Summary: The case revolves around Haji Muhammad Yunis and his wife, Mst. Mumtaz Akhtar, who initially lived in South Africa and later settled in the United Kingdom. The couple purchased a house in Abbottabad, Pakistan, on a 4-kanal and 7-marla land. The property was bought from Mst. Suriyya Ashraf in 1989. After Mst. Ashraf's demise, her legal heirs, including Mst. Farukh Sultan and Syed Faisal Shah, contested the ownership of the property. Mst. Farukh Sultan, one of the legal heirs of Mst. Suriyya Ashraf, filed a suit seeking a declaration that she and her siblings were the co-owners of the property. The trial court initially dismissed the suit, but Mst. Sultan appealed the decision. Eventually, the High Court reversed the previous judgments, decreeing in favor of Mst. Sultan. Civil Appeals No. 152 and 153 of 2019 were filed by the appellants as a result. In parallel to the civil appeals, Haji Muhammad Yunis and Mst. Mumtaz Akhtar filed a complaint against Syed Faisal Shah under the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005, accusing him of illegally occupying the property. The trial court temporarily halted the proceedings until the civil suit was decided. After the civil suit's conclusion, the trial court resumed the proceedings, leading to a series of legal battles between the parties. The High Court eventually dismissed the appellants' complaint, which prompted them to file Civil Petition No. 472 of 2019. During the case, the appellants raised concerns regarding the conduct of Syed Faisal Shah. They accused him of introducing a fictitious attorney, misrepresenting the death of Haji Muhammad Yunis, and filing a written statement on behalf of the appellants through the fictitious attorney. Additionally, it was alleged that Shah had obtained a sale mutation for half of the property through the same fabricated attorney. These claims were substantiated when the appellants appeared before the trial court to expose the fraud. The Supreme Court meticulously evaluated the facts presented and the arguments put forth by all parties involved. They considered the authenticity of the sale mutation, the legal rights of the legal heirs, and the conduct of Syed Faisal Shah. The court notes that during the trial proceedings, the appellants (Haji Muhammad Yunis and Mst. Mumtaz Akhtar) appeared in person and exposed the fraud committed by Syed Faisal Shah regarding the fictitious attorney and the misrepresentation of the death. However, despite this exposure, Syed Faisal Shah proceeded with obtaining half of the suit property through the fictitious attorney.The court also addresses the issue of limitation, stating that the suit filed by Mst. Farukh Sultan (respondent No.1/plaintiff) was time-barred, as it was filed beyond the prescribed period. The court finds that Mst. Farukh Sultan failed to discharge the initial burden of rebutting the legal presumptions of regularity and truth attached to the sale mutation and the revenue entries, which favored the appellants.The High Court's judgment, which favored Syed Faisal Shah, is reversed by the appellate court, restoring the concurrent judgments of the trial court and appellate court.Finally, the judgment calls for affirmative actions to address the grievances of overseas Pakistanis in pursuing their legal rights in courts, as they face disadvantages due to their absence from the country.The court also examined the judgments of the trial court and the appellate court, which were reversed by the High Court. The supreme court after thorough analysis, allowed the appeal and restored the judgement by the trial court.

Summary: The appellant's counsel seeking specific performance of an agreement to sell dated May 4, 1966, along with a power of attorney executed by the seller, Muhammad Aslam. The suit was initially decreed by the Civil Judge, and the decision was upheld by the Appellate Judge. However, the High Court set aside the judgments of the subordinate courts, stating that an agreement not signed by the purchaser is not enforceable, which was allegedly a wrong interpretation of the law. The counsel also argued that the requirement of producing two witnesses under Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, did not apply since the agreement was executed in 1966, before the enactment of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984. The respondents' counsel contended that the appellant had sold the land subject to the agreement in 1973 to his brothers, Haq Nawaz and Zulfiqar Ali, and a declaratory suit was filed by the brothers against the appellant, which was decreed by consent. Consequently, the ownership of the land was established in favor of Muhammad Aslam through an unchallenged judgment. The respondents argued that the appellant's suit was not maintainable due to res judicata and being time-barred. Upon examining the arguments and documents, the court found that the High Court did not thoroughly consider the revision and primarily relied on a decision that was later distinguished by a larger bench. The court also noted that the appellant had divested his interest in the land and failed to include the brothers as parties in the suit. The unchallenged judgment in favor of Muhammad Aslam constituted res judicata, and the appellant's suit was filed beyond the prescribed limitation period. Despite requesting the appellant's counsel to address these objections, no satisfactory explanation was provided. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal, upholding that the appellant's suit was not maintainable. However, it held that the parties would bear their respective costs since the learned Judge had set aside the judgments of the subordinate courts.

