Summary: Territorial jurisdiction of high court in Article 199 ---- The main petition challenged the Lahore High Court's order, the petitioners contended that the High Court's order, issued close to the scheduled General Elections on 8 February 2024, would disrupt the election process --- The Supreme Court highlighted that the High Court's order had suspended notifications issued by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) related to the appointment of officers crucial for conducting elections ---- The order pertained to a writ petition challenging the constitutionality of sections 50(1)(b) and 51(1) of the Elections Act, 2017, related to the appointment of District Returning Officers (DRO), Returning Officers (RO), and Assistant Returning Officers (ARO) ---- The Court criticized the High Court's interference in matters falling outside its territorial jurisdiction and emphasized the availability of an alternate remedy under section 55(3) of the Act --- the Court suspended the operation of the impugned order and stayed further proceedings before the High Court. The Election Commission was allowed to proceed with the Election Programme, which had been delayed due to the High Court's order. --- The High Court's order suspended four ECP notifications related to the appointment of officers for election duties, which the ECP and the Federation argued would impede the holding of general elections scheduled for 8 February 2024.Ruling:CMA No. 10613 of 2023: Granted. The application for exemption of certified copy of the impugned order is allowed.Civil Petition No. 4365 of 2023: Leave to appeal is granted. The Supreme Court observed the necessity to consider the impugned order's conflict with constitutional duties and a previous judgment ensuring the holding of elections.CMA No. 10612 of 2023: The operation of the Lahore High Court's order is suspended, and the ECP is directed to issue the Election Programme, allowing the electoral process to proceed.Reasoning:The Supreme Court found the Lahore High Court's order to be in direct conflict with the constitutional mandate for holding elections and the Supreme Court's previous judgment affirming this mandate.The Court noted the absence of challenges to the constitutionality of the contested provisions in past elections and the lack of allegations against appointed officers' conduct.The Court also highlighted the practical difficulties in appointing judicial officers as election officials, referencing correspondence with High Courts and the resultant inability to spare judicial officers due to caseloads.Order:The Supreme Court suspended the Lahore High Court's order, allowed the Election Commission to proceed with issuing the Election Programme, and stayed further proceedings at the High Court.The Court issued notices to respondent No. 1 and the Federation of Pakistan and sought explanations from respondent No. 1 regarding potential contempt of court for obstructing the electoral process.

Summary: Refund Claim --- i) What is the scope of Section 10 of the Act andwhether the elapse of time stipulated thereunder ipsofacto renders the refund claim admissible and due? --- ii) What are the consequences of delay in deciding therefund claim? --- iii) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the caseand the scope of Section 10 of the Act, the presentpetition having been filed against a show-causenotice issued, premised on pre-refund audit --- The court emphasized that tax authorities could not indefinitely delay the processing of refund claims. Instead, they had to adhere to the specified time limits outlined in Section 10(3) of the Act. The court highlighted the absence of consequences for non-compliance with these time limits and recommended legislative action by the Federal Government to address this policy gap --- Applicability of Section 67: The court examined Section 67 of the Sales Tax Act, which provided for additional payment to the taxpayer in case of delayed refunds. It clarified that this provision was applicable only after the investigation of the claim and for the amount determined to be due. The court thus interpreted the conditions under which Section 67 became operative, highlighting its role in compensating taxpayers for delayed refunds.proceedings against the petitioner, is maintainable? --- The court went beyond the specific case at hand and directed the Federal Government to consider enacting legislation to address the consequences of non-compliance with the time limits specified in Section 10(3).

Summary: Petitions challenging the constitutionality of certain amendments to the Supreme Court Practice and Procedure Rules were filed before the Supreme Court. The petitioners contended that the amendments violated fundamental rights and questioned the court's jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. However, the court, in response, pointed out that the petitioners had failed to specify questions of public importance related to fundamental rights and that the conditions for invoking the court's extraordinary jurisdiction were not satisfied.The court noted that the amendments, which became effective as law on April 21, 2023, introduced provisions for the formation of a committee to decide on benches for hearing cases and outlined procedures for cases falling under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.Despite finding no apparent unconstitutionality in the amendments upon initial examination, the court observed that a stay had been granted during the bill stage, and the matter had been extensively argued. The petitioners argued that the independence of the judiciary was at risk. The court delved into the constitutional framework, emphasizing that the Chief Justice does not possess unilateral decision-making power and that the concept of the "Master of the Roster" is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution.The court dismissed the notion of conventions having the force of law and highlighted that, unlike in the UK, conventions in Pakistan are not judicially enforceable. The judgment emphasized the importance of respecting the separation of powers and maintaining a balance between different institutions. The court further argued that the amendments, far from compromising the judiciary's independence, actually strengthened it by ensuring access to justice, transparency, and effective enforcement of fundamental rights.In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the amendments to the Supreme Court Practice and Procedure Rules, finding them in compliance with the Constitution and beneficial for the judiciary and the public. The petitions were dismissed, and the court affirmed the validity of the amendments.

Summary: Tariq Mehmood filed a petition challenging an order issued by an Ex-officio Justice of Peace. The order directed the registration of a First Information Report (FIR) against Tariq Mehmood based on an application filed by Respondent No. 3. According to the respondent, Tariq Mehmood issued a post-dated cheque for Rs. 400,000, which bounced due to insufficient funds, leading to an accusation of a cognizable offense under section 489-F PPC. Tariq Mehmood contested the order, arguing that the cheque was a "self-cheque," exempting it from criminal liability.During the hearing on December 15, 2023, Mr. Muhammad Waqas Mirza, representing the petitioner, argued that the cheque in question was a self-cheque and did not meet the essential elements of the offense under section 489-F PPC. He further contended that the petitioner never obtained a loan from Respondent No. 3. On the other hand, the Additional Advocate General, Ms. Khalida Parveen, and Rana Waqar Ahmad Khan, representing Respondent No. 3, opposed the petition, asserting that the self-cheque does not exempt the petitioner from criminal liability.The judgment delves into the interpretation of section 489-F PPC, emphasizing the need for dishonest intent in issuing a dishonored cheque. It discusses the legal aspects of self-cheques, referring to the Negotiable Instruments Act and relevant case law from India. The court concludes that section 489-F PPC does not apply to a self-cheque made payable to "self" without dishonest intent. The judgment dismisses the petition, upholding the Ex-officio Justice of Peace's order for the registration of an FIR, and directs the police to investigate the matter in accordance with the law.

