied in the present case---Material collected by the Investigation Officer and challan submitted in the Court so far against the applicant was based upon suspicion which obviously was to be decided by the Trial Court after completion of trial and adducing the evidence by the prosecution about the guilt or otherwise of the applicant and as to whether S.324, P.P.C., was applicable or not---Bail petition was allowed, in circumstances. Shoukat Ilahi v. Javed Iqbal and others 2010 SCMR 966; Hakim Ali Zardari v. State PLD 1998 SC 1; Zaigham Ashraf v. The State and others 2016 SCMR 18 and Gul Mohammad v. The State 2023 SCMR 857 rel. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Bail order---Observations of the Court---Scope---Observations made in bail order are just tentative in nature, strictly confined to the disposal of bail petition and shall not prejudice the case of either side during trial. Javed Ali Buriro for Applicant. Ms. Safa Hibani, A.P.G for the State. Date of hearing: 29th May, 2025.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 28.01.2025 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in C.M.A. No. 409 of 2024). (a) Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance (XLV of 1977)--- ----S. 7(3)(d)---Pakistan Citizenship Act (II of 1951), S. 17---Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925), Part-II---Civil Service Regulations, Vol-I, R. 310-A, Schedule---Domicile after marriage---Scope---Authorities were aggrieved of acceptance of candidature of respondent for post in question on the basis of domicile of her husband---Validity---Theories of domicile span several disciplines––law, human geography, and residential mobility, each highlighting how one’s place of habitual residence affects jurisdiction, migration patterns, and settlement dynamics---Domicile must always be interpreted in light of underlying purpose it is meant to serve---In Pakistan, concept of domicile is recognized in Part II of Succession Act, 1925 and section 17 of Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951 and Schedule to Rule 310-A of Civil Service Regulations, Volume I---Such provisions acknowledge changes of domicile through dependence, voluntary relocation, choice, or marriage---Procedural framework for obtaining, modifying, renewing, or cancelling domicile is outlined in the Pakistan Citizenship Rules, 1952---For civil servants, the applicable domicile regime is set out in the Schedule to Rule 310-A of Civil Service Regulation, Volume I, which explicitly recognizes change of domicile through marriage and other modes, and affirms that the domicile of a married woman ordinarily follows that of her husband---Supreme Court set aside orders of FPSC whereby respondent’s candidature was rejected---Supreme Court directed FPSC to consider the case of respondent for appointment for post in question as the same was lying vacant, on the basis of her Balochistan domicile strictly in accordance with law and after complying with all codal formalities---Appeal was dismissed. A. Rahim Foods (Pvt.) v. K & N's Foods (Pvt.) PLD 2023 SC 516; Wafaqi Mohtasib v. SNGPL PLD 2020 SC 586; Dr. Riffat Kamal v. Federation of Pakistan 2015 SCMR 847; Officer Incharge Army Housing v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2024 SC 576; Rasheed Ahmad v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2017 SC 121; Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority v. Government of Sindh 2022 SCMR 595; Muhammad Mubeen us Salam v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 602; Dr. Rashid Anwar v. Federation of Pakistan 1996 PLC (C.S.) 1073; Ellison Kahn, 'The South African Law of Domicile of Natural Persons' (1971) 1971 Acta Juridica 1; Albert Levitt, 'The Domicile of a Married Woman - I - The Older View' (1920) 91 Cent LJ 4; Black's Law Dictionary (9th edn, West 2009) 558; Words and Phrases (Permanent edn, vol 13, West 1952) 425-26; Corpus Juris Secundum (vol 25, West 1956) 2-3; District Education Officer (Female), Charsadda v. Sonia Begum 2023 SCMR 217; Muhammad Yar Khan v. Deputy Commissioner 1980 SCMR 456; Joan Mary Carter v. Albert William Carter PLD 1960 SC 616; Mark v Mark [2005] UKHL 42; Cragnish v. Craignish [1892] 3 Ch. 180; Pradeep Jain v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 654; Mohammad Raza v. State of Bombay, AIR 1966 SC 1436; Peter Stone, Conflict of Laws (Longman Law Series 1995); Waicker v. Hume (1858) 10 HLC 124; Paul Torremans, 'Domicile, Nationality and Residence' in Paul Torremans (ed), Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law (15th edn, OUP 2017); Anggi Fitratama Rianto