Summary: Background:The Public Interest Law Association of Pakistan initiated a legal challenge against the Federation of Pakistan concerning the failure to implement certain provisions of the Climate Act, 2017. The primary concerns included the non-establishment of a designated Climate Authority and a Climate Fund. These entities were mandated by the Act to oversee and fund efforts to combat climate change?a critical issue given its profound implications for the nation.----Issues:Whether the delay in establishing the Climate Authority and Climate Fund as required by the Climate Act, 2017, violates the fundamental rights of the people of Pakistan.The adequacy of provincial strategies to address climate change, as directed by the Supreme Court in previous orders.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court expressed serious concerns regarding the delay in establishing the Climate Authority and the Climate Fund, noting the urgency of addressing climate change due to its existential threat to Pakistan. The Court ordered the Federal Government to establish the Climate Authority within two weeks and to complete the establishment of the Climate Fund shortly thereafter. Additionally, the Court reviewed the strategies submitted by the provincial governments of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh, and Punjab regarding climate change, finding them in compliance with its earlier directives. Balochistan was noted to have made some progress with a summary put before its Cabinet.The Court scheduled a follow-up hearing for June 3, 2024, to ensure compliance with its directives and to continue monitoring the implementation of the Climate Act, 2017.----Citations/Precedents:Climate Act, 2017Fundamental rights as interpreted in the context of environmental law and public health in Pakistan.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)— ----O. VII, R.11—Rejection of plaint—Effect—Deposit made pursuant to court direction—Refund— Suit for specific performance was rejected under O.VII, R.11, CPC for non-deposit of court fee and non-deposit of remaining sale consideration—Petitioner had, however, deposited a sum of Rs.22,910,000/- in Treasury through Challan Form No.32-A in purported compliance of Trial Court direction—Subsequent application for refund was dismissed by Trial Court on ground that no order existed permitting such deposit and order-sheet did not reflect the permission—Held, where record (including challan/register entries and treasury verification) establishes deposit in relation to suit proceedings, omission of court to properly record permission in order-sheet cannot be used to deny refund—Litigant cannot be prejudiced by act/omission of Court and technicalities cannot be employed to perpetuate injustice—Impugned refusal of refund was unsustainable. Cited Case: Irfan Rasheed v. Muhammad Muazim and others PLD 2022 Lahore 372 (b) Administration of justice—Act of Court—Maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit”— ----Court’s omission—Litigant not to suffer— Trial Court’s record showed petitioner’s application to deposit amount was allowed by marginal endorsement, and treasury record verified deposit under suit title—Held, if court after allowing deposit failed to reflect the same in order-sheet, such inaction was attributable to Court and could not form basis to deprive petitioner of her money—A litigant is not to be affected by mistake/omission of Court; otherwise court becomes instrumental in perpetuating injustice—Refund could not be denied on mere technical ground where deposit stood admitted and no adverse claimant existed. (c) Contract Act (IX of 1872)— ----Ss. 68–72—Unjust enrichment—Restitution—Equitable jurisdiction— Amount deposited in Treasury was not required in any other matter and neither State nor respondent had any right or claim over it—Respondent expressly raised no objection to disbursement in petitioner’s favour—Held, retention of petitioner’s money by State in absence of any lawful entitlement would amount to unjust enrichment; remedy lies in restitution—Doctrine of unjust enrichment and restitution applies to prevent benefit at expense of another; refund could not be withheld where deposit was proved and no competing claim existed—Court, in exercise of equitable jurisdiction, set aside impugned order and directed Trial Court to facilitate refund after codal formalities. Cited Cases (comparative reference): Moses v. Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr. 1005 Towers v. Barrett 1 T.R. 133 Sinclair v. Brougham L.R. (1914) A.C. 398 Disposition: Writ Petition No.57749 of 2023 was allowed; impugned order dated 29.04.2023 was set aside; petitioner’s application for refund of Rs.22,910,000/- was accepted; Trial Court was directed to proceed to enable refund after completing codal formalities.

Summary: The court ordered that all proposals from the bar councils, associations, and high courts be consolidated and submitted appropriately, promoting unity and a structured approach to addressing the issue. It deferred the final determination to a later date, giving time for all parties to prepare and present their arguments and proposals comprehensively.--- to come up on To come up on Tuesday, 7 May 2024 at 11.30 am.