Summary: Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar's note regarding Supreme Court Practice and Procedure Rule: the Supreme Court of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan had considered the constitutionality of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ("the Act"). The majority, by a vote of 10 to 5, had upheld the Act as consistent with the Constitution, resulting in the dismissal of related petitions. However, a subsequent division within the majority emerged, leading to a split decision on the issue of conferring a retrospective right of appeal. The majority vote of 8 to 7 had deemed the retrospective right of appeal under Section 5(2) of the Act as ultra vires the Constitution, while a separate majority of 9 to 6 had held the prospective right of appeal to be intra vires.Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar, while generally aligning with the majority on the legitimacy of the Act, presented a nuanced perspective by declaring the retrospective right of appeal under Section 5(2) of the Act as ultra vires the Constitution concerning its retrospective application. Justice Mazhar had provided a detailed analysis in support of this position, covering various aspects such as legislative competence, the doctrine of intra vires and ultra vires, retroactive or ex post facto right of appeal, the distinction between Articles 184 and 199 of the Constitution, the doctrine of reading down, change of counsel in review petitions, master of the roster, the effect of the Act on decided cases, and the concept of a full-court hearing.The justice delved into constitutional provisions, emphasizing the importance of reading the Constitution as a whole and interpreting it liberally. The analysis had included references to specific articles, such as Article 141, Article 142, Article 175, and Article 191, highlighting the jurisdiction and powers of the Parliament and the judiciary. The interpretation had also taken into account entries in the Federal Legislative List, particularly Entry No.55 and Entry No.58, which played a crucial role in understanding the legislative competence of the Parliament.Justice Mazhar drew upon legal principles, case law, and comparative analysis with the Constitution of India to substantiate the argument that the Parliament was within its constitutional powers to enact the provisions of the Act. The justice had underscored the need for a broad and liberal interpretation of legislative lists, aiming to encompass ancillary or subsidiary matters within the purview of the enumerated entries. The document discusses the provision of a right of appeal to the Supreme Court through ordinary acts of Parliament, citing examples such as the Competition Act, 2010, and the Elections Act, 2017. It explores the interpretation of Article 191 of the Constitution, focusing on the phrase "subject to" and citing legal precedents like Dada Soap Factory Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax.The summary then distinguishes between procedural and substantive law, referencing Jeremy Bentham and Thomas Holland. It highlights the interdependence of these laws and their roles in legal proceedings and statutory obligations.The legal doctrines of intra vires and ultra vires are introduced, with the petitioners arguing that the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 is ultra vires the Constitution. Legal principles from cases like Baz Muhammad Kakar v. Federation of Pakistan and Lahore Development Authority v. Imrana Tiwana are cited, emphasizing the presumption in favor of constitutionality and the reluctance to declare laws unconstitutional. The court addresses concerns that the Parliament's regulation of the Supreme Court's internal processes could lead to further encroachments on judicial independence. It emphasizes the Supreme Court's role in safeguarding the constitution and asserts that any attempts to compromise judicial independence will be addressed by the court.Regarding the retroactive right of appeal provided by Section 5 of the Act, the court expresses reservations. It argues that allowing appeals with retrospective effect could open the floodgates for re-litigating past cases, disrupting the finality of judgments. The court criticizes the lack of clarity in Section 5, deeming it uncertain and unintelligible. It states that such a broad retroactive right of appeal is against public policy and the doctrine of finality of judgments, declaring it ultra vires to that extent.The court distinguishes between Articles 184 and 199 of the Constitution, emphasizing that direct petitions under Article 184(3) should involve questions of public importance related to the enforcement of fundamental rights. The court criticizes the past misuse of Article 184(3) jurisdiction and highlights the importance of the Act's provision for the right of appeal in the larger public interest and compliance with Article 10A of the Constitution, ensuring due process of law.One significant point raised is the need to read down Section 3 of the Act, which mandates that matters invoking the original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution should be first examined by a Committee. If the Committee decides no question of public importance regarding the enforcement of Fundamental Rights is involved, the matter ends without further judicial scrutiny. The author suggests that in such cases, the matter should be brought before the Court for judicial review.The document also delves into the doctrine of purposive interpretation of statutes, emphasizing that the primary aim of the Courts should be to align their interpretation with the legislative purpose and object. It highlights the need for harmonizing the provisions of the new Act with the pre-existing Rules of the Court.Another point of discussion is the change introduced by Section 6 of the Act, allowing the appointment of a counsel of choice for filing a review petition. The document clarifies that this provision doesn't grant a right to a rehearing of the entire case but is limited to addressing errors in the judgment or order.Lastly, the document addresses the role of the Chief Justice as the master of the roster and the shift to a collegium system under the Act. It argues that the Chief Justice's administrative powers have been transferred to the Committee, making it the new master of the roster. The author references precedents and emphasizes the historical administrative assignment of the Chief Justice as the master of the roster.Precedents mentioned include cases like M/s Habib and Company v. Muslim Commercial Bank, Engineers Study Forum v. Federation of Pakistan, and Shanti Bhushan v. Supreme Court of India. Firstly, it emphasizes the shift in the role of the master of the roster from the Chief Justice to a collegium system, comprising the Chief Justice and the two next most senior judges. This change was enacted to mitigate the sole discretion of the Chief Justice in issuing the roster of sittings and constituting benches.Secondly, the document addresses the temporal effect of the Act on cases decided between its effective date (21.04.2023) and the date of the short order (11.10.2023). The author contends that all cases decided during this period are protected based on legal precedents (Malik Asad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan and Sindh High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan). The conclusiveness of these cases, decided without the involvement of the Committee under Section 2 of the Act, cannot be questioned.Additionally, the document discusses the hearing of the case by a Full Court. The author highlights that even if the law is declared intra vires, allowing for an Intra Court Appeal, the initial eight-member bench lacked the required number of judges for such an appeal. The Chief Justice, therefore, appropriately constituted a Full Court to address the legislative competence and constitutionality of the Act. The author argues that the collective wisdom of all judges, obtained through a Full Court, was crucial in determining the future of the Act. The constitution of a Full Court was deemed more prudent than adopting a phased approach with limited judges on the original side and a larger bench on the appellate side.

