Summary: Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)--- ----Ss.6, 7& 8---Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, ("the New York Convention") Article-V---Recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards---Limited grounds for refusal---Scope and limitations explained---Overriding effect of New York Convention stated in case of inconsistency between the Act, 2011 and New York Convention---The issue for determination before the High Court in the present intra-court appeal was as to "whether a foreign arbitral award rendered by the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) could be recognized and enforced in Pakistan under the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011?"---The appellant challenged the enforcement of arbitral award on grounds that the underlying contract between the parties was signed by unauthorized person on its behalf and that the arbitral award suffered from legal and factual errors---Held: Plea of the appellant company that contract was signed by unauthorized person was misconceived because the contract was signed by agent of the appellant company who acted upon appellant company's behalf with its permission and consent and no action against him was stated to have been taken by the appellant company; moreover, the address of the appellant company and that of the agent/signatory was also the same which further supported that the agent was acting on behalf of the appellant company---With respect to the alleged legal factual errors averred by the appellant company High Court emphasized upon and took note of the fact that the appellant company had replied to a legal notice but not opted to appear and join the arbitration proceedings which showed that the appellant company intentionally avoided the proceedings of arbitration---Refusing to accept the arbitrator's authority and not taking part in the arbitration proceedings did not release the appellant from the duties and responsibilities under the sales contract---Even if there were any mistakes or illegalities in the decision of arbitrator, same did not fall under Article-V of the New York Convention---Under S. 7 of the Act, 2011, only the reasons listed in Article-V of the New York Convention could be used to refuse enforcement of a foreign award---Section 6 of the Act, 2011 also confirmed that only those reasons mentioned in S. 7 of the Act, 2011, which was Article-V of the New York Convention, were valid grounds for refusal for recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award---This showed that the law allowed very limited scope for rejecting a foreign arbitration award---The argument of the appellant company that the arbitrator while giving its award made legal or factual errors was not a valid reason under Article-V of the New York Convention, so this defense was not available to the appellant---Recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award could only be refused by a Pakistani Court if the award seriously violated the basic notions of morality and justice prevailing in Pakistan which was not the case of the appellant---Pakistan had been a signatory to the New York Convention and the country had promulgated the Act, 2011 to implement it---Section 8 of the Act, 2011 provided that in the event of any inconsistency between this Act and the convention (New York Convention), the convention was to prevail to the extent of the inconsistency---Appellant-company failed to point out any jurisdictional error in the judgment of the Single Judge in Chamber or in the award in the light of the Act, 2011 and New York Convention---For the foregoing reasons, no ground was made out for interference in the judgment impugned---Therefore, the present intra-court appeal being without substance was dismissed, in circumstances. Taisei Corporation and another v. A.M. Construction Company (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 2024 SCMR 640 rel. Shah Zaib Masood and Jawad Jameel Malik for Appellant. Shah Bakhat Pirzada, Ahmed Nisar Khan and Mahaar Mustafa Kazmi for Respondent. Date of hearing: 3rd June, 2025.

Summary: (a) Mediation--- ----Corporate dispute---Rule of law---Very foundation of a just society, safeguarded by rule of law, rests upon enduring bedrock of public trust and confidence in its Courts and judiciary---Individuals, including families involved in complex corporate disputes, approach Courts as their ultimate recourse to seek fair and impartial adjudication and resolution---Willingness of individuals to do so, and to comply with judgments, depends on the degree of confidence they place in judicial processes. (b) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----Ss. 286, 287 & 288---Company affairs---Prevention of oppression and mismanagement---Corporate and family business disputes---Mediation---Annual General Meeting (AGM) of shareholders---Petitioner sought prevention of oppression and mismanagement in respondent company---On directions of High Court AGM was held to resolve dispute amongst the parties---Held: Process of resolution adopted was rooted in corporate harmony, family goodwill and statutory framework under Companies Act, 2017 which had proven to be both timely and effective---High Court appreciated gracious conduct and conciliatory approach adopted by counsel for the parties, who played a vital role in facilitating such amicable settlement---High Court also appreciated dignified role of petitioner and respondent, who, as mother and son, chose cooperation over conflict in the larger interest of respondent / Company, its stakeholders and over 3000 workers who were dependent on its continuity---Registrar SECP played pivotal role during mediation process, providing much-needed guidance akin to that of an elder in a family, as recognized in the minutes of the AGM---High Court reaffirmed its unwavering commitment to the principles laid down by Supreme Court in its landmark judgments, wherein mediation was emphasized as an essential and rights-based component of access to justice---Mediation was not merely an alternative but a necessary and effective means for