Putra and Rifqi Ridlo Phahlevy, 'The Concept of Domicile in Filling Government Positions in the Regions' (2024) 1(4) Journal of Geography, Regional Planning and Development; JG Castel, 'Domicile' (1958) McGill LJ 179; Dr. Muather Gul v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2025 MLD 36; Najm-un-Nisa v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2021 PLC (C.S.) 434; Dr. Shama Hidayat v. Chairman Public Service Commission 2018 PLC (C.S.) Note 93; Shabnam v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2015 PLC (C.S.) 1111; Fareeda Noor v. Mehar Muhammad Nawaz 2005 CLC 669; E. H. Deering, 'Coverture and Lasting Effects of Gender Inequality: An Analysis through Equal Protection Jurisprudence' Washington University Jurisprudence Review (Volume 16, Issue 2, 2024); Reed v. Reed 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v. Ricardson 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Kirchberg v. Feenstra 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Bombay Labour Union v. Messrs International Franchises AIR 1966 SC 942; C. B. Muthamma v. Union of India AIR 1979 SC 1868; Air India v. Nargesh Meerza AIR 1981 SC 1829; Joseph Shine v. Union of India AIR 2018 SC 4898, Murdoch v. Murdoch [1975] 1 SCR 423; Bhe v. Magistrate Khayelitsha 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC); Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act, 1973 (U.K.); Domicile Act, 1976 (New Zealand); Domicile Act, 1982 (Australia) and Section 52, Women's Charter 1961 (Singapore); Teo Ka Fook v Loo Chiat Hui [2010] MLJU 636; Pakistan ratified the CEDAW on April 12, 1996; Articles 2, 5, 15 and 16, CEDAW; Mauzam Hanif v. Settlement Officer 2006 SCMR 642; Qaisar Khan v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2021 SCMR 67; Muhammad Shakoor and Rehan Safdar v. Federal Public Service Commission PLD 2007 SC 381; Hadayat Ullah v. Federation of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 1691; Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab (1999) 7 SCC 209; Barbara Geddes, Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America (University of California Press 1994); Paul P Craig and Adam Tomkins (eds), The Executive and Public Law: Power and Accountability in Comparative Perspective (Oxford University Press 2006); Wahiduddin v. Province of Sindh 1980 PLC (C.S.) 390; The Mysore State Civil Services Rules, 1957; I.P.S. (Regulation of Seniority Rules, 1954); R. N. Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmiah AIR 1972 SC 1767; Dr. P. Dananjayan v. The Principal (Writ Appeal No. 1423 of 2019); Waqar Zafar v. Haji Mazhar Hussain Shah PLD 2018 SC 81; Aftab Shahban Mirani v. Muhammad Ibrahim PLD 2008 SC 779; Mohsin Ali Hasani v. Government of Pakistan 1990 SCMR 1685 and Yaqub Ali Khan v. Federal Public Service Commission 2019 SCMR 413 rel. (b) Civil service--- ----Establishment Division Office Manual, 1971, O. M. No. 1/14/71-TRV dated 20-09-1971---Domicile---Female civil servant---Principle---Exception to general principle under O.M. 1971, whereby domicile of a civil servant stands frozen upon entering civil service, has been carved out in the case of female officers who marry during service---Recognizing constitutional values of equality, dignity and realities of social mobility that accompany marital life, a limited concession is provided whereby a woman officer may, only once, adopt domicile of her husband if she seeks appointment to a post through direct recruitment---Such exception acknowledges that marriage often entails a change in residence and social identity and aims to accommodate such transitions without violating broader principle of domicile integrity---Such option is strictly a one-time concession in the entire service tenure of female officer---Once exercised, the new domicile (based on husband’s domicile) stands frozen and remains immutable regardless of whether the officer is subsequently divorced, widowed, or remarries a person from another province---Such safeguard ensures that the exception does not evolve into an instrument of circumvention or manipulation and preserves the constitutional scheme of fair and equitable representation across the Federation. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 176---Role of Supreme Court and its Judges---Scope---Real role of Supreme Court and its Judges is not merely a forum for resolving disputes; it is the constitutional conscience of the nation, tasked with producing progressive and principled jurisprudence that breathes life into the Constitution and bridges distance between law and the lived realities of the people---It is the ultimate guardian of fundamental rights and final sentinel against Executive or Legislative overreach---Judges of Supreme Court are not passive interpreters of text, they are the custodians of liberty, equality, and institutional independence---Supreme Court must remain alive to the evolving aspirations of society and innovate new remedies to advance justice---Judges are to act with integrity and courage, to resist all encroachments, external or internal that threaten to erode the autonomy of the judiciary or subvert the rule of law---Judges must not fall prey to the lure of small, short-term benefits, whether of elevation, power, or personal comfort that may accrue if they speak the language of authority rather than that of the Constitution---Such benefits are illusory and transient---True reward of a Judge lies in preserving dignity of the institution and trust of the people---It is also the solemn duty of Judges of Supreme Court to call out, with moral clarity and institutional courage, those among their ranks who surrender to the power of the day at the cost of constitutional principles---Critique from within, when rooted in fidelity to the Constitution, is not disloyalty, it is the highest form of service to the judicial institution---History is a vigilant witness, it does not remember those who accommodated power but those who stood resolute in defense of principle---Jurisprudential legacy of a Judge is not built on appeasement but on principled defiance when the soul of justice is imperiled---Courts must never become tools of expediency, rather they must be lighthouses of constitutional morality and guardians of democratic integrity---History does not absolve judges who abandon their constitutional duty; it remembers them not as dispensers of justice, but as collaborators in injustice. Rashideen Nawaz Kasuri, Addl. A.G.P. along with Haroon Rasheed, Director FPSC, Sana Ullah Islam, J.S, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan and Masroor Hussain, D.S, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan for Petitioner. Barrister M. Saad Umer Buttar, Advocate Supreme Court along with Moiz Gul and Ms. Maheen Junaid, Advocates for Respondents. Ms. Asma Hamid, Advocate Supreme Court, Amicus Curiae. Assisted by: Umer A. Ranjha, Judicial Law Clerk and Ms. Uzma Zahoor Civil Judge/Research Officer, Supreme Court of Pakistan. Date of hearing: 22nd May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Thal Development Act (XV of 1949)--- ----S. 21(2)---Right of return, determination of---Correction of longstanding entries, sought---Revenue Authorities, powers of---On application for correction of record moved by the respondent, the Revenue Authorities successively passed orders against the petitioners qua an adjustment order having been passed in their favour under the provisions of the Thal Development Act ,1949 (‘TDA’)---Validity---Record manifested that the very first (impugned) order was passed without notice to the petitioners, thereby offending the settled principle of natural justice that no person shall be condemned unheard---Claim of respondent pertained to an TDA area other than the TDA land petitioners' lawful adjustment related to---By disturbing petitioners’ adjustment, the Additional Commissioner (Revenue) travelled beyond pleadings and jurisdiction---The impugned order itself was beyond jurisdiction, as the Deputy Commissioner( being Notified Officer ) had not referred the matter to ADCR to determine right of return pertaining to land in Mauza where no land was available, yet its implementation illegally affected pure TDA land---The request of the respondent before ADCR was for correction of mutations but the ADCR did not consider the fact that he was not competent to correct long standing entries and particularly when the respondent’ father did not challenge said mutations during his lifetime nor was it established that the respondent was the sole lawful owner and competent to file the application for correction of record on behalf of all legal heirs---Revenue authorities should have taken their hands off from correcting the long-standing entries, especially those reflected in successive jama bandies---Both the Revenue fora were not competent to undo such longstanding entries at a belated stage in a summary manner---Member –Board of Revenue set-aside the impugned orders passed by the Revenue Authorities declaring the same to be without lawful authority, void ab- initio, of no legal effect; consequently, any action taken pursuant to the impugned orders in the revenue record stood annulled forthwith---Revenue