Summary: The Lahore High Court civil revision case, dispute was regarding the ownership of a 4-marla property in village 287/JB, tehsil and district Toba Tek Singh. The respondent alleged that the petitioners obtained a verbal mutation in their favor through collusion with revenue officials, while the petitioners contested the suit, leading to a series of legal proceedings.The trial court, in its judgment, dismissed the suit, citing evidence from the tehsildar (DW-2) and patwari (DW-3) that was deemed sufficient to prove the mutation. However, the decision was overturned in civil appeal, and the respondent's suit was decreed. Dissatisfied with this outcome, the petitioners filed a civil revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.The primary contention raised by the petitioners was that the Appellate Court failed to provide issue-wise findings, thereby violating Order XLI, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They also highlighted the pendency of an application for producing further evidence.The respondent's legal team vehemently opposed these contentions, arguing that the Appellate Court's decision contained reasons for setting aside the trial court's judgment and that the objection about Order XLI, Rule 31 was not tenable. They asserted that the respondent's evidence was credible, while the petitioners failed to support their mutation claim.Judge Sultan Tanvir Ahmad, in his analysis, delved into the legal precedents mentioned in the case. He cited the Supreme Court of Pakistan's decision in the case titled "Pakistan Refinery Ltd., Karachi vs. Barrett Hodgson Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. and others" (2019 SCMR 1726). In this case, the Supreme Court examined Order XLI, Rule 31 of the Code and emphasized the importance of indicating the points for determination, reasons for the decision, and the relief granted, especially when significant points of law are involved.Additionally, the judge referred to other Supreme Court cases, namely "Ch. Abdul Kabeer vs. Mian Abdul Wahid and others" (1968 SCMR 464), "Mst. Roshi and others vs. Mst. Fateh and others" (1982 SCMR 542), and "Qadir Bakhsh (deceased) through L.Rs vs. Allah Dewaya and another" (2011 SCMR 1162). These cases emphasized the need for adherence to Order XLI, Rule 31, depending on the nature of the judgment and whether it involves points of fact or law.Judge Sultan Tanvir Ahmad concluded that, upon careful review, the Appellate Court had correctly allowed the respondent's suit. The judge dismissed the revision petition and the application for additional evidence, finding no infirmity in the impugned judgment that warranted interference in revisional jurisdiction.

Summary: Background: The appellant filed a suit for declaration, possession, and perpetual injunction regarding land transferred to her and the respondents after their father's death. The appellant alleged that her name was incorrectly recorded as "Roshan Jan" instead of her real name, "Gulshana Begum," in mutation records. Additionally, the appellant claimed that a fraudulent gift deed was registered by producing a woman named Afsar Jan. The trial court dismissed her suit, and the appellate court concurred, leading to this second appeal. ----Issues: 1- Whether the appellant’s name was incorrectly recorded in the mutation entries. 2- Whether the gift deed dated 15.05.1978 was fraudulent and executed without the appellant’s consent. 3- Whether the trial court and the first appellate court erred in dismissing the appellant’s suit. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Issue 1: The court found that the appellant’s real name, "Gulshana Begum," was incorrectly recorded as "Roshan Jan" and "Afsar Jan" in various mutation records. The evidence supported the appellant’s claim. Issue 2: The court determined that the gift deed was fraudulent. The appellant never executed the deed, and an unknown woman, Afsar Jan, falsely represented herself as the appellant. The trial and appellate courts failed to summon the gift deed to verify its authenticity. Issue 3: Both lower courts misread the evidence and did not consider the appellant’s claims properly. The courts did not appreciate the inconsistency in the mutation records and the fraudulent nature of the gift deed. The court found that the appellant's suit was within the limitation period as the limitation would run from the date of knowledge of the fraudulent act. The appeal was accepted, and the judgments of both lower courts were set aside. The suit of the plaintiff was decreed, annulling the gift deed and mutation. The plaintiff was entitled to her rightful share in her father's legacy, and the revenue authorities were directed to correct her name in the records. ----Citations/Precedents: 2012 SCR 115 2016 SCMR 1417 2010 SCMR 1630 2004 SCMR 1001