ensuring party autonomy, reducing judicial backlog and fostering lasting, interest-based solutions---High Court underscored importance of "Mediation through AGM" as a model mechanism for resolving corporate and family business disputes, preserving corporate democracy and strengthening institutional integrity through resolution by consensus, as envisioned under Companies Act, 2017 and the Constitutional and jurisprudential mandates of High Court---High Court maintained the successful outcome of mediation conducted among the parties through the AGM---Petition was disposed of accordingly. Sohail Nisar v. Nadeem Nisar and others 2025 MLD 105; Mian Muhammad Ilyas Mehraj and 17 others v. Appellate Bench No.III, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad and 6 others 2009 CLD 883; Faisal Zafar and another v. Siraj-ud-Din and 4 others 2024 CLD 1; Netherlands Financierings Maatschappij Voor Ontwikkelingslanden N.V. (F.M.O.) v. Morgah Valley Limited and SECP PLD 2024 Lah. 315 = 2024 CLD 685; Strategic Plans Division and another v. Punjab Revenue Authority and others PLD 2024 Lah. 545; Messrs National Logistics Cell v. Assistant/Deputy Commissioner and others 2025 PTD 614; Messrs Mughals Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited v. Employees Old Age Benefits Institution through Director Law, Lahore and others PLD 2025 SC 1; Province of Punjab through Secretary C&W, Lahore and others v. Messrs Haroon Company, Government Contractor and others 2024 SCMR 947; Taisei Corporation and another v. A.M. Construction Company (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 2024 SCMR 640; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Messrs RYK Mills 2023 SCMR 1856; Orient Power Company (Private) Limited through Authorized Officer v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited through Managing Director 2021 SCMR 1728; Federation of Pakistan and others v. Attock Petroleum Ltd. Islamabad 2007 SCMR 1095; Muhammad Naseer Butt v. Additional District Judge, Lahore and others (C.P.L.A. No.3519 of 2021) and Additional Registrar Companies v. Al-Qaim Textile Mills Ltd. 2021 CLD 931 rel. Barrister Sameer Khosa, Advocate Supreme Court and Sardar Haseeb Iftikhar Ahmad for Petitioner. Muhammad Imran Malik, Akif Majeed Butt, Asim Tufail Farooqi, Fayyaz Ahmad Khan and Bilal Mehmood Khokhar for Respondents. Muhammad Waseem Ashraf Rana, Omar Azad Malik and Shehzad Ali Rana, Advocates / Special Prosecutors for SECP. Ahmad Nawaz Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Barrister Talha Ilyas Sheikh, Advocate. Barrister Zain Mansoor and Ms. Nabila Rubab, Assistant Attorney Generals and Barrister Raja Hashim Javed, Assistant Advocate-General. Date of hearing: 3rd June, 2025.

Summary: (a) Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 ----Standing Orders 1, 12, 13 & 14---Seasonal factory---Sugar mill---Classification of workman---Respondent initially appointed as seasonal worker and subsequently promoted to technical and skilled posts culminating in appointment as Centrifugal Operator---Nature of duties attached to the post of Centrifugal Operator held to be permanent and indispensable for functioning of sugar factory---Respondent continuously engaged for several years including off-season retention on partial salary to ensure availability for next crushing season---Length and continuity of service coupled with permanent nature of duties brought respondent within definition of “permanent workman” under Standing Order 1---Employer failed to establish that respondent remained merely a temporary or seasonal worker. (b) Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 ----Standing Order 12---Termination of service---Mandatory requirement of written order stating reasons---Respondent removed from service without compliance of statutory procedure---No lawful notice, no valid termination order and no explicit reasons furnished---Termination held illegal and void. (c) Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 ----Standing Order 13---Retrenchment---Last come first go---Burden of proof on employer---Employer pleaded retrenchment on account of financial constraints and claimed respondent was last employed in the relevant category---No evidence produced to substantiate alleged financial crunch---No proof that respondent was in fact last person employed as Centrifugal Operator---Employer took mutually destructive pleas of seasonal termination and retrenchment---Failure to satisfy statutory conditions of lawful retrenchment. (d) Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 ----Standing Order 14---Re-employment of retrenched workman---Seasonal factory---Statutory obligation to give preference---Employer neither pleaded nor proved compliance with requirement of offering re-employment or preference to respondent in subsequent crushing season---Violation of mandatory statutory mandate---Termination rendered unlawful. (e) Service jurisprudence ----Concurrent findings of fact---Scope of interference by Supreme Court---Labour Appellate Tribunal and High Court returned concurrent findings after proper appreciation of facts and law---No perversity, illegality or misreading of evidence established---Supreme Court declined to interfere in concurrent findings. (f) Case-law ----Indian Supreme Court precedents relating to cessation of purely seasonal employment and doctrine of “litigious employment” examined---Held, not applicable---Present case based on long continuous service on a permanent technical post and plea of retrenchment which remained unproved---Cited precedents held distinguishable on facts and law. Cited cases: • Morinda Co-op. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Ram Kishan and others AIR 1996 SC 332 • Anil Bapurao Kanase v. Krishna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. AIR 1997 SC 2698 • Secretary, State of Karnataka and others v. Uma Devi (3) (2006) 4 SCC 1 • Town Administration and another v. Mohammad Khalid and others 2024 SCMR 1862 = 2024 SCP 295 Disposition: Civil appeal dismissed; impugned judgment of High Court of Sindh upheld; reinstatement of respondent sustained.

