Summary: Background: The petitioners, a multinational company, filed a revision petition challenging the judgment of the Additional District Judge, Lahore, who had set aside the Civil Judge's order and remanded the case for a fresh decision on the merits. The respondents had initially filed a suit seeking damages of Rs. 14 million, alleging copyright infringement concerning a song they had created and composed. The Civil Judge had earlier returned the plaint under Order VII Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) for lack of jurisdiction. However, the Additional District Judge had overturned this decision and remanded the case back to the trial court. -----Issues: 1- Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the respondents' claim of copyright infringement and passing off. ----2- Whether the matter falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Intellectual Property Tribunal as per the Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the respondents' claim involved allegations of copyright infringement, which fall under the purview of intellectual property laws. The Copyright Ordinance, 1962, provides exclusive rights related to literary, musical, and artistic works, which were allegedly violated in this case. The court ruled that the Intellectual Property Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over all intellectual property disputes, including copyright infringement, as outlined in Section 18 of the Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012. The court emphasized that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to hear cases related to intellectual property infringement, as these matters must be addressed by the specialized tribunal. The revision petition was allowed, and the judgment of the Additional District Judge was set aside. The respondents’ plaint was ordered to be returned for presentation before the Intellectual Property Tribunal. -----Citations/Precedents: Muhammad Multazam Raza v. Muhammad Ayub Khan (2022 SCMR 979) Messrs Tabaq Restaurant v. Messrs Tabaq Restaurant (1987 SCMR 1090) Messrs Shaheen Chemist through Proprietors v. Zahid Mehmood Chaudhry (2023 CLD 1) Messrs Ferozesons Pvt. Ltd. v. Dr. Col. Retd. K.U. Kureshi (2003 CLD 1052) Glaxosmithkilne Services Ltd. v. Anfords Pakistan (SBLR 2017 Sindh 1537)

Summary: Issue: The primary issues revolve around the interpretation of ?fraudulent use of another?s trademark, firm name, or product labelling or packaging? under Section 10(2)(d) and the distribution of false or misleading information under Section 10(2)(a) of the Competition Act 2010.Holding: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the Tribunal's decision. It held that Rahim Foods' actions constituted deceptive marketing practices under Section 10(2)(d) of the Competition Act by copying K&N?s Foods? packaging and labelling, which likely caused confusion among consumers. However, it agreed with the Tribunal that there was no direct distribution of false or misleading information about K&N?s Foods? products by Rahim Foods, thus not violating Section 10(2)(a).Reasoning: The Court reasoned that the act of copying packaging and labelling to the extent that it causes confusion among consumers amounts to fraudulent use under Section 10(2)(d), regardless of the registration status of the trademark or packaging. However, for an act to fall under Section 10(2)(a), there must be a distribution of false or misleading information specifically aimed at harming another business, which was not the case here.''(i) Free and fair competition in trade and busniess is an intrinsic part of the fundamental right to freedom of trade and business guaranteed by Article 18 of the Constitution; (ii) Codification of common law on injurious falsehood and passing-off actions; (iii) meaning and Scope of Section 10(2)(a)&(d) of the Competition Act 2010; (iv) Criterion for determining confusing similarity in the use of another's product labeling and packaging: (v) No locus standi of an adjudicatory body to contest for upholding its quasi-judicial decision.''

Summary: ''(i) Free and fair competition in trade and busniess is an intrinsic part of the fundamental right to freedom of trade and business guaranteed by Article 18 of the Constitution; (ii) Codification of common law on injurious falsehood and passing-off actions; (iii) meaning and Scope of Section 10(2)(a)&(d) of the Competition Act 2010; (iv) Criterion for determining confusing similarity in the use of another's product labeling and packaging: (v) No locus standi of an adjudicatory body to contest for upholding its quasi-judicial decision.'' --- Background:The case revolves around the allegations by K&N?s Foods (Pvt) Limited (?K&N?s Foods?) against A. Rahim Foods (Pvt) Limited (?Rahim Foods?) concerning deceptive marketing practices, particularly the fraudulent use of product labeling, packaging, and a trademark term ?Combo Wings.? The Competition Commission of Pakistan initiated proceedings against Rahim Foods based on these allegations, leading to penalties being imposed for contravention of Section 10 of the Competition Act 2010.----Issues:Whether Rahim Foods? product labeling and packaging misleadingly resembled that of K&N?s, constituting deceptive and fraudulent use under Section 10(2)(d) of the Act.Whether Rahim Foods' use of the term ?Combo Wings? amounted to fraudulent use of another?s trademark under the same section.The applicability of Section 10(2)(a) concerning the distribution of false or misleading information capable of harming another undertaking's business interests.---Court's Analysis:Trademark and Packaging: The Court affirmed the findings of both the Competition Commission and the Appellate Tribunal that Rahim Foods had engaged in deceptive marketing by copying K&N?s product labeling and packaging, which could mislead consumers. This constituted a violation of Section 10(2)(d) of the Competition Act, focusing on the fraudulent use of another?s product labeling or packaging.Use of ?Combo Wings?: Despite the term not being registered as a trademark by K&N?s Foods at the time of the complaint, the overall context demonstrated Rahim Foods' intention to deceive, fitting within the scope of Section 10(2)(d).Distribution of False Information: The Supreme Court agreed with the Tribunal's view that Rahim Foods had not distributed false or misleading information about K&N?s products, hence not violating Section 10(2)(a) of the Act. The deceptive practice was primarily aimed at benefiting from K&N?s established market reputation rather than directly harming it by distributing false information.---Conclusion:The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the Tribunal's decision to impose penalties on Rahim Foods for contravention of Section 10(1) read with Section 10(2)(d) of the Competition Act 2010, while agreeing with the Tribunal's finding that Section 10(2)(a) was not applicable. The case underscores the importance of honesty, fairness, and transparency in marketing practices to ensure fair competition and consumer protection.