Revisions were allowed accordingly. PLD 2010 SC 1001 and 2013 CLC 1743 ref. (b) Judgment--- ----Decree passed by Civil Court---Binding effect---Revenue Authorities---Revenue Authorities passed orders against the petitioners qua an adjustment order for which they had decree passed by Civil Court in their favour---Validity---Record revealed that adjustment order-in-question was passed on the basis of a civil court decree having been passed about three decades ago (in the year 1993), which had attained finality---Revenue officers are bound to honour civil court judgments which cannot be upset or reversed by revenue authorities---In the present case, the Revenue authority acted in disregard of limitation, ignored binding civil decree, and exceeded jurisdiction---Core issue had already been adjudicated up to the level of the High Court, wherein it was held that the petitioners had established their possession---However, the Revenue Authorities failed to take into consideration the binding decisions of the civil courts, which had already been duly upheld by the appellate/District as well as the revisional/High court---The long-standing entries of revenue record in favour of petitioners enjoy presumption of correctness which could not be casually unsettled---Moreover, the concerned Revenue Authorities implemented the said orders at their own sweet will as nothing specific was mentioned in the impugned order, as to what was the error in record and how and in which manner it was to be corrected; in such way over 3000 Kanals of pure TDA owned land has been mutated in favour of the respondent who subsequently sold it to various people illegally---Said subsequent sale of land during pendency of lis was illegal and void---Member–Board of Revenue set-aside the impugned orders passed by the Revenue Authorities declaring the same to be without lawful authority, void ab initio, of no legal effect; consequently , any action taken pursuant to the impugned orders in the revenue record stood annulled forthwith---Revenue Revisions were allowed accordingly. 2008 SCMR 1658 and PLD 2012 Lah. 160 ref. (c) West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation (MLR No. 64 of 1959)--- ----Para No.22---Ala Malkiat---Status---According to West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation, para No.22 issued on 03-03-1959, Ala Malkiat stood abolished and no compensation shall be claimed or paid to any person affected by the abolition---However, in the present case, the Additional Deputy Commissioner Revenue while passing the impugned order casually ignored said binding legal requirement and ordered correction of record of Ala Malkiat as prayed by the respondent and as per the report of revenue, without application of the judicial mind---Member –Board of Revenue set-aside the impugned orders passed by the Revenue Authorities declaring the same to be without lawful authority, void ab- initio, of no legal effect; consequently, any action taken pursuant to the impugned orders in the revenue record stood annulled forthwith---Revenue Revisions were allowed accordingly. (d) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)--- ----S. 24-A---Thal Development Act (XV of 1949), S. 21(2)---Speaking order, passing of---Requisites---Record revealed that the respondent in her application addressed to Deputy Commissioner prayed for correction of mutation of her predecessor-in-interest which was passed in the year 1941; later on, she filed a constitutional petition before the Lahore High Court where her request was limited to disposal of her application pending before the Deputy Commissioner for determination of right of return under slab system of her predecessor-in-interest under S.21(2) of Thal Development Act, 1949 and the order of the High Court contained no specific direction for correction of record and merely directed to dispose of the pending application of respondent through a speaking order after hearing all the concerned---But the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue) did not pass a speaking order in compliance of the direction of the High Court nor heard all the concerned parties, which vitiated the impugned order with legal infirmities---Additional Commissioner (Coordination) while conceding to the fact that the matter was of determination of correct right of return of the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent accepted the appeal without seeking any possession report or hearing the concerned parties or requisitioning the record, by again passing a vague and conditional order, which did not fulfill the requirements of S.24-A