Summary: (a) When there were apparent indications of possibility of fabricating evidence by the investigating officer in making the case, the court must be watchful against the trap, which may mislead to draw a false inference and satisfy itself about the fair and genuine collection of such evidence. The failure of the court to observe such care and caution could adversely affect the proper and safe administration of criminal justice . (b) The extent to which information received from an accused may be proved is subject to two essential conditions: first, there must be information or a statement made by the accused, whether constituting a confession or otherwise, while in police custody; and second, such information or statement must lead to the discovery of a relevant fact. In the absence of any such statement or information provided by the accused to the police — as required under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 — any subsequent discovery will be rendered inconsequential and inadmissible in evidence . (c) The settled principle for determining the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to convict an accused is that, if the proven facts and circumstances admit of no reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused, conviction may be recorded; however, if those facts and circumstances can be reconciled with any reasonable hypothesis compatible with innocence, the evidence is insufficient and the accused must be acquitted. In a murder case, circumstantial evidence must form an unbroken and coherent chain, with one end connected to the deceased and the other to the accused, leaving no link missing. Each circumstance must be incapable of explanation on any reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused, and the chain must be complete to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Any missing link renders the chain unreliable, making it unsafe to convict, particularly in a capital charge. Where the circumstantial evidence falls short of this standard, the prudent and safer course is to decline reliance upon it for conviction.

Summary: The statement of complainant Zafar Ali Khan recorded before the trial court as PW-10 is of worth perusal for the reason that if we believe on the statement in the shape of murasila-cum-F.I.R that the two deceased succumbed to the injuries on the spot then why they were shifted to the civil hospital B.D. Shah instead of shifting for recording the report to the Police Station which, other-wise, reflects and is evident from the statement of PW-10 "After the firing, accused decamped from the spot while co-villagers attracted to the spot. In the meanwhile, someone had called 1122 and ambulance of 1122 arrived there and the dead bodies were shifted to THQ hospital B.D Shah while I followed them on my motorcycle. Now, the bare reading of the above portion of the statement of Zafar Ali Khan complainant (PW-10) clearly reveals that if he was present and someone had called 1122 and on arrival of the ambulance of 1122 he could have been boarded the same instead of following the dead bodies on his motorbike to the hospital. More so, when the said motorbike was also not produced to the investigation agency. Yet another intriguing aspect which, other-wise, adversely effect the presence of Zafar Ali Khan complainant (PW-10) on the spot at the relevant time, as he statedکہ میں اپنی ہمشیرہ مسماۃ بی بی سکینہ کے گھر کسی نجی کام کے سلسلے میں گیا ہوا تھا ان کے صحن میں ہمشیرہ بی بی سکینہ اور بانجھی صدف بیٹھ کر موجود تھے۔ Now for that matter, the site-plan of the case which is Ex.PW-8/1 is worth perusal, wherein the complainant has been shown at Point No.1 while the Point No.2 is the place of the deceased Mst. Sakeena while Point No.3 is the place of Mst. Sadaf and behind them towards Eastern side of the wall of the house there are Points-B & C which shows the bullet striking marks which clearly suggests and confirmed the fact that the complainant was absolutely in the firing range of the accused who have been shown at Point No.4 and 5. Had the complainant been present on the spot he would have not been spared unhurt rather he was not left alive by the assailants. Normally, the report are being recorded when the dead body of injured is brought inside the hospital, but in the instant case, the complainant has admitted that " I had made the report to police in medical store situated outside the hospital as I was called from the hospital to the shop by police. " It is not known as to what were the circumstances