Summary: Short order ---- Income Tax Ordinance, 2001—Ss. 4B & 4C—First Schedule, Part I, Division IIA & Division IIB—Fifth Schedule, Rules 4, 4AA & 4AB—Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 25, 73(2)(a), 175F, 185(3)—Fourth Schedule, Federal Legislative List, Part I, Entry 47—Super tax—Constitutional validity—Nature of levy—Tax on income—The Federal Constitutional Court considered the vires of super tax imposed under S. 4B, introduced through the Finance Act, 2015 for raising revenue for internally displaced persons, and under S. 4C, introduced through the Finance Act, 2022 on high-earning persons. The Court held that both S. 4B and S. 4C were validly enacted taxes on income falling squarely within Entry 47 of Part I of the Federal Legislative List, and that Parliament was fully competent to impose, alter, regulate, or abolish such taxes through a Finance Act as part of a Money Bill under Art. 73(2)(a) of the Constitution. It was further held that super tax under S. 4B was a “tax” and not a “fee”, and that neither S. 4B nor S. 4C suffered from any inherent lack of legislative competence or facial constitutional infirmity warranting invalidation. Constitutional law—Fiscal legislation—Article 25—Classification—Income-based and sector-based distinctions—The Court held that the classification created under S. 4B was income-based, founded on intelligible differentia, and bore a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved; therefore, it was neither discriminatory nor productive of unreasonable or hostile discrimination among persons similarly situated. Likewise, the classification of fifteen sectors in the First Proviso to Division IIB, Part I, First Schedule, subjected to a higher rate of super tax under S. 4C for tax year 2022, was held to be reasonable and constitutionally permissible under Art. 25 of the Constitution. Consequently, the judgments of the Sindh, Lahore and Islamabad High Courts, insofar as they had declared the said proviso discriminatory, were set aside. Taxation—Retrospective operation of fiscal statutes—Tax year 2022 and onwards—Past and closed transactions—The Court held that the legislature possesses plenary power to enact laws with retrospective as well as prospective effect, subject to the limitation that such laws must not operate upon past and closed transactions. Applying that principle, it was held that S. 4C validly applied to tax year 2022 and onwards, and that the closing of accounts for a tax year did not, in the scheme of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, constitute such an event as would preclude imposition of a fresh charge, particularly when returns for tax year 2022 were yet to be filed. On the same reasoning, the rates in Division IIB amended through the Finance Act, 2023 were held applicable to tax year 2023. Accordingly, the contrary findings of the Sindh, Lahore and Islamabad High Courts, which had held S. 4C inapplicable to tax year 2022, and the amended rates inapplicable to tax year 2023, were set aside. Income Tax Ordinance, 2001—S. 4C(2)—Meaning of “income”—All sources of income—Capital gains on securities—The Court held that the statutory definition of “income” for purposes of S. 4C, insofar as it embraced income from all sources, was validly enacted. The judgments of the Islamabad High Court which had read down S. 4C were, to that extent, set aside. It was further held that super tax under S. 4C is a self-contained and standalone tax on income independent of the levy under S. 4 of the Ordinance, and, therefore, applies to capital gains falling under S. 37A and the Eighth Schedule, being within the ambit of S. 4C(2)(i) and (iv). Practice and procedure—Maintainability of appeals—Locus standi of CIR/FBR—Transposition of parties—The taxpayers raised a preliminary objection that appeals in the S. 4C matters were not maintainable because they had not been instituted by the Federation of Pakistan. The Court rejected the objection and held that it possessed inherent power to transpose a party where necessary for just and proper adjudication, and since the Federation was already before the Court as respondent, it could be transposed as appellant, which was accordingly done. The Court further noted that several connected matters had, in any event, been filed by the Federation itself in addition to the Commissioner Inland Revenue and Federal Board of Revenue; hence, the appeals were maintainable on that count as well. Exploration and petroleum companies—Fifth Schedule—Petroleum Concession Agreements—Aggregate tax ceiling—Super tax liability—The Court held that Ss. 4B and 4C, by virtue of Rules 4AA and 4AB of the Fifth