Summary: (a) Inheritance Law – Right of Heirs ----Inheritance rights in the estate of a deceased Muslim----Constructive possession----Limitation Act, 1908----Scope. The estate of a Muslim, upon his death, devolves upon his legal heirs by operation of law. Each heir retains constructive possession of their share in the estate until partition or lawful transfer. If an heir is deprived of their share in an inheritance mutation, the cause of action arises when they seek their share and it is denied. However, where third-party rights have been created in the inherited property, the limitation period becomes applicable, requiring the claimant heir to establish fraud or ignorance of their rights to invoke an exception under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Cited Cases: Mohammad Boota (decd) v. Mst. Fatima (2023 SCMR 1901) Mst. Parveen (decd) v. Muhammad Pervaiz (2022 SCMR 64) Noor Din (decd) v. Pervaiz Akhtar (2023 SCMR 1928) Ghulam Qasim v. Mst. Razia Begum (PLD 2021 SC 812) Tahsinullah v. Mst. Parveen (decd) (2022 SCMR 346) Lal Din v. Muhammad Ibrahim (1993 SCMR 710) Bashir Ahmad Anjum v. Muhammad Raffique (2021 SCMR 772) Nazir Ahmad v. Abdullah (1997 SCMR 281) (b) Limitation Act, 1908 ----S. 18----Effect of fraud in inheritance disputes----Exceptions to limitation period----Scope. Under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908, a claimant heir alleging fraud must demonstrate that they were kept from knowledge of their right to sue due to fraudulent concealment. The limitation period begins from the date the fraud first became known to the “injuriously affected person.” However, if the affected heir does not initiate legal proceedings within the prescribed limitation period upon discovering the fraud, no fresh period of limitation is available to their legal successors. Cited Case: Mst. Rabia Gula v. Muhammad Janan (2022 SCMR 1009) (c) Limitation in Cases of Third-Party Rights in Inherited Property ----Applicability of limitation where third-party interests have been created----Doctrine of actual vs. constructive denial----Scope. A distinction is made between: (i) cases where an heir is deprived of their rightful share in inheritance at the time of mutation; and (ii) cases where third-party rights have been created in the inherited property. In the former, the limitation period starts when the heir is denied their share. In the latter, where land has been sold to third parties, the limitation period applies, barring claims after its expiration. In the present case, transactions affecting the disputed property took place decades ago, with sales occurring in 1994 and 1997, barring the claimants from seeking redress under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Cited Cases: Haji Muhammad Yunis v. Mst. Farukh Sultan (2022 SCMR 1282) Salamat Ali v. Muhammad Din (PLD 2022 SC 353) (d) Civil Procedure – Obligation of Courts to Consider Limitation ----S. 3, Limitation Act, 1908----Duty of courts to dismiss time-barred claims regardless of whether limitation is pleaded as a defense----Scope. Courts are bound to dismiss suits, appeals, and applications filed beyond the prescribed limitation period, even if the issue of limitation is not raised by the parties. The appellants’ claim, filed in 2007, was time-barred given that transactions creating third-party interests took place as early as 1994 and 1997. Disposition Appeal dismissed. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the appellants’ claim was barred by limitation. The Court reaffirmed that where concurrent findings of fact and law exist, it will not interfere unless exceptional circumstances warrant intervention, which were absent in this case.

Summary: ''Discussion: (1) Dishonest investigation (2) Section 166, 375, 376 & 511 P.P.C. (3) Role of I.O. (4) Section 4 (l) Cr.P.C. read with Rule 25.2 of the Police Rules, 1934 (5) Section 22 of the Anti-Rape (Investigation and Trial) Act, 2021 (6) Rule 2 (v) of the Sindh Police (E & D) Rules, 1988 (7) Article 4 & 155 of Police Order 2002.'' --- Facts: The petitioner, a Sub-Inspector in the Investigation Wing of Police Station Mominabad, District West, Karachi, was assigned to investigate a rape case involving a minor victim. The petitioner was alleged to have improperly reduced the charge from rape to attempted rape despite substantial evidence confirming the rape, including medical reports and eyewitness accounts. This led to the issuance of a show cause notice, and subsequently, the petitioner was dismissed from service. The departmental appeal and subsequent appeal to the Sindh Service Tribunal were both dismissed.----Issue: The main issue was whether the disciplinary action taken against the petitioner, including his dismissal from service for allegedly converting a rape charge to an attempted rape charge in the investigation, was justified.----Holding: The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the petitioner was justified based on the overwhelming evidence indicating misconduct in the investigation. The court found no illegality or perversity in the judgment of the Sindh Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his dismissal.----Reasoning: The court emphasized the crucial role of an Investigation Officer in the criminal justice system and the need for conducting investigations with integrity, impartiality, and in accordance with the law. Given the clear medical evidence and eyewitness accounts establishing the commission of rape, the court found no justification for the petitioner's decision to alter the charge. The court also highlighted the importance of discipline and integrity in the police force and upheld the disciplinary action as being conducted in compliance with due process.----Disposition: The Civil Petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused, thereby upholding the disciplinary action against the petitioner, including his dismissal from service. The court's findings were limited to the disciplinary action and did not affect ongoing proceedings related to the original FIR in the rape case, which was to be decided on its own merits and in accordance with the law.

