Summary: [discretion for absorption rested with the competent authority] The petitioners stated that they were appointed on deputation basis in the Islamabad Capital Territory Police in 2005. Six months before the expiry of their deputation period, they applied for permanent absorption in the ICT police. The Islamabad Police committee recommended their absorption, but they were suddenly repatriated to their parent departments, leading to the filing of the writ petition. The respondents, through their representative, argued that the petitioners were considered by the committee but were not recommended for absorption. They were repatriated upon completing the maximum deputation period of five years, and it was within the discretion of the borrowing department to allow or disallow absorption. The Chief Justice, after hearing both sides and examining the record, concluded that there were no specific rules or provisions regarding the absorption of deputationists in the borrowing department. The discretion for absorption rested with the competent authority, and in this case, the repatriation of the petitioners did not violate their fundamental rights as guaranteed by the constitution. The court stated that the issue concerned the terms and conditions of service, rather than fundamental rights, and therefore, the constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 could not be invoked. Consequently, the court dismissed the writ petition, and as a result, the related CM No. 2024/2011 was also dismissed.

Summary: According to the facts presented in the petition, Abdul Wali, while serving in the Pakistan Air Force, was arrested in 2004 and subsequently sentenced to imprisonment for life and a fine. However, he was later acquitted by the Honorable Supreme Court. During his detention, a Board of Inquiry was held, and the petitioner was administratively discharged from service without being given an opportunity to respond or participate in the inquiry proceedings. The respondents submitted their comments, denying the petitioner's claim for reinstatement and justifying his administrative discharge based on the guidelines provided by the PAF Act. They argued that the petitioner's acquittal was based on the benefit of doubt and did not warrant reinstatement with back benefits. They also contended that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Article 199(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan. They referred to the guidelines provided by the PAF and cited similar cases where acquittal on the benefit of doubt did not result in reinstatement with back benefits. After considering the arguments and reviewing relevant documents, the court concluded that the petitioner's claim for relief beyond the limits specified by the Honorable Supreme Court was not justified. They noted that the discharge order passed against the petitioner was justified based on the guidelines provided by the PAF Act. The court also mentioned a previous judgment in a similar case (Abdul Basit) where the findings and observations were deemed binding. As a result, the court dismissed the writ petition, stating that the petitioner was not entitled to any other relief beyond what had already been provided. They also mentioned that the petitioner's service benefits had already been transmitted to his account, and therefore his plea regarding unpaid benefits was not justified.

Summary: Dismissed for non-prosecution.

Summary: None appeared on behalf of petitioner despite repeated calls. Writ petition was dismissed for non prosecution.

Summary: Custom Act, 1969 (147) (Show Cause Notice)

Summary: An employee who has been superseded once; cannot be considered for promotion until expiry of one year as provided in Rule 10(5) of Civil Servants Promotion (BPS-18 to BPS-21) Rules 2019.

Summary: Fatal Accident (Compensation and Damages)

Summary: The tender notice was published by respondent nos. 1 and 2, inviting bids for various items, including LVPs with specific requirements. The bidding documents clearly stated that LVPs should have a "Y" Injection Port and Eurocap. During the evaluation process, the bid of respondent 6/7 was rejected by respondent No.4 due to its lack of eurocap. Respondent No.3 referred the matter back to respondent No.4 for further evaluation of financial soundness, where it was noted that respondent 6/7 did not meet the financial requirement and lacked eurocap. However, despite these findings, respondent No.3 decided to accept the bid of respondent 6/7, claiming it was due to being the lowest bidder. The petitioners argued that the decision was in violation of procurement laws, tender terms, and posed a threat to public health. The court ruled that the acceptance of a bid that did not meet the financial soundness requirement and lacked eurocap was not justifiable. The court set aside the decision, declared the process void, and ordered a new tendering process within one month. The court also emphasized the importance of judicial review in matters involving government contracts and procurement, ensuring that decisions are not arbitrary, favoritism-free, and in line with the law.

Summary: (Dismissed) The petitioner's counsel argued that there were misinterpretations and omissions of evidence by both lower courts. It was claimed that the trial court and the appellate court failed to properly understand the real controversy, leading to the issuance of the impugned judgments and decrees. After hearing the arguments and examining the impugned judgments and decrees, the court stated that it is well established that the High Court can interfere in concurrent findings only if it finds them to be perverse or the result of an arbitrary exercise of authority. The petitioner's counsel failed to provide a clear stance on the petitioner's status. The court found that both lower courts had considered all relevant aspects and correctly interpreted the evidence. The petitioner's counsel did not present any exceptional circumstances that would justify the court's interference in the revisional jurisdiction. Therefore, the court dismissed both civil revisions.

Summary: (Condonation of Delay Denied) The appellant's counsel argued that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal made an error in determining that the contract performed by the assessee, M/s Adage Advertising (Pvt.) Ltd., constituted services rendered and was not liable to tax under the fixed regime provided in Section 80-C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The counsel further stated that the appeal was filed within 60 days from the date of receiving the judgment. The court heard the arguments of the appellant's counsel and examined the record. The court noted that the determination of the nature of the contract is a question of fact that cannot be raised in the appeal and requires the appreciation of evidence. Furthermore, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal had already decided the appeal on 19.4.2000, while the present appeal was filed on 01.8.2000. The appellant's counsel failed to provide valid reasons for filing the appeal beyond the prescribed period of sixty days. As a result, the court dismissed the appeal at the preliminary stage.