Schedule, would apply to income arising to oil exploration and petroleum companies only to the extent that such application did not result in exceeding the aggregate rate of taxes provided in the Fifth Schedule and in their respective Petroleum Concession Agreements. In relation to S. 4C, the Court modified the Islamabad High Court judgment to the extent that the departmental determination of each Petroleum Concession Agreement was to be undertaken by juxtaposing its terms and conditions with the Regulation of Mines & Minerals (Government Control) Act, 1948 and the applicable tax law, whether the Income Tax Act, 1922, the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, or the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Court further held that S. 4C would continue to apply to other income of such companies from all other sources falling under S. 4C(2)(i), (ii) and (iii), but the concerned Commissioner Inland Revenue must first determine liability afresh and afford an opportunity of hearing before taking recovery measures. Special statutory regimes—Sector-specific protection—No implied override—The Court held that S. 4C could not be construed to operate in a manner inconsistent with Rule 4 of the Fifth Schedule, because that rule embodied a sector-specific framework recognizing the unique nature, risks and investment requirements of the petroleum and exploration industry. Imposition of super tax beyond the prescribed threshold would override that legislative safeguard, impose an excessive and disproportionate burden, and frustrate the very purpose for which the special provisions had been enacted. In the absence of a clear and express legislative intention to abrogate or modify those sectoral thresholds, S. 4C could not be interpreted so as to produce that result. Banking companies—Super tax—Tax year 2023 onwards—The Court held that S. 4C, as enacted through the Finance Act, 2022, applied to banking companies for tax year 2023 and onwards, and at the rates made applicable to tax year 2023 by the Finance Act, 2023. Exempt entities—Provident and benevolent funds—Statutory exemption—Super tax not chargeable—The Court held that, without prejudice to the foregoing declaration upholding S. 4C, the said provision would not apply to income, particularly of benevolent funds, enjoying exemption from tax under S. 53 read with the relevant provisions of the Second Schedule to the Ordinance. Such funds constituted a distinct class expressly exempted by the Legislature in furtherance of recognized charitable and welfare objectives, and subjecting them to super tax would defeat the statutory exemption and be inconsistent with the legislative scheme. In the case of provident and benevolent funds before the Court, it was held that those holding valid exemption certificates under the Ninth Schedule read with the relevant entries in the Second Schedule were not liable to pay super tax under S. 4C. The Court directed such funds to furnish their exemption certificates for the relevant tax years to the concerned Commissioners Inland Revenue within fifteen days, whereupon written orders absolving them of liability were to be passed within seven days. Constitutional transition—Transfer of pending matters—The Court noted that, owing to the complexity of the issues and the large number of pending cases concerning Ss. 4B and 4C for multiple tax years, the Supreme Court had, by order dated 12.03.2025 under the erstwhile Art. 186A of the Constitution, directed that all such cases pending in various High Courts and the Supreme Court be transferred and clubbed for final adjudication. Upon the coming into force of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, all such cases stood transferred to the Federal Constitutional Court by virtue of Art. 175F of the Constitution. Appeals, petitions and transfer cases disposed of—The Federal Constitutional Court upheld S. 4B as intra vires and applicable for tax year 2015 and onwards; upheld S. 4C as intra vires and applicable for tax year 2022 and onwards; upheld the amended rates for tax year 2023; sustained the statutory definition of income and the sectoral classification under the First Proviso; declared S. 4C applicable to capital gains on securities and to banking companies for tax year 2023 onwards; limited the application of Ss. 4B and 4C to exploration and petroleum companies in accordance with the Fifth Schedule and their Petroleum Concession Agreements; protected exempt provident and benevolent funds from liability under S. 4C; set aside the contrary findings of the High Courts to the extent indicated; and disposed of all appeals, petitions and transfer cases accordingly.