Summary: Background: Rashid Baig and others (petitioners) filed a petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, seeking leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's order dated January 30, 2018. The High Court had dismissed their writ petition (W.P. No. 40075/2015), which challenged the dismissal of their applications by the trial court to summon revenue officers as witnesses. The petitioners had also unsuccessfully challenged the trial court's decision in a revision petition before the revisional court. -----Issues: 1. Whether the trial court's dismissal of the applications to summon revenue officers as witnesses was justified. 2. Whether the petitioners could challenge the interim orders of the trial court through revisional or constitutional jurisdiction. 3. Whether the High Court correctly exercised its constitutional jurisdiction in dismissing the writ petition. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the High Court's decision. The Court provided the following reasoning: ----Interim Orders: The Supreme Court emphasized that challenging interim orders during the pendency of a suit should be approached cautiously. Interim orders can be reviewed at the final appeal stage. The first appellate court, as a court of fact and law, can scrutinize all interim orders issued during the trial. ---Jurisdiction of the High Court: The High Court's constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 is limited to cases where the order challenged is without jurisdiction. The Court held that the orders in question were within the discretion of the trial and revisional courts, thus within their jurisdiction. ----Delay in Proceedings: The Court noted significant delays caused by the petitioners' actions, including multiple adjournments and applications to stay proceedings. The Court criticized such delays as an abuse of the legal process. ---Conclusion: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused to grant leave to appeal. The Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts, emphasizing that they had acted within their jurisdiction. The Court highlighted the importance of addressing interim orders at the final appeal stage and criticized the petitioners for causing undue delays in the proceedings. The petitioners' actions were seen as an abuse of the legal process, and the Court reinforced the proper procedural approach for challenging interim orders within the judicial system. ----Citations: Order XX Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980: Discusses the impact of filing a petition for leave to appeal on the execution of the decree or order appealed against.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 9, 14, 194, 204 & 209; Code of Conduct for Judges (Article IV); Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 Recusal applications moved by state agencies including FIA, IB, PTA and PEMRA on grounds of alleged bias by Presiding Judge due to authorship of a confidential letter addressed to the Supreme Judicial Council concerning interference of intelligence agencies with judicial independence---Maintainability---Applications alleged conflict of interest and past association of Presiding Judge with law firm AJURIS, as well as his past representation of PTA and telecom companies---Held, applications lacked merit and were part of a collusive scheme to obstruct court proceedings and intimidate the Judge into disqualification---Letter in question did not constitute personal interest, nor did it reflect hostility toward any litigating party---Mere authorship of intra-judicial correspondence addressing institutional independence, in absence of personal or pecuniary interest, does not attract test of “real likelihood of bias”---Grounds relied upon failed to establish either “reasonable apprehension of bias” or “real likelihood of bias”---Judges are under constitutional obligation to adjudicate without fear or favor and determine recusal according to their conscience, not at the behest of litigants---Bias must relate to disposition toward parties, not subject-matter of adjudication---Applications held to be mala fide, frivolous, and part of forum-shopping intended to manipulate bench composition and delay adjudication---Recusal applications dismissed with cost. Cited Cases: • Abid Shahid Zuberi v. Federation of Pakistan 2023 SCMR 2028 • Asif Ali Zardari v. The State PLD 2001 SC 568 • Multiline Associates v. Ardeshir Cowasjee PLD 1995 SC 423 • Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Abdul Wali Khan PLD 1976 SC 57 • Mst. Benazir Bhutto v. The President 1992 SCMR 140 • Syed Akhlaque Hussain v. Pakistan PLD 1969 SC 201 (b) Contempt of Court ----Art. 204 of the Constitution State functionaries liable to contempt proceedings for collusive, unauthorized filing of recusal applications---Court issued show-cause notices to Directors General of FIA and IB, and Chairman and Members of PTA, to justify why they should not be proceeded against under Art.204 of the Constitution for abuse of court process---Prima facie collusion established from identical applications and lack of authorization or relevant connection to grounds pleaded---Misuse of state authority to obstruct