Summary: Facts:The petitioner, Tri-Star Industries, has been manufacturing toothbrushes and hairbrushes in Pakistan since 1983, using the trade mark "TRISA" registered in 1985.Tri-Star filed a civil suit in 1997 to restrain respondent No.1, TRISA Burstenfabrik AG, from using the "TRISA" trademark, securing an injunctive order in 1999.Respondent No.1 applied for a similar trademark in 1997, which was advertised in 2000. The petitioner sought an extension to file opposition, which was granted by the Registrar of Trademarks, condoning a 108-day delay.Respondent No.1 challenged this decision, leading to the High Court setting aside the Registrar's decision, prompting this appeal.Issue: Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the Registrar of Trademarks' decision to grant an extension to the petitioner for filing opposition against the trademark registration by respondent No.1.---Holding: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the High Court's judgment.---Reasoning:The Supreme Court found no fault with the High Court's judgment, noting that the Registrar of Trademarks must not grant extensions in a mechanical manner without proper justification.The Court emphasized that the law and rules must be followed as prescribed, and any deviations from the prescribed procedures are not permissible.The Court highlighted that the Registrar's power to grant extensions is not automatic and must be exercised with due consideration and within the bounds of the law.The petitioner's failure to provide justifiable reasons for the extension and the Registrar's decision to condone the delay without proper consideration were deemed improper.Conclusion: The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, finding that the Registrar of Trademarks had erred in granting an extension to the petitioner without sufficient justification, and thus the appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.---- (1) Section 15 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 and Rule 30 & 76 of Revised Trade Marks Rules 1963. (2) The word ?satisfied? requires mental persuasion with existence of reasonable ground. (3) The Registrar T.M cannot extend time for filing opposition without following the prescribed procedure. (4) If a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner.

Summary: The appellant, Shezan Services (Private) Limited, filed the appeal against Shezan Bakers & Confectioners (Private) Limited and another.The dispute revolved around the registration of the trade mark "Shezan" by the respondent. The appellant, who held various trade marks including "Shezan," opposed the registration, claiming ownership and prior use of the mark. The appellant argued that the respondent's registration violated the Trade Marks Act, 1940, and the Revised Trade Mark Rules, 1963. The case involved the interpretation of an agreement dated 19 February 1975 between the parties' alleged predecessors. The agreement granted certain rights to the respondent to use the "Shezan" name within the territorial limits of Lahore Division for their businesses. The Registrar of Trade Marks and the High Court relied on this agreement to dismiss the appellant's opposition and allow the respondent's registration. The appellant contended that the agreement did not permit the registration of the trade mark by the respondent and that the goodwill associated with the "Shezan" mark belonged to them. They argued that subsequent registration of a similar mark violated the Trade Marks Act. During the hearing, the Supreme Court considered the relevant provisions of the Trade Marks Act and the Agreement. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine the issues related to the agreement's interpretation, the ownership of the trade mark, and the legality of the respondent's registration. Appeal was allowed, judgement was set aside. Application of the respondent was dismissed.