of General Clauses, 1897 and was liable to be set aside---Where procedure has been provided for doing a thing in a particular manner then the same should be done in the prescribed manner or not at all---Member–Board of Revenue set-aside the impugned orders passed by the Revenue Authorities declaring the same to be without lawful authority, void ab- initio, of no legal effect; consequently, any action taken pursuant to the impugned orders in the revenue record stood annulled forthwith---Revenue Revisions were allowed accordingly. Rao Tariq Aziz and Abdul Samad Ali for Petitioners (in R.O.R. No. 560 of 2022). Malikzada Hameed Ur Rehman for Respondents Nos. 6, 7 and 8 (in R.O.R. No. 560 of 2022). Mehr Zafar Iqbal for Respondent No. 6 (in R.O.R. No. 560 of 2022). Muhammad Aslam Khan Nutkani for Respondent No. 9 (in R.O.R. No. 560 of 2022). Abdul Samad Ali for Petitioners (in R.O.R. No. 2130 of 2024). Malikzada Hameed Ur Rehman for Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 (in R.O.R. No. 2130 of 2024). Muhammad Aslam Tahir for Respondents Nos. 5 to 10 (in R.O.R. No. 2130 of 2024). MEHR KHALID AHMAD, MEMBER/SECRETARY.--- This consolidated judgment arises out of two connected revision petitions, R.o.R. No. 560/2022 and R.o.R. No. 2130/2024, instituted under Section 164 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 read with Section 7 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957, calling into question the legality, validity and propriety of the orders dated 14-10-2021 and 29-05-2024 passed respectively by the learned Additional Commissioner (Coordination), Dera Ghazi Khan und the learned Additional Commissioner (Revenue/Consolidation), Dera Ghazi Khan Division. Through the impugned order dated 14-10-2021, the appellate authority allowed the appeal of respondent No.6, Mst. Manzooran Mai, and directed implementation of the earlier order dated 24-11-2018 of the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue), Layyah, in respect of correction of record in her favour without notice to the petitioners, thereby resulting in cancellation of adjustment order dated 03-11-2004 passed in favour of the petitioners. Through the subsequent impugned order dated 29-05-2024, the appellate authority again interfered with the adjustment order dated 03-11-2004 and remanded the matter to the Deputy Commissioner, Layyah, for fresh decision. The petitioners, aggrieved by both the impugned orders, have sought restoration of their vested rights flowing from the lawful adjustment of 2004, founded upon civil court decrees which had attained finality up to the Honourable Lahore High Court.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939), Ss.2(viii)(a) & 2(viii)(d)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Husband selling immoveable property/plot belonging to wife to a third party---Recovery claim by wife to the extent of total sale consideration, granting of---Respondent/father failing to pay maintenance to minor children---Obligation of father to pay maintenance---Financial capacity of father, consideration of--- Dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula---Cruelty as a ground---Scope and effect---Family court ordering wife to return dower--- Legality---Cruelty was established and wife was allowed to retain the dower---Factual background was that petitioner No.1/wife married respondent No.1/husband in 2011 against a prompt dower of Rs. 50,000/- and 20 tolas of gold, and had two daughters from the marriage---She alleged persistent cruelty, abuse, and violence by the respondent/husband, culminating in incidents in 2021 where she was assaulted, and her parents were abused---A suit for maintenance and recovery of personal belongings was filed, including claims for dowry, gold ornaments, a plot worth Rs. 5,075,000/- (belonging to the petitioner No.1/wife)---The family court partially decreed the suit, granting limited maintenance, recognizing alternate value of dowry articles, and ordering return of dower gold---On appeal, maintenance was enhanced, but other reliefs were partly upheld---The pivotal issues for determination before the High Court were as to “whether the family court and appellate court erred in (i) ignoring the sale of petitioner No.1’s plot by the respondent/husband, (ii) awarding insufficient maintenance for minors given the respondent’s financial capacity; and, (iii) directing wife to return dower despite dissolution being sought on cruelty?”