justice, interfere with proceedings and undermine judicial independence, held to be a serious matter requiring judicial accountability under constitutional framework. (c) Judicial Bias---Principles and Doctrinal Framework ----Maxims: Nemo judex in causa sua; “Justice must not only be done, but be seen to be done” Doctrinal distinction between conflict of interest and bias clarified---Conflict of interest arises from personal or pecuniary interest and mandates automatic disqualification---Bias refers to a state of mind prejudiced against a party and is assessed by the Judge’s conscience and surrounding facts---Code of Conduct and Constitution require Judge to be impartial but not viewpoint-neutral---Judicial independence, belief in constitutional supremacy, or prior expression of legal views cannot be construed as bias---Mere institutional criticism or past legal association without current personal connection or confidential knowledge is not sufficient ground for recusal---Standard of reasonable apprehension of bias must be met through objective facts, not subjective perception of a litigant. Cited Cases: • Federal Government v. Gen. (R) Pervez Musharraf PLD 2014 SC 585 • Asif Ali Zardari v. The State PLD 2001 SC 568 • Anwar v. The Crown PLD 1955 FC 185 • Independent Media Corporation v. Federation PLD 2014 SC 650 • Muhammad Azam Khan Swati v. The State 2023 PCr.LJ 350 • Kanwar Naveed Jameel v. Province of Sindh PLD 2022 Sindh 499 • Muhammad Asif v. The State PLD 2014 Lahore 543 (d) Costs---Frivolous Litigation ----Imposition of Costs Each applicant (FIA, IB, PTA, PEMRA) directed to deposit Rs.500,000/- personally by the officials who authorized filing of recusal applications---Amount to be held by the Deputy Registrar (Accounts) till final decision of the case---Court exercised inherent powers to penalize abuse of process and discourage mala fide attempts to interfere with court proceedings.

Summary: (a) Passport Rules, 2021— ----R.22—Passport Control List (PCL)—Placement of name—Scope and legality— Appellants challenged placement and retention of their names on Passport Control List (PCL)—Appellants were neither nominated in FIR nor refused passports under law—Validity—Held, under Rule 22 of Passport Rules, 2021, names can be placed in Category ‘A’ only if persons are involved in anti-State activities or their travel abroad is prejudicial to State interest, and in Category ‘B’ if they have been refused passport under rules—Appellants did not fall within either category—Placement and retention of their names on PCL without fulfilling criteria prescribed by law was without lawful authority and of no legal effect—Order retaining names on PCL was liable to be set aside. (b) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973— ----Arts. 4 & 9—Right to life and liberty—Right to travel abroad—Curtailment—Limitations— Right to travel abroad though not expressly provided in Constitution is an integral part of right to liberty and to be treated in accordance with law—Such right can only be restricted in accordance with law and upon existence of valid legal grounds—Curtailment of appellants’ right to travel abroad without lawful justification and without their involvement in any criminal proceedings was violative of their constitutional rights—Restriction imposed was unlawful and liable to be struck down. Cited Cases: Government of Pakistan v. Dada Amir Haider Khan PLD 1987 SC 504 Sheikh Shan Ilahi v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2023 Lahore 359 (c) Exit control / travel restrictions—Criminal proceedings—Effect of mere investigation or FIR— ----Mere pendency of criminal proceedings or investigation—Insufficient ground— Appellants’ names were placed on PCL on ground that their mother was nominated in corruption case and was absconder—Appellants themselves were neither nominated in FIR nor accused in any proceedings—Held, mere registration or pendency of criminal case, investigation, or suspicion cannot justify curtailment of liberty of a citizen or restriction on travel abroad—Restriction imposed on appellants solely due to alleged acts of another person was illegal and unjustified. Cited Cases: Federal Government v. Ms. Ayyan Ali 2017 SCMR 1179 Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif v. Federation of Pakistan 2019 P Cr.L.J 1123 Sohail Latif v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2008 Lahore 341 Muhammad Khyzer Yousuf Dada v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2011 Karachi 546 Dr. Joseph Wilson v. Federation of Pakistan 2017 P Cr.L.J 1569 (d) Constitutional jurisdiction—Administrative order—Judicial review— ----Order passed without lawful justification—Interference— Respondents failed to show any lawful justification or material to retain names of appellants on PCL—Appellants were minors at time of alleged occurrence and no allegation was attributed to them—Continued restriction on their movement was unlawful—High Court, in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction, set aside impugned order. Disposition: Intra Court Appeal No.71740 of 2023 was allowed, and order dated 17.10.2023 retaining names of appellants on Passport Control List was set aside, with no order as to costs.

