Summary: Art.199 Constitution of Pakistan, 1973.S.3 Arbitration Act, 1940.Principle of Laches---Contractual Obligations cannot be enforced through writ petition.

Summary: (a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940) ----S. 20---Arbitration agreement---Enforcement---Disputes under Joint Venture and Shareholders Agreement (JVA)---Civil suits were filed invoking Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, for resolution of disputes arising from the JVA, which governed the investment and management of two private limited companies---Clause-24 of the JVA provided for disputes to first be resolved through mediation and, if unresolved, to be referred to arbitration conducted by two arbitrators, one being a retired High Court Judge and the other a Chartered Accountant---The arbitration clause was admitted by both parties, and they consented to the appointment of Mr. Justice (R) Sair Ali and Mr. Rashid Ibrahim (Chartered Accountant) as arbitrators---Court directed the arbitrators to appoint an Umpire within 15 days and to proceed with arbitration under the Act---Civil suits were allowed to the extent of arbitration proceedings. (b) Contract Law---Mediation and Arbitration Clauses ----Joint Venture and Shareholders Agreement (JVA)---Validity of arbitration clause---Parties bound by their agreement---Arbitration clause upheld by the court, ensuring resolution of disputes in accordance with agreed terms---Appointment of arbitrators by mutual consent reinforced the validity and enforceability of the JVA's dispute resolution mechanism. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----Order XXXIX, Rules 1 & 2---Interim relief---Principles---Application for suspension of a discharge notice and restraining orders on board meetings and capital expenditure---Court declined interim relief, noting that the relief sought was directly related to the main dispute in the suit, which was to be resolved through arbitration---Applicants failed to establish irreparable loss or balance of convenience in their favor---Interim relief application dismissed.

Summary: The appellant questioned the order dated 02.06.2014 passed by the trial court, which had issued status quo in a suit for declaration, permanent injunction, and recovery of damages.The appellant was a multinational company engaged in manufacturing and bottling aerated waters and beverages. They awarded a construction contract to the respondent for setting up a plant in Multan. However, the respondent allegedly failed to fulfill its contractual obligations, leading to the termination of the contract. The appellant filed applications under sections 20 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, seeking arbitration and an injunction to restrain the respondent from en-cashing bank guarantees. Subsequently, the respondent filed a second suit for declaration, permanent injunction, and recovery of damages.During the appeal, the appellant argued that the second suit was not maintainable due to the principles of res judicata and Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as it raised the same cause of action as the earlier proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The respondent countered that the second suit was valid as it was not a full-fledged civil suit, but an application under the Arbitration Act.The court ruled in favor of the appellant, stating that the application under the Arbitration Act should be treated as a suit, and res judicata applies in this case. The court found that the second suit was barred by law, lacked territorial jurisdiction, and should be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the second suit's plaint was rejected.

Summary: Contract Law, Order for blacklist set-aside---The petitioner, a construction company, had entered into a contract with respondent No.2 for a construction and maintenance project. Due to project delays, the contract was rescinded, and the petitioner filed a suit, alleging that respondent No.2 had breached the contract by not releasing mobilization advance. During the legal proceedings, the petitioner was blacklisted by respondent No.2. The petitioner argued that the blacklisting order lacked a prescribed mechanism and procedure under the Punjab Procurement Rules, 2009 (PPRA, 2009) and that it had not consistently failed to provide satisfactory performance in previous contracts. The petitioner contended that its blacklisting was unjust, as it had not been determined by a competent court whether it was in breach of the contract. The court found that PPRA, 2009 required a specified mechanism and manner for blacklisting suppliers and contractors, which had not been provided by respondent No.2. The court also concluded that the order was arbitrary because it applied PPRA, 2014 to the petitioner's case instead of the relevant PPRA, 2009, and it had been issued without a well-reasoned decision. The court ruled in favor of the petitioner and set aside the blacklisting order. However, the judgment emphasized that this decision did not prevent the respondents from implementing a fair and transparent mechanism and manner for blacklisting under the procurement rules in the future.

Summary: Background: The case involves a civil revision challenging orders dated October 3, 2013, and January 13, 2014, by the Civil Judge and the District Judge (West) Islamabad, respectively. These orders vacated an ad-interim injunction granted to the petitioner and dismissed the subsequent appeal. The petitioner, a contractor, was awarded a tender for supplying explosive detectors for the Supreme Court Building. However, concerns were raised by the end-user regarding the functionality and specifications of the equipment supplied. Subsequent meetings led to a decision to seek alternative equipment, and the petitioner was held liable for recovery of a specified amount. The petitioner contested this through a suit seeking declaratory, permanent, and mandatory injunctions, along with an application for interim relief. -----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioner supplied the equipment in accordance with the specifications provided in the Bill of Quantities (BoQ). -----2- Whether the interim relief granted initially should have been vacated. -----3- Whether the petitioner suffered irreparable loss due to the impugned orders. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court dismissed the petition in limine on the following grounds: The petitioner failed to substantiate that the equipment was supplied in line with the specified requirements. The record suggested that upgradation of the equipment could have met the required standards. The supplied equipment was not the only make and model specified in the BoQ; alternatives were also permissible to fulfill the purpose of detecting various types of explosives. The brochure accompanying the supplied equipment specified its capabilities, which required further inquiry through evidence. The warranty period had not expired, and the impugned letter's scope was limited to the specified amount, indicating no irreparable loss to the petitioner.

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- Civil Procedure Code CPC (Order VII R.11)----O. VII, R.11---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.12---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.23---Suit for specific performance---Rejection of plaint---Plaintiff entered into agreement to sell with defendant in respect of property which belonged to his son, who was real owner of the suit property---Validity---Plaintiff's agreement with defendant was without permission of original owner who never consented to the agreement and refused to execute power of attorney in favour of defendant---No privity of contract existed between the plaintiff and the real owner of the suit property---Plaintiff knew that the agreement was dependent upon execution of General Power of Attorney by original owner who was not under any obligation to execute the power of attorney---Defendant had no authority to enter into an agreement to sell in respect of property which did not belong to him---Agreement was, therefore, not for lawful object in terms of S.23 of the Contract Act, 1872 as the same involved injury to the property of another person---Plaintiff had no cause of action---Plaint was rejected.

Summary: Background:Meezan Bank Limited brought a suit under section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001, seeking to recover a debt amounting to Rs. 84,539,865.95. After the death of Defendant No. 3 on August 30, 2011, who had acted as a guarantor, the bank filed an application under Order I, Rule 10, C.P.C., seeking to implead his legal heirs to honor the guarantee he had furnished.-----Issues:1. Whether the personal guarantee furnished by the deceased Defendant No. 3 can bind his legal heirs after his death.2. Whether mentioning the words: binding on successors in interest is sufficient to bind legal heirs?3. Whether the suit against a deceased person can continue by impleading the legal heirs based on a guarantee agreement.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Sindh High Court, presided over by Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar, denied the bank?s application to implead the legal heirs of the deceased guarantor. 1. The court differentiated between a "guarantee" and other forms of securities like "mortgages," emphasizing that a personal guarantee does not typically extend to the guarantor?s heirs unless explicitly stated and agreed upon by the heirs. 2. Mere mentioning of the words in the guarantee that the same "would be binding on successors-in-interests" would have no significance and the legal heirs could not be held responsible unless they agreed to the covenantmade in the guarantee by their predecessors-in-interest in their absence.3. The court clarified that the guarantee was personal and died with the guarantor, further supported by the specific language of the guarantee which did not clearly bind the heirs. Moreover, the court held that a suit cannot initially be filed against a deceased person, and any proceedings in such a manner are null and void without any legal effect. The suit was originally filed without the heirs being part of it, and thus could not be rectified simply by later adding them.----Citations/Precedents:Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Order 1 - Rule 10Contract Act (IX of 1872) - Sections 131, 127 & 1292008 CLD 552 (First Women Bank Ltd. v. Mrs. Afifa Iftikhar and others)2005 SCMR 72 (Rafique Hazguel Masih v. Bank Alfalah Ltd. and others)PLD 2003 Lahore 615 (Malik Bashir Ahmad Khan and another v. Qasim Ali and 12 others)2003 CLD 1788 (Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Indus Lenentose (Pvt) Ltd. and others)

Summary: Art: 199 Constitution of Pakistan, 1973.Contractual obligation, in presence of alternate remedy Writ not maintainable.

Summary: The petitioner argued that respondent No.1 should have auctioned the contract openly and that the extension was granted to respondent No.2 without following legal procedures, possibly for ulterior motives. The petitioner also mentioned approaching the Anti-Corruption Establishment regarding the matter. After hearing the arguments, the court found that the extension of the contract to respondent No.2 without an open auction was illegal and against the principles of fairness and transparency. It cited a Supreme Court case supporting the importance of transparent auction proceedings for public contracts. The court declared the extension and subsequent contract between respondent No.1 and No.2 as null and void and directed the petitioner to deposit a certain amount within a week. If no one bids higher than the petitioner's deposited amount in the re-auction, respondent No.1 shall award the contract to the petitioner. If the petitioner fails to deposit the amount, the re-auction will proceed, and respondent No.2 may secure the contract if no one bids higher than the previously deposited amount.

Summary: Specific Performance of Contract (Transfer of Property)--At one handthe plaintiff claimed that he was and is ready to perform the part of herobligation pursuant to which she had issued notices at the addressprovided by the defendant and on the other hand she failed to depositsuch amount in Court which she was willing to pay her. If the plaintiffcould be exempted from the payment of Rs.1 Million at the requiredtime on account of non-availability of the address or on account of theavoidance for the registration of the sale deed than at least the timewhen she filed suit, she should have come forward and should havedeposited the sum of Rs.1 Million in Court. The fact that she was/isenjoying the possession of the said property, it became all thatimportant for her to discharge this obligation as her first priority, whichshe failed but this non-deposit in Court does not constitute breach ofagreement. The Court is also conscious of the fact that the plaintiff hasnot just made the payment of the token amount, in fact she has paid60% of the total sale consideration against which the possession washanded over to her. This 60% was utilized by defendant.