Summary: (a) Constitutional Law – Right to Fair Treatment – Domicile Requirement in Competitive Examination: ----Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977, S. 7––CSS Competitive Examination Rules, 2019, Rr. 5 & 10––FPSC advertisement clause 2(d) Eligibility criteria for CSS Examination––Cut-off date for submission of requisite documents including domicile certificate––Appellant’s application rejected and result withheld on grounds of non-submission of domicile certificate by the deadline of 31.12.2022––Appellant contended that she was domiciled in District Swat prior to the cut-off date but obtained the certificate later––Held, both Rule 5 of the CSS CE Rules, 2019 and clause 2(d) of the advertisement explicitly required that a candidate must “have” domicile—not merely obtain a certificate—to qualify by the cut-off date––Distinction drawn between having domicile and possessing a domicile certificate––Impugned decision by FPSC appeared to have conflated the two terms, failing to appreciate the substantive legal concept of domicile versus the evidentiary function of the certificate––Appeal allowed; FPSC’s rejection order set aside; matter remanded for reconsideration based on legal possession of domicile, not procedural delay in certification. ---Cited Case: • Central Bank of India v. Ram Narain PLD 1956 SC (Ind.) 81 "Domicile meaning and import. (A) As against the very term domicile, the expression 'domicile certificate' too had come up for consideration before a division bench of this court in the case of 'Afsar Khan vs. Tribunal FCR' reported in 2005 CLC 1392, and it was held as under, Domicile certificate means the official confirmation of the place of permanent residence of a citizen. Apparently it has nothing to do with castes or Tribes. A person belonging to Nasar sub-caste can neither be denied right of citizenship nor of domicile if The meets the criteria laid down by the love, the rules and The guidelines given by the Supreme Court. More the unambiguous certificate issued by the Tribal Elders of one of the recognized case of Bhittani Trine also confirms the entitlement of the petitioner to the ban and liabilities of the Tribe being a resident of the area In this very judgment this court has also ruled that the right to have a domicile in any part of Pakistan was tracing it origin in a fundamental right guaranteed to a citizen of Pakistan in Art. 15 of the Constitution of Pakistan. (B) The law attributes to every person at birth a domicile which is called a domicile of origin. This domicile may be changed and a new domicile, which is called a domicile of choice acquired but the two kinds of domicile differ in the following respects: (1) The domicile of origin is received by operation of law at birth; the domicile of choice is acquired later by the actual removal of an individual to another country accompanied by his animus manendi. (2) The domicile of origin is retained until the acquisition of a domicile of choice; it cannot be divested by mere abandonment and is never destroyed though it remains in abeyance during the continuance of domicile of choice, the domicile of choice is lost by abandonment whereupon the domicile of origin is acquired, the domicile. Of choice; when is once lost, is destroyed but may be acquired anew by fulfilling the same conditions as are required in the first instance.

Summary: Acquittal ----- a) Criminal trial – Evidence of chance witnesses – Presence at the scene not established – Value of such testimony ----Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 342 & 161---- Ocular account furnished by complainant (brother of deceased) and his friend was disbelieved due to failure to justify their presence at the crime scene—Both witnesses were held to be chance witnesses as they resided at some distance from the location of the occurrence and failed to provide satisfactory explanation for their presence—Lack of identification of deceased at hospital further belied their claim of being present at relevant time—Held, testimony of chance witnesses not corroborated through convincing explanation loses its evidentiary value—Reference made to Naveed Asghar v. The State (PLD 2021 SC 600); Mst. Mir Zalai v. Ghazi Khan (2020 SCMR 319); and Muhammad Ashraf alias Acchu v. The State (2019 SCMR 652). (b) Criminal trial – FIR – Delay in registration – Adverse inference – Non-production of material witness ----Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 154 & 161---- Though FIR was presented as promptly lodged, prosecution failed to produce the police constable who allegedly brought the complaint from hospital to police station—This unexplained omission cast doubt on the timing and authenticity of FIR—Supreme Court precedent indicates that non-production of key witnesses in chain of registration may vitiate prosecution’s version—Held, in absence of credible proof of prompt lodging, benefit of doubt must go to accused—Relied on Minhaj Khan v. The State (2019 SCMR 326); Muhammad Jahangir v. The State (2024 SCMR 1741). (c) Criminal trial – Medical evidence – Contradiction with ocular account – Delay in shifting injured – Doubtful version ----Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 129(g)---- Prosecution claimed