Summary: The case revolves around the registered trademark "Ranchers," jointly owned by the petitioner, Muhammad Multazom Roza, and respondent No.1, Muhammad Ayub Khan. The trademark was registered under the Trade Mark Ordinance 2001 in Pakistan. The petitioner and respondent No.1 had formed a partnership firm called Zakori International, which operated successful brands like "Mr. COD" and "Ranchers" in the country. The Intellectual Property Tribunal, in its order dated 11.03.2020, returned the petitioner's plaint under Order VII Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). The tribunal concluded that since respondent No.2 had not physically used the trademark in the course of trade, the suit was not maintainable under section 46(1) and (2) of the Trade Mark Ordinance 2001. The tribunal also stated that the dispute between the co-owners of a trademark could not be agitated before the tribunal.The petitioner appealed the tribunal's decision before the Islamabad High Court. The court, through its judgment dated 26.02.2021, dismissed the petitioner's appeal, affirming the tribunal's decision. The court held that the acts complained of by the petitioner fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal, as prescribed by the Intellectual Property Organisation at Pakistan Act, 2012 (IPO Act 2012). The case highlights the significance of intellectual property protection for businesses operating in Pakistan. By registering trademarks and enforcing their rights, businesses can safeguard their brand identities and prevent unauthorised use. It is essential for businesses to understand the legal framework surrounding intellectual property laws and seek legal remedies in case of infringement or passing off. Petition was converted into an appeal, and the same was allowed. The impugned judgment was set-aside and the case was remanded back to the tribunal.

Summary: Civil Procedure Code CPC (Order VII R.11), TRADE MARK By moving an application under order VII rule 11 a litigant does not surrender to the jurisdiction of the Court. The jurisdiction is conferred by law based on facts. A litigant may be right or wrong in asserting that the Court had no jurisdiction or that the suit is barred by law. But, this act of litigant would neither confer and/or bestow nor take away any jurisdiction which in fact is conferred by law. Actions of parties prior to litigation leads to constitution of a cause to initiate proceedings in Court of competent jurisdiction.- If the two applications were not moved simultaneously and would have been filed one after the other, will a litigant still be debarred from filing the other application such as Order VII Rule 10 CPC.A simple answer to this proposition is No as rejection of plaint has its own reasons whereas return of plaint has its own. In an application under order VII rule 11 a litigant has only to show that it does not disclose a cause of action; the relief claimed is undervalued or is not properly valued and that the suit appears to be barred by law. None of these rational is available while entertaining an application under order VII rule 10 CPC, which is for return of plaint on numerous counts including but not limited to pecuniary jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction. Courts when plaint is presented are required to see whether they are bestowed with pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction whereas under Order VII Rule 11 CPC Courts are required to see whether it is barred by law. The Court had to apply law to decide the issue of jurisdiction; it is the law that confers or takes away the jurisdiction of the Court and not based on moving of application under the aforesaid provision of law. Another proposition is that while entertaining and hearing application under order VII rule 11 CPC Court is empowered to return the plaint if the circumstances so warrants as required under the law.-Section 86(3) of the Trademark Ordinance, 2001 provides that owner of the trademark which is entitled to protection under the Paris Convention as a well-known trademark shall be entitled to restrain by injunction the use in Pakistan of a trademark which, or the essential part of which, is identical or deceptively similar to the well-known trademark in relation to identical or similar goods or services, where the use is likely to cause confusion or where such use cause dilution of the distinctive quality of the well-known trademark.- At the very outset there is nothing in the instant case which could attract Section 81 of Trademark Ordinance, 2001. The proprietor of the mark never gave up their right or it has not been demonstrated that for continuous period of five years from the date of alleged registration (in favour of user) in the use of registered mark in Pakistan, the proprietor was aware of it and that the proprietor ceased to be entitled on the basis of that earlier trademark or other rights. The engagement of the appellant with the respondent itself is enough to understand that there was no case of acquiescence at all. In fact the appellant conceded when they assumed the role of a distributor.-The appellate Court normally avoid interfering in the orders of the interlocutory nature involving exercise of discretion as the appellate Court cannot substitute its own discretion unless when the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely or where the Court has ignored certain principles regulating grant or refusal of injunction. The appellate Court is not required to reassess the material to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the trial Court/learned Single Judge on the consideration that another view is possible.