Summary: The appellant's counsel seeking specific performance of an agreement to sell dated May 4, 1966, along with a power of attorney executed by the seller, Muhammad Aslam. The suit was initially decreed by the Civil Judge, and the decision was upheld by the Appellate Judge. However, the High Court set aside the judgments of the subordinate courts, stating that an agreement not signed by the purchaser is not enforceable, which was allegedly a wrong interpretation of the law. The counsel also argued that the requirement of producing two witnesses under Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, did not apply since the agreement was executed in 1966, before the enactment of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984. The respondents' counsel contended that the appellant had sold the land subject to the agreement in 1973 to his brothers, Haq Nawaz and Zulfiqar Ali, and a declaratory suit was filed by the brothers against the appellant, which was decreed by consent. Consequently, the ownership of the land was established in favor of Muhammad Aslam through an unchallenged judgment. The respondents argued that the appellant's suit was not maintainable due to res judicata and being time-barred. Upon examining the arguments and documents, the court found that the High Court did not thoroughly consider the revision and primarily relied on a decision that was later distinguished by a larger bench. The court also noted that the appellant had divested his interest in the land and failed to include the brothers as parties in the suit. The unchallenged judgment in favor of Muhammad Aslam constituted res judicata, and the appellant's suit was filed beyond the prescribed limitation period. Despite requesting the appellant's counsel to address these objections, no satisfactory explanation was provided. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal, upholding that the appellant's suit was not maintainable. However, it held that the parties would bear their respective costs since the learned Judge had set aside the judgments of the subordinate courts.

Summary: As the plea had been raised by the respondent that suit was barred by time, the date of accrual of cause of action was important and required to be determined for deciding the question of limitation, which in the absence of any specific reference in the plaint could only be done by recording of evidence for which purpose the application for leave to defend filed by the appellant having raised subsequent question of law and facts requiring recording of evidence merited to be allowed for enabling the parties to lead evidence on the said aspect of the matter.

Summary: [The proceedings before the revisional Court are to ensure strict adherence to safe administration of justice. In a fit case, the exercise of suo motu jurisdiction may not be conveniently avoided or overlooked. The revision application on application or laying information cannot be left opened without rigors of limitation period that will be against the doctrine of finality. The Court may exercise suo motu jurisdiction under Section 115 C.P.C if the conditions are satisfied which is meant to cure and rectify serious illegality or irregularity] Civil Petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench, which dismissed the petitioner's Civil Revision. The petitioner's Revision Application was filed after the specified time limit, and the reasons provided for the delay were deemed unsatisfactory by the High Court. The petitioner's counsel argued that despite the delay, the High Court should have considered the case on its merits. However, upon examination of the judgments and decrees of the Trial Court and Appellate Court, it was found that substantial justice had been served. The Trial Court found in favor of the respondent based on the evidence presented, while the Appellate Court also dismissed the appeal after considering the evidence. The Supreme Court noted that the exercise of suo motu jurisdiction in cases filed beyond the limitation period is discretionary and depends on the circumstances. In this case, there was no justification or explanation for the delay, and allowing such petitions without respecting the limitation period would create chaos and undermine the purpose of limitation. The Court emphasised the importance of finality in litigation and the need for cases to come to an end. Ultimately, the Supreme Court found no illegality or irregularity in the lower courts' proceedings, and the Civil Petition was dismissed. Appeal dismissed.

Summary: [The proceedings before the revisional Court are to ensure strict adherence to safe administration of justice. In a fit case, the exercise of suo motu jurisdiction may not be conveniently avoided or overlooked. The revision application on application or laying information cannot be left opened without rigors of limitation period that will be against the doctrine of finality. The Court may exercise suo motu jurisdiction under Section 115 C.P.C if the conditions are satisfied which is meant to cure and rectify serious illegality or irregularity] Civil Petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench, which dismissed the petitioner's Civil Revision. The petitioner's Revision Application was filed after the specified time limit, and the reasons provided for the delay were deemed unsatisfactory by the High Court. The petitioner's counsel argued that despite the delay, the High Court should have considered the case on its merits. However, upon examination of the judgments and decrees of the Trial Court and Appellate Court, it was found that substantial justice had been served. The Trial Court found in favor of the respondent based on the evidence presented, while the Appellate Court also dismissed the appeal after considering the evidence. The Supreme Court noted that the exercise of suo motu jurisdiction in cases filed beyond the limitation period is discretionary and depends on the circumstances. In this case, there was no justification or explanation for the delay, and allowing such petitions without respecting the limitation period would create chaos and undermine the purpose of limitation. The Court emphasised the importance of finality in litigation and the need for cases to come to an end. Ultimately, the Supreme Court found no illegality or irregularity in the lower courts' proceedings, and the Civil Petition was dismissed. Appeal dismissed.