deceased was alive and shifted to hospital in injured condition—Medical officer testified that death was immediate and deceased was brought dead—Held, inconsistency between medical and ocular evidence rendered prosecution version unreliable—Medical evidence, being corroborative in nature, did not support prosecution’s claim about manner and timing of injuries—Reference made to Muhammad Tasaweer v. Hafiz Zulkarnain (PLD 2009 SC 53) and Altaf Hussain v. Fakhar Hussain (2008 SCMR 1103). (d) Criminal trial – Recovery of weapon – Safe custody and chain of evidence – Failure to prove linkage ----Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 103 & 165---- Recovery of .12 bore pump action gun allegedly used in murder held unreliable—Safe custody and transmission of weapon to PFSA not proved—Moharrar who allegedly stored and forwarded the weapon was not produced—Positive FSL report discarded due to broken chain of custody—Held, recovery cannot be relied upon where prosecution fails to prove safe handling of case property—Followed principle laid down in Kamal Din alias Kamala v. The State (2018 SCMR 577). (e) Criminal trial – Supplementary statement – Evidentiary value – Non-mention of source – Value of subsequent improvements ----Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 161 & 162---- Co-accused not named in FIR but later implicated through supplementary statement—Source of such information not disclosed—Supplementary statements are not a continuation of FIR and treated merely as statements under S.161 Cr.P.C.—Held, supplementary statement lacking evidentiary value cannot be used to implicate accused without independent corroboration—Relied upon Muhammad Yaqoob v. The State (2007 YLR 534); Nusrat Bibi v. The State (2015 YLR 2694). (f) Criminal trial – Motive – Failure to prove – Adverse inference against prosecution ----Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302---- Prosecution alleged motive relating to arbitration in a monetary dispute—Failed to produce key person involved in dispute or documentary proof of arbitration—Complainant admitted in cross-examination that he did not disclose motive details to police—Held, once motive is alleged, it must be proved; failure to do so weakens prosecution’s case—Followed Sarfraz v. The State (2023 SCMR 670). (g) Criminal trial – Standard of proof – Benefit of doubt – Principle reaffirmed ----Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 121(g)---- Prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt—Presence of contradictions, unreliable witnesses, and unproven motive raised sufficient doubt—Held, even in heinous offences, doubt must result in acquittal—Reiterated golden principle that it is better to acquit ten guilty than to convict one innocent—Relied upon Ayub Masih v. The State (PLD 2002 SC 1048). Disposition Criminal Appeal No. 9714-J of 2020 was allowed—Conviction and death sentence of Imran alias Mana set aside—Murder Reference No. 54 of 2020 answered in the negative—Criminal Appeal No. 9716 of 2020 against acquittal of co-accused dismissed being without merit.

Summary: (a) Registration Act, 1908 (XVI of 1908): ----Ss. 17 & 49---Gift of immovable property---Registration---Legal effect---Validity---Unregistered gift deed of immovable property has no legal sanctity and cannot transfer title, right or interest in the property---Appellant claimed ownership of residential property in Islamabad through an unregistered gift deed allegedly executed by her husband (respondent No. 1) in the capacity of attorney for the original owner, Muhammad Rafiq s/o Punnu Khan---Held, under S. 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, a gift of immovable property is compulsorily registrable, and under S. 49, failure to register renders such document legally ineffective---Appellant’s claim of ownership failed due to non-registration of the gift deed. Relied on: Muhammad Ejaz v. Mst. Khalida Awan (2010 SCMR 342); Allah Diwaya v. Ghulam Fatima (PLD 2008 SC 73) **(b) Power of Attorney---Gift to attorney’s wife---Validity---Special permission---Requirement---Attorney gifting principal’s property to his spouse---Held, a general power of attorney does not empower an attorney to gift principal’s property to his own wife unless express permission is conferred by the principal---No such specific authority was found in the power of attorney dated 17.09.1990 produced in this case---Gift allegedly executed during lifetime of principal without his personal intervention or explicit consent, thus rendering the transaction invalid in law. Relied on: Allah Bakhsh v. Muhammad Riaz (PLD 2025 SC 63); Ijaz Bashir Qureshi v. Shams-un-Nisa Qureshi (2021 SCMR 1298); Rab Nawaz v. Mst. Samra Andleeb (2025 MLD 286) (c) Evidence Act (I of 1872) & Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908): ----Proof of gift---Essential ingredients---Burden of proof---Offer, acceptance, delivery of possession---Failure to establish valid execution of gift---Appellant failed to produce title documents of the suit property, failed to prove possession or transfer, and did not establish three essential elements of a valid gift---Also failed to produce material witnesses including her husband, who allegedly executed the gift deed