Summary: Background: The petitioners, the Secretary of School Education, Government of Punjab, challenged the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, which had granted the respondents (Graduate Primary Teachers appointed in 1995) a "selection grade" based on their claim that they were entitled to financial benefits due to their long-term service. The respondents were regularized in 2004 and sought the selection grade, which they claimed was due under Rule 8(3) of the Punjab Civil Servants Pay Revision Rules, 1977, and a notification issued in 1983. ----Issues: 1- Whether the respondents, as Graduate Primary Teachers, were entitled to a selection grade based on Rule 8(3) of the Punjab Civil Servants Pay Revision Rules, 1977, and the 1983 notification. 2- Whether the Punjab Service Tribunal was correct in granting the selection grade despite no specific policy covering Graduate Primary Teachers. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, overturning the decision of the Punjab Service Tribunal. The Court held that: --No Entitlement to Selection Grade: The respondents could not prove any government policy entitling Graduate Primary Teachers to a selection grade. Rule 8(3) of the 1977 Rules applied only when a higher pay scale had been sanctioned for a class of posts, which was not the case for Graduate Primary Teachers. The 1983 notification also did not include their post for the purposes of selection grade. --Role of Policy in Granting Selection Grade: The Court clarified that the grant of a selection grade is not a right under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, nor under the relevant service rules. It is within the executive's discretion to formulate such a policy, and no tribunal or court can compel the government to create such a policy. Since no policy covered Graduate Primary Teachers for selection grade, the tribunal overstepped by granting it. --Withdrawn Policy & Retrospective Regularization: Even if the policy had included Graduate Primary Teachers, the respondents were not regularized during its enforcement. Therefore, they could not claim retrospective benefits from a withdrawn policy. The Tribunal was wrong in granting selection grade based on a withdrawn policy that never applied to the respondents' post. As a result, the petitions were converted into appeals, and the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal. ----Citations/Precedents: Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974. Punjab Civil Servants Pay Revision Rules, 1977.

Summary: Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)--- ----S. 7---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 54---Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, The New York Convention), Art. V(2)---Suit for declaration and injunction---Foreign award, enforcement of---Violation of public policy---Effect---Plaintiff company was award-debtor, and resisted enforcement of foreign award on the plea that it was in violation of public policy issued by State Bank of Pakistan---Validity---If plaintiff company (award-debtor) had any objections to recognition and enforcement of the award, it could raise the same in Enforcement Suit and suit of plaintiff company (award-debtor) seeking declaration and permanent injunctions of the award was not maintainable in light of Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 and New York Convention---Question relating to maintainability of "Suit for Declaration and Permanent Injunction" was a question of law and had to be dealt with first before delineating questions of merits of the case---Legal challenge to the award raised by plaintiff company, including in terms of Art. V (2) of New York Convention, had to be in separate proceedings, and not under award-creditor's suit---Plaintiff company, did not submit on factual plane and avoided touching upon merits of the case and taking steps that could later prejudice his defence in other suit---Plaintiff company strategically saved his attack on the award under Art. V of New York Convention to plead in defendant's (award-creditor's) suit---Defendant (award-creditor) also did not commit himself and face its consequences in other suit seeking the recognition and enforcement of award---Parties did not draw themselves into any discussion about whether the award was contrary to public policy, or what constituted "public policy" under Art. V of New York Convention---Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in the Award as there was no violation of the grounds enshrined under Article V (2) of New York Convention---Suit filed by plaintiff company was not maintainable under Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011---Suit was dismissed, in circumstances. Abdullah v. Messrs CNAN Group SPA through Chief Executive/Managing Director