Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974 ----Art. 44 & Art. 49---Constitutional petition---Quota for initial recruitment---Non-advertisement of direct recruitment posts---Petitioner, appointed on ad hoc basis as Section Officer BPS-17 after a competitive process under the 50% quota for direct recruitment, continued serving without formal induction---Despite admission by respondents in prior compliance report and written statement that two vacant posts existed under the direct quota, respondents failed to advertise them and instead initiated promotional proceedings, violating rules and depriving eligible state subjects of fair opportunity---Held, such conduct was contrary to the departmental recruitment rules and constitutional guarantee of equality in public service for state subjects---Writ petition was held maintainable and allowed. **(b) Service Law---Departmental recruitment rules---Initial recruitment versus promotion quota---Enforceability---Departmental rules clearly provided for 50% of posts of Section Officer BPS-17 to be filled by initial recruitment and remaining 50% by promotion---Promotion quota had already been exhausted, yet respondents attempted to fill remaining direct quota posts through promotion---Such action was declared illegal and arbitrary---Court observed that direct recruitment process must be fair, transparent, and merit-based, and eligible candidates must not be deprived of their right to apply. **(c) Administrative Law---Transparency in recruitment---Unjustified delay and secrecy---Respondents failed to initiate the recruitment process despite clear acknowledgment of vacant direct quota posts and directions from competent authorities---Secretive convening of Selection Board meetings and prolonged inaction created suspicion and amounted to abuse of authority and denial of fair process---Court held that admitted availability of posts cannot be bypassed or manipulated through internal promotions. **(d) Service Law---Ad hoc appointment---Right to salary and continuity---Petitioner, though appointed on ad hoc basis, had not been relieved by any competent order and continued to serve---Respondents failed to issue permanent appointment order or relieve him from duties---Court held that salary for period of actual service must be paid as per record and petitioner’s service could not be interrupted until permanent induction through lawful process. (e) Disposition Writ petition was accepted. Respondents were directed to (i) advertise the two vacant posts of Section Officer BPS-17 under the 50% direct recruitment quota within one month, (ii) ensure the petitioner is not relieved from service until permanent appointments are made, and (iii) release all outstanding salary to the petitioner in accordance with law. Compliance report to be submitted to the Registrar.

Summary: From perusal of Section 21(4) of the Act, it is abundantly clear that while applying for setting aside ex- parte order, a separate application for leave to contest in the form and manner prescribed in Section 22(3) of the Act has to be filed within the period of limitation. Any plea taken on merits of the case in the application for setting aside ex-parte order passed by the Rent Tribunal under Section 21 of the Act without an application seeking leave to contest in the form and manner prescribed under Section 22(3) of the Act cannot be taken into consideration. Therefore, the impugned order dated 23.04.2024 is unexceptionable and warrants no interference. 1037First Appeal Against Order(F.A.O.) 46541/22 Muhammad Akram Rahi Vs The Copyright Board etc Mr. Justice Abid Hussain Chattha 04- 06- 2024 2024 LHC 3351 2024 CLD 1277 (Lahore)

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199 Protection against police harassment—Marriage contracted by free will—Petitioners, a legally married couple, alleged harassment by private respondents in connivance with local police due to familial opposition—Held, protection under constitutional jurisdiction is available against unlawful interference in personal liberty and harassment—Police officials directed not to harass petitioners—Court reaffirmed that such matrimonial issues fall outside the scope of writ jurisdiction and should be resolved before competent forums if disputed. (b) Police Order, 2002 / General Law ----Police functions—Obligation to act fairly—Power to arrest without warrant—Held, police is under constitutional duty to protect citizens’ rights and ensure fair investigation—Use of police powers must be in accordance with law and cannot be employed to harass individuals in private matrimonial matters—Court deprecated misuse of authority and emphasized that police are required to protect, not abduct. (c) Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 ----S. 496-A Second marriage without dissolution of first marriage—Allegation by private respondent of “marriage over marriage”—FIR lodged during pendency of court’s restraining order—Held, lodging of FIR during operation of interim order amounted to violation of court’s directions—Court barred further action on FIR No.1109/2024 pending fact-finding inquiry—Directed DIG East to examine alleged police highhandedness if approached. (d) Civil / Matrimonial Disputes Private disputes—Jurisdiction—Held, questions relating to subsistence or legality of first marriage and civil consequences thereof are to be resolved by appropriate legal forums—High Court declined to interfere in disputed questions of fact regarding subsistence of earlier marriage or validity of subsequent marriage. Disposition: Petition disposed of in terms of SHO and private respondents’ statements—Court restrained further harassment—FIR proceedings stayed pending inquiry—Private respondents furnished bonds—DIG East directed to conduct inquiry upon complaint.