to record the report inside the hospital; instead the complainant was brought out from the hospital to the medical store situated outside the hospital to have recorded his statement/report. Now another aspect regarding non-presence of Zafar Ali Khan complainant (PW-10) is the statement of one Saad Ullah Khan (PW-11) s/o Mir Ajab Khan r/o of the same village Kot Banda, where the alleged incident has taken place. This witness was the close relative of deceased Mst; Sakeena, as husband of the that deceased was the real uncle of Saad Ullah Khan, therefore, he had identified the dead bodies of the two deceased. As this PW has also confirmed, being close relative of the two deceased, that complainant was not present at the spot at the relevant time though he is a formal witness of identification of the dead bodies of the both the deceased before the police and the doctor, but he had spoken the truth and his statement cannot be overlooked at all. He has admitted in his cross-examination that Zafar Ali Khan complainant (PW-10) was not present in the hospital when he reached the hospital and further went on saying that the local police asked him in the hospital that who will lodge the report to become the complainant. PW-11 stated to the police that as he had not personally seen the incident, therefore, would not lodge the report, thereafter, another relative Muhammad Naeem made telephone call to the present complainant PW- 10 and on his arrival after 2 ½ (two and a half) hours he recorded the report that too in a shop outside the hospital. Therefore, in view of the above, it is held that the incident has gone un-witness and that Zafar Ali Khan complainant (PW-10) was not present at the relevant time rather he was procured later on and he cannot be termed as an eye-witness at all. Another aspect of the case is that the investigating officer had recovered from the place of “Waradat” 06 empties of 7.62 bore from the places of accused irrespective of the fact that there are two deceased and there are multiple Fire-arm injuries on their person, but as the F.S.L report Ex.PW-8/16 reflect that all these empties were fired from one and the same 7.62 caliber weapon, which confirms that the incident is the job of a single accused. Regarding the medical evidence, the lady doctor (PW-1), has found almost all the entry wounds on both the deceased (mother and daughter) were of the same size and dimension, which other-wise, reflects that it was the job of one weapon and single person. [Criminal appeal allowed, conviction of the accused by the lower fora is set-aside.]

Summary: (a) A writ cannot be issued to cast an impracticable obligation on a departmental authorities.

Summary: A close examination of the history of the four Hudood Laws and their subsequent amendments reveals that when the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hudood) Order, 1979, and the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, VI of 1979, were promulgated, Section 24 of the Ordinance and Article 27 of the Prohibition Order initially provided for trial of offences by ordinary criminal courts, with appeals to be heard by forums established under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Cr.P.C.). Both provisions stated that, unless otherwise provided, the Cr.P.C. would apply mutatis mutandis to cases under the Ordinance and Order. In 1980, the Federal Shariat Court was established. Subsequently, through Presidential Order No. 5 of 1980, a second proviso was added to Article 27 of the Prohibition Order (P.O. No. 4 of 1979), and by Ordinance No. XIX of 1980, a similar second proviso was inserted into Section 24 of Ordinance VI of 1979. These amendments made certain offences—namely those punishable under Article 8 of the Prohibition Order and Sections 9 and 17 of the Offences Against Property Ordinance—triable exclusively by a Sessions Court, with appeals to be heard by the Federal Shariat Court. Proviso (2) to Section 24 of the Offences against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, reaffirmed that the Cr.P.C. would apply mutatis mutandis. This supports the interpretation that, although the appellants were charged under the Hudood Ordinances and the charges were framed accordingly, their subsequent conviction and sentencing under Tazir (rather than hadd) did not alter the appellate forum. The correct forum for appeal was the Federal Shariat Court. The nature of the original charge—not the final sentence under Tazir—is the determining factor for deciding the appellate jurisdiction.