Summary: [Removal of shares by fraud---Limitation--Article 181 of the Limitation Act does not apply to the rectification companies register] This case involves a petition challenging an order passed by the Lahore High Court, wherein the petitioners' application for the correction of the register of members of a company called Indus Services (Pvt) Limited was dismissed. The petitioners claimed to hold a total of 8,150 shares in the company but their names were removed from the register and it was shown that the shares were transferred to a respondent without their consent.The petitioners contended that the transfer of shares was fraudulent and sought rectification of the company's register. The High Court dismissed the application on the ground that it was belatedly filed, beyond the three-year period prescribed under Article 181 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908.The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard the case and determined two main questions: whether rectification of the company's register could be sought after three years, and whether the purported transfer of shares was legal.The Supreme Court held that Article 181 of the Limitation Act does not apply to applications for rectification of a company's register. Companies are governed by their own self-contained law, and the Companies Ordinance (now Companies Act, 2017) does not prescribe any specific limitation period for such applications. Moreover, the court emphasized the importance of maintaining the integrity of a company's register, and fraudulent or illegal entries and omissions in the register are punishable offenses.As the contesting respondents failed to provide credible evidence of the legal transfer of shares, the court ordered the restoration of the petitioners' shareholding in the company and rectification of the company's register to reflect their ownership.The court further stated that the case need not be remanded to the High Court, as the petitioners' shareholding had been established, and ordered the immediate rectification of all forms and documents submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) to show the correct ownership of shares.Finally, the court allowed the petition in favor of the petitioners, and if they have any remaining grievances, they can file them separately before the Company Judge.

Summary: Background: The petitioner filed a civil revision challenging the order dated 11.04.2019 passed by the Additional District Judge, which set aside the ex parte decree issued by the Civil Judge and directed a fresh trial. Initially, the petitioner had filed a suit for recovery of Rs.500,000 based on a promissory note. The suit was decreed ex parte on 22.01.2018 after the respondent failed to appear. The respondent later filed an application under Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C., for setting aside the ex parte decree, which was initially dismissed by the Civil Judge but allowed on appeal. -----Issues: 1- Whether the service of notice to the respondent was valid, thus justifying the ex parte decree. -----2- Whether the application under Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C., for setting aside the ex parte decree was filed within the limitation period. -----3- Whether the dismissal of the application without framing issues or recording evidence was legally tenable. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court dismissed the civil revision, upholding the Additional District Judge's order that the ex parte decree be set aside and the case be retried. The reasoning was based on the following: --Improper Service of Notice: The court found that the notice served to the respondent was insufficient and did not meet the legal requirements under Order V, Rules 16-19, C.P.C. The notice was allegedly served to Zakir Ali, claimed to be the respondent's brother, but there was no evidence to establish that Zakir Ali was indeed a family member or living in the same household. The process server’s statement, which should have confirmed the proper delivery of notice, was not recorded. Thus, the service of notice was deemed invalid, making the ex parte proceedings unsustainable. --Limitation Period: The court held that the respondent’s application under Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C., was filed within the limitation period. The respondent only became aware of the ex parte decree during the execution proceedings when his property was attached. The application was filed promptly after this discovery, and the court ruled that the application was timely filed. --Procedural Lapse: The Civil Judge had dismissed the application without framing issues or recording evidence, which was a procedural error. The appellate court correctly observed that the case raised factual controversies regarding service of notice, which required proper adjudication. The dismissal without addressing these issues or conducting a proper inquiry was legally untenable. The court emphasized that technicalities should not impede the delivery of justice and ordered the trial to proceed on merits. -----Citations/Precedents: Siraj Din v. Mst. Iqbal Begum (PLD 1968 Lah. 639) Syed Muhammad Anwar Advocate v. Sh. Abdul Haq (1985 SCMR 1228)

Summary: [Article 113 of the Limitation Act,Implication of Article 113 of the Limitation Act. (2) Effect of Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act on an agreement by the co-sharer. (3) Proof of handwriting/signature under Article 84 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. (4) Power of Appellate Court under Section 107 C.P.C. (5) Niceties of Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 for proof of document.] The case revolves around a dispute over a piece of land previously owned by Syed Gul Hasan Shah, who passed away in 1998. The land then devolved to his legal heirs, including respondents No. 1 to 6. The appellant, Khudadad, claimed to be the lessee of the land since 1996 and alleged that he entered into an agreement with respondents No. 1 for purchasing the land in 2001. However, the respondents did not execute the sale deed as agreed, leading to legal proceedings.The trial court, the appellate court, and the high court all ruled against the appellant, finding that the suit for specific performance of the alleged agreement was time-barred. The agreement was purportedly executed in 2001, and the suit was filed in 2008, well beyond the three-year limitation period prescribed by law for such cases. Additionally, the appellant failed to produce two attesting witnesses as required by law to prove the execution of the agreement.The appellant sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, arguing that the evidence of one witness had been ignored, which could have established the genuineness of the agreement. However, the Supreme Court found that the evidence presented by the appellant was insufficient, and the lower courts had properly applied the law in holding the suit as time-barred and dismissing the appeals.In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts, dismissing both civil appeals.

Summary: 'Adjournment sine die' is a phrase from Latin language meaning 'adjournment without a day' or 'adjourned indefinitely' which in other words means that the next date for fixation of the case has not been mentioned by the court or the case has not been fixed for any particular future date. An order for adjourning any case sine die does not mean that it has been terminated rather the case is simply taken out of the active list of the Court and remains pending with the Court which can be resurrected at any time by a party by filing an application or upon order by the Court itself without any application. The order for resurrecting the suit does not amount to fresh initiation of proceedings which would be governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 providing for three years limitation rather no limitation would be applicable for revival of matter by the Court whether by itself or on application filed by either party.