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----O.VII, R.11—Rejection of plaint—Repetitive and vexatious applications—Abuse of process of law Petitioner’s second application under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. in a suit for malicious prosecution was dismissed with costs for being identical to his earlier application under the same provision and another under S.21, General Clauses Act, 1897 r/w S.13 of Defamation Ordinance, 2002—Earlier orders had attained finality and could not be re-agitated—Repeated filing of similar applications held to be frivolous and intended merely to delay proceedings; such conduct constitutes misuse of the process of law—Concurrent findings of Trial and Revisional Courts warranted no interference. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) ----Art.120—Limitation in suits for malicious prosecution—Mixed question of fact and law Determination of limitation in a claim for malicious prosecution depends upon factual inquiries and legal evaluation—Properly triable only after recording of evidence—Trial Court rightly declined to reject plaint summarily on limitation grounds. (c) Defamation Ordinance, 2002 ----Ss.8, 12 & 13—Distinction between defamation and malicious prosecution Underlying suit sought damages for malicious prosecution and not defamation under Defamation Ordinance, 2002—Contentions regarding limitation and exclusive jurisdiction under the Ordinance held misconceived—Courts below correctly found the Ordinance inapplicable to the controversy. (d) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) ----Art.199—Constitutional jurisdiction—Scope of interference High Court’s jurisdiction under Art.199 confined to correcting jurisdictional or constitutional errors—No such infirmity or violation found—Concurrent orders of lower courts based on sound reasoning; interference declined. (e) Practice and procedure ----Vexatious litigation by an advocate party-in-person—Imposition of costs Petitioner, an Advocate, repeatedly filed frivolous applications after settlement of issues, demonstrating a pattern of obstinate and abusive litigation—Courts are empowered to discourage such conduct through imposition of realistic costs—Costs of Rs.35,000 imposed, payable to the Sindh High Court Clinic within fourteen days. Cited cases: None reported. (g) Disposition — Petition dismissed with costs of Rs.35,000/-, to be deposited with the Sindh High Court Clinic within fourteen (14) days—All pending applications dismissed accordingly.

Summary: The Hyderabad Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Old-HCCI) challenged: The cancellation of its licence by the DGTO through the order dated 27.01.2020. The dismissal of its appeal by the Federal Government on 01.04.2022. The issuance of a licence to a competing entity, New-HCCI, on 20.04.2022. The Old-HCCI argued that the cancellation of its licence and issuance of a licence to New-HCCI violated the provisions of the Trade Organizations Act, 2013 (TO Act, 2013). ------- Issues: ------- 1) Whether the Old-HCCI’s licence stood revoked under the TO Act, 2013. ------- 2) Whether the DGTO and the Federal Government lawfully cancelled Old-HCCI’s licence. ------- 3) Whether the issuance of a licence to New-HCCI violated the TO Act, 2013. ------- 4) Whether procedural and natural justice were observed in the cancellation of the Old-HCCI’s licence. ------- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Revocation of Old-HCCI’s Licence: Section 4(1) of the TO Act, 2013 revokes licences granted under the Trade Organizations Ordinance, 1961, but Old-HCCI’s licence was granted under the TO Ordinance, 2007. Section 36 of the TO Act, 2013 saves licences issued under the TO Ordinance, 2007. Thus, Old-HCCI’s licence did not stand automatically revoked under the TO Act, 2013. ------- Legality of Licence Cancellation: Section 6(2) of the TO Act, 2013 requires trade organizations to apply for licence renewal 90 days before its expiry. Old-HCCI applied for renewal in 2013, two years after the licence expired in 2011. This violated Section 6(2) and its proviso, which only allows a 30-day extension. The DGTO acted beyond its authority by entertaining this late application. ------- Issuance of Licence to New-HCCI: Section 9(1) of the TO Act, 2013 allows a licence to be granted to a new entity only one year after a previous licence’s cancellation. New-HCCI’s licence was granted before the expiry of this one-year period, violating Section 9(1). ------- Violation of Natural Justice: Section 7(2) of the TO Act, 2013 mandates a show cause notice and an opportunity of being heard before licence cancellation. While a notice was issued, Old-HCCI was not afforded a proper hearing after its issuance. Orders passed without adhering to natural justice principles are void, as held in precedents like Muhammad Ismail (2023 SCMR 1319) and Abdul Majeed Zafar (2007 SCMR 330). ------- Outcome: Appeal and Writ Petition Allowed: ------- The court set aside: DGTO’s order dated 27.01.2020 canceling Old-HCCI’s licence. Federal Government’s appellate order dated 01.04.2022. Licence issued to New-HCCI on 20.04.2022. Remand to DGTO: ------- The DGTO was directed to: Issue an amended show cause notice to Old-HCCI if necessary. Decide on licence cancellation after affording Old-HCCI an opportunity of being heard under Section 7(2) of the TO Act, 2013. Key Legal Principles ------- Preservation of Existing Rights: Section 36 of the TO Act, 2013 saves licences issued under the TO Ordinance, 2007. ------- Procedural Justice: Orders with penal consequences require strict compliance with procedural fairness. Natural justice violations, including failure to provide a fair hearing, render such orders void. Timelines for Licence Renewal: ------- Strict adherence to timelines in Section 6(2) is mandatory, with a maximum 30-day extension allowed. Prohibition on Concurrent Licences: ------- Section 9(1) prohibits issuing a new licence within one year of a prior licence’s cancellation.