and another PLD 2014 Sindh 349 rel. Auteurs Acteurs Associes v. Hemdale Film Corporation (XVI YCA 543 (1991); Lanifico Mario Zegna SpA v. Emernegildo Zegna Corporation and another (XXXI YCA 798 (2006)); Mary D. Slaney v. International Amateur Athletic Federation (244 F.3D 580 (2001), XXVI YCA 1091 (2001); Agricultural Workers Union v. The Registrar of Trade Unions 1997 SCMR 66, 81; Vikrant Tyres Ltd. and another v. Techno Export Foreign Trade Company Ltd., ILR 2005 Kar 4738; Jindal Drugs Ltd. v. Noy Vallesina Engineering SpA and others, 2002 (3) BOMCR 554; 2008 SCC Online Bom 1694 ; Goldcrest Exports v. Swissgen N.V. and another, 2005 (4) BOMCR 225; Bulk Trading SA v. Dalmia Cement (Bharat Ltd), 2006 (1) ARBLR 38 Delhi ; Hindustan Petroleum Cor. Ltd. v. M/s Videocon Ltd. and others, 2012 (3) ARBLR194 (Delhi)(MANU/DE/3196/2012) and Shriram EPC Limited v. Rioglass Solar SA, Civil Appeal No.9515 of 2018 (arising out of SLP (Civil) No.13913 of 2018) ref. Abdul Ahad, Ammar Suria and Ms. Hareem Godil for Plaintiff. Jahanzeb Awan and Rashid Khan Mehar for Defendant. Date of hearing: 20th September, 2023.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Background: The Lahore Tax Bar Association filed a writ petition challenging the appointment of the Chairman of the Appellate Tribunal, Inland Revenue (ATIR), the constitutionality of Section 130 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, as amended, and the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (Appointment of Chairperson and Members) Rules, 2020. ----Issues: 1- Whether the ATIR is a Judicial Tribunal and thus subject to specific guidelines and rules for appointments. 2- The constitutionality of delegating appointment powers to the Prime Minister. 3- The legality of appointing members on a contract basis against sanctioned posts. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The petition was allowed to the extent of declaring the Appointment Rules of 2020 as ultra vires and illegal. Appointments under these rules were deemed illegal, but incumbents were allowed to continue until regular appointments were made. ---Judicial Tribunal Status: The ATIR was confirmed as a Judicial Tribunal, and thus appointments should adhere to the guidelines set forth in the judgments of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, specifically in Sh. Riaz-ul-Haq and other relevant cases. ---Appointment Rules and Delegation of Powers: The Attorney General's office acknowledged that executive powers, including appointments, should vest with the Federal Government (Cabinet) rather than the Prime Minister alone. This was in line with the Mustafa Impex case, which invalidated unilateral decisions by the Prime Minister without Cabinet approval. Consequently, the phrase "Prime Minister" in Section 130 of the Ordinance was read down to mean "Federal Government." ---Contract Appointments: The Supreme Court's decisions in various cases, such as Nemat Ullah and Pakistan Railways v. Sajid Hussain, consistently held that appointments to sanctioned posts on a contract basis are illegal. Appointments must be made through a transparent, competitive process, ensuring merit and open competition. ---De Facto Doctrine: To maintain continuity, the de facto doctrine was invoked, allowing current members and the Chairman, appointed under the now-invalid rules, to continue their service until regular appointments were made. ---Transparency and Merit in Appointments: The judgment emphasized the need for appointments to be made transparently and competitively, particularly in judicial and quasi-judicial bodies like the ATIR, which play a crucial role in economic stability and tax collection. he Appointment Rules of 2020 were declared ultra vires and without lawful authority. The Members and Chairman currently serving under these rules were allowed to continue until regular appointments were made within a specified timeframe. The Federal Government was directed to frame new rules within thirty days and complete the appointment process within forty-five days thereafter. -----Citations/Precedents: Mustafa Impex Case (PLD 2016 SC 808): Affirmed that executive authority vests with the Federal Government (Cabinet), not the Prime Minister alone. Sh. Riaz-ul-Haq and another v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2013 SC 501): Set guidelines for appointments in judicial tribunals. Nemat Ullah and others v Chairman Governing Body, Worker Welfare Board (2016 SCMR 1299): Declared contract appointments to permanent posts illegal. Pakistan Railways v. Sajid Hussain (2020 SCMR 1664): Reinforced the requirement for transparent, merit-based appointments. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Sher Aman (2022 SCMR 406): Highlighted the need for transparent recruitment processes for permanent posts.

