Summary: [Scope of statutory bail under third proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.]---The petitioner was involved in a matter related to the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016 ("PECA") and the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 ("PPC"). The case involved allegations of creating a fake Facebook account and posting blasphemous material. The petitioner was arrested on 23.11.2017, and since then, his trial had not concluded.The petitioner had previously filed a bail petition on the grounds of statutory delay under the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) on 27.02.2020, which was dismissed by the trial court on 10.06.2020. The petitioner then approached the High Court, which directed the trial court to conclude the trial within three months. However, as the trial did not conclude within the specified period, the petitioner filed a fresh bail petition mainly based on the ground of statutory delay. The High Court dismissed this petition on 08.06.2021, considering the petitioner's conduct during the direction period, where he failed to cross-examine prosecution witnesses.The petitioner argued that the first bail petition had not been argued on merits and had been withdrawn to seek a direction for expeditious trial. Therefore, the second bail petition should be considered on its merits. The petitioner's counsel contended that the delay in trial had exceeded two years from the date of detention and, as per the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1) CrPC, the petitioner had a statutory right to be released on bail.The Deputy Attorney General argued that the delay was not a fresh ground for the second bail petition since it was available to the petitioner during the first bail petition. The Supreme Court analyzed the scope of the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1) CrPC based on previous judgments. It noted that the purpose of the provision was to ensure expeditious trials and that an accused had a right to be released on bail if the trial exceeded certain time limits. Exceptions to this right included delays caused by the accused or if the accused was a hardened criminal.The Court found that the petitioner had a prima facie right to be released on bail due to the delay in concluding the trial. It determined that there was no evidence of the petitioner intentionally causing delay and that his right to be released on bail was not barred by the previous direction issued by the High Court.In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and granted the petitioner post-arrest bail on the grounds of statutory delay.

Summary: Order---The appellant's argument was centered around the fact that he had been granted a lease for a plot of 204.06 square yards by the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) on 31 August 1989. He claimed that he should have also been leased an additional 40.56 square yards, which had instead been granted to respondent No. 1 on 21 May 1985. The Appellate Court initially ruled in favor of the appellant's claim, but the High Court overturned this decision and restored the Trial Court's judgment, citing the issue of limitation.The appellant's attempt to seek the same relief through a suit filed in 1991 had been dismissed due to non-prosecution. The present suit, filed in 1995, was also dismissed as time-barred. The Court found that the suit, seeking a declaration and cancellation of a lease granted in 1985, was indeed time-barred, and both the Trial Court and the High Court's decisions were upheld.Another crucial issue addressed in the case was whether the appellant could claim entitlement to a plot that was not in his possession. Both the appellant and respondent No. 1 were granted leases by the KMC for plots under the title "Lease for Plot by Regularization of Unauthorised Possession." The appellant was not in possession of the land for which respondent No. 1 had been granted a lease. The appellant contended that respondent No. 1 was his tenant, which the Court acknowledged.However, the Court held that even if respondent No. 1 was the appellant's tenant, the appellant could not claim leasehold rights over land situated in a declared Katchi Abadie (informal settlements). The law that regularizes such settlements is intended to benefit the landless. The Court emphasized that the appellant had no legal character to assert ownership over land that neither belonged to him nor was in his possession. The appellant's attempt to exploit land ownership rights by claiming possession through a tenant was against public policy.In conclusion, the Court dismissed the appeal based on the aforementioned reasons. As the proceedings were ex-parte, no order was given regarding costs.

Summary: Against Reinstatement--The quantum of punishment is the authority's discretion.

Summary: Illegal Dispossession---right to cross examination---The issue at hand concerned the striking down of the petitioners' right to cross-examine certain witnesses (PWs 3?5) in a case filed under Section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005.The matter originated from a complaint filed by the respondents against the petitioners, alleging illegal dispossession from a property in Peshawar. The trial court initially dismissed the complaint, but it was later remanded by the Peshawar High Court for further proceedings. During the trial, statements of some witnesses were recorded, but the petitioners' counsel was absent on multiple occasions during the cross-examination of PWs 3?5. Subsequently, the trial court struck down the petitioners' right to cross-examine these witnesses. This decision was upheld by the lower courts, leading to the current appeal.The petitioners contended that the absence of their counsel during cross-examination was due to professional engagements and not deliberate. They argued that denying them the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses violated their right to a fair trial as guaranteed by Article 10A of the Constitution. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of cross-examination as a fundamental aspect of evidence collection and fair trial. Referring to a previous case (Muhammad Bashir Vs. Rukhsar), the Court reiterated that the right to cross-examine is crucial and cannot be deprived from the accused. The Court determined that denying this right could lead to a violation of the fundamental right to a fair trial.Given the circumstances, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and set aside the impugned judgment. The Court directed the trial court to provide the petitioners with the opportunity to cross-examine PWs 3?5, ensuring a just and fair trial.

Summary: Facts:The dispute revolved around a piece of land claimed by both parties. The petitioners claimed the land partly through inheritance from Muhammad Ibrahim and partly through sale. The respondent, Haji Abdul Fatah, relied on a Qabin-nama dated 29.6.1949 (Ex.P-3), which purportedly transferred the land as dower to Mst. Sahib Khatoon, from her second husband, Muhammad Raheem. The lower courts ruled in favor of the respondent, a decision upheld by the High Court of Balochistan.----Issue:Whether the Qabin-nama (Ex.P-3) was a valid and sufficient document to establish the respondent's claim over the disputed land, thereby nullifying the petitioners' claim based on inheritance and sale.---Decision:The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no reason to interfere with the decisions of the lower courts, which favored the respondent based on the Qabin-nama.----Reasoning:The Court noted that the Qabin-nama, being over 30 years old and originating from the respondent's custody, held statutory presumption of validity. The Court found no basis to doubt its authenticity, especially considering the admitted marital relationship between Muhammad Raheem and Mst. Sahib Khatoon, and the historical context of the document. The petitioners' claims, based on revenue records and inheritance, were deemed insufficient to override the clear evidence provided by the Qabin-nama.----Rule:The decision emphasizes the significance of ancient documents like the Qabin-nama in property disputes, especially when such documents have been preserved for over 30 years and originate from a party's custody, thereby attracting a presumption of authenticity and legality under the law.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Overall incharge of criminal case is Area Magistrate who even during the progress of an investigation gets many opportunities to go through the record of investigation conducted by the police and in an appropriate case and at an appropriate stage he can require the investigating officer to consider addition or deletion of any penal provision

Summary: This is case of two versions and benefit of doubt can be extended at bail stage

Summary: Pending

Summary: Bail Allowed--After careful consideration and examination of the case records, the panel of judges noted that the denial of post-arrest bail to the petitioner was based on the petitioner's failure to fulfill a commitment made before the Court. This commitment had led to the petitioner being granted pre-arrest bail earlier. The judges emphasized the Court's role as an impartial adjudicator, stressing the importance of adhering to legal principles rather than allowing the petitioner to negotiate his freedom in a manner inconsistent with those principles. The judges reiterated the established criteria for granting pre-arrest bail and concluded that the petitioner's actions did not alter this legal stance.The petitioner was facing an offense that did not entail statutory restrictions, and the petitioner had been in custody since June 14, 2021. The Court found that continued custody would not serve a meaningful purpose prior to the final adjudication. Consequently, the Criminal Petition was reclassified as an appeal and granted.