Summary: (a) Punjab Employees (Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability) Act, 2006 ----Ss. 4(1)(b)(vi & i), 13(4)---- Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 4 & 10-A---- Departmental proceedings---Dismissal from service---Recovery of emoluments---Due process---Fair trial---Scope---Petitioner, Lab Assistant, dismissed from service on allegation of submitting bogus qualification certificates---Earlier termination set aside by High Court with direction for reinstatement, but petitioner suspended and subjected to fresh inquiry---Inquiry Officer recommended dismissal and recovery of all emoluments drawn during service---Show-cause notice issued after inquiry; impugned order passed without confronting petitioner with verification reports or producing relevant witnesses from issuing institution---No opportunity of cross-examination afforded---No unimpeachable evidence produced to prove allegations---Held, fair trial under Art. 10-A and principles of natural justice require confronting accused with material evidence, affording opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and permitting production of defence evidence---Inquiry proceedings defective; impugned orders passed in violation of due process and without lawful authority---Orders set aside; matter remanded for de novo inquiry. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Sadiq v. I.G. Police Punjab 2017 SCMR 1880 • Tariq Khan v. A.D.G. (North) FIA 2025 SCMR 453 • Muhammad Nasir Ismail v. Govt. of Punjab 2005 SCMR 708 • Vice-President (Admin.), NBP v. Basharat Ali 1996 SCMR 201 • Saad Salam Ansari v. C.J. Sindh High Court 2007 SCMR 1726 • Abdul Qayyum v. D.G. Project Management Org. 2007 SCMR 1726 • Govt. of Balochistan v. Muhammad Yasir 2025 SCMR 367 • Sanaullah Sani v. Secretary Education Schools 2024 SCMR 80 • Muhammad Saeed v. PTCL 2023 PLC (C.S.) 517 (b) Departmental inquiry Principles of natural justice---Regular inquiry---Scope---A regular departmental inquiry must ensure service of charge-sheet with full particulars, reasonable time for reply, opportunity to participate in proceedings, confrontation with documentary evidence, right to cross-examine departmental witnesses, and right to produce rebuttal evidence---Failure to follow these steps vitiates proceedings and renders findings unreliable---Appellate authority must independently apply its mind and not act mechanically in affirming punishment. (c) Recovery of emoluments Where employee has continuously served without proven misconduct, ordering recovery of all service emoluments is harsh and unwarranted unless charges are lawfully proved in accordance with due process---Such recovery to abide final outcome of de novo inquiry. Disposition: Writ petition allowed; impugned orders set aside; matter remanded for de novo inquiry in accordance with law and observations of the Court; payment of emoluments subject to outcome of inquiry.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan – Art. 212 – Jurisdiction of Service Tribunal – Obligation to Adjudicate Service Matters on Factual and Legal Grounds Failure to adjudicate relevant facts—Scope—Held, Service Tribunal is the primary fact-finding forum for adjudication of service matters and is duty-bound to consider material on record and claims of similarly placed employees—Petitioners asserted inclusion in a previously scrutinized and judicially acknowledged group of 166 appointees whose appointments had been regularized—Tribunal dismissed appeals without addressing whether petitioners fell within that protected category—Supreme Court held this omission constituted failure to discharge judicial function—Tribunal must evaluate records and recruitment process fairly and not disregard relevant reports and past judicial findings while dismissing service appeals. (b) Civil Servants – Appointment and Termination – Validity of Recruitment Process and Scope of Judicial Review Recruitment against 289 advertised posts—Petitioners alleged lawful appointments through merit-based selection in 2011—Service books prepared but salaries withheld and appointments subsequently terminated without establishing personal fault—Scrutiny committee’s 2016 report acknowledged that fault lay with the Director (Colleges), not the appointees—Held, blanket termination without verifying individual credentials and documentary compliance amounts to arbitrary exercise of power—Right to fair adjudication includes opportunity to produce evidence and have claims assessed on merit—Court directed formation of scrutiny committee to verify petitioners’ inclusion in protected group and compliance with codal formalities. (c) Administrative Law – Executive Oversight and Committee-Based Review – Validity and Binding Nature Constitution of verification committee—Held, where large-scale terminations arise from administrative irregularities not attributable to individual employees, a fact-based assessment is essential to distinguish bona fide appointees—Supreme Court directed formation of a high-level three-member committee to scrutinize individual claims of petitioners—Committee to assess inclusion in prior approved list of 166 employees, verify documents, and restore service accordingly—Exercise to be completed within two months independently and without being influenced by impugned judgment of Tribunal. (d) Principles of Natural Justice – Right to be Heard – Due Process in Service Terminations Lack of meaningful hearing prior to removal—Held, issuance of show cause notices followed by perfunctory hearings without individualized assessment violates the right to due process—Where petitioners’ service credentials were previously accepted and appointments documented, department was required to prove specific irregularity in each case—Blanket removal, particularly after Tribunal’s directions for scrutiny, is unsustainable in law—Judicial review warranted to ensure compliance with principles of fairness and non-discrimination. (e) Precedent and Consistency – Judicial Endorsement of Similarly Placed Employees Previous judgments and departmental reports—Effect—Held, earlier Service Tribunal judgments dated 29.05.2018 and 11.05.2015, and Supreme Court orders dated 24.01.2019 and 08.04.2021 upheld appointments of similarly situated employees based on departmental scrutiny—Petitioners were entitled to parity of treatment if found within same factual matrix—Tribunal failed to consider binding precedents and prior factual findings—Reassessment directed to ensure consistent application of law. Disposition: Civil Petitions converted into appeals and disposed of with directions to constitute a verification committee within ten days. Committee to complete scrutiny within two months and reinstate petitioners found covered under previously approved category of 166 employees, subject to document verification.