Summary: Insurance Ordinance, 2000—Ss. 118(2), 130(1) & 156—Federal Ombudsman Institutional Reforms Act, 2013—S. 9(4)—Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Art. 185(3)—Takaful claim—Nominee/beneficiary—Repudiation of claim—Alleged concealment and misrepresentation—Burden to substantiate repudiation—The Federal Constitutional Court held that where the deceased policyholder had obtained a life/Takaful policy, his death was admitted, and the respondent was the sole nominee duly recorded in the policy documents, the insurer could not lawfully repudiate the claim on bare allegations of concealment, delayed intimation, or alleged drug addiction without producing independent, contemporaneous, and reliable documentary evidence in support of such grounds. The Court observed that the insurer had failed to place on record any material substantiating misrepresentation or concealment at the time of obtaining the policy, and even the investigation report did not disclose any such incriminating material. In these circumstances, the Federal Insurance Ombudsman had rightly allowed the complaint and directed payment of the claim amount to the nominee under S. 130(1) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, together with liquidated damages under S. 118(2), while also referring the matter to SECP for action under S. 156 read with S. 9(4) of the Federal Ombudsman Institutional Reforms Act, 2013. Insurance law—Nominee—Entitlement to policy proceeds—The Court held that once the respondent’s status as sole nominee under the policy was undisputed, and the death of the insured was also admitted, her entitlement to receive the insured amount stood established, particularly when the insurer failed to prove any legally sustainable ground for avoiding the contract or denying liability. The mere assertion that the nominee was not the “real sister” of the deceased did not dislodge her position as the recorded beneficiary under the policy. Insurance law—Delayed intimation of death—Whether sufficient to defeat claim—The Court held that the principal objection regarding non-immediate intimation of death was, by itself, insufficient to justify rejection of the claim. In the absence of proof that such delay caused legal prejudice or was tied to any proved breach going to the root of the contract, repudiation of the claim on that basis alone was unsustainable. Insurance law—Allegation of drug addiction—Unsubstantiated allegation—The Court further held that the insurer’s plea that the deceased was a drug addict remained wholly unsubstantiated, because no medical record was produced to show that the death was attributable to addiction or that any relevant fact had been concealed at the proposal stage. Mere allegation, unsupported by medical or other documentary evidence, could not defeat the nominee’s claim under the policy. Constitutional jurisdiction—Concurrent challenge and enforcement proceedings—High Court judgment affirmed—The Federal Constitutional Court found no illegality in the Islamabad High Court’s judgment whereby the writ petition of the nominee seeking implementation of the Ombudsman’s order was allowed and the writ petition of the insurer challenging the Ombudsman’s order, the review order, and the President’s order was dismissed. The Court, therefore, declined to interfere. Case references—No precedent or case law appears to have been cited in the text provided in this order; accordingly, none can properly be added as judicially relied-upon authorities. Petition dismissed—Leave refused—The Federal Constitutional Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, maintaining the impugned judgment of the Islamabad High Court and, thereby, the Ombudsman’s direction for payment of the Takaful claim and related relief.

Summary: Interim injunction in a suit for recovery of damages under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002--- In defamation matters involving serious and unproven allegations, courts are empowered to grant limited interim injunctions to prevent irreparable harm. ----- Freedom of speech is a cherished constitutional right, it is not absolute and must be balanced against the inviolable dignity and reputation of an individual. ----- judicial restraint, emphasizing protection of reputation during pendency of trial without foreclosing final adjudication on merits. 34Writ Petition- Family- Dowry Articles 836-26 MUHAMMAD AHMAD TARIQ VS JFC ETC Mr. Justice Muzamil Akhtar Shabir 22- 01- 2026 2026 LHC 1286

Summary: Both an arbitrator and a referee can be appointed only with the consent of the parties; however, an arbitrator exercises jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act, 1940, whereas a referee operates under Article 33 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The statement of a referee constitutes an admission of the parties themselves and, once recorded on consent, cannot be challenged in appeal or revision. 36C.O. (Commercial) CM/1/48681/26 Qatar Lubricants Company W.L.L through Ashfaq Ahmed Jalal & 1 Other Vs Atif Naeem Rana & 4 Others Mr. Justice Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi 22- 01- 2026 2026 LHC 79