Summary: In a democracy General Elections cannot be delayed or derailed after announcement of Election Programme --- The High Court had declared the delimitation order of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) void and directed the ECP to notify the final delimitation for certain constituencies.The Supreme Court, led by Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, acknowledged the vital role of elections in a constitutional democracy, emphasizing their importance in upholding democratic principles and public trust. The court considered the significance of timely elections and the potential consequences of delaying or prolonging legal disputes related to elections.The central question before the court was whether to proceed with adjudicating the controversy over constituency delimitation or defer the matter until after the general elections. The Balochistan High Court's order had created a situation where the ECP had not yet notified the final delimitation as directed by the court.The Supreme Court expressed concern about the timing of the High Court's order, considering that the ECP had already announced the Election Programme for the General Elections in 2024. The court highlighted the established principle that general elections are fundamental to representative governance, and their timely conduct takes precedence over issues related to constituency delimitation.In applying the principle of proportionality, the court concluded that the constitutional importance of holding general elections outweighed the need to re-examine constituency delimitation at that juncture. The court expressed the view that intervening in the delimitation matter at that stage would disrupt the electoral timeline and potentially undermine democracy.As a result, the Supreme Court suspended the operation of the Balochistan High Court's order, granting leave to appeal to consider the justification of the High Court's judicial intervention in the ECP's delimitation order. The court directed the ECP to organize and conduct the elections in the two constituencies based on the final delimitation notified on November 30, 2023, and in accordance with the Election Programme announced on December 15, 2023.The court decided to defer the resolution of the delimitation controversy until after the General Elections in 2024, with the case scheduled for hearing at that time.

Summary: The Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) had decided against NTDC, which was affirmed by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue. However, for the tax year 2015 (subject matter of ITR No.72345 of 2023), the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) took a different stance, ruling in favor of NTDC.The Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) found that the Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue (ADCIR) was unjustified in charging minimum tax on turnover not related to NTDC but being offered for tax by distribution companies. This decision was based on the argument that minimum tax under Section 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, cannot be charged twice on the same turnover. The Appellate Tribunal, however, dismissed NTDC's appeal and upheld the Department's appeal based on similar grounds.The judgment outlines several legal questions arising from the controversy, including the applicability of precedent from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, justification for overruling the appellate order, misinterpretation of NTDC's business activities, and the repugnancy of the demanded amount to Section 113(2)(b).The core issue revolves around whether NTDC, as a special purpose vehicle with a transmission license from NEPRA, is primarily engaged in transmission business or involved in the sale and purchase of electricity. The judge emphasizes the need to consider the entire structure of electricity regulation and concludes that NTDC's activities are confined to transmission, as specified in its license. The judgment further notes that the department failed to establish NTDC's engagement in the sale of electricity, and documents, including a NEPRA decision, support NTDC's exclusive role in transmission business.The judgement discusses the role and functions of the National Transmission and Despatch Company (NTDC) in the context of the power sector. The key points include NTDC's responsibility to intimate Distribution Companies (DISCOs) about the generation part of the transfer charge during a billing period, deductions from the transfer charge for Use of System Charges, and the generation of power-electricity sales bills. The document highlights the organizational restructuring plan for NTDC, leading to the establishment of the Central Power Purchasing Agency (CPPA-G) and the Agreement made between CPPA-G and DISCOs for power procurement and transmission.The decision emphasizes the continuity of functions between CPPA-G and its predecessor, CPPA of NTDC, and disputes the claim that a new restructuring plan changed NTDC's role. It delves into the Power Procurement Agency Agreement, Commercial Code, and Market Settlement System, outlining the functions, responsibilities, and obligations of CPPA-G in power procurement, billing, and settlement.The legal analysis addresses the contention that NTDC engages in the sale of electric power, emphasizing its role as an agent for settlement rather than a seller. The decision also interprets relevant sections of the NEPRA Act and SRO 541(I)/2015, providing the statutory framework for NTDC's functions.Ultimately, the decision concludes in favor of NTDC, stating that it does not engage in the sale of electric power and dismissing the tax claims made by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR).

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending