Summary: Challenge has been laid to the pre-refund audit proceedings and the consequent show-cause notice dated 09.06.2023 issued by the respondent-FBR, with the averments that the same be declared illegal, unlawful and violative of the provisions of Section 10 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 ("the Act"). Prayer has also been made that respondent No.3 be directed to refund the excess amount of input tax paid by the petitioner amounting to Rs.2,214,825,246/-. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner pays input tax applicable at 17% whereas the output tax is charged, on the goods (fertilizers), at the reduced rate of 2% by virtue of Eighth Schedule to the Act and hence, the petitioner is entitled to the above referred amount of tax refund for the period of January, 2021 to June, 2022; however, the refund claims remained pending for payment with the respondent-FBR despite timely filing of the same along with the requisite documents and timeframe envisaged under Section 10 of the Act has not been adhered to by the respondent-FBR. The following legal questions arise out of the factual layout of the case and call for the opinion of this Court: i) What is the scope of Section 10 of the Act and whether the elapse of time stipulated thereunder ipso facto renders the refund claim admissible and due? ii) What are the consequences of delay in deciding the refund claim? iii) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case and the scope of Section 10 of the Act, the present petition having been filed against a show-cause notice issued, premised on pre-refund audit proceedings against the petitioner, is maintainable? Held: This Court is of the opinion that; i) Section 10 of the Act is not a self-containing and self-executory provision rather the admissibility of the tax refund claim is required to be determined in a case where there is reason to believe that the refund claim is not admissible; ii) the respondent-FBR and its officials cannot sit over the rights of the taxpayers in relation to the tax refund claims for indefinite period and must conclude the pre-refund audit proceedings by strictly following the mandate of Section 10(3) of the Act; iii) in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case and the scope of first proviso to Section 10(1) of the Act, the present petition is misconceived and pre-mature inasmuch as the impugned show-cause notice issued by the department has been premised on the pre-refund audit proceedings and no adverse order has been passed against the petitioner; iv) the respondent-FBR is directed to proceed with the present matter, strictly in accordance with law, keeping in view the mandate of Section 10(3) of the Act and if in the instant case, there has been no approval obtained from the Board for the conclusion of pre-audit proceedings within nine (09) months, ex-post facto approval must be obtained, before proceeding further; v) Section 67 of the Act is only applicable and the additional amount is payable to the taxpayer when the refund is held due and is not made within the time specified in Section 10 of the Act but the said provision is to be applicable after the investigation of the claim, or so much of the claim as, is accepted and for the said purpose mandate of Section 10(3) is to be strictly adhered to; and vi) non-adherence by the respondent-FBR to the time-limit envisaged under Section 10(3) of the Act in concluding the refund claims amounts to concomitant violation of the fundamental rights of the tax-payers guaranteed under Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution. No consequences of such non-adherence have been envisaged under the Act. This aspect of the matter is a policy issue and requires legislation, which is for the Federal Government to examine on priority basis. Therefore, the Federal Government is directed to consider the possibility of initiating necessary legislation on the subject by providing the consequences of non-adherence to the provision of Section 10(3) so that the rights of the tax payers can be safeguarded.

Summary: Challenge has been laid to the appointment of respondent No.4, through impugned notification dated 24.11.2023, as Election Commissioner for holding and conducting election of the Chairman of the Pakistan Cricket Board ("PCB") on the ground that respondent No.4, being a practising advocate, was obligated to get his licence suspended in terms of Rule 108-O of the Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1976 ("the Rules") to obtain his appointment as the Election Commissioner, which was not done, therefore, he cannot hold the said office. Further challenge has been laid to the mandate given to respondent No.4 for composition of the Board of Governors ("BoG") which, as per learned counsel for the petitioner falls within the purview of the functions assigned to the Management Committee in terms of Paragraph 10 of the Constitution of Pakistan Cricket Board ("the PCB Constitution"). Following questions have been put forth for the opinion of this Court: (i) Whether respondent No.4 was lawfully appointed as the Election Commissioner under the PCB Constitution and was required to get his license to practice law suspended before or after his appointment? (ii) Whether this Court can assume the functions and/or powers of a regulator such as the Bar Council in case of failure of respondent No.4 to get his license to practice law suspended? (iii) Whether the task assigned to respondent No.4 for the composition of the BoG violates the PCB Constitution and the powers of the Management Committee? The first two questions formulated hereinabove are inter-linked. It has been noted that the qualifications of a person to be appointed as Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court of Pakistan, as the case may be, has been made basis for the qualification to be appointed as the Election Commissioner. Perusal of the relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 renders it succinctly clear that practice as an advocate for 10 years, inter alia, is condition precedent, in case of an advocate, to be qualified to be elevated as Judge of a High Court in terms of Article 193, whereas Article 177 of the Constitution envisages that a person who, inter alia, has an experience of 15 years as practicing lawyer is eligible to be appointed as Judge of the Supreme Court. This Court is of the opinion that it is the existence of these qualifications which are required to become Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, and the suspension of the license to practice law would ipso facto eat away the eligibility to become the Judge of the said Courts and resultantly, eligibility to be appointed as the Election Commissioner, under the PCB Constitution. Therefore, the said interpretation as pleaded by the petitioner, will not only defeat the eligibility criteria envisaged under Paragraph 29 of the PCB Constitution but by its very nature and character, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is self-destructive. Moreover, Rule 108 provides that an advocate shall apply to the Bar Council concerned that his license may be suspended as he intends to join some other business, service, profession or vocation. Proceedings on account of the misconduct is the power of the Bar Council concerned in terms of the provisions of the Act, 1973. When confronted, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that this Court is empowered to take cognizance of such misconduct. The argument is misconceived. Once it is abundantly clear that it is the Bar Council concerned that has been armed with the power to entertain and determine cases of misconduct, the constitutional jurisdiction cannot be exercised in a manner which amounts to usurpation and transgression into jurisdiction of the Regulators (i.e., Bar Council concerned). Furthermore, perusal of Paragraph 10 of the PCB Constitution amply reveals that all the members of the BoG except the Chairman are either ex-officio members and/or to be appointed from the service organization or department and/or by the Patron, as the case may be, and the Management Committee and/or the Election Commissioner has no direct role in it to play. However, the composition of the BoG is not complete till the election of the Chairman is held. Once the Chairman has been elected, only then the composition of the BoG becomes complete. Thus, the primary task assigned to respondent No.4 as the Election Commissioner by using the words "composition of BoG and the conduct of free and fair election of Chairman, PCB" clearly refers to the conduct of free and fair election of the Chairman of the PCB to complete the composition of the BoG.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Writ Petition No. 68498 of 2022, heard on 15th December, 2023. Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 561-A, 22-A & 154---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 489-F---Inherent powers of High Court under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C.---Scope---Powers of Ex-officio Justice of Peace---Order passed by Ex-officio Justice of Peace for the registration of FIR under S.489-F, P.P.C---Petitioner assailed order passed by Ex-officio Justice of Peace and sought quashing of the same---Petitioner borrowed Rs. 400,000/- from complainant and issued post-dated cheque for its repayment, but it was dishonoured upon presentation due to insufficient funds---Petitioner neither disputed his signature on the cheque nor that it was drawn on his account---Section 154, Cr.P.C., mandated the officer in charge of a police station to register FIR when informed about the commission of a cognizable offence---Officer in charge of a police station could not determine the veracity of the information/allegations at such stage---Application under S.22-A, Cr.P.C., submitted by complainant prima facie indicated the commission of a cognizable offence---Therefore, the SHO must proceed under S.154, Cr.P.C. and investigate the various aspects of the case---Impugned order did not require interference by the Court---Petition had no merit and was accordingly dismissed. Muhammad Waqas Mirza for Petitioner. Ms.Khalida Parveen, Additional Advocate General with Muhammad Mansha/ASI for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Rana Waqar Ahmad Khan for Respondent No. 3. Date of hearing: 15th December, 2023. Judgment Tariq Saleem Sheikh, J .--- Respondent No. 3 filed an application under section 22-A of the Cr.P.C. with the Ex-officio Justice of Peace, Kamoke, stating that Tariq Mehmood (Petitioner herein) was a close friend. On 02.02.2022, the Petitioner borrowed Rs. 400,000/- from him and issued Cheque No. 57628358 post-dated 04.07.2022 for its repayment, but it was dishonoured upon presentation due to insufficient funds. Respondent No. 3 alleged that the Petitioner had dishonestly given him a bad cheque and had thereby committed a cognizable offence under section 489-F, P.P.C. He prayed that a direction be issued to the Respondent SHO to register an FIR against him. The Ex-officio Justice of Peace accepted his application vide order dated 31.10.2022 (the "Impugned Order"). The Petitioner has assailed that order before this Court through this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. 2. Mr. Muhammad Waqas Mirza, Advocate, submits that Cheque No.57628358 on the basis of which Respondent No.3 seeks to get a criminal case registered against the Petitioner is a "self-cheque," i.e. a cheque issued by the account holder to "himself". He contends that criminal liability under section 489-F, P.P.C. cannot arise for such a cheque because it does not meet the essential elements of the offence. 3. On merits, Mr. Mirza contends that the Petitioner manufactures leather gloves, and the sister of Respondent No.3, Gul-e-Hina, invested money with him on a profit-and-loss basis. According to him, the Petitioner gave her Cheque Nos. 57628356 and 57628358 for comfort. However, he suffered huge losses due to the Covid-19 pandemic and eventually closed his business. Gul-e-Hina passed over Cheque No.57628358 to Respondent No.3, who concocted a false story and filed an application under section 22-A, Cr.P.C. for registration of FIR as aforesaid and procured the Impugned Order. Mr. Mirza contends that he never obtained any loan from Respondent No.3. 4. Ms. Khalida Parveen, Additional Advocate General, has vehemently opposed this petition. She argues that Cheque No. 57628358 is payable to "self or bearer." The Petitioner's claim that section 489-F P.P.C. does not apply to such instruments is based on a misconception. 5. Rana Waqar Ahmad Khan, Advocate, has supported the Assistant Advocate General, adding that the application of Respondent No.3 under section 22-A of the Cr.P.C. discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. Hence, the Ex-officio Justice of Peace was justified in directing the registration of an FIR. Mr. Khan contends that the defence plea is unfounded, as the Petitioner issued Cheque No. 57628358 to settle a debt with Respondent No. 3. He points out that conflicting claims exist, and the truth can only be determined through an investigation initiated after the registration of the FIR. This Court cannot adjudicate on the correctness of either plea in the current proceedings. 6. Heard. Respondent No.3 seeks to prosecute the Petitioner under section 489-F, P.P.C. which provides: 489-F. Dishonestly issuing a cheque. - Whoever dishonestly issues a cheque towards repayment of a loan or fulfillment of an obligation which is dishonoured on presentation, shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both, unless he can establish, for which the burden of proof shall rest on him, that he had made arrangements with his bank to ensure that the cheque would be honoured and that the bank was at fault in not honouring the cheque. 7. The purpose of enacting section 489-F, P.P.C. was to foster confidence in the banking system and trustworthiness in conducting business through cheques. This provision was designed to proactively deter individuals from engaging in dishonest practices - specifically, drawing cheques without sufficient funds in their bank accounts, thereby inducing the payee to act upon the transaction with a false sense of security. 8. The canons for the interpretation of penal statutes are well settled. In Mirza Shaukat Baig and others v. Shahid Jamil and others (PLD 2005 SC 530), the Supreme Court of Pakistan held: "(1) All penal statutes are to be construed strictly, that is to say, the court must see that the thing charged as an offence is within the plain meaning of the words used and must not strain the words on any notion that there has been a slip, that there has been a casus omisus, that the thing is so clearly within the mischief that it must have been intended to be included and would have been included if thought of. On the other hand, the person charged has a right to say that the thing charged, although within the words, is not within the spirit of the enactment. But where the thing is brought within the words and within the spirit there a penal enactment is to be construed like any other instrument according to the fair common sense meaning of the language used, and the court is not to find or make any doubt or ambiguity to the language of a penal statute, where such doubt or ambiguity would clearly not be found or made in the same language in any other instruments. "(2) Criminal enactments are not to be extended by construction. When an offence against the law is alleged, and when the court has to consider whether that alleged offence falls within the language of a criminal statute, the court must be satisfied, not only that the spirit of the legislative enactment has been violated, but also that the language used by the legislature includes the offence in question, and makes it criminal. "(3) Nothing is to be regarded as within the meaning of the statute which is not within the letter - which is not clearly and intelligibly described in the very words of the statute itself. "(4) Also, in the interpretation of Acts, the elementary rule is to give full and accurate effect to every word used in them. The courts in the exposition of penal statutes, are not to narrow the construction. They are to look at the words in the first instance, and where the words are plain, they are to decide on them. If the words be doubtful, they are then to have recourse to the subject matter, but at all events, it is only a secondary rule. It is not the province of a judge to disregard or go outside the letter of the enactment according to its true construction." 9. Section 489-F, P.P.C. should be interpreted following the principles outlined above. This provision does not apply to every instance of a dishonoured cheque. The foundational elements to constitute the offence are: (i) the cheque was duly issued; (ii) it was issued with dishonest intent; (iii) it was issued towards repayment of a loan or fulfilment of an obligation; and (iv) it was dishonoured on presentation. In Muhammad Sultan v. The State (2010 SCMR 806), the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that "fulfillment of an obligation" is a broad term and is, inter alia, applicable to all lawful agreements and contracts. 10. Section 489-F, P.P.C. is not a strict liability offence, which is evident from the word "dishonestly" used therein. Section 24 of the P.P.C. defines the term "dishonestly" to mean anything done with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another. Whether the issuer/drawer of a cheque has issued it dishonestly is a question of fact that the prosecution must establish in every case. 11. In the present case, Cheque No.57628358 specifies: "Pay Self or bearer". The word "self" is handwritten while "or bearer" is printed. The first question that needs determination is whether criminal proceedings under section 489-F, P.P.C. can be initiated against the issuer of a cheque made out to oneself in the event of dishonour. To answer this query, we must delve into the definition of a cheque. 12. Section 6 of the NIA defines a "cheque" as "a bill of exchange drawn on a specified banker and not expressed to be payable otherwise than on demand." Section 5 of the Act defines "bill of exchange" and explains that a bill of exchange may be drawn in the name of a particular person, or payable to his order or bearer. Section 3(c) of the NIA states, "bearer" means a person who by negotiation comes into possession of a negotiable instrument, which is payable to bearer." Negotiation can be by delivery (section 47) or endorsement (section 48). A cheque payable to the bearer can be negotiated through simple delivery, whereas one payable to order requires endorsement. Thus, a bearer cheque has an independent legal standing and identity and does not depend on any endorsement for its validity. Linking its validity and independent status with any positive endorsement is inappropriate. 13. A review of the above provisions shows that a cheque is a kind of bill of exchange with certain peculiarities. In view of section 5, ibid, where the payee is a fictitious or non-existing person, it may be treated as payable to the bearer. 14. A "self-cheque" has neither been defined by the Pakistan Penal Code nor the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (the "NIA"). Essentially, it refers to a cheque where the drawer is also the payee. 15. Section 489-F, P.P.C. does not stipulate that the cheque must be in the name of a specific individual. It simply requires that the person drawing the cheque does so from his own account, and the purpose should be for loan repayment or fulfilling a legal obligation. If the cheque is made to "self" only, no offence is committed. Firstly, a person cannot dishonestly issue a cheque to pay money to himself, and secondly, a person cannot give a cheque for the payment of a loan or to fulfil an obligation that one has towards oneself. 16. When a cheque is addressed as payable to "self or bearer" (and the word "bearer" is not scored off), any person who qualifies as a "holder in due course" under section 9 of NIA can initiate legal action under section 489-F, P.P.C., provided they satisfy the elements of the offence described in paragraph 9 above. An individual asserting the status of a holder in due course must also substantiate their claim if challenged. 17. Section 118 of the NIA outlines certain presumptions about negotiable instruments, but these do not extend to section 489-F, P.P.C. The latter provision exclusively governs the prosecution of the offence. Significantly, it does not raise any statutory presumption in favour of the holder of a cheque. 18. India has criminalized the dishonour of cheques by inserting section 138 in the Indian Negotiable of Instruments Act, 1881 (the "Indian Act"), which shares some similarities with Pakistan.s section 489-F, P.P.C. The Indian courts have considered the issue of criminal liability of a self-cheque in a catena of cases. In Mahesh Goyal v. S.K. Sharma (1997 Cri.LJ 2868 (P and H)), the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that if other conditions are met, merely because the cheque is addressed to self does not exempt it from the applicability of section 138 of the Indian Act. Once the cheque has been given for valid consideration, the respondent must be considered a holder in due course. The Kerala High Court, in Michael Kuruvilla v. Joseph J Kondody, [1998(2) Andh. LD (Cri) 957) (Ker)], following the judgment of the same Court in A.K. Hameed v. Appakutty (AIR 1969 Ker. 189), and considering the definition of "holder in due course" under section 9 of the Indian Act (analogous to section 9 of the NIA), held that even if the cheque lacks the payee's name, the printed words "or bearer" are struck off, and it is written "pay to cash," it remains a legal and valid negotiable instrument. It must be implied that the direction is to pay to the bearer, and there is no evidence to suggest that the appellant cannot be treated as a holder in due course under section 9 of the Indian Act. With these observations, the learned Judge overturned the trial court's judgment, finding the accused guilty of the offence under section 138 of the Indian Act, and convicted him accordingly. In Intech Net Limited and others v. State and another, (2007 Cri.LJ 216), Andhra High Court held: "Once the issuance of the cheques is admitted and as the words "or bearer" have not been struck off, the complainant is held to be the holder of the said cheques in due course though it was written as self and thus he is entitled to receive the cash and on dishonouring of the said cheques, he can very well file the complaint. The contention of the petitioners that the said cheques was issued in the process of transaction between the first petitioner and the complainant for supply of goods has to be substantiated during the course of trial by the petitioners by leading evidence. Under these circumstances, I see no ground to quash the impugned proceedings at this stage." 19. In Dr. Shreeyansh Rayappa Nandeshwar v. Dr. Prakash Ponde, the Karnataka High Court held: "Having perused the principles laid down in the Judgment, the very contention that there is no endorsement and the self cheque does not attract Section 138 of the [Indian Act], cannot be accepted at this juncture." Further reference can be made to Farhat Hussain Siddiqui v. State of U.P. and another (2010 Cri.LJ 1213), B. Sarvothama v. S.M. Haneef (2013 SCC OnLine Ker 5328), Adigear International v. State (2013 SCC OnLine Del. 4938) and Sarafudheen v, T. Muhammed Ashraf [2016 (3) ILR (Kerala) 645]. 20. While there are similarities between Pakistan's section 489-F, P.P.C. and section 138 of the Indian Act, they differ substantively. As adumbrated, the most crucial distinction is that the vital ingredient of the section 489-F, P.P.C. is the dishonest issuance of a cheque, a requirement that every holder of a cheque, including the bearer of a self-cheque, must establish. 21. In the present case, Cheque No. 57628358 is made payable to "self," and the words "or bearer" remain uncrossed. According to Respondent No.3, the Petitioner handed it over to him in the presence of two witnesses, Muhammad Ashraf and Majid Ali, to repay a loan. Therefore, he was a holder in due course. The cheque was dishonoured due to insufficient funds in the Petitioner's account, and the bank issued a memo. to Respondent No.3 confirming this fact. 22. The Petitioner neither disputes his signature on Cheque No. 57628358 nor that it is drawn on his account. Instead, he challenges its validity by claiming it does not fulfil the requirements of section 5 of the NIA. In view of the law discussed above, this contention is repelled. 23. Section 154, Cr.P.C. mandates the officer in charge of a police station to register an FIR when informed about the commission of a cognizable offence. It is a settled law that he cannot determine the veracity of the information/allegations at that stage. The application under section 22-A, Cr.P.C. submitted by Respondent No.3 prima facie indicates the commission of a cognizable offence. Therefore, the Respondent SHO must proceed under section 154, Cr.P.C. and investigate the various aspects of the case in light of this judgment. 24. The Impugned Order does not require interference by this Court. This petition has no merit and is, therefore, dismissed. JK/T-3/L Petition dismissed.

Summary: Per Qazi Faez Isa, CJ. (a) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act (XVII of 2023)--- ----Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)---Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act'), constitutionality of---Constitutional petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Act---By majority of 10 to 5, the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act')was upheld as being in accordance with the Constitution---Detailed reasons stated. There appears to be nothing unconstitutional, illegal or objectionable in the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act')on a plain reading of its provisions. The measures taken in the Act ensure judicial independence, facilitate access to justice, instill transparency, make the realization of Fundamental Rights more effective, and strengthen the office of the Chief Justice by introducing consultation with the two most senior Judges. The Constitution does not grant to the Chief Justice power to decide cases unilaterally and arbitrarily. The term "Master of the Roster" is not mentioned in the Constitution, in any law or even in the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 ("the Rules"). The word master is offensive in a constitutional dispensation founded on democracy, and servitude negates consultation. History stands witness to the fact that when power is concentrated in an individual, disastrous consequences invariably follow. Irreparable damage is caused to the Judiciary and to the people of Pakistan when the legitimacy, integrity and credibility of the Judiciary is undermined. Mutual respect requires that the Supreme Court should not substitute its own opinion for that of Parliament, no matter how correct it considers it to be. Interventions should be restricted to only when Parliament enacts legislation which is demonstrably unconstitutional. In respect of the Act this has not been demonstrated. Parliament enacted the Act which does not in any manner infringe any of the Fundamental Rights, rather facilitates their enforcement. The Act also grants an appeal to one who is aggrieved by a decision of the Supreme Court which is passed in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. The Act does not in any manner violate the Constitution, it does not undermine the Supreme Court, nor does it compromise the independence of the judiciary. In effect it does the very opposite in ensuring the enforcement of Fundamental Rights, strengthening the Judiciary and creating greater independence therein. For the aforesaid reasons these petitions are dismissed and the constitutionality of the Act is upheld. Per Yahya Afridi, J. (b) Precedent--- ----Supreme Court of Pakistan---Full Court---Members of a Full Court are not to be shackled by precedents---No doubt, the Supreme Court has to draw wisdom from the decisions already rendered, but in no way is a Full Court bound by the principle of stare-decisis---To do so, would defeat the very purpose of convening a Full Court to hear and decide a matter. (c) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act (XVII of 2023)--- ----Ss. 2, 5(1), 5(2) & Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)- --Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act'), constitutionality of---Constitutional petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Act---Maintainability---In essence, the petitioners through these petitions seek to preserve and protect the independence of the judiciary, which undoubtedly, is beyond the realm of their private or individual concerns, and most certainly covers a more general or wider sphere, spanning the entire society and affecting the public at large---Thus, the present petitions do relate to an issue of 'public importance'---Scope of taking cognizance of a matter by the Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution is much wider and can also be invoked, even if there is no infringement of any fundamental right, but what is essential is that the matter raised in the challenge before the Court relates to ensuring that the fundamental rights of the citizens and/or persons, provided under the Constitution, are effectively exercised---Given this aspect of the jurisdiction that can be invoked under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, the present petitions, fulfill both the conditions precedent for invoking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court---Accordingly, objection regarding maintainability of present petitions is repelled. (d) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act (XVII of 2023)--- ----Ss. 2, 5(1), 5(2) & Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 184(3), 191 & Fourth Sched., Part 1, Entry No. 58---Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act'), constitutionality of---Constitutional petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Act---By majority of 10 to 5, the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act') was upheld as being in accordance with the Constitution---However, His Lordship declared that section 5 of the Act had been enacted by Parliament beyond its ordinary legislative power conferred on it under the Constitution; that section 5 of the Act was, therefore, ultra vires the Constitution, and thus of no legal effect---His Lordship also observed that section 2 of the Act had expanded the scope of regulating the practice and procedure of the Court to "every cause, appeal or matter" before the Court, which was rather excessive, therefore, the Federal Government was urged to move Parliament to reconsider section 2 of the Act---Detailed reasons stated. Saying that a law enacted by a competent legislature cannot regulate the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court would amount to shutting our eyes on the plain language of Article 191 of the Constitution, and thereby offending the settled cardinal principles of interpretation of constitutional provisions. The matter of practice and procedure of the Supreme Court is a matter that relates to the Federation, and thus falls within the scope of Entry 58 of the Federal Legislative List in the 4th Schedule to the Constitution. Parliament, therefore, has the legislative competence to enact the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act') on the matter of practice and procedure of the Supreme Court. Admittedly, the Act has essentially dealt with the power of constituting Benches and suo motu invocation of the original jurisdiction of this Court under Article 184 of the Constitution. Earlier, the constitution of Benches of the Supreme Court was decided by the Chief Justice alone, whereas the enabling provisions of the Act have conferred the said authority on a Committee, comprising of the Chief Justice and two next most senior Judges of this Court. What is evident is that these powers have remained in and with the Court, that is, its Judges. No power has been conferred on any outsider to the Court. Despite their lengthy arguments, the counsel for the petitioners and other persons opposing the validity of the Act remained unable to explain, how the Act affects the independence of the judiciary in substituting the Chief Justice with the Committee comprising not only the Chief Justice but also the two next most senior Judges to exercise the administrative powers of constituting Benches and invoking suo motu under the original jurisdiction of the Court. Viewed from another legal perspective, it would be interesting to note that, in essence, the Act makes the process of constituting Benches more democratic, fostering a participatory approach in decision-making. No one can dispute that a decision based on mutual consultation of three Judges, instead of the solitary opinion of one Judge, would enhance transparency and responsibility of the process. The expansive scope of authority vested in the Committee under section 2 of the Act is a cause of concern. As per the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill introduced in the Parliament, the primary aim was to regulate the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution but the compass of section 2 of the Act goes far beyond it, and covers "[e]very cause, appeal or matter" before the Court. This can be regarded as rather excessive. Section 5 of the Act has created a right of appeal against an order passed by the Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. And this right of appeal has been made available, with retrospective effect, to an aggrieved person against whom the order has been made even before the commencement of the Act. By creating the right of appeal against orders passed by the Supreme Court in its existing original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, Parliament has not 'enlarged' the jurisdiction but has in fact created a separate and new appellate jurisdiction, which was not provided for in the Constitution. By no stretch of the imagination can the word 'enlargement', include the 'creation' of a new jurisdiction. With utmost respect for Parliament, I declare that section 5 of the Act has been enacted by Parliament beyond its ordinary legislative power conferred on it under the Constitution; section 5 of the Act is, therefore, ultra vires the Constitution, and thus of no legal effect. Per Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J. (e) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act (XVII of 2023)--- ----S. 5(2) & Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4, 8, 9, 10, 10A, 24, 25 & 184(3)---Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act'), constitutionality of---Constitutional petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Act---By majority of 10 to 5, the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act') was upheld as being in accordance with the Constitution---However, His Lordship declared that the provisions of subsection (2) of section 5 of the Act providing the right of appeal to an aggrieved person against whom an order had been made under clause (3) of Article 184 of the Constitution, prior to the commencement of impugned Act were ultra vires under Article 8 of the Constitution as they offended Articles 9, 10, 10-A, 24 & 25 thereof and were arbitrary and unreasonable---Therefore, they shall be deemed non-est from the day of their promulgation---Detailed reasons stated. I generally concur with the majority judgment to the extent of affirming the constitutionality of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act'); however, my disagreement pertains solely to the retrospective right of appeal as stipulated in section 5(2) of the Act. This dissent is grounded in a conscientious examination of the potential consequences that such a retrospective operation may yield, both legally and practically. Before the Act, there was no right of appeal against the order passed by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the original jurisdiction under clause (3) of Article 184 of the Constitution. But, the aggrieved person could have sought his remedy by invoking the review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 188 of the Constitution. An appeal allows for a comprehensive re-examination of a case, unlike a review that focuses on specific aspects of the original decision. More appropriately, the right of appeal and review are not analogous as an appeal is, the review is not the continuation of the same proceedings. The provision of the right of appeal to an aggrieved person against whom an order has been made under Clause (3) of Article 184 of the Constitution is one of the objects of the enactment of the Act as set out in the preamble thereof. By providing the right of appeal, the legislature has achieved its objective. The conferment of the right of appeal is also in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Quran and the Sunnah. Federation of Pakistan v. Public at Large PLD 1988 SC 202 and Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. The General Public PLD 1989 SC 6 ref. The legislative framework (i.e. the Act) would uphold the principles of fairness, transparency, and justice within our legal system. Now, independent judges, greater in numbers and uninvolved in the original case, have the opportunity to rehear and decide the matter. This not only reaffirms the core values of impartiality but also strengthens the integrity of the legal system by allowing for a fresh perspective when justice may not have been adequately served in the original proceedings. On a plain reading of the language of subsection (2) of section 5 of the Act, it becomes abundantly clear that the legislature's intent is to provide the remedy of appeal against orders passed by the Supreme Court, even predating the enactment or commencement of the Act. The retrospective expansion thereof raises significant apprehensions, as it threatens to disrupt the finality and certainty that has historically been attributed to judicial pronouncements. The notion of granting a right of appeal against earlier decided cases is not to be taken lightly, as it carries profound implications that extend far beyond the immediate legal proceedings. Such a provision, while intended to ensure justice and fairness, can potentially cast a shadow of prejudice over past and closed transactions, as well as the rights and interests that have been secured under the judgments of the Supreme Court. Introducing a