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 10A, 40, 184(3) & 175E(4)—Criminal Procedure Code, 1898—S. 4(1)(l)—Mutual Legal Assistance (Criminal Matters) Act, 2020—Ss. 2(1)(c), 4 & 7—Suo motu proceedings—Murder of journalist abroad—Independent and transparent investigation—Judicial supervision of investigation—Limits of constitutional jurisdiction—The Federal Constitutional Court, while dealing with the suo motu case regarding the murder of journalist Arshad Sharif in Kenya, held that although the State is under an obligation to ensure a fair, independent and transparent investigation, the constitutional courts cannot continuously supervise, monitor, or control the conduct and manner of investigation merely by keeping proceedings pending. The Court observed that Article 10A guarantees not only a fair trial but also an investigation free from undue pressure and interference, and such protection begins from the inception of the investigative process. However, the statutory sphere of investigation belongs to the police and investigating agencies, and judicial assumption of ongoing supervisory control would be prejudicial to fairness, inconsistent with settled jurisprudence, and beyond the proper constitutional role of the Court. Since no objection had been raised to the findings of the fact-finding process or the Special Joint Investigation Team, and the real concern related only to the pace of progress in a matter involving a foreign sovereign state, no justification existed for continued judicial monitoring. Criminal law—Investigation—Functions of judiciary and police—Non-overlapping spheres—Relying on Ajmeel Khan v. Abdur Rahim (PLD 2009 SC 102), the Court reiterated that the functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary but not overlapping, and that the conduct and manner of investigation normally cannot be scrutinized in constitutional jurisdiction. It further relied on Malik Shoukat Ali Dogar v. Ghulam Qasim Khakwani (PLD 1994 SC 281) for the principle that continued court control over investigation is prejudicial to the accused and detrimental to fairness of procedure. Referring also to S. 4(1)(l), Cr.P.C., the Court held that investigation means proceedings for collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or other authorized person, and does not contemplate continuous supervision by courts. The Court noted that judicial intervention in investigation is confined to exceptional situations, such as habeas corpus matters, mala fide investigation, or cases of jurisdictional excess, as recognized in Fahad Ahmed Gulzar v. ASI/IO Saeed Mahroof (2025 PCrLJ 1140). Accordingly, the request of the deceased’s family to keep the suo motu proceedings pending for ongoing oversight of the investigation was declined. Constitutional law—Foreign affairs—Article 40—International forums—Judicial restraint—The Court further held that it could not issue directions requiring the Federal Government to raise the matter at international forums, because such a course would intrude into the domains of foreign policy and diplomatic engagement, which constitutionally belong to the Federal Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Article 40, though reflective of constitutional aspirations to foster goodwill and friendly relations among nations, did not justify judicial management of foreign relations. The Court noted that the Supreme Court had earlier accepted the position that mutual legal assistance and diplomatic channels should first be allowed to run their course, with recourse to international forums to be considered only if the need subsequently arose. The matter was therefore left to the good sense and discretion of the Federal Government. Mutual Legal Assistance—Cross-border criminal investigation—Pakistan and Kenya—Statutory framework in both states—The Court observed that both Pakistan and Kenya have enacted legal regimes governing mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. In Pakistan, the Mutual Legal Assistance (Criminal Matters) Act, 2020 establishes the Secretary, Ministry of Interior, as the central authority empowered to make requests for assistance in criminal investigations and proceedings; while in Kenya, the Mutual Legal Assistance Act, 2011 vests corresponding authority in the Office of the Attorney General. A request for mutual legal assistance had been made by Pakistan to Kenya on 22.02.2023, accepted by Kenya, and the agreement was signed on 10.12.2024. In addition, the record showed constitution of the SJIT, diplomatic contacts by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, communication between the Prime Minister of Pakistan and the President of Kenya, examination of the Kenyan case file, engagement with the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions of Kenya, contact with the pathologist who conducted the post-mortem, and issuance of black warrants against the alleged perpetrators. In these circumstances, the Court held that the matter was actively proceeding through lawful investigative and diplomatic channels in both sovereign states and did not warrant judicial interference. Case references—Ajmeel Khan v. Abdur Rahim (PLD 2009 SC 102); Malik Shoukat Ali Dogar v. Ghulam Qasim Khakwani (PLD 1994 SC 281); Fahad Ahmed Gulzar v. ASI/IO Saeed Mahroof (2025 PCrLJ 1140). The Court also referred to the earlier orders passed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the same proceedings dated 13.02.2023 and 17.03.2023, particularly regarding the impermissibility of judicial supervision over investigation and the propriety of allowing mutual legal assistance and diplomatic processes to continue. Suo motu action disposed of—Pending applications disposed of—The Federal Constitutional Court held that, in light of the steps already taken by the Federal Government and the legal frameworks operating in Pakistan and Kenya, no further judicial intervention was required. The suo motu proceedings were accordingly disposed of, with observation that if the legal heirs of Arshad Sharif had any specific grievance, they could approach the court of competent jurisdiction.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 199, 201, 175F(1)(c) & 25A—Judicial review—Constitutional jurisdiction of High Courts—Equitable relief—Compassion and conscience of Judge—Courts as courts of law and not of personal sentiment—The Federal Constitutional Court held that High Courts, while exercising constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199, are strictly bound to decide cases in accordance with law and cannot grant relief on the basis of compassion, hardship, equity, or personal notions of justice where no legal right or statutory basis exists. The Court emphasized that Pakistan’s constitutional order is founded on rule of law and constitutionalism, under which judges are required to interpret and apply the law rather than substitute it with individual morality or subjective conscience. It was held that the Constitution does not confer upon High Courts any general authority to do “complete justice” or to fill perceived gaps in law through equitable intervention, and that every case must be adjudicated within constitutional and statutory limits. Constitutional jurisdiction—Mandamus—Requirement of pre-existing legal duty and enforceable legal right—No writ can issue in absence of law—The Court held that a writ of mandamus under Art. 199(1)(a)(i) can only issue where the law imposes a duty upon a person or authority and a corresponding legal right exists in favour of the petitioner. In the present case, there was admittedly no law, rule, or regulation permitting a “special/super supplementary examination” for the respondent MBBS student. Therefore, the Sindh High Court acted without lawful authority in directing the University to conduct such examination and in effectively creating, through judicial order, a power and duty not recognized by law. The impugned direction was thus held to be beyond the permissible scope of mandamus and an instance of judicial overreach. Educational institutions—Autonomy in academic matters—Judicial restraint—Special/super supplementary examination—The Federal Constitutional Court reiterated that courts must sparingly interfere in the internal governance, academic structure, and disciplinary affairs of educational institutions, which possess specialized expertise and are entitled to regulate their own examinations and policies in accordance with law. Since the statutes and academic framework governing the medical university did not contemplate or permit a “special/super supplementary examination,” the Sindh High Court could not, under the guise of equitable relief or enforcement of rights, compel the University to hold an examination unknown to law. Judicial intervention in educational matters was held permissible only where the governing rules or policies offend natural justice or transgress statutory or constitutional limits, which was not the case here. Fundamental rights—Art. 25A—Right to education—Limits of enforcement jurisdiction—The Court observed that although Art. 25A recognizes the right to education, the enforcement of a fundamental right under Art. 199(1)(c) does not authorize a High Court to grant disproportionate or legally unsanctioned relief. Even in matters touching upon fundamental rights, the High Court remains confined by law and cannot invent remedies contrary to the statutory framework. The Court further found that the respondent’s plea that the relevant examination schedule was not uploaded on the website lacked substance, particularly when he admittedly appeared in the other supplementary examinations and the record showed that all other students were aware of the timetable. Precedent—Arts. 189 & 201—Binding effect of superior court judgments—Court cannot confine precedential value of its own decision—The Federal Constitutional Court held that once a court delivers a judgment deciding a question of law or laying down a principle of law, such judgment enters the stream of precedent and cannot be insulated by the court itself through a direction that it shall not serve as precedent. Such a course was held to undermine legal certainty, invite arbitrariness, and weaken judicial accountability. The Court emphasized that the doctrine of stare decisis is embedded in the constitutional structure, and that judges remain bound by the principles they pronounce as well as by the precedents of superior courts operating within the relevant constitutional hierarchy. It was further observed that the practice of granting relief in an individual case while disclaiming precedential effect would permit unchecked discretion and destabilize the rule of law. Constitutional structure—Federal Constitutional Court and Supreme Court jurisprudence—Partial disagreement with earlier precedent—The Court observed that while prior jurisprudence of the Supreme Court remains valid unless overruled, the Federal Constitutional Court, within its own constitutional domain, is competent to interpret the law independently. In that context, the Court partially disagreed with the proposition in Director General, National Savings, Islamabad v. Balqees Begum (PLD 2013 SC 174) to the extent it suggested that equity may step in where law has no answer to provide justice, holding instead that even in cases of perceived silence in law, courts must seek answers consistent with constitutional order, legal principle, and precedent rather than resort to free-standing compassion. Case references—The Court referred to and discussed the following authorities: Muhammad Umar Wahid v. University of Health Sciences, Lahore (PLD 2006 SC 300); Dossani Travels Pvt. v. Messers Travels Shop (PLD 2014 SC 1); Director General, National Savings, Islamabad v. Balqees Begum (PLD 2013 SC 174); Riaz Hussain through Legal Representatives v. Chairman Federal Land Commissioner (CPLA Nos. 962, 963 and 964 of 2023); DeShaney v. Winnebago County (489 U.S. 189, 1989); Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (597 U.S. 215); Khalid Mehmood v. Pakistan, through Ministry of Finance (2025); Muhammad Azam Khan Swati v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2023 Islamabad 184); Prof. Dr. Sheikh Israr Ahmed v. Government of Punjab (2025 PLC (C.S.) 182); Muhammad Azam Khan v. Government of N.W.F.P through Chief Secretary NWFP (1998 SCMR 204); and Khyber Medical University v. Aimal Khan (PLD 2022 SC 92). The Court also cited A.K. Brohi’s Fundamental Law of Pakistan and an academic article by Susan A. Bandes on compassion and rule of law. Appeal accepted—Impugned order set aside—Writ petition dismissed—The petition for leave to appeal was converted into an appeal and allowed. The impugned order of the Sindh High Court directing the holding of a “special/super supplementary examination” was set aside, and the respondent’s constitutional petition stood dismissed.