Summary: Background:The case concerns an intra-court appeal filed by Faraz Iqbal Jamil and another against the Federation of Pakistan and four others. The appeal challenged an order dated October 17, 2023, which denied the appellants' request to remove their names from the Passport Control List (PCL). The initial petition for the removal was declined despite a directive from the Constitution Petition No. 45436 of 2023, which had instructed the Secretary Ministry of Interior to decide the matter fairly within 15 days.---Issues:The primary issue in this appeal was whether the names of the appellants should be retained on the Passport Control List, which restricts their ability to travel outside Pakistan. The retention was based on an ongoing investigation linked to criminal activities allegedly involving their mother, yet the appellants themselves were not accused in the related FIR.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:Justice Sultan Tanvir Ahmad of the Lahore High Court heard the appeal. The court found that:The appellants were not directly accused in the FIR that implicated their mother and others in corruption-related offenses.The legal framework governing the Passport Control List allows for the addition of individuals involved in anti-state activities or those whose travel might harm state interests. There was no assertion that the appellants engaged in such activities.Previous case law establishes that the mere registration of a criminal case or an ongoing investigation, particularly one not involving the person directly, is insufficient grounds for restricting constitutional liberties, including the freedom to travel.It had been nearly a year since the FIR's filing, and no substantive progress had been made in the investigation that justified the continued restriction on the appellants' travel rights.Based on these considerations, the court concluded that the maintenance of the appellants' names on the PCL was unjustified and disproportionate, given the absence of direct allegations against them and the lack of progress in the investigation. The court allowed the appeal, set aside the previous order that upheld the retention of their names on the PCL, and emphasized the need for state actions that restrict individual liberties to be justified, proportionate, and timely.---Citations/Precedents:The Federal Government through Secretary Interior, Government of Pakistan vs. Ms. Ayyan Ali and others (2017 SCMR 1179), which discusses the conditions under which individual liberties may be curtailed based on criminal charges.Sheikh Shan Ilahi vs. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Interior, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 6 others (PLD 2023 Lahore 359), which elaborates on the constitutional rights related to travel.Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif vs. Federation of Pakistan and 4 others (2019 P Cr. L J 1123), which highlights the insufficiency of ongoing investigations alone as grounds for placing restrictions on an individual's travel.

Summary: Background:This case revolves around a civil petition filed by Raja Tanveer Safdar against Mrs. Tehmina Yasmeen and others. The petition challenges the Lahore High Court's decision, which upheld the orders passed by the Governor of Punjab and the Ombudsperson, Punjab. These orders enforced major penalties on Safdar, including compulsory retirement and forfeiture of past service for two years, based on allegations of sexual harassment and misconduct.----Issues:The legality and appropriateness of the penalties imposed on the petitioner, given the alleged double jeopardy violation.Whether the same set of facts led to multiple penalties under different laws, thus violating the constitutional protection against double jeopardy as provided in Article 13(a) of the Constitution of Pakistan.The distinction and interaction between defamation, harassment at the workplace, and misconduct under distinct legal frameworks.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court dismissed the civil petition, affirming the decisions of the lower courts and administrative bodies. It held that the principles of double jeopardy were not applicable as the penalties were imposed under separate laws with different purposes and legal requirements:Defamation under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002, was addressed through a civil suit for damages due to harm caused by the petitioner's actions.Harassment at the workplace under the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010, resulted in compulsory retirement for creating a hostile work environment.Misconduct under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 (PEEDA), led to forfeiture of past service due to false allegations made by the petitioner.The court clarified that these proceedings, although based on interconnected events, did not constitute double jeopardy since they addressed different legal violations and were supported by different sets of evidence and legal standards.----Citations/Precedents:Article 13(a) of the Constitution of Pakistan provides protection against double jeopardy.Muhammad Ashraf v. the State elaborates on the principle of double jeopardy, asserting that one cannot be punished twice for the same offense based on the same facts.Various international norms and treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, also recognize the principle of double jeopardy.----Quote: ''(i) The Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 in essence protects the right to dignity at the workplace by ensuring an inclusive, safe and equitable workspace, where respect and acceptability are necessary prerequisites. (ii) Factual aspects of the orders of the Ombudsperson and the Governor as the appellate authority cannot be challenged in constitutional jurisdiction.''