retrospective right of appeal now raises a profound concern. This could further compromise the principle of res judicata and jeopardize the stability and predictability of the legal system. It would open a floodgate of litigation and potentially overburden the Supreme Court with the daunting task of reevaluating numerous pre-settled matters or rights which had accrued on account of determinations validly made under the then-existing law. Chief Land Commissioner, Sindh, and others v. Ghulam Hyder Shah and others 1988 SCMR 715 and Badshah Gul Wazir v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary and others 2015 SCMR 43 ref. By applying the settled principles of law, it has been found that the provision of section 5(2) of the impugned Act unequivocally grants a right of retrospective appeal, a remedy that, by its very nature, has the potential to revisit and reopen all past and closed transactions. This aspect of the matter carries significant consequences, particularly the looming specter of injustice and prejudice that could be inflicted upon the parties in whose favour certain personal rights and liabilities have already rightfully been accrued and secured under the judgments or orders of the Supreme Court. The provision of the right of appeal retrospectively by itself is an infringement of fundamental rights which provide that every citizen shall be entitled to equal protection of law and will not be deprived of life or liberty save in accordance with law as provided under Article 9 read with Article 25 of the Constitution. Bhandari v. the Rehabilitation Authority, Lahore and 2 Others PLD 1961 SC 89; Nagina Silk Mill, Lyallpur v. the Income-Tax Officer, A-Ward Lyallpur and others PLD 1963 SC 322; Ahmad Ali Khan v. Muhammad Raza Khan and others 1977 SCMR 12 and Controller General of Accounts, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others v. Abdul Waheed and others 2023 SCMR 111 ref. Since the laws are enacted under a written Constitution and have to conform to the does and don'ts of the Constitution, neither prospective nor retrospective laws can be made to contravene the said prescribed limitations, particularly, the fundamental rights, independence of judiciary or its separation from the executive. In view of the foregoing, it is declared that the provisions of subsection (2) of section 5 of the impugned Act providing the right of appeal to an aggrieved person against whom an order has been made under clause (3) of Article 184 of the Constitution, prior to the commencement of impugned Act are ultra vires under Article 8 of the Constitution as they offend Articles 9, 10, 10-A, 24 & 25 thereof and are arbitrary and unreasonable. Therefore, they shall be deemed non-est from the day of their promulgation. Per Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J. (f) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act (XVII of 2023)--- ----S. 5(2) & Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)---Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023('the Act'), constitutionality of---Constitutional petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Act---By majority of 10 to 5, the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act') was upheld as being in accordance with the Constitution---However, His Lordship declared that the retrospective/retroactive right of appeal conferred under subsection (2) of Section 5 of the Act was ultra vires the Constitution to the extent of the retrospective application thereof---Detailed reasons stated. Though I have advocated and reinforced the majority view with regard to the legitimacy and constitutionality of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act'), but in tandem I have declared the retrospective/retroactive right of appeal conferred under subsection (2) of Section 5 of the Act ultra vires the Constitution to the extent of the retrospective application thereof. The provision of a right of appeal to the Supreme Court through an ordinary act of Parliament is not a unique or novel idea and has, in the past, been supported by various pieces of legislation. Such rights of appeal, or leave to appeal, are in addition to the jurisdiction conferred by Article 185 of the Constitution. The counsel for the petitioners remained unsuccessful in persuading as to how the Act infringes or contravenes the fundamental rights of any person, or how the same is against the public interest. Except to the extent of the right of Intra Court Appeal with retrospective effect, the Act is neither hit by the doctrine of colourable legislation, nor is it ex facie discriminatory or violative of any constitutional provision. The procedural stipulations and the conferral of a right of appeal with prospective effect do not violate any fundamental right, nor do they offend any provision of the Constitution. The Parliament has not curtailed the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by dint of colourable legislation, rather the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been enlarged in the larger public interest by means of the Act. Providing for an appeal with retroactive effect would open a flood gate of cases which will have serious repercussions on already decided cases and would amount to a reversion to the status quo ante (the previously existing state of affairs), with no end in sight. Though some persons may feel aggrieved by the orders or judgments of the Supreme Court rendered prior to the promulgation of the Act, it is equally true that many persons were found to have benefited from the same, and such rights between the litigants or parties, now having been decided one way or the other, cannot be re-agitated at this juncture and the parties cannot now be repositioned in the state of affairs that existed previously or before the effective date of the Act. The moment a decision is final, either for the reason that no appeal was preferred, or an appeal was filed and subsequently dismissed by the Court, or no right of appeal is provided under the relevant legislation, then neither party will be permitted subsequently to challenge such decision in order to relaunch the matter and argue it de novo. No doubt prior to this Act, no right of appeal was provided, but all those persons aggrieved in the past must have availed the right to file a review petition, and if these review petitions have been decided then it is not possible or feasible to provide a right of appeal to them and reagitate the matter again. Every statute which takes hold of or prejudices vested rights assimilated under existing laws, or contrives a new obligation or enforces a new duty, or characterises a new disability in respect of transactions already past and closed is presumed to have no retrospective effect. In other words, a statute is not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment, especially where the statute is to affect vested rights, past and closed transactions, or facts or events that have already occurred and, instead of promoting or advancing the cause of justice, is creating consequential impediments or causing any disadvantage to any of the concerned parties. Moreover, the provisions of a statute cannot be interpreted in a way that would lead to the devastation of rights and liabilities that have accrued by means of past and closed transactions, therefore the right of Intra Court Appeal with retrospective effect as provided under subsection (2) of Section 5 of the Act is against public policy, as well as the doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments; hence to such extent it is declared ultra vires. (g) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Fourth Sched.