Summary: (Against the order dated 16.11.2017 of the Peshawar High Court, D.I. Khan Bench passed in Criminal Appeal No. 73-D of 2016). Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 302(c)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Punishment of Qisas not applicable---Grave and sudden provocation---Accused was convicted under section 302(b), P.P.C. for qatl-i-amd and sentenced to imprisonment for life---Validity---It could not be ruled out that one of the deceased had created a situation of sudden provocation due to which the case fell under section 302(c), P.P.C.---Law maker had left it to the Court to decide on a case to case basis depending upon gravity and intensity of provocation and the time taken for reaction---It was a case of spontaneous reaction and accused was rightly convicted, however, his case was to be considered within the frame of section 302(c), P.P.C.---Supreme Court converted conviction of accused awarded under section 302(b), P.P.C. into one under section 302(c),P.P.C. and his sentence of imprisonment for life on two counts was reduced to imprisonment for fourteen years---Appeal was allowed. State v. Muhammad Hanif and 5 others 1992 SCMR 2047 and Ali Muhammad v. Ali Muhammad PLD 1996 SC 274 rel. Ahmed Ali, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner. Syed Kauser Ali Shah, Additional Advocate-General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the State. Saleem Ullah Ranazai, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 2 to 4. Date of hearing: 5th March, 2025.

Summary: Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925)--- ----Ss. 232(a), 232(c), 276 & 372---Sindh Letters of Administration and Succession Certificates Act (VII of 2021), Preamble---Petition for grant of probate / letter of administration---Grant of administration to universal or residuary legatees---Lady died testate and executed will in favour of her sister who filed Succession Application, however, the same was dismissed with direction to approach NADRA along with will for process / issuance of letter of administration---Stance of the appellant / petitioner was that under S. 232 of the Succession Act, 1925, which deals with grant of administration to universal or residuary legatees, she can be classified as "universal legatee" as there is no residue estate of the deceased---Validity---Subsections (a) and (c) of S. 232 of the Succession Act, 1925, stipulates that when the deceased has made a will but has not appointed an executor, such a universal or a legatee may be admitted to prove the will, and letter of administration with the will annexed may be granted to him of the whole estate, or of so much thereof as may be administered---In the present case, the impugned order (directing the Appellant to approach NADRA Authority to process letter of administration) cannot be sustained under the Sindh Letters of Administration and Succession Certificates Act, 2021---NADRA Authority under Sindh Letters of Administration and Succession Certificates Act, 2021, can only issue letter of administration in matters in which there is no probate---Existence of a will can only be proved through Court of law; hence, present case is beyond the scope of the Sindh Letters of Administration and Succession Certificates Act, 2021---High Court set-aside the impugned order and the case was remanded back to Trial Court with direction to the appellant to prove the execution of the will in the first instance; if she proves the execution of the will, the court may proceed with grant of letter of administration under S. 232 of the Succession Act, 1925---Appeal, filed by beneficiary of will, was disposed of accordingly. Re: Mrs. Homai Minwalla 1989 CLC 1953 ref. Bassam Ali Dahri for Appellant. Ahmed Khan Khaskheli, Additional Advocate General for Respondent. Date of hearing: 5th March, 2025.