Summary: Background:Muhammad Akram Sohail, the petitioner, challenged the legality of the inquiry proceedings re-initiated against him under Section 3 of the Punjab Employees, Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 ("PEEDA, 2006"). This followed a prior exoneration on similar charges related to his role as a Forest Guard, where he was initially accused of causing the loss of 466 trees valued at Rs. 40,26,500. Despite being cleared of these charges in a previous order dated 08.05.2019, the Divisional Forest Officer, Layyah Forest Division, issued a new show cause notice and initiated de novo inquiry proceedings.----Issues:Whether the re-initiation of inquiry proceedings against the petitioner was legal and justified, given that he had been previously exonerated for the same charges.Whether the initiation of de novo inquiry proceedings contravenes the constitutional protection against double jeopardy as provided under Article 13 of the Constitution of Pakistan.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Lahore High Court held that the re-initiation of inquiry proceedings against Sohail was unlawful and without authority. The court noted that once the petitioner had been exonerated, and the show cause notice withdrawn, the competent authority lacked the legal basis to review or reopen the matter. The court emphasized that legal provisions do not allow for a review of a final decision in disciplinary proceedings unless there is a stipulation within the law, which was not present in PEEDA, 2006. Consequently, the impugned order dated 18.01.2021 was set aside to the extent it affected the petitioner, reinforcing that a person cannot be vexed twice for the same cause.---Citations/Precedents:Javed Maqbool Bhatti v. Secretary, Irrigation and Power Department [1998 PLC (C.S.) 208]: Discussed the finality of disciplinary proceedings.Mrs. Khalida Amjad v. Government of the Punjab through Secretary of Education, Lahore and another [2009 PLC (C.S.) 1]: Related to the legality of revisiting disciplinary decisions.Muhammad Tariq Saeed and 2 others v. Government of the Punjab through Secretary Forest, Wildlife and Fisheries Department and 2 others [2011 PLC (C.S.) 884]: Explored the implications of final decisions in disciplinary actions.Rana Tahir Hassan Khan v. Capital Development Authority and others [2022 CLC 454]: Addressed the issue of double jeopardy in administrative proceedings.Administrator/Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority Karachi v. Ghulam Mustafa Khan and another [2011 SCMR 480]: Established principles regarding the re-initiation of inquiry on the same charges.Hasanat Gul and 8 others v. The Chief Minister, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Principal Secretary [2018 PLC (C.S.) Note 48]: Discussed the admissibility of challenging inquiry initiation in court.

Summary: Acquittal granted ---- The petitioner, Subha Sadiq, sought leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution against the Lahore High Court's judgment upholding his conviction and sentence for charges under sections 302, 324, 353, 186, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, as well as sections 7 and 21-L of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The charges stemmed from the murder of a police constable during an encounter with three unidentified suspects. The petitioner was later identified in a test identification parade as one of the suspects. The trial court convicted him, a decision affirmed by the High Court. ----- Issues ----- Whether the evidence, particularly the test identification parade, was reliable enough to sustain the conviction. ----- 2) Whether inconsistencies in witness testimonies and procedural lapses in the identification process warranted acquittal based on reasonable doubt. ----- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, extending the benefit of doubt to the petitioner. Key points include: ----- Reliability of Testimonies: The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly the complainant, were inconsistent and lacked credibility. It was unlikely that the witnesses could identify the petitioner accurately, given they arrived after the incident. ----- Identification Parade Flaws: The test identification parade, supervised by the Judicial Magistrate, had serious procedural issues. The petitioner’s features were not properly recorded, and there was a high possibility the witnesses may have seen him post-arrest, undermining the reliability of their identifications. ----- Guideline Non-Compliance: The court highlighted the magistrate's lack of adherence to established protocols for identification parades, as outlined in previous case law. This lapse further weakened the evidentiary value of the identification process. ----- Given these flaws, the Court found that the conviction could not stand and granted the petitioner the benefit of doubt, leading to his acquittal. ----- Citations/Precedents Muhammad Siddique and others v. The State (2020 SCMR 342) – Importance of procedural adherence in test identification parades. Javed Khan Bacha v. The State (2017 SCMR 524) – Test identification as corroborative, not conclusive, evidence. M.Akram Rahi v. The State (2011 SCMR 877) – Importance of compliance with identification protocols. Kanwar Anwar Ali (PLD 2019 Supreme Court 488) – Guidelines for conducting test identification parades. Mian Sohail Ahmed v. The State (2019 SCMR 956) – Necessity of assessing eyewitness credibility in conjunction with identification parade results. ----- The Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowing it, and ordered the petitioner’s release based on the benefit of doubt.