Summary: On the Basis of fake affidavit and certificate regarding Tyrian White's parentage, seeks disqualification of Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi under Act 62(1)(F) UC ----- (a) Jurisdiction of Bench Reconstitution Issue: Whether a bench can be reconstituted after a judgment has been rendered by the majority. Held: The reconstitution of a bench after the judgment of the majority is legally impermissible. The Chief Justice cannot alter the composition of the bench once a majority opinion has been reached, particularly when he himself is part of the bench and has issued a minority view. Judicial independence cannot be compromised by administrative actions. Precedent Cited: PLD 2019 SC 183 (Human Rights Case No.14959-K of 2018). Disposition: The reconstitution of the bench was declared without lawful authority. ------ (b) Scope of Writ of Quo Warranto: Issue: Whether a writ of quo warranto can be issued against a respondent no longer holding a public office. Held: A writ of quo warranto is not maintainable unless the respondent is holding a public office at the time of filing the petition. The resignation of Respondent No. 1 from his office rendered the petition infructuous. Legal Principles: A public office must be substantive, created by law, and involve the exercise of sovereign functions. Precedent Cited: PLD 1963 SC 203 (Masud-ul-Hasan v. Khadim Hussain). ------ (c) Dependency and Affidavit Requirements: Issue: Whether failure to declare Tyrian White as a dependent in nomination papers violated Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution. Held: The petitioner failed to prove dependency as defined under the law. The foreign judgment cited was ex-parte and not enforceable under Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. Dependency requires clear evidence of financial reliance, which was absent. Precedent Cited: PLD 2017 SC 692 (Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi v. Nawaz Sharif). ------ (d) Privacy and Legitimation of Children: Issue: Whether the petitioner could question the legitimacy of Tyrian White in the context of public office eligibility. Held: The court upheld the right to privacy under Article 14 of the Constitution and refused to entertain baseless allegations regarding legitimacy. The legitimacy of a child cannot be questioned in writ jurisdiction without proper legal proceedings. Precedent Cited: PLD 2023 SC 174 (Muhammad Nawaz v. Additional District Judge). (e) Bonafides and Malicious Petitions: Issue: Whether the petition was filed with malafide intent or ulterior motives. Held: The petition was found to be vexatious, aimed at intruding into the private life of the respondent for political purposes. The court emphasized that quo warranto cannot be used as a tool for personal vendetta. Precedent Cited: 2023 SCMR 162 (Jawad Ahmad Mir v. Prof. Dr. Imtiaz Ali Khan). -----Disposition: Final Decision: The petition was dismissed as not maintainable. Reasoning: The petition violated procedural norms, lacked evidence, and was filed with malafide intent. Outcome: The judgment of the majority bench (dismissing the petition) was upheld as valid and binding.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Background:M/s Taj Wood Board Mills (Pvt) Ltd, M/s Al-Mashood Oil & Ghee Industries (Pvt) Ltd, and M/s Bara Ghee Mills (Pvt) Ltd ("Petitioners"), private companies operating in the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), challenged the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 09.02.2022. The grievance arose from the change in the constitutional status of FATA and PATA following the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, leading to the extension of fiscal and tax laws to these areas, and the subsequent issuance of various orders and circulars by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) regulating imports and transhipment procedures.----Issues:1. Whether the Peshawar High Court correctly upheld the legality of Circular No. 1 of 2021 and its conditions, excluding condition v.2. Whether the preferential treatment provided under CGO No. 8 of 2021 to bulk-importing edible oil manufacturers is justifiable and non-discriminatory.-----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:Legality of Circular No. 1 of 2021:The Supreme Court reviewed the Peshawar High Court's judgment, which upheld the legality of Circular No. 1 of 2021, excluding condition v, which was deemed ultra vires Sections 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and Section 25 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The Court concurred that the audit provision in condition V was illegal as it introduced a parallel system not envisioned by the existing legislative framework.2. Preferential Treatment Under CGO No. 8 of 2021:The petitioners contended that the preferential treatment for bulk-importing edible oil manufacturers under CGO No. 8 of 2021 was discriminatory. The Supreme Court referred to its earlier judgment in M/s AK Tariq Foundry Etc. v. Government of Pakistan, which struck down similar discriminatory classifications under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The Court held that the preferential treatment in CGO No. 8 of 2021 lacked a rational basis and violated the equality clause of Article 25 of the Constitution. Therefore, the discriminatory provisions of CGO No. 8 of 2021 were also struck down.The Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals and allowed them, setting aside the discriminatory provisions of CGO No. 8 of 2021 and upholding the legality of Circular No. 1 of 2021, excluding condition v.----Citations/Precedents:Hyderabad Development Authority v Karam Khan Shoro (1985 SCMR 45)Established the importance of compliance with procedural requirements under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.Land Acquisition Collector, National Highway Authority, Lahore v Javed Malik (2009 SCMR 634)Affirmed that provisions limiting compensation cannot be invoked without strict compliance with procedural requirements.Malik Nasim Ahmad Aheer v WAPDA (PLD 2004 SC 897)Highlighted the necessity for courts to adhere to claimed compensation if procedural notices are served.Land Acquisition Officer, Hyderabad v Gul Muhammad (PLD 2005 SC 311)Reinforced the principle that compensation cannot exceed the claimed amount when procedural notices are duly served.M/s AK Tariq Foundry Etc. v. Government of Pakistan (Civil Petitions No. 159 to 178 of 2023)Struck down discriminatory classifications under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, violating Article 25 of the Constitution. This precedent was pivotal in the present case for addressing the issue of discriminatory treatment in CGO No. 8 of 2021.

Summary: The petitioner, Ch. Rizwan Ali Raa, filed a writ petition challenging a scheme proposed by the Government of Punjab to provide 23,000 motorcycles to students, of which 19,000 would be petrol bikes. The primary concern was the environmental impact of introducing a large number of motorcycles into the traffic system of Punjab, potentially causing increased pollution and adverse effects on public health. The petitions were filed under Article 9 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, which guarantees the right to life, emphasizing environmental concerns.-----Issues:Whether the scheme proposed by the Government of Punjab constitutes a "project" under the Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997.Whether an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is required before the commencement of the scheme.Whether the Government of Punjab followed the mandatory provisions of the Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997, before launching the scheme.Whether the Transport Department can proceed with the scheme without prior approval from the Provincial Agency.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:----Definition of Project:The court examined the definitions provided in the Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997, particularly the terms "adverse environmental effect," "project," and "proponent." It was determined that the scheme to provide motorcycles to students falls within the definition of a "project" as it involves a change in the environment and has potential adverse environmental effects.Requirement of EIA:The court emphasized that Section 12 of the Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997, mandates that no proponent of a project shall commence construction or operation unless an Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) or an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is filed with the Provincial Agency and its approval obtained. Given the environmental concerns associated with the scheme, an EIA was deemed necessary.----Non-Compliance with the Act:It was noted that the Transport Department did not comply with the mandatory provisions of the Act, 1997, by failing to submit an EIA before formulating and obtaining approval for the scheme. The Secretary of the Transport Department did not dispute the applicability of the Act under these circumstances.Prohibition and Obligation:The court highlighted that Section 19 of the Act, 1997, makes it an offense for any Government Agency to proceed with the implementation of a scheme without the approval of the Provincial Agency. The head of the Government Agency would be directly liable for punishment under the Act. Therefore, the Transport Department was obligated to submit an EIA and obtain approval before formally launching the scheme._----Citations/Precedents:Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997----Conclusion:The court disposed of the petitions with the following directives:The Transport Department must submit an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) to the Provincial Agency for approval before the scheme is formally implemented and motorcycles are distributed.The Provincial Agency must engage private and independent consultants to review the submitted EIA and make recommendations. The fee for these consultants will be borne by the Transport Department.Until the approval is granted, the scheme will be held in abeyance, and no further steps will be taken by the Transport and Masstransit Department regarding the scheme.The court's decision emphasizes the importance of adhering to environmental regulations and ensuring that any project with potential adverse environmental effects undergoes a thorough assessment and receives the necessary approvals before implementation.