Summary: Plaintiffs prayed for a restraining order, which is a form of equitable and discretionary relief that is to be invoked in the aid of justice and not to aid injustice and favor one party over another. If we do not grant relief, then the subject matter of the suit, which is essentially a family dispute, may well become complicated and potentially frustrate the decree, if any. While a case for stay is made out, which is allowed however the trial court correctly dismissed the Receiver's appointment because receivership is the harshest remedy in civil law

Summary: The Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) had filed a petition against an ad-interim ex-parte order of the Peshawar High Court that had suspended the ECP's notification changing the returning officer for a constituency. The ECP asserted that the change was made on medical grounds and at the returning officer's request, supported by a medical certificate. The respondents did not provide a satisfactory explanation for challenging the change. Due to the court order, the scrutiny of nomination papers scheduled for December 28, 2023, could not take place, affecting the election process.The ECP, represented by Mr. Afnan Karim Kundi, explained that the scrutiny delay was a result of the respondents' legal action. They proposed a revised schedule for the scrutiny process. The court acknowledged the ECP's justifiable reasons for the change and expressed concern over the High Court's ad-interim ex-parte order without the ECP's notice or hearing. The court set aside the order, converting the petition into an appeal, and dismissed the writ petition in the Peshawar High Court.However, recognizing the impact on the scrutiny schedule, the court directed the ECP to undertake the scrutiny of nomination papers, including those of the respondents, based on the provided fresh schedule. The petition was converted into an appeal and allowed accordingly.

Summary: Facts:Muhammad Shafi (Respondent No.1), now represented by his legal heirs, filed a suit in 1993 for specific performance.The suit was decreed against the petitioners' predecessor and others, a decision upheld in subsequent appeals.The petitioners, successors of Malik Ali Akbar, filed an application under Section 12(2) of the CPC in 2016, alleging fraud and misrepresentation.The High Court dismissed this application along with an application for condonation of delay.The petitioners claimed they were unaware of the litigation until 2013 due to wrong address.----Issues:Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the application under Section 12(2) CPC.Whether the petitioners' lack of knowledge of the proceedings constitutes grounds for reopening the case.----Judgment:The Court observed that the previous litigation had reached finality, with judgments and decrees executed.It found the petitioners' plea of wrong address and lack of knowledge unpersuasive, given the extensive legal history and execution of decrees.The Court reiterated that allegations of fraud or misrepresentation must be substantiated and that mere lack of knowledge isn't sufficient grounds for reopening a case.The Court referenced precedents stating that while investigating fraud allegations, the Court isn't obliged to follow the full procedure of a suit.Consequently, the Court declined leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.Disposition:The Civil Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan.---Significance:This case emphasizes the high threshold for reopening cases based on allegations of fraud or misrepresentation, particularly when previous litigation has reached finality. It highlights the importance of substantiating such allegations and the discretionary power of the Court in handling such matters.

Summary: Background: The petitioners, managing and production heads of a pharmaceutical company, filed a Shariat Miscellaneous Application seeking to make submissions for hearing three Shariat Miscellaneous Applications filed previously. These applications aimed to set aside orders passed by the Lahore High Court and the Chairman Drug Court, Gujranwala, with a direction to summon a prosecution witness whose name existed in the calendar of witnesses. The petitioners argued that under Islamic justice, all prosecution evidence must be presented to the court. ----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioners' miscellaneous applications are maintainable under Article 203D of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. 2- Whether the relief sought by the petitioners, pertaining to procedural matters in criminal trials, falls within the jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Federal Shariat Court dismissed the petition for the following reasons: --Non-Conformity with Article 203D: The petitioners' miscellaneous applications did not conform to the requirements of Article 203D, which mandates the examination of laws for repugnancy to Islamic injunctions. The applications sought relief in personam, which is beyond the jurisdiction of the court as defined by Article 203D. --Lack of Specific Impugned Law: The petitioners failed to identify any specific law or provision of law that is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. The court emphasized that its mandate is to assess laws against the touchstone of the Holy Quran and Sunnah, which was not demonstrated in this case. --Precedent and Legal Context: The court referred to its previous judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 17/L of 2005, emphasizing that the prosecution must present all evidence to the court. However, the relief sought by the petitioners, related to procedural directives for summoning witnesses, did not pertain to a law being repugnant to Islamic injunctions. --Jurisdictional Limits: The relief sought involved setting aside specific court orders and directing the conduct of a criminal trial, which is outside the jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court as defined by Article 203D. Such matters are procedural and do not implicate the constitutionality or Islamic conformity of a law. -----Citations/Precedents: Article 203D of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 Criminal Appeal No. 17/L of 2005 MUHAMMAD WASEEM alias KALU vs. THE STATE Decided on 19th November 2005 Reported as 2006 PCr.LJ 364 The court concluded that the petitioners' applications were misconceived and not maintainable under the jurisdictional scope of the Federal Shariat Court, leading to their dismissal.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199(1)(a)(i) & (ii)---Supervisory jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Climate justice----Writ of mandamus for enforcement of climate justice---Judicial review---Scope---Elimination of climate chaos and enforcement of climate justice by the Water and Environment Commission appointed by High Court to compel implementation of actions taken for water reservation and environmental issues in Punjab particularly in Lahore---High Court exercised its ssupervisory jurisdiction with strong commitment of environmental protection and sustainable development by way of proactive measures and enforcement of strict regulations---Substantial and practical steps had been taken to control air pollution and to preserve groundwater---During the winter season those steps largely contributed to lowering Air Quality Index at different places in Lahore and thereby smog was controlled which had initially assumed dangerous proportions---This was an illustration of judicial review in action, and enforcement of climate justice---These actions were beyond mere judgments which adorn law journals and fail to address in actual terms, the climate chaos, which surrounds the inhabitants---In essence, it was a case of continuing mandamus or supervisory jurisdiction where orders of High Court were enforced by a Commission set up to compel implementation---Departments in turn, came back with reports of compliance and further orders were issued for complete climate justice and to protect fundamental rights of persons---Unique tool was employed by High Court which had yielded substantial results and same would not have been possible without the selfless and untiring efforts of the members of the Commission, who had devoted their energies to the monumental task---Counsel of different Departments and Regulatory Authorities had also come on board as friends of the Court and environment to lend a hand in the enterprise---Constitutional petition was adjourned for further proceedings, accordingly. Mrs. Hina Hafeez Ullah Ishaq, Sayed Kamal Ali Haider and Ch. Zulfiqar Ali, Members Judicial Commission. Faiz Ullah Khan Niazi, for counsel for the Petitioner. M. Azhar Siddique, Talaat Farooq Sh. and M. Yasin Hatif, for the Petitioners (in connected petitions) Shazib Masood, for counsel for CBD. Sahibzada Muzaffar Ali and Abdul Hanan, for Lahore Development Authority. Haris Azmat and Maryam Hayat Advocates for respondent-PHA. Mian Irfan Akram and Mohsin Mumtaz, for WASA. Dilnawaz Ahmad Cheema, Mian Ejaz Latif, Rana M. Afzal Razzaq Khan, Ghulam Abbas Haral, Umar Rafiq, Abdul Latif, M. Adeel Ch., Qari Zuhaib ur Rehman Zubairi and Mian M. Waseem, for the Applicants. Asad Ali Bajwa, Deputy Attorney General. Hassan Ejaz Cheema, Assistant Advocate General, M. Nawaz Manik, Director Law, EPA, Touqeer M. Wattoo, Director (Coord.) PDMA, Shahzad Khan, DSP Traffic, Umer Hayat, Law Officer and Ghulam Akhtar, Law Officer. Irfan Sana Ullah Khan Kakar, (in C.M No.74 of 2023). Date of hearing: 29th December, 2023.

Summary: The petitioner is a Hajj Group Operator. For below the par services, it was penalized with refunding each and every Hajj. The appeal has also been dismissed. Hence this writ.

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Petitioner Shehryar Afridi files this Writ from confinement against his father detention of 30 days.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 9, 10, 16, 17, 19 & 184(3) Preventive detention—Fundamental right to liberty—Judicial scrutiny—Scope and limits of executive authority—Constitutional safeguards against arbitrary detention—Principle of proportionality—Rule of law—Government's discretionary power to detain individuals under the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 (MPO) must conform to constitutional principles—Fundamental right to liberty, enshrined in Art. 9 of the Constitution, is inviolable unless restricted by due process—Art. 10 provides safeguards against arbitrary detention, ensuring detainees are informed of reasons, allowed legal representation, and produced before a magistrate—Preventive detention, as an exception to these rights, must be exercised with extreme caution—Detaining authority must substantiate its subjective satisfaction with sufficient material—Court held that mere suspicion or executive convenience cannot justify curtailment of liberty—Principle of proportionality demands that any restriction on fundamental rights must be the least intrusive means to achieve the objective—Courts have inherent power of judicial review under Art. 184(3) to strike down detention orders issued in contravention of constitutional safeguards—Impugned detention orders were found to be unlawful as no substantive material was presented to justify preventive detention—Petitions allowed, and detention orders set aside. Cited Cases: Pakistan Muslim League (N) v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2007 SC 642) In Re Suo Motu Constitutional Petition (1994 SCMR 1028) Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto v. President of Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 388) Begum Shorish Kashmiri Case (PLD 1969 SC 14) Federation of Pakistan v. Mrs. Amatul Jalil Khawaja (PLD 2003 SC 442)​ (b) Preventive Detention ----West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960—Scope and limitations Preventive detention under Section 3 of the MPO—Judicial review—Requirement of objective satisfaction—Executive's power to detain individuals must be based on tangible and reasonable grounds—Supreme Court and High Courts have repeatedly emphasized that preventive detention cannot be used as a tool against political dissent—Historical misuse of preventive detention laws in Pakistan to suppress political opposition noted—Courts must ensure that detention orders pass the test of reasonableness and necessity—In the absence of verifiable material justifying detention, such orders are liable to be struck down—Court observed that invocation of Section 3 of the MPO against political opponents raises serious concerns regarding abuse of executive authority—Preventive detention should only be exercised in exceptional circumstances where there is clear and immediate danger to public order—Detention orders in the present case failed to meet this threshold and were declared ultra vires the Constitution. Cited Cases: Ghulam Jilani v. Government of West Pakistan (PLD 1967 SC 373) Mir Abdul Baqi Baloch v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 1968 SC 313) Liaquat Ali v. Government of Sindh (PLD 1973 Karachi 78) Haroon Farooq v. Federation of Pakistan (2023 LHC 1450)​ (c) Fundamental Rights—Right to Protest ----Arts. 9, 16, 17, 19—Protest and public order Right to peaceful assembly and protest—State’s obligation to ensure balance between maintaining public order and protecting fundamental rights—Art. 16 guarantees the right to assemble peacefully—Art. 17 ensures the right to form associations and participate in political activities—Art. 19 protects freedom of speech and expression—State action restricting these rights must be proportional and the least restrictive measure available—Court relied on the Faizabad Dharna Case (PLD 2019 SC 318) to reaffirm that the right to protest is a constitutional right that cannot be arbitrarily curtailed—Any restriction must be justified by concrete evidence showing a credible threat to public order—Court found that the detaining authorities in the present case failed to demonstrate such justification—Detention orders were struck down. Cited Cases: Faizabad Dharna Case (PLD 2019 SC 318) Mian Ali Asghar v. Government of Punjab (2020 CLC 157) Pakistan Muslim League (N) v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2007 SC 642)​ (d) Rule of Law—Judicial Review ----Arts. 4, 9, 10, 175—Judicial scrutiny of executive action Judicial review of preventive detention—Principles of natural justice—Burden of proof on detaining authority—Superior courts have repeatedly emphasized that preventive detention cannot be arbitrary or based on political considerations—Detaining authority must present substantive material justifying satisfaction for issuing detention orders—Court reiterated that rule of law requires executive decisions to be subject to judicial scrutiny—Arbitrary detention violates the constitutional guarantee of due process and access to justice under Art. 10A—Court applied strict scrutiny standard and found that the impugned detention orders did not meet constitutional and legal requirements—Orders declared null and void. Cited Cases: Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 324) Munir Hussain Bhatti v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2011 SC 407) Pakistan Muslim League (N) v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2007 SC 642)​ (e) Separation of Powers—Executive Overreach ----Arts. 90, 99—Delegation of power to executive authorities Limits on executive discretion—Scope of delegation of powers—Court observed that the delegation of detention powers under the MPO from provincial governments to district magistrates lacks constitutional validity—Excessive delegation of power to lower executive functionaries raises concerns about abuse—Court held that provincial and federal governments must establish clear guidelines to ensure that preventive detention is exercised in accordance with constitutional safeguards—Failure to do so results in executive overreach, warranting judicial intervention—Detention orders passed by district authorities were deemed unconstitutional and set aside. Cited Cases: Lahore Development Authority v. Imrana Tiwana (2015 SCMR 1739) Federation of Pakistan v. Mustafa Impex (2016 SCMR 447)​ Disposition Petitions allowed—Impugned detention orders set aside—Government directed to ensure that preventive detention laws are not used as instruments of political suppression—Court emphasized that all future detention orders under the MPO must be based on concrete and verifiable evidence—State authorities instructed to respect constitutional rights while ensuring public order.

Summary: Acquittal granted ---- Issue(s):The propriety of framing charges under the ATA of 1997 against the petitioner.Whether the evidence presented and the procedure followed in the case justified the charges and subsequent conviction of the petitioner.-----Holding: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments of both the Trial Court and the High Court.----Reasoning:----Defective Charges: The Supreme Court found the charges framed against Shahid to be vague and lacking specificity regarding the alleged offenses under the ATA of 1997. The Court noted the importance of framing precise charges to inform the accused of the nature of allegations and to focus the trial on relevant evidence.----Insufficient Evidence: The Court observed that the evidence and the FIR did not substantiate the charges against Shahid, specifically under Section 11-H of the ATA of 1997, which deals with fundraising for terrorism. The FIR and subsequent investigations failed to concretely link Shahid to the collection of funds with the intention or knowledge that they would be used for terrorism.----Procedural Flaws: The Court highlighted procedural irregularities, such as the failure to document the spy's information in writing and the lack of forensic analysis of the alleged signatures of Shahid in the donation book. These flaws cast doubt on the reliability of the evidence against Shahid.----Quality of Evidence: The Supreme Court emphasized the need for high-quality evidence in cases involving serious offenses like terrorism, which was lacking in Shahid's case. The Court criticized the practice of implicating individuals based on weak or speculative evidence.----Disposition: The convictions and sentences against Zain Shahid were set aside, and he was acquitted of all charges. The Supreme Court ordered his immediate release unless required in another case.---Quote: ''Framing of charge is the foundation of trial; section 221 of Cr.P.C. provides an elaborate procedure for framing of charge; it is the responsibility of the Trial Judge to take all necessary and possible steps to ensure compliance of law with regard to framing of proper and unambiguous charge; if necessary ingredients of the offences with which the accused is charged, are not mentioned in the charge, or it is framed in an incomplete, defective or vague manner, it might mislead the accused, which would be a failure of justice.''