---Determination---Held: The document (agreement to sell the plot which belonged to the petitioner No.1) was duly acknowledged by the respondent in his admission made during cross-examination---In addition, a provisional allotment letter clearly established that plot sold by the respondent was owned by petitioner No. 1 / wife---This unimpeachable evidence reflected that the plot belonged to the petitioner No.1, ex-wife of the respondent, and was sold by the respondent, who received the entire sale consideration --- There was no denial on respondent’s part, particularly given his admission that he sold the plot to one “MN” despite not being the lawful owner of the said property---The respondent / husband was under a legal obligation to discharge the burden of proof by demonstrating that after receiving total sale consideration the property was transferred and the amount was paid to petitioner No.1/wife---First appellate court’s findings that petitioner/wife failed to produce sale deed by which plot was sold were beyond pleadings as such assumption was outside the scope of pleadings and was not even claimed or argued by the respondent at any forum---Moreover, it erroneously placed burden upon petitioner No.1 to prove that witness of the said agreement were not summoned---Trial Court and appellate court were under the obligation and had proper jurisdiction to resolve the issue of plot rather than just saying that the plot amount was not prayed for as both the courts could mold the relief in order to grant substantial justice---Both findings of courts below, though concurrent, were not based upon proper appreciation of evidence---Plot in question admittedly belonged to petitioner No.1/wife which was evident from documentary record and admission made by respondent that he sold the same to a third party and received sale consideration---Resultantly, claim of petitioner No.1 to the extent of total sale consideration of Rs.50,75,000/- was decreed by High Court in her favor---With respect to the maintenance of minors, respondent/father possessed sufficient means to maintain his children which was otherwise a heavy obligation of the father in all respects, however, in the present case, respondent’s (father's) conduct indicated his lack of serious efforts to pay maintenance---Financial status shown by respondent (father) pertained to the period 2019-2021, thus, as of the present year 2025, the respondent/father, who had failed to pay regular maintenance for the minors, did not merit any leniency---Accordingly, as he had not paid the arrears of maintenance, the maintenance was fixed at Rs.25,000/- by the High Court---With respect to the third question for determination in the present case i.e. cruelty as highlighted in the suit for dissolution of marriage filed by petitioner No.1, on plain reading of the record and S.2 (viii)(a) & (d) of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 (the “Act 1939”), the elements of cruelty and mental torture were established which petitioner No.1/wife endured during the subsistence of her marriage and those were sufficient to be considered against the respondent who had failed to refuse such allegations---Moreover, selling of plot in question which belonged to the petitioner No.1/wife and not transferring the consideration/sale proceeds to her was cruelty under S.2(viii)(a) of the Act 1939---Respondent failed to pay a single penny in maintenance which amounted to cruelty, as non-maintenance of one’s wife and minor children was not justifiable under any social or legal framework---Therefore, petitioner No.1/wife was entitled to a decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of cruelty, a ground which stood fully established---Respondent’s claim for adjustment of dower amount of 20 tolas of gold was not sustainable---The simple khula decree granted by family court was modified, and the marriage stood dissolved on the ground of cruelty---Condition imposed upon petitioner No.1/wife for return of 20 tolas of gold was waived of---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Abid Hussain v. Additional District Judge, Alipur, District Muzaffargarh 2006 SCMR 100 rel. (b) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939)--- ----Ss.2(viii)(a) & 2(viii)(d)---Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S.5, Sched.---Dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula---Return of dower by wife upon dissolution of marriage---Exception---Cruelty as a ground, proving of---Factors to be considered by Court---Cruelty whether mental or physical, premeditated or unpremeditated is not diminished by lack of intent---Obviously, if it is a physical act, it would be a question of fact; however, in the event of mental cruelty, an inquiry is required to be conducted regarding the nature of the treatment to determine its impact or repercussions on the mind of the spouse---Mental cruelty may broadly be delineated as a course of conduct that inflicts mental pain with such severity and harshness as to render it impossible for the aggrieved party to continue the matrimonial bond or to cohabit---The matrimonial relationship is inherently based on mutual trust between the husband and wife, encompassing emotions, and it obliges reciprocal respect, love, and affection, aimed at ensuring a fair and balanced adjustment between spouses without generating a sense of anguish and disappointment---While deciding any lis for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty, the Court must assess the intensity and severity of the acts alleged, and determine whether such conduct amounts to something more than mere trivial disputes, which are common in day-to-day married life---The conduct must be of such a nature that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it---The unbecoming attitude of the husband amounts to cruelty, as not only physical torture but also mental, moral, and psychological abuse by a partner constitutes cruelty---The grant of a decree of khula simpliciter is not justiciable when the incidents and the overall conduct of the husband reflect a cruel and oppressive demeanor, otherwise, wife would not approach the Court for dissolution of marriage---While dealing with such disputes the courts are not expected to act in an arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical manner---The most pertinent question for determination, therefore, would be, to what extent the right to dissolve marriage on the basis of khula is exercisable by the wife?---Where the claim for dissolution is based on cruelty, the court is duty bound to make a thorough inquiry into the matter, examine the complete body of evidence, and may even interview the spouses---If the conduct of the husband reaches a level demonstrated through the record that amounts to a cruel relationship, the court is obligated to grant a decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula. Mst. Taiba Amreen v. Shafaqat Ali Kiani 2023 SCMR 246; Faheem-ud-Din v. Mst. Hameeda PLD 1967 SC 97 and Sadia Begum v. Maqbool Ahmad PLD 1984 SC 329 rel. Rifatullah v. Hadiya Mustafa and 2 others 2023 MLD 1237; Mst. Saima Irum v. Tariq Javed 2006 MLD 83; Ana Liaqat v. Additional District Judge, Gujranwala PLD 2021 Lah. 757; Mst. Balqis Fatima v. Najm-ul-Ikram Qureshi PLD 1952 Lah. 113 and Mst. Khurshid Bibi v. Baboo Muhammad Amin PLD 1959 Lahore 566 ref. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional petition---Relief not expressly prayed for, granting of---Molding of relief by court---Powers of court---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---When the court is seized of the matter under Art.199 of the Constitution then it does not matter whether the relief has not been claimed or it falls under a specific provision of the Constitution or not---Given the circumstances of the case if relief is found and justice demands that relief is to be given then courts have ample power under Art.199 of the Constitution to grant relief and not refuse the relief on technical or hyper technical grounds as it is against the spirit of the Constitution and the larger interest of the public. Salahuddin v. Frontier Sugar Mills PLD 1975 SC 244 rel. (d) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Maintenance of minors, awarding of---Financial capacity of father---Scope---Maintenance is to be awarded considering the financial capacity and living status of the father. Dr. Aqueel Waris v. Ibrahim Aqueel Waris 2020 CLC 131 ref. (e) Administration of justice--- ----Relief not expressly prayed for, granting of---Powers of court---Molding of relief---Scope---Courts can mold relief with the changing circumstances even if such relief is not prayed for expressly---Courts are empowered by the law to adopt this course and dispense an effective decree which settles the rights of the parties forming the part of the same issue in order to avoid multiple legal actions---Courts cannot deny relief just because there is a defect in the prayer and such relief has not been asked for---Courts are not powerless to overlook such defects. Amina Begum and others v. Mehr Ghulam Dastagir PLD 1978 SC 220 and Syed Abdul-ala Maudoodi v. Government of West Pakistan PLD 1964 SC 673 rel. Abdul Majid Qureshi v. National Bank of Pakistan 1997 PLC (C.S.) 671 ref. Waqas Ahmed Abbasi and Barrister Abdullah Haroon for Petitioners. Abid Hussain Kayani for Respondent No. 1.