---Legislative Lists---Entries, interpretation of---Entries in the legislative lists represent fields of legislation which must receive the broadest and most expansive interpretation, and are construed to encompass all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can reasonably be said to be comprehended in them---In case of discord or overlap with other entries, the rule of harmonious construction is applied to reconcile the conflict for giving effect to each of the entries-- -The items mentioned in the list cannot be read in a narrow or restricted sense but rather should be given a wide and liberal interpretation without constricting it with technical considerations, and each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can reasonably be said to be comprehended in it. Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 6 others PLD 1997 SC 582; Government of Sindh through Secretary, Health Department and others v. Dr. Nadeem Rizvi and others 2020 SCMR 1 and Messrs Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2018 SCMR 802 ref. (h) Administration of justice--- ----Excessive use of lawful power is in itself unlawful. Independent Newspapers Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. and another v. Chairman, Fourth Wage Board and Implementation Tribunal for Newspaper Employees, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 2 others 1993 SCMR 1533 ref. (i) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act (XVII of 2023)--- ----S. 3---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)---Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act'), constitutionality of---Constitutional petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Act---Reading down of section 3 of the Act---An important aspect which needs to be addressed and read down is the provision contained under Section 3 of the Act which elucidates that any matter invoking the exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution shall be first placed before the Committee constituted under Section 2 for examination, and if the Committee is of the view that a question of public importance with reference to enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II of the Constitution is involved, it shall constitute a Bench comprising not less than three Judges of the Supreme Court which may also include the members of the Committee, for adjudication of the matter---This is perturbing for the reason that if the Committee administratively decides not to fix a particular matter before the Court because, in their point of view, no question of public importance with reference to the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II of the Constitution is made out, then in that eventuality the matter ends without any further judicial scrutiny or order---Obviously, no appeal lies in Chamber before a single judge in terms of Supreme Court Rules, 1980 on the refusal of Committee to entertain a matter---Therefore, where the Committee refuses to entertain or fix a case, then in such a situation the matter should be fixed before the Court for judicial scrutiny regarding whether any case is made out to exercise the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution; and since the matter is taken up by the Committee on the administrative side, therefore, in case of refusal, the matter may be fixed before any available three-member bench, not including the members of the Committee, on the judicial side. (j) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act (XVII of 2023)--- ----S. 6---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 184(3) & 188---Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O.XXVI---Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act'), constitutionality of---Constitutional petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Act---Change of counsel in review petitions---Under Section 6 of the Act, a right has been accorded to appoint a counsel of choice for filing a review petition, which was not earlier permissible---The right of changing or appointing new counsel of choice to file and pursue the review application/petition shall not be construed as allowing a rehearing of the matter, and the counsel so appointed should not attempt to reargue the whole case, or expect to start from scratch as an opportunity of rehearing to cure or supplant the lacunas, mistakes and/or oversights of the earlier counsel---Mere repetition of old and overruled arguments through a different counsel would be insufficient and impermissible in this regard. (k) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act (XVII of 2023)--- ----Ss. 2 & 3---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)---Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act'), constitutionality of---Constitutional petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Act---Chief Justice of Pakistan---"Master of the Roster"---Changes made after promulgation of the Act---Prior to the promulgation of the Act, the Chief Justice alone was the master of the roster, and without the issuance of the roster of sittings or the constitution of benches by him, no Judge or bench of Judges could embark on or assume any jurisdiction except for the cases assigned by the Chief Justice, however in order to mitigate and clip off the sole discretion of the Chief Justice, the Act was enacted and now, for all intents and purposes, the functions of the master of the roster which vested solely in the Chief Justice have now been assigned and shifted to the collegium comprising the Chief Justice and the two next most senior judges of this Court as the masters of the roster for issuing the roster of sittings and constituting benches after due deliberation. Per Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J.; Qazi Faez Isa, CJ,.Sardar Tariq Masood, Amin-ud-Din Khan, Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Athar Minallah and Musarrat Hilali, JJ. agreeing; Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ., partially agreeing (l) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act (XVII of 2023)--- ----Ss. 2, 3, 4, 5 & Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.142, 184(3), 191, 238 & Fourth Sched., Part 1, Entry Nos. 55 & 58--- Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act'), constitutionality of---Constitutional petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Act---By majority of 10 to 5, the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act') was upheld as being in accordance with the Constitution---Detailed reasons stated. The phrase "subject to law" as used in Article 191 of the Constitution does not mean subject to "substantive law" only. The word "law" includes law in all senses - procedural and substantive; enacted directly on the matter of practice and procedure of the Supreme Court or containing only incidental or ancillary provisions. Winberry v. Salisbury 5 N.J. 240 (1950) ref. The power to deal with the subject of rules regulating its practice and procedure, no doubt, primarily vests in the Supreme Court but this is not exclusive to it. This rule-making power of the Supreme Court is subservient to the superior constituent power and ordinary legislative power of the Legislature. The rules made by the Supreme Court are to hold the field unless changed by the Legislature in the exercise of its constituent power under Article 238 or its legislative power under Article 142 of the Constitution. This is the correct understanding of the phrase "Subject to the Constitution and law" as used in Article 191 of the Constitution. Entry 58 of the Federal Legislative List further establishes the legislative competence of Parliament to make law on the subject of practice and procedure of the Supreme Court. No provision in the Constitution has been pointed that prohibits either expressly or by necessary implication the exercise of legislative power of Parliament on the subject of practice and procedure of the Supreme Court, but rather the specific mention of the phrase "subject to law" in Article 191 of the Constitution suggests otherwise and repels the argument of any implied prohibition that could have possibly been raised if this phrase had not been there. When instead of any such prohibition there is a clear permissibility expressed by using the phrase "subject to law" in Article 191, the subject of the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court squarely falls within the scope of Entry 58 of the Federal Legislative List and with respect to it, Parliament is fully competent to make law in the exercise of its legislative power under Article 142(a) of the Constitution. Therefore, the Parliament has competently enacted the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act')on the subject of practice and procedure of the Supreme Court. Hawkins in Hall v. State 539 So. 2d 1338 (Miss. 1989) ref. Section 5 of the Act also falls within the scope of the subject of regulating the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court, and Parliament has competently enacted it in the exercise of its legislative power under Article 142(a) of the Constitution read with entry 58 of the Federal Legislative List. Even otherwise, if Section 5 of the Act is taken as the one that has conferred a substantive right of appeal on persons aggrieved of an order passed under Article 184(3) and thus enlarged the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the same will then fall within the scope of Entry 55 of the Federal Legislative List. Devolving two of the administrative powers of the office of the Chief Justice (i.e. powers to constitute benches and invoke suo motu original jurisdiction) to the Committee of three Judges, which also includes the Chief Justice, does not in any manner infringe the independence of the judiciary nor does the provision of a right of intra court appeal affect the right of access to justice. His Lordship declared that the doctrine of past and closed transactions is to applied to the acts of constitution of benches and decisions of the cases by those benches during the period of suspension of the operation of the Act; that in order to give effect to the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act to a possible extent, the review petitions filed against orders passed in jurisdiction under Article 184(3) should be treated as appeals, on applications made in this regard, with permission to file additional grounds of challenge and dealt with accordingly under Section 5 of the Act while the review petitions filed in other cases that fall within the category mentioned in Section 4 of the Act may be fixed for hearing before the Benches comprising not less than five Judges of the Court. (m) Separation of powers, doctrine of--- ----Scope---Doctrine of checks and balances---Concomitant with the doctrine of separation of powers is, however, the doctrine of checks and balances---It acknowledges that while each organ operates independently, there should be some mechanism to restrain each organ within the limits of its power and to counteract whenever such limits are exceeded---It is through checks and balances that each organ is empowered to monitor and, if necessary, undo the actions of the others, ensuring that no organ exceeds its constitutional authority---The very strength of the separation of powers is thus dependent on the checks and balances, making no organ absolutely unchecked---Therefore, in essence, the separation of powers and the checks a

Summary: (a) Parks and Horticulture Authority Act (XXXV of 2012): ----Ss. 2(n) & 5 Heritage Park—Preservation of historical and cultural sites—Scope of statutory obligations. Under Section 5 of the Parks and Horticulture Authority Act, 2012, it is the statutory duty of the government and relevant authorities to declare parks and gardens of historical and cultural significance as Heritage Parks. Once declared, these parks must be preserved, conserved, and developed specifically for maintaining their historical essence and flora and fauna. The development of such parks must not compromise their original shape or heritage value under the guise of modernization or commercial development. ----Cited Law: Section 5, Parks and Horticulture Authority Act, 2012 (b) Punjab Special Premises (Preservation) Ordinance, 1985: ----Ss. 2(a), 5 & 6 Special Premises—Scope and protection—Inclusion of appurtenant land and walls—Restrictions on alteration or development. Under Section 2(a) of the Punjab Special Premises (Preservation) Ordinance, 1985, the term Special Premises includes not only the historical buildings but also the land externally appurtenant to them and their outer walls. Sections 5 and 6 of the Ordinance impose strict restrictions on alterations, demolitions, or renovations of such premises without prior approval from the government or a designated committee. Any ongoing or future developments must align with these statutory restrictions and must not alter the original historical shape of the premises. ----Cited Law: Section 2(a), Punjab Special Premises (Preservation) Ordinance, 1985 Section 5, Punjab Special Premises (Preservation) Ordinance, 1985 Section 6, Punjab Special Premises (Preservation) Ordinance, 1985 (c) Public Interest Litigation (PIL): ----Preservation of cultural and historical sites—Judicial oversight—Role of public participation. In public interest litigation concerning historical or cultural sites, the court plays a critical role in ensuring compliance with statutory duties under preservation laws. It is mandatory for authorities to involve public representation and stakeholders, including petitioners, in decision-making processes regarding alterations or developments in such sites. Judicial oversight ensures transparency and adherence to laws aimed at heritage conservation. ----Cited Law: Punjab Special Premises (Preservation) Ordinance, 1985 Parks and Horticulture Authority Act, 2012 (d) Constitutional Duty: ----Protection of cultural heritage—Historical and architectural value—Responsibility of state and statutory authorities. It is the constitutional and statutory duty of the government and relevant authorities to preserve and protect cultural and historical heritage. The rationale behind such preservation lies in safeguarding history, culture, and national identity. Heritage sites inspire and educate future generations while serving as cultural unifiers. (e) Scope of Administrative Control: ----Jurisdictional boundaries of PHA and Archaeology Department—Non-interference with original historical structure. While the Parks and Horticulture Authority (PHA) is responsible for preserving and maintaining flora and fauna in heritage parks, it cannot alter or redevelop historical sites or compromise their original design. Administrative control over such premises is primarily governed by the Punjab Special Premises (Preservation) Ordinance, 1985, which eclipses the general administrative authority of the PHA in such matters. ----Cited Law: Parks and Horticulture Authority Act, 2012 Punjab Special Premises (Preservation) Ordinance, 1985 ----(f) Disposition: The petition was allowed. The authorities were directed to ensure strict compliance with the Punjab Special Premises (Preservation) Ordinance, 1985, and the Parks and Horticulture Authority Act, 2012. Any ongoing projects in Bagh-e-Jinnah must be reviewed by the relevant committee, ensuring no alteration to the original historical design of the park.

Summary: Petitioner challenges delimitation orders in PP 223 and PP 224 of Multan

Summary: Challenges delimitation in Provincial Assembly Constituency of Lower -Dir PK -14

Summary: Summary Pending