Summary: (a) Police Rules, 1934— ----R.13.6(2) & R.13.9—Promotion of constables as Head Constables—Outstanding merit course promotions—Vested rights—Effect of alleged repeal/omission— Police constables were promoted as Head Constables after completing requisite courses and their names were included in Promotion List, but later promotions were withdrawn and they were reverted/demoted under departmental orders on premise of “out of turn/shoulder promotions” pursuant to directions of IGP Sindh in light of Suo Motu Case No.03/2012—Service Tribunal upheld withdrawal without determining whether promotions were in fact covered by R.13.6(2) at the relevant time—Held, Service Tribunal was obligated to verify whether R.13.6(2) was in force when promotions were granted and, if omitted/repealed later, whether such omission could retrospectively disturb vested rights or closed transactions—Without examining service record, requisite courses/examinations, and applicability of rule at time of promotion, promotions could not mechanically be labeled as “out of turn/shoulder”—Impugned judgment suffered from non-application of mind and failure to decide essential factual/legal questions, hence could not be sustained. Cited Cases: Ali Azhar Khan Baloch and others v. Province of Sindh and others 2015 SCMR 456 Contempt proceedings against Chief Secretary Sindh and others 2013 SCMR 1752 (b) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973— ----Arts. 189 & 212—Binding effect of Supreme Court judgments—Role of Service Tribunals as fact-finding fora— Judgments of Supreme Court are binding under Art.189, including deprecation of out of turn/shoulder promotions—Held, notwithstanding binding principles, each service case must be decided on its own facts through independent and judicious appraisal—Service Tribunal, as appellate fact-finding forum constituted under Art.212, must examine service record and determine whether impugned action truly falls within ratio of binding precedents—Mechanical reliance on departmental stance, without factual verification of merit-based promotion and codal formalities, amounts to abdication of statutory duty. (c) Service Tribunal—Appellate jurisdiction—Duty to address factual and legal pleas— ----Scope under Service Tribunal law—Appeal as continuation of proceedings— Service Tribunal has jurisdiction to confirm, set aside, vary or modify departmental orders and must satisfy test of reasonableness and judiciousness—Held, Tribunal is ultimate judicial fact-finding forum for service matters; it must thoroughly examine original and appellate departmental orders and address all factual and legal pleas—Failure to examine crucial questions (whether promotions were merit-based under rules; whether rule was in vogue; whether promotions were improperly termed “out of turn”; and effect of alleged omission) vitiates adjudication—Matter required remand for fresh decision after affording opportunity of hearing and permitting production of relevant qualification/course documents. Cited Cases: Rao Muhammad Rashid and others v. Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others 2024 SCMR 1864 = 2024 PLC (C.S.) 1349 Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Law and Parliamentary Affairs Department, Lahore v. Ali Ahmad Khan 2025 SCP 2 = 2025 SCMR 289 = 2025 PLC (C.S.) 549 = 2025 SCLR 25 (d) Police service—Out of turn/shoulder promotions—Distinction from merit-based promotions under rules— ----Uniform application of law—Requirement of record-based determination— Out of turn/shoulder promotions stand condemned in law and may be withdrawn, however, before depriving an employee of promotion already granted, Tribunal/Court must determine on record whether promotion was actually out of turn/without merit or granted pursuant to codal requirements—Held, where employees assert promotion under R.13.6(2) on basis of course merit and completion of prescribed stages, Tribunal must scrutinize relevant service record and dates to determine applicability of precedents; otherwise reversion becomes unsustainable on legal plane. Disposition: Civil Petitions for leave to appeal were converted into appeals and allowed; consolidated judgment dated 29.04.2025 of Sindh Service Tribunal was set aside; matter was remanded to Sindh Service Tribunal to decide service appeals afresh in accordance with law after providing ample opportunity of hearing to parties, preferably within three months; petitioners were permitted to file relevant documents to establish qualification and completion of requisite courses prior to promotion.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Workplace harassment is not limited to office premises; it includes abuse of authority wherever linked to employment. The Ombudsperson may proceed independently of criminal trials. concerns about honor, family dignity and social pressure often silence victims, but delayed reporting cannot be treated as consent or used to defeat a woman's right to justice. 64Crl. Appeal 68455/23 Naseem alias Seemay Shah Vs The State etc. Mr. Justice Farooq Haider 18-12- 2025 2025 LHC 7841