Summary: Dilawar Khan challenged the jurisdiction of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) to register FIRs under the Copyright Ordinance, 1962, and sought a writ of prohibition against them. His counsel argued that all matters related to offences under the Copyright Ordinance should be addressed under the Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012 (IPO-Pakistan Act), citing precedents such as Director General, FIA v. Kamran Iqbal, and others (2016 SCMR 447), Syed Mushahid Shah v. Federal Investigating Agency (2017 SCMR 1218), and others to support their position. The Court considered the nature of intellectual property, emphasizing the importance of protecting copyright and related rights for national culture and international economic cooperation. It noted that the IPO-Pakistan Act is a special law, with exclusive jurisdiction conferred upon the Intellectual Property Organization to handle copyright-related matters. Additionally, the Court highlighted the absence of rules for enforcing the IPO-Pakistan Act, drawing parallels with legal precedents such as Orissa State Pollution Board v. Orient Paper Mills (AIR 2003 SC 1966) to support its interpretation. Regarding the jurisdiction of the FIA, the Court analyzed the Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974, and emphasized the importance of purposive construction to determine legislative intent. Drawing on legal precedents like Director General, FIA v. Kamran Iqbal (2016 SCMR 447) and Shahbaz-ud-Din Chaudhry v. Director, FIA (1999 YLR 678), the Court concluded that the FIA's jurisdiction extends to offences related to matters concerning the Federal Government, including those under the Copyright Ordinance. Furthermore, the Court referenced recent judgments, including Oxford University Press v. Inayat-ur-Rahman, to affirm the FIA's jurisdiction in copyright infringement cases. It underscored the Federal Government's responsibility to uphold international commitments and address challenges in intellectual property rights enforcement. The Court's ruling emphasized that copyright, being a federal subject, falls within the purview of the Federal Government's authority, thus validating the FIA's jurisdiction in such matters.

Summary: (a) Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962)-------S. 45---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 37---Petitioner sought direction to the FederalGovernment to constitute Copyright Board as required under S. 45 of the CopyrightOrdinance, 1962 in order to safeguard his right of appeal against the order passed byRegistrar of Copyrights---Validity---Right of appeal, when provided under the law, was asubstantive right and denial of such substantive right was against the dictates of Art. 37(d) ofthe Constitution which mandated that the State would ensure provision of inexpensive andexpeditious justice to the people---Appeal was not merely a formality but a substantive toolof re-examination of a higher pedestal to either rectify and correct any probable error orapplication of law in the orders passed by the lower forum or to endorse the same being rightand thus further enhance its credibility---High Court directed the Federal Government to takeup the matter regarding appointment of the Chairman of the Copyright Board on prioritybasis---Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.Presson-Descon International (Private) Limited and others v. Joint Registrar of CompaniesPLD 2020 Lah. 869 = 2020 CLD 1128 ref.Ghulam Qadir and others v. Sh. Abdul Wadood and others PLD 2016 SC 712 and OvexTechnologies (Private) Limited v. PCM PK (Private) Limited and others PLD 2020 Isl. 52rel.(b) Constitution of Pakistan-------Art. 4--- Right of individuals to be dealt with in accordance with law---Scope---Everycitizen of the country has a right of access to justice and dispensation of justice in a timelyfashion---Every citizen had an inalienable right to enjoy protection of law and to be treated inaccordance with law and no action detrimental to the life, liberty, body reputation or propertyof any person shall be taken except in accordance with law.Watan Party and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2011 SC 997 rel.(c) Constitution of Pakistan-------Art. 5---Loyalty to State and obedience to Constitution and law---Scope---Obedience tothe Constitution and law is inviolable and it is the duty of the State to obey the laws.

Summary: The case involved a dispute between the petitioner and Respondent No. 2, Ms. Zeeshan Zia Raja, who were previously married and jointly established "American Lycetuff (Pvt) Limited" under the Companies Ordinance, 1984. They are equal shareholders of the company, but their marriage ended in 2017 through Khula. Disputes over movable and immovable properties, including intellectual properties of the company, emerged post-divorce. The petitioner alleged that Respondent No. 2 conducted the company's affairs illegally and fraudulently, contrary to the Memorandum and Articles of Association, thereby excluding the petitioner from the company's management. The petitioner claimed that the Respondent No. 2's actions are detrimental to the business and the petitioner's rights. On the other hand, the Committee of Directors (Respondent No. 3) contends that it was constituted with mutual consent through a Director's Agreement. They assert that the committee has effectively managed the company's affairs, and its decisions are being complied with by both parties. The legal dispute primarily revolved around Section 286 of the Companies Act, which outlines the requirements for seeking intervention from the court regarding the conduct of a company's affairs. The court examined whether the company's affairs are being conducted unlawfully, fraudulently, oppressively, or prejudicially to any member or creditor. The court cited several legal precedents from Pakistan, such as Dr. Muhammad Imran Qureshi vs. Muhammad Asif and others (2020 CLD 1060 (Sindh)) and Malik Aziz ul Haq vs. Crystal Line Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. (2016 CLD 970), to emphasize the criteria for invoking Section 286. These cases underscored the importance of demonstrating unfair prejudice or oppression against minority shareholders and mismanagement by majority shareholders. Additionally, the court compared the statutory provisions in the UK and India related to protection against oppression and mismanagement in companies. Ultimately, the court dismissed the petitioner's claims, noting the absence of substantial evidence to prove unlawful conduct by Respondent No. 2 and the Committee of Directors. The court highlighted the petitioner's failure to satisfy the requirements under Section 286 of the Companies Act and concluded that the petition lacks merit.