Summary: (a) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 — Ss. 6, 7 & 8 — United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (New York Convention), Art. V — Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199 Foreign arbitral award — Enforcement — Limited grounds for refusal — Intra Court Appeal against enforcement order — Scope and limits of judicial review — Respondent-company, a Singapore-based trader, obtained arbitral award from Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) arising out of contract with appellant — Learned Single Judge recognized and enforced the foreign arbitral award under S.6 of the Act, 2011 — Appellant resisted enforcement on the ground that there was no valid arbitration agreement, alleging unauthorized execution of contract — Held, the sole signatory of the contract acted on behalf of the appellant-company, and no action was taken by the appellant against him, thus binding the company under the doctrine of indoor management — Failure to participate in arbitration proceedings did not invalidate the arbitration — No ground under Art. V of the New York Convention was established to resist enforcement — Pakistani courts cannot re-examine factual or legal merits of the award — Enforcement courts act akin to executing courts and are bound by the limited grounds specified in S.7 of the Act, 2011 and Art. V of the Convention — Appellant’s challenge based on alleged legal/factual errors in the award was not sustainable — Appeal dismissed. Held, enforcement of a foreign arbitral award may only be refused on grounds strictly enumerated in Art. V of the New York Convention; no expansive review or merits-based challenge is permissible. Cited Cases: • Taisei Corporation v. A.M. Construction Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. (2024 SCMR 640) • Reinhart India (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Bashir Cotton Mills Ltd. (2023 CLD 1051) • POSCO International Corporation v. Rikans International (2023 CLD 189) • Dar Okaz Printing & Publishing Ltd. v. Printing Corporation of Pakistan (PLD 2003 SC 808) • Orient Power Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. SNGPL (PLD 2019 Lahore 607) • Rahat and Company v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan (PLD 2020 SC 366) (b) Company law — Doctrine of indoor management — Authority of agent — Binding effect of corporate acts Appellant resisted enforcement of arbitration award by claiming that the contract was signed by an unauthorized individual — Held, doctrine of indoor management applicable — Where a third party deals with a company in good faith, internal irregularities or absence of board resolutions cannot be used to invalidate a transaction — No disciplinary or legal action was initiated against the alleged unauthorized signatory, and company address was same as signatory’s — Thus, contract deemed valid and binding upon appellant-company. Held, internal corporate disputes regarding authority cannot be used to deny arbitration obligations to bona fide foreign counterparties. (c) International arbitration — Public policy defence — Narrow construction — Enforcement not to be denied on ground of legal or factual error in award Appellant argued that enforcement of SIAC award was contrary to Pakistani public policy — Held, public policy ground under Art. V of the New York Convention must be narrowly construed and only invoked where enforcement would violate fundamental notions of morality and justice — Alleged errors of law or fact by arbitrator are not valid defences under Art. V — Courts are not to interfere with merits of foreign arbitral awards — Pakistan's legal framework reflects a pro-enforcement bias consistent with its international obligations. Held, public policy cannot be interpreted expansively to frustrate international enforcement mechanisms. Cited Case: • Taisei Corporation v. A.M. Construction Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. (2024 SCMR 640) (d) Disposition Intra Court Appeal dismissed — Judgment of Single Judge enforcing foreign arbitral award upheld — No jurisdictional or legal error found — Enforcement proceedings to continue in accordance with law. ------ "In today's interconnected world, no nation can thrive in isolation. The Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 reflects Pakistan's commitment to global arbitration standards. By aligning with the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, it ensures legal certainty for international investors. This progressive step will build foreign trust and support steady economic growth."