Summary: S. 34 Arbitration Act, S.42 of Specific Relief Act. Arbitration agreement-Stay of proceedings.Upon termination of agreement, the arbitration clause shall survive and the arbitrator had the power to resolve the dispute. --- Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-------S. 34---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.42---Arbitration agreement---Stay ofproceedings---Suit for declaration and recovery of damages---Defendant filed applicationfor stay of proceedings on the ground that parties had arbitration clause in theiragreement---Application filed by defendant was dismissed by Trial Court----Plea raisedby defendant was that dispute had arisen out of the agreement, therefore, despitetermination of agreement between the parties, matter should be referred to arbitrator---Validity---Plaintiff did not dispute execution of agreement and its arbitration clause---Once, the parties agreed to decide their dispute in a particular manner, then unless anduntil any strong and sufficient reason was shown, parties must surrender themselves to theforum voluntarily chosen by them with their free will and consent---Defendant, being cosignatory with plaintiff to arbitration agreement, had the option to compel plaintiff toabide by arbitration clause before commencement of legal proceedings---Applicationunder section 34 of Arbitration Act, 1940, filed by defendant without taking any step ofparticipating into legal proceedings showed his intention to exercise his option to enforcearbitration agreement---Plaintiff failed to show any sufficient reason as to why the mattershould not be referred to arbitrator---Termination of agreement was a result ofdissatisfaction of defendant and alleged violation of terms and conditions of theagreement, therefore, dispute was outcome of the agreement, which ought to have beendecided by invoking arbitration clause---Intention of parties to include arbitration clause,was to specify the forum to resolve future differences or dispute arising out of theagreement, including its termination---Arbitration clause was an independent agreementbetween the parties which could be invoked, if a dispute or difference had arisen betweenthe parties, therefore, termination of agreement would not supersede it---Irrespective ofnon-existence of agreement, the arbitration clause survived and arbitrator had the powerto resolve the dispute---High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction, set aside theorder passed by Trial Court and application under section 34 of Arbitration Act, 1940,filed by defendant was accepted resultantly proceedings before Trial Court were stayed---Appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan-------Art. 199---Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), S.196--- Constitutional petition---Company---Only competent person can file and initiate legal proceedings---Act of ratification ofpetition can only be availed, if Directors were empowered in the Articles of Association.2005 CLD 1208 ref(b) Constitution of Pakistan-------Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Scope---Contractual obligation---Unclean hands ofpetitioner---Effect---Petitioners having failed to perform their obligations within the stipulatedperiod, had no right to seek any remedy before the High Court with unclean hands. PLD 2009 SC 28 and 2007 SCMR 1318 ref(c) Constitution of Pakistan-------Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Contractual obligation---Arbitration clause mentioned in the contract---Disputed questions of fact---Controversy betweenthe parties hinged upon the pivotal point as to whether the physical work (construction) executedby the petitioners was in accordance with the contract or not---Such question, held, could notbe resolved by High Court in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction under Art.199 of theConstitution, as the court had no mechanism to resolve the question involved---Where thedisputed questions of facts had been raised, particularly when floating as the surface of therecord and arbitration clause was provided in the contract, constitutional petition was notmaintainable, however each case had to be decided on its own peculiar facts and circumstances.(d) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)-------S. 24-A---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---constitutional petition---Contractualobligations not covered by any statute---Benefit of S.24-A of General Clauses Act, 1897 couldnot be extended to the petitioners---Principles.(e) Constitution of Pakistan-------Art. 199---Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), S.196---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Company---Constitutional petition, in the present case, had not been filed bythe petitioner on the basis of the resolution of the company---Effect---When law required a thingto be done in a particular manner, the same must be done accordingly and if prescribedprocedure was not followed, presumption would be that the same had not been legally done---Subsequent resolution of the company authorizing the petitioner to ratify would not resolve theissue as for that matter there should have been some powers vesting in the Directors to ratify thewrong and no such power had been provided in the Memorandum and Articles of the company---Constitutional petition, on such score, was not maintainable. 2005 CLD 1208 ref(f) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-------S. 126---Bank guarantee---Default---Written demand---Notice of default before encashment---Words of guarantee made it clear that the very first written demand constituted the notice ofdefault, meaning thereby that the "notice of default" and "on such written demand" had beenamalgamated into one and there was no need to serve notice separately---Guarantee must followits terms and conditions---Guarantee was an independent and self governing document and onlywords of the same could be considered for its decision without considering agreement or contractfor making any decision on it---Principles.(g) Interpretation of statutes-------Any condition cum provision of law which has no consequence is considered advisory anddirectory but not having any mandatory consequence---Provision which has no mandatory effect,if not complied with, does not vitiate the effect of the act/order for that matter.(h) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-------S. 126---Bank guarantee---Encashment---Scope---Bank guarantee shall be considered for itsencashment along with its conditions---Encashment by Bank in violation of the terms of theguarantee---Effect.PLD 2003 SC 191 ref(i) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-------S.126---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Bank guarantee---Noterms attached to the guarantee and no form of default asserted therein---Once guarantee placedfor encashment cannot be stayed and Bank is bound to encash it and courts are refrained tointerfere in such like matters.(j) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-------S.126---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Bank guarantee---Arbitration clause provided in the contract---Effect---Once such guarantee put for encashmentcannot be stayed and has to be encashed and aggrieved person may challenge the encashment inthe ordinary course of law or avail the remedy of arbitration as provided under the contract.(k) Constitution of Pakistan-------Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---While sitting in writjurisdiction, High Court cannot delve upon factual depth to resolve the whole dispute in aslipshod manner---Questions which involve factual controversies cannot be resolved by HighCourt through summary procedure under Article 199 of the Constitution---Where the matterneeds evidence which exercise cannot be undertaken by High Court for which the petitionershave to approach the proper forum.

Summary: S.13,14.20,21 Arbitration Act:Arbitration outside court,how to make it rule of the court

Summary: S.13,14,20,21 Arbitration Act:Arbitration outside court,how to make it rule of the court

Summary: Plj 1996 Peshawar 150 [Circuit Bench Abbottabad] Present Sardar Muhammad Raza J Maulvi Muhammad Zufran and 273 others - Petitioners versus Malik Nehmat and 619 others - Respondents CR No 101 of 1992 accepted on 1251996 (i) Arbitration Act 1940 - Civil Suit - Reference to arbitrators - Jurisdiction of civil court - Whether exists - Question of - Once it is held that matter was referred to arbitration after a alid arbitration agreement then jurisdiction of court to decide matter is ceased so long as such arbitration agreement is in the field - Court can only xercise jurisdiction with regard to matters arising out of award for example receipt of award receipt of objections if any xamination of evidence pro nd contra and examination of arbitrator or arbitrators in order to see as to whether they have rightly acted in terms of reference or not [P 152] A (ii) Arbitration Act 1940 - Civil Suit - Reference to arbitrators - Jurisdiction of civil court - Whether existsJurisdiction of court is not resumed untill or unless arbitration is dropped y parties or award is declared invalid and no further arbitrators ar appointed by parties [P 152] B (iii) Civil Procedure Code 1908 - - O 1 R 9 - Parties to suit - Non - joinder of - It was a case of non - joinder of arties and plaintiffs had not exercised due diligence in ascertaining names of eople belonging to Harban (village) who have a claim over mountain indispute - Without impleadment of these people in the suit as necessary parties no udgment would have been binding upon them - Petition accepted [P 153] C Mr ShaukatAli Khan Advocate for Petitioners Mr Mufti Muhammad Idris Advocate for RespondentsJudgement Result:Petition accepted.

Summary: PLJ 1987 Lahore 374 Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 – Article 199 – Laches: The petition was filed after a delay of one year from the date of the impugned order. The court held that the petition suffered from laches and lacked merit. [P. 379] C. Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 – Article 199 read with Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (VIII of 1961), Section 9 – Maintenance Application: The petitioner challenged the concurrent findings of fact regarding the maintenance order. The court held that it would not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact in its extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199. [P. 379] B. Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (VIII of 1961) – Section 9 – Maintenance Claim – Quantum of Maintenance: The Arbitration Council was held competent to award maintenance to the wife, not only for future periods but also for past maintenance. The amount of maintenance could vary depending on the socio-economic status of the parties. [P. 379] A. -----Background: The petitioner challenged the legality of an order dated January 7, 1986, which upheld a previous order of the Arbitration Council awarding maintenance of Rs. 300 per month, along with arrears, to the respondent. The petitioner contended that the Arbitration Council lacked the jurisdiction to pass the order due to pecuniary limitations under the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961, and sought to challenge the concurrent findings of the Arbitration Council. -----Issues: 1- Whether the Arbitration Council exceeded its pecuniary jurisdiction in awarding maintenance exceeding Rs. 5,000, under the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961. -----2- Whether the concurrent findings of fact could be reviewed in constitutional writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan. -----3- Whether the petition, filed after one year from the impugned order, suffers from laches. -----Holding, Reasoning, and Outcome: The court dismissed the petition on multiple grounds: --Pecuniary Jurisdiction Misconception: The court clarified that the Arbitration Council, constituted under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, and the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961, are distinct entities with different mandates. The Arbitration Council is empowered to resolve family law disputes, including the provision of maintenance, without being subject to the pecuniary limitations applicable to Conciliation Courts. Therefore, the petitioner's argument was based on a misunderstanding of the law. --Concurrent Findings of Fact: The court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the Arbitration Council and subsequent review by respondent authorities could not be interfered with in the High Court's extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199. This principle is rooted in the limitation that constitutional courts do not re-examine factual findings unless there is a manifest error of law. --Laches: The petition was filed after a delay of more than one year from the date of the impugned order, rendering it barred by laches. The court found no merit in the petition due to this undue delay, which alone was sufficient grounds for dismissal. ------Citations/Precedents: P. 379 (C): Petition suffering from laches has no merit. P. 379 (B): Concurrent findings of fact are not to be reviewed in extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction. P. 379 (A): Arbitration Council has the authority to grant maintenance for both past and future periods, with the quantum varying according to the socio-economic status of the parties.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)- ---O. I, r. 10-Joining as plaintiff-Order of High -Court allowing respondents to join as plaintiffs in suit challenged on ground that no con sent was given by counsel for grant of application of intervenors and that intervenors were not party to arbitration clause in lease agreement in question and therefore they had no locus standi to be impleaded as party in arbitration proceedings-Question of consent not very re levant when consent relates to point of law to be decided on its own merits irrespective of consent of counsel and whether intervenors who were not parties to arbitration clause, were entitled to be joined as parties in arbitration proceedings being purely legal question, a Court if holds that strangers are not entitled to be impleaded as parties, then in spite of consent of counsel, claim of intervenors can be rejected. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)- --O. I, r. 10-Joining as plaintiff-Appeal-Consent of counsel on a point of law being not binding on his client, appeal against order passed on this ground, held, cannot be held to be not maintainable. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- --O. I, r. 10 read with Arbitration Act (X of 1940), S. 31(3)-Joining as plaintiffs Question whether strangers not being parties to arbitration agreement can maintain application under O. I, r. 10, C. P. C. for being joined as parties simply on ground that during pendency of proceedings, they had agreed to purchase property from owners being such parties to arbitration proceedings-Held, application of strangers fox being joined as party does not relate to conduct of arbitration proceedings nor does it arise out of arbitration proceedings and as such it cannot be argued that application of-Strangers to arbitration agreement for being joined as parties to proceedings before Arbitrator can be said to fall under subsection (3) of S. 31. Indra Narayan Kundu v. Nani Gopal Banerjee A I R 1946 Cal. 426 ref. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-- --- O. I, r. 10-Joining. as plaintiffs-Sale agreement executed in favour of intervenors does not confer any right - upon' them except to file suit for specific performance against vendors if later refuses to perform their part and by virtue of sale-agreement intending pur chasers do not acquire any vested right in property itself and they acquire right only against intending vendors to maintain a suit either for specific performance or for damages for breach of contract.

Summary: (a) Arbitration (FIDIC/Contract COPA) ----Clauses 64 & 67—Dispute Resolution Expert (DRE)—Binding effect—Time to commence arbitration—Scope—DRE recommended in contractor’s favour on 02-01-2010; employer sought “review” on 28-04-2010 (after 115 days) instead of issuing notice of intention to arbitrate within 14 days as required—Held: under the binding dispute-resolution clause, failure to serve timely notice renders the DRE recommendation final and binding on both parties unless revised in an arbitral award commenced in the prescribed time; indiscriminate recourse to a review outside the contract timeline cannot defeat the clause. (b) Arbitration Act, 1940 ----Ss. 14, 17, 30(c) & 33—Improperly procured award—Maintainability of objections—Trial Court set aside ex parte award on ground of improper procurement and accepted objections—Held: where the award is vitiated by violation of contractually mandated pre-conditions and foundational procedural defects, the court may annul it under s. 30(c); arguments premised on treating a s. 14(2) motion as one for making rule of court were misconceived in the face of substantive infirmities tainting the award. (c) Natural justice in arbitral proceedings ----Notice and opportunity to be heard—Minimum due process—Arbitrator must afford reasonable notice of date, time and place and opportunity to present evidence/arguments; proceedings at a party’s back without sufficient notice constitute misconduct and invalidate the award. AIR 1932 Bom 68 applied. (d) Contractual timelines vs. arbitral commencement ----Effect of missing the 14-day window—Where the contract stipulates a 14-day post-recommendation period to notify intention to arbitrate, non-compliance forecloses arbitration on that dispute and cements the DRE recommendation; later unilateral appointment of an arbitrator and conduct of ex parte proceedings cannot revive a lapsed entitlement. (e) Limitation (objections to award) ----Starting point—Record sufficiency—In absence of arbitrator’s properly filed record showing notices under s. 14(1) and service thereof, a rigid computation of limitation cannot be pressed to uphold a procedurally tainted award; courts will first address jurisdictional/procurement defects under s. 30(c). (f) Practice & procedure ----Section 14 vs. Section 17—Court’s role—A request under s. 14(2) to call the award does not pre-empt scrutiny under ss. 30/33 once parties are before the court; misreading/non-reading of notices and contract timelines by the award-seeker cannot cure foundational defects. (g) Disposition — Appeal dismissed. Impugned Order dated 11-04-2017, setting aside the award and dismissing the s. 14(2) prayer, upheld.

Summary: (a) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 — Ss. 6, 7 & 8 — United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (New York Convention), Art. V — Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199 Foreign arbitral award — Enforcement — Limited grounds for refusal — Intra Court Appeal against enforcement order — Scope and limits of judicial review — Respondent-company, a Singapore-based trader, obtained arbitral award from Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) arising out of contract with appellant — Learned Single Judge recognized and enforced the foreign arbitral award under S.6 of the Act, 2011 — Appellant resisted enforcement on the ground that there was no valid arbitration agreement, alleging unauthorized execution of contract — Held, the sole signatory of the contract acted on behalf of the appellant-company, and no action was taken by the appellant against him, thus binding the company under the doctrine of indoor management — Failure to participate in arbitration proceedings did not invalidate the arbitration — No ground under Art. V of the New York Convention was established to resist enforcement — Pakistani courts cannot re-examine factual or legal merits of the award — Enforcement courts act akin to executing courts and are bound by the limited grounds specified in S.7 of the Act, 2011 and Art. V of the Convention — Appellant’s challenge based on alleged legal/factual errors in the award was not sustainable — Appeal dismissed. Held, enforcement of a foreign arbitral award may only be refused on grounds strictly enumerated in Art. V of the New York Convention; no expansive review or merits-based challenge is permissible. Cited Cases: • Taisei Corporation v. A.M. Construction Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. (2024 SCMR 640) • Reinhart India (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Bashir Cotton Mills Ltd. (2023 CLD 1051) • POSCO International Corporation v. Rikans International (2023 CLD 189) • Dar Okaz Printing & Publishing Ltd. v. Printing Corporation of Pakistan (PLD 2003 SC 808) • Orient Power Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. SNGPL (PLD 2019 Lahore 607) • Rahat and Company v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan (PLD 2020 SC 366) (b) Company law — Doctrine of indoor management — Authority of agent — Binding effect of corporate acts Appellant resisted enforcement of arbitration award by claiming that the contract was signed by an unauthorized individual — Held, doctrine of indoor management applicable — Where a third party deals with a company in good faith, internal irregularities or absence of board resolutions cannot be used to invalidate a transaction — No disciplinary or legal action was initiated against the alleged unauthorized signatory, and company address was same as signatory’s — Thus, contract deemed valid and binding upon appellant-company. Held, internal corporate disputes regarding authority cannot be used to deny arbitration obligations to bona fide foreign counterparties. (c) International arbitration — Public policy defence — Narrow construction — Enforcement not to be denied on ground of legal or factual error in award Appellant argued that enforcement of SIAC award was contrary to Pakistani public policy — Held, public policy ground under Art. V of the New York Convention must be narrowly construed and only invoked where enforcement would violate fundamental notions of morality and justice — Alleged errors of law or fact by arbitrator are not valid defences under Art. V — Courts are not to interfere with merits of foreign arbitral awards — Pakistan's legal framework reflects a pro-enforcement bias consistent with its international obligations. Held, public policy cannot be interpreted expansively to frustrate international enforcement mechanisms. Cited Case: • Taisei Corporation v. A.M. Construction Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. (2024 SCMR 640) (d) Disposition Intra Court Appeal dismissed — Judgment of Single Judge enforcing foreign arbitral award upheld — No jurisdictional or legal error found — Enforcement proceedings to continue in accordance with law. ------ "In today's interconnected world, no nation can thrive in isolation. The Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 reflects Pakistan's commitment to global arbitration standards. By aligning with the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, it ensures legal certainty for international investors. This progressive step will build foreign trust and support steady economic growth."

Summary: (a) Arbitration Act, 1940––Ss. 8 & 20––Conversion of application under S.20 into S.8––Preconditions for judicial reference––Statutory obligation to first file arbitration agreement––Scope of Court’s jurisdiction. Trial Court treated an application under S.20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, as one under S.8 and appointed an arbitrator, without first directing the filing of the alleged arbitration agreement dated 01.07.2006––Held, S.20 requires that before any reference can be made to arbitration, the Court must direct filing of the agreement and satisfy itself judicially as to its existence––Failure to direct filing and make a reference under S.20(4) amounts to bypassing a mandatory jurisdictional step––Appointment of arbitrator without such filing is legally unsustainable––Judicial function under S.20 cannot be substituted by ministerial act of appending a copy of the agreement without evidentiary foundation––Appeal allowed; impugned order set aside. Cited Cases: • TBEA Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Al’Wasay Construction Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. 2020 CLC 106 • A.J. Corporation v. Fauji Fertilizer Bin Qasim Ltd. 2013 CLD 636 • Mujtaba Hussain Siddiqui v. Sultan Ahmed 2005 YLR 2709 (b) Arbitration Act, 1940––Ss. 8 & 20––Structural distinction––Function of Court under each provision––Functus officio principle under S.8. Court distinguished the procedural regimes under Ss. 8 and 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940––S.8 applies when arbitration is conducted without intervention of the Court and Court’s role is limited to appointment of arbitrator––Once arbitrator is appointed under S.8, Court becomes functus officio and retains no further jurisdiction––Conversely, S.20 applies where parties seek initiation of arbitration through judicial intervention––Held, treating S.20 application as one under S.8 without initiating proper S.20 procedure, including filing and reference, renders order procedurally defective––Trial Court’s simultaneous assumption of S.8 powers while retaining supervisory control over arbitral proceedings violates statutory framework. Cited Cases: • Messrs Tribal Friends Co. v. Province of Balochistan 2002 SCMR 1903 • Muhammad Hanif v. Muhammad PLD 1990 SC 859 (c) Arbitration Act, 1940––S. 39(1)(iv)––Appeal––Maintainability––Order refusing to file arbitration agreement and instead appointing arbitrator––Whether appealable. Trial Court, instead of issuing direction to file arbitration agreement under S.20, proceeded to appoint arbitrator under S.8––Held, such order is appealable under S.39(1)(iv) of the Act, 1940, as it amounts to refusal to file arbitration agreement––Even if impugned order were treated as one under S.8, remedy by way of revision would be competent under S.115 CPC in view of S.41 of the Act––Objection as to maintainability of appeal found to be misconceived. Cited Cases: • Karamat Hussain v. Muhammad Zaman PLD 1987 SC 139 • Ali Muhammad v. Mahbub Ahmad 1987 SCMR 1263 (d) Partnership Act, 1932––S. 69(3)––Unregistered partnership agreement––Reference to arbitration––Bar under S.69(3)––Scope. Appellant challenged maintainability of arbitration based on unregistered partnership agreement in light of S.69(3) of the Partnership Act, 1932––Held, arbitration is not a “suit” nor an “other proceeding” ejusdem generis with “set-off” as contemplated in S.69(3)––Therefore, arbitration proceedings are not barred on basis of non-registration of partnership––Judicial consensus affirms that arbitration clauses in unregistered deeds remain enforceable. Cited Cases: • Sqn. Ldr. (R.) Khurram Zaman v. Afia Zafar 2008 CLD 662 • Ram Lal Harnam Dass v. Bal Krishen AIR 1957 Punjab 159 (e) Arbitration Act, 1940––Filing of arbitration agreement––Judicial satisfaction required––Appended copy not sufficient––Evidentiary threshold. Held, mere attachment of photocopy of arbitration agreement with application under S.20 does not amount to judicial “filing” as required under S.20(4)––Court must satisfy itself as to the existence and facial enforceability of the agreement––Absence of original or unexplained failure to summon it renders proceedings invalid––Statutory safeguard against fraudulent invocation of arbitration clause cannot be diluted. Disposition: Appeal allowed. Impugned order set aside. Trial Court directed to decide application under Section 20 of Arbitration Act, 1940 afresh after ensuring compliance with Sections 20(3) and 20(4). ------- "The respondent filed application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 ("the Act"), inter alia, on the basis of an unregistered arbitration agreement, which was treated as application under Section 8 of the Act and the arbitrator was appointed with direction to pass an award to be later on submitted before the Trial Court. This Court, inter alia, held that the Trial Court erred in converting the application under Section 20 into the application under Section 8 of the Act inasmuch as both the provisions form part of different procedural regimes under the Act. In case of application under Section 8 of the Act, once an arbitrator is appointed, the Court becomes functus officio whereas in contrast, under Section 20 of the Act, the role of the Court is not limited to the appointment of an arbitrator; rather, the Court first determines whether there exists an arbitration agreement and then, under sub-Section (4), orders the filing of the agreement and makes the reference. Section 20 of the Act, provides a procedural mechanism for initiating arbitration through judicial intervention where no arbitration proceedings have commenced independently. The structure of Section 20 is sequential and substantive. Sub-Section (1) permits any party to an arbitration agreement to apply to the Court for filing the agreement. Sub-Section (3) provides that the Court, if satisfied that an arbitration agreement exists, shall order the agreement to be filed. Most critically, under Section 20(4), it is only after such filing that the Court becomes competent to refer the dispute to arbitration by appointing an arbitrator. This staged progression is not a ceremonial formality; it reflects a deliberate legislative intent to ensure that the existence and authenticity of the arbitration agreement is first judicially scrutinized, and the document is formally brought onto the Court's record, before the arbitral process is triggered. The act of filing, accompanied by judicial satisfaction under Section 20(3), constitutes a jurisdictional condition precedent to the making of any reference or the appointment of an arbitrator. The necessity of this filing becomes all the more pronounced when the opposing party has specifically objected to the very existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, as was done by the appellant in the present case. The appeal was allowed and the impugned order of appointment of arbitrator was set aside with direction to the Trial Court to decide the matter afresh after adhering to the mandatory requirements of sub-Sections (3) and (4) of Section 20 of the Act, including proper judicial satisfaction as to the existence and filing of the arbitration agreement dated 01.07.2006, in accordance with law, keeping in view the observations of this Court."