Summary: (a) Criminal Trial – Explosive Substances Act, Anti-Terrorism Act, Arms Ordinance – Requirements of Safe Custody, Recovery and Chain of Custody – Non-Production of Case Property – Effect Failure of the prosecution to produce critical physical evidence, such as explosives, detonators, weapons, and other incriminating items allegedly recovered from the accused, vitiated the entire prosecution case. Non-production and non-exhibition of case property in court created fatal gaps in the chain of custody, drawing adverse presumption under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Reliance placed on Gul Dast Khan v. The State (2009 SCMR 431), Amjad Ali v. State (2012 SCMR 577), and Ahmed Ali v. State (2023 SCMR 781). (b) Electronic Evidence – Video from Mobile Phone – Requirements for Admissibility – Role of Forensic Expert – Standard of Proof: Video evidence allegedly recovered from a mobile phone was held inadmissible due to lack of proper forensic examination, sealing, and authentication. Requirements under Ishtiaq Ahmed Mirza v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2019 SC 675) were not fulfilled. Prosecution failed to produce the person who made or handled the video, and the device was not sealed or forensically verified, undermining evidentiary value. (c) Explosive Substances Act, 1908 – Section 7 – Mandatory Requirement of Sanction from Government – Failure to Obtain – Effect: No sanction under Section 7 of the Explosive Substances Act was obtained from the competent authority before prosecution. This was a jurisdictional defect rendering the proceedings and conviction under Sections 4 and 5 ESA void ab initio. Reliance placed on Abdul Aziz @ Sadam v. The State (2023 YLR 1821 [Balochistan]). (d) Criminal Conspiracy – Section 120-B PPC – Ingredients – Proof of Common Intention – Requirement of Agreement: Prosecution failed to prove any agreement or meeting of minds between appellants necessary to establish conspiracy under Section 120-B PPC. No independent corroboration or electronic evidence was provided to link the appellants to each other or to any proscribed organization. (e) Anti-Terrorism Act – Prosecution under ATA & General Law – Requirement for Separate Charges and Sentences: Trial court erred by merging charges under Anti-Terrorism Act and general penal statutes in single sentencing phrases. Convictions must be separately recorded under each statutory provision. Reliance placed on Akhtar Muhammad v. The State (PLD 2017 Peshawar 55). (f) Enforced Disappearance – Defense of Abduction by State Agencies – Burden on Prosecution – FIR for Missing Person – Failure to Refute Defense: Appellants’ claim of abduction by law enforcement agencies was corroborated by FIR No. 1024/2022, lodged prior to the alleged recovery. Prosecution failed to rebut this defense or provide credible explanation for the delay or absence of due process under Articles 9, 10, and 14 of the Constitution. Burden of disproving enforced disappearance was not discharged, and adverse inference was drawn. (g) Criminal Procedure – Section 103 Cr.P.C. – Failure to Associate Independent Witnesses – Recovery at Public Place – Effect: Despite alleged recovery from a public place and the presence of bystanders, no private witness was associated with recovery proceedings. This omission raised serious doubt as to the veracity of the prosecution case and undermined the credibility of police witnesses. (h) Forensic Chain of Custody – Delay in Sending Samples – Absence of Mallkhana Registers – Vitiation of NFSA Report: Explosive samples were sent to NFSA after an unexplained delay of six days. Mallkhana Register No. 19 and Roznamcha entries were not produced. Such lapses cast doubt on the integrity and authenticity of the NFSA report, rendering it unreliable. -----Disposition: Appeals allowed. Conviction and sentences set aside. Appellants acquitted of all charges. Judgment also directed Inspector General Police, Islamabad, to take cognizance of CTD officials' conduct and recommended that enforced disappearance be declared a distinct criminal offence.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan: –––Art. 199––– Writ jurisdiction–––Scope and discretionary nature–––Extraordinary relief–––Petitioner, a BPS-19 officer of the Pakistan Administrative Service, was appointed as Director General Hajj, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for a fixed term of three years–––Impugned notification was issued prematurely curtailing his tenure and directing his repatriation to the Establishment Division–––Petitioner challenged the said notification through constitutional petition–––Petitioner, however, joined his new post at the Establishment Division on 11.02.2025, prior to obtaining interim relief from the Court on 12.02.2025, but failed to disclose this material fact–––Held, writ jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution is equitable and discretionary–––Petitioner had failed to approach the Court with clean hands by concealing material facts and obtaining interim relief through suppression–––Such conduct disentitles the petitioner to any relief under writ jurisdiction–––Petition was dismissed, as no live controversy survived after petitioner’s acquiescence to the impugned notification. Cited Cases: • PLD 2024 SC 54 • 2006 PLC (CS) 325 • 2024 PLC (CS) 323 • 2020 CLC 1945 (b) Service Law: –––Tenure posting on foreign assignment–––Premature repatriation–––Scope of ESTACODE provisions–––Petitioner’s appointment was based on a fixed tenure of three years, as per ESTACODE (Edition-2021), Section 3.2, Clause (xi), which mandated strict adherence to tenure without extension–––Petitioner relied on an earlier notification of selection (16.03.2023) rather than actual posting order (07.04.2023)–––Interim relief was obtained by relying on an incorrect document–––Held, reliance on improperly cited notifications to mislead the Court is a serious breach of legal obligation and undermines judicial integrity–––Court observed that such conduct must be discouraged to maintain sanctity of judicial process. (c) Administration of Justice: –––Interim relief–––Duty of full disclosure–––Petitioner's failure to inform Court of material developments–––Concept of uberrima fides (utmost good faith)–––Court emphasized that parties seeking interim relief are under strict duty to disclose all material facts–––Failure to do so, whether intentional or inadvertent, may result in discharge of relief obtained–––Reliance placed on Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 12A (2023), para. 1657–––Court held that concealment of petitioner’s joining report and pursuit of interim relief constituted serious lapse in candor–––Although no penal action was taken, Court reiterated importance of transparency and good faith in invoking constitutional jurisdiction.