Summary: In order to delimit territorial constituencies for upcoming elections to the National Assembly and the Provincial Assembly of the Province, the Election Commission constituted a committee for preparing a draft proposal for the delimitation of the constituencies in question (PP-8 and PP-9) and on publication of draft, the petitioners being the residents and voter members of the constituencies filed their objections to the Election Commission but the objections were discarded by way of order dated 26th November, 2023. The Election Commission is the creation of the "Constitution". Part VIII of the "Constitution" deals with Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commission. Article 218 of the "Constitution" lays down the composition of the Election Commission and its duties prime of which is to hold election to both Houses of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament), Provincial Assemblies and such other public offices as may be specified by law. In the case of WORKERS' PARTY PAKISTAN through Athar Hussain, Advocate, General Secretary and 6 others v. FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and 2 others (PLD 2012 Supreme Court 681) In order to amend, consolidate and unify laws relating to the conduct of elections and matters connected therewith or ancillary thereto, the Elections Act, 2017 was promulgated. The matter in issue since relates to the delimitation of the constituencies, so instead of pondering upon any other aspect, it would be apposite to have a direct recourse to Chapter-III of the "Act", which deals with the subject. Section 17 mandates the Election Commission to delimit territorial constituencies for elections to the National Assembly, each Provincial Assembly and to the local governments in accordance with the provisions of the "Constitution", the "Act", the Rules and the applicable local government law. Section 19 specifies the manner of delimitation of constituencies whereas section 20 lays down the principles of delimitation.

Summary: ----S. 42---Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules, 2009, R. 6---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S. 21---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 18 & 199---Constitutional petition---Right of business and trade---License in perpetuity---Proof---Locus poenitentia, principle of---Applicability---Frequency Allocation Board---Petitioner company was aggrieved of non-renewal of its license of Cable Television Network under MMDS System---Validity---License issued under previous regime was made subject to further renewal and conditions under new law---Claim of petitioner to have a license in perpetuity was falsified---License having expiry could not be termed as license in perpetuity unless there were specific conditions outlined in license agreement or under prevailing law---New Frequency Board under section 42 of Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996, was established, which had undertaken the work of Pakistan Wireless Board established in consonance with Telegraph Act, 1885---License is merely privilege, and it does not mean that licensee acquired any vested right in the subject matter---No one can claim vested rights on ground of locus poenitentia as such legislature/authority which can pass an order, is entitled to vary, amend, add to or to rescind that order---License issued by Government is not in perpetuity, neither licenses can be deemed as license coupled with interest---In enactments revocation grounds are always available---Right to license for any trade or business is always subject to restrictions and qualification, if any, governed by law---Petitioner could approach Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority under R. 6 of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules, 2009 by filing application, for grant of MMDS license to operate broadcast media or distribution service as the case may be, and also approach the Frequency Allocation Board (FAB) for allocation of frequency---High Court directed Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority that if such applications were filed the same were to be decided in accordance with law at an early date, however, not later than 100 days as provided under R. 9 of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules, 2009---High Court restrained the Authority from taking any adverse action till decision on such application if filed by petitioner---Constitutional petition was dismissed accordingly. Pak Telecom Mobile Limited v. Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, Islamabad PLD 2014 SC 478; Pakistan and another v. FECTO Belarus Tractors Limited PLD 2002 SC 208; Messrs Army Welfare Sugar Mills Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1992 SCMR 1652; Danish Kaneria v. Pakistan and others 2012 CLC 389; M.A. Kareem Iqbal v. Presiding Officer, Banking Court No.III and others 2003 CLD 1447; MY Electronics v. Government of Pakistan and others 1998 SCMR 1404; Abdul Rasheed v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1962 SC 42; Nabi Ahmed and another v. Home Secretary and others PLD 1969 SC 599; Mian Rafiuddin v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others PLD 1971 SC 252; Federation of Pakistan v. Mirza M. Irfan Baig and others 1992 SCMR 2430; Landirenzo Pakisan (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2013 MLD 601; Coated by Lord Woolf MR in R v. North and East Devon (200) 3 ALL. ER 850. 877; Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) and others v. Southern Networks Limited, Karachi 2023 SCMR 1348; Malik Asad Ali and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1998 SC 161 and Mag Entertainment (Pvt.) Ltd v. Independent Newspapers Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. 2018 SCMR 1807 ref. Pakistan v. Salahuddin and others PLD 1991 SC 546 rel. Abbas Leghari and Nadeem Ahmed for the Petitioner. Badar Alam for Respondent No.2. Kashif Hanif, Sarmad Ali, Zafar Iqbal Arain and Ms. Shaista Perveen for Respondent No.3 (PEMRA). Salar Khan for Respondent No.4 (Frequency Allocation Board) Ali Akbar Sehto, Deputy Director Law PTA. Khaleeq Ahmed, D.A.G. Date of hearing: 14th December, 2023.

Summary: Summary pending