Summary: (a) Murder—Sudden Provocation—Reduction of Sentence from Section 302(b) PPC to 302(c) PPC: ---Petitioner Mehboob was convicted under Section 302(b) PPC for killing his sister, Mst. Farhat Bibi, and his relative, Saif Ullah, after finding them in a compromising position—Trial court awarded life imprisonment on two counts under Section 302(b) PPC—High Court upheld the conviction—Supreme Court examined the element of sudden provocation and applied Section 302(c) PPC, reducing the sentence to 14 years of imprisonment—Court noted that the reaction was immediate and spontaneous, falling within the scope of grave and sudden provocation—Reliance placed on State v. Muhammad Hanif (1992 SCMR 2047) and Ali Muhammad v. Ali Muhammad (PLD 1996 SC 274). (b) Evidence—Unimpeachable Witness Testimony—Conviction Upheld: ---Prosecution produced 15 witnesses—Medical evidence, recovery of murder weapon (12-bore shotgun No. 790812), and circumstantial evidence were consistent—Dr. Hina Ayub (PW-3) confirmed findings from the post-mortem examination—Defendant introduced a new defense plea at trial claiming the crime weapon belonged to his father, but this was contradicted by evidence—PW-11 (Allah Ditta, father of deceased Saif Ullah) attempted to alter the incident’s circumstances, but his version was not accepted—Court found no material contradictions in prosecution evidence. (c) FIR and Confession—Petitioner’s Initial Surrender and Later Denial: ---FIR was lodged immediately at the crime scene, and petitioner surrendered with the weapon—Petitioner initially admitted the offense but later denied involvement—Thumb impression was obtained, and the motive was not disputed—Court held that mere denial of the FIR was not sufficient to discredit prosecution’s case. (d) Applicability of Section 302(c) PPC—Judicial Discretion in Sentencing: ---Court analyzed Section 302 PPC, which categorizes Qatl-e-Amd into three punishments: (i) Death as Qisas, (ii) Death or life imprisonment as Ta’zir, (iii) Imprisonment up to 25 years under Section 302(c) PPC where Qisas is not applicable. ---Court found that the provocation was immediate and thus, section 302(c) PPC was applicable—Held that sentence should be adjusted according to the intensity and immediacy of provocation. ----Disposition: ---Appeal converted into a criminal appeal and partly allowed. ---Conviction under Section 302(b) PPC reduced to Section 302(c) PPC. ---Life imprisonment on two counts reduced to 14 years of imprisonment. ---Benefit of Section 382-B Cr.P.C. extended to the petitioner. ---Judgment approved for reporting.

Summary: Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 7(1), 8(1) & 10---Taxable supplies---Lost / damaged goods---Input tax, adjustment of---Scope---Whether the taxpayer (Gas supply Company/SSGC) was entitled for adjustment of entire input tax including that which had been paid on Unaccounted for Gas (“UG”), notwithstanding the threshold fixed by OGRA?---Held : If any sales tax is paid on a product, which for some reason is not fully utilized in the production or manufacture of the finished goods, the input tax so paid can still be claimed and be fully adjusted against the tax liability---In the present case, the taxpayer's claim for adjustment of such input tax was denied by the Department on the ground that the said input was never used in final production of the finished goods---Loss of input/ raw materials does not fall within the scope of "used or to be used for any purpose other than for taxable supplies made or to be made as stipulated in S. 8(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990---Therefore, the proposed question was answered in the affirmative i.e. in favor of the taxpayer (SSGC) and against the Department---Thus, the order of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue stood set-aside /modified---Special Sales Tax Reference Application filed by the taxpayer (SSGC) was allowed. Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Mayfair Spinning Mills Ltd. and others 2025 SCMR 1 ref. Khalid Jawed Khan for Applicant. Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi for Respondents. Adeel Kaiser, Acting Deputy General Manager, Tax Department (SSGC), Shah Hilal Manager Tax Department (SSGC) and Raj Love Kush, Deputy Manager, Legal (SSGC).

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 265-F(7), 94, 540, 510 & 561-A---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A---Application seeking direction to Forensic DNA and Serology Laboratory for obtaining and matching a DNA profiling was dismissed---Held: It was an undisputed fact that the applicants did not submit such an application before the Investigating Officer during the investigation, nor did they approach the Judicial Magistrate supervising the investigation---Failure to raise such request at the proper procedural stage rendered the present application legally untenable---Record reflected that prosecution evidence had already concluded, statements of the accused under S.342, Cr.P.C., hadbeen recorded and the defense was now leading its evidence---Defense had a fair opportunity to challenge the DNA report through cross-examination but failed to do so---At this advanced stage, the request for further forensic examination was merely an attempt to reopen the investigation, which was impermissible under the law---Section 265-F(7),Cr.P.C., did not empower the Court to order a fresh investigation or conduct additional forensic testing---Applicants' request for DNA profiling effectively sought to revive an aspect of the investigation, which fell outside the scope of said provision---Trial Court rightly held that what was not permissible directly could not be done indirectly---While exercising revisional jurisdiction, High Court must determine whether the trial Court committed a jurisdictional error or a manifest illegality---Trial Court had correctly applied the law and there was no illegality, irregularity, or miscarriage of justice in the impugned order--- Petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Naeem and another v. The State and others PLD 2019 SC 669 rel. Raj Ali Wahid Kunwar for Applicants. Mumtaz Ali Shah, A.P.G along with P.I. Javed Akhtar, P.S. Peerabad for Respondent No. 1. Complainant in person. Date of hearing: 4th March, 2025.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: The intention of legislature behind Article 150 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 is to pure the evidence from impurities. Therefore, court can allow parties calling the witness to put question to him which might be put in the cross-examination by the adverse parties and said exercise can be undertaken at any stage i.e. during examination-in-chief, cross-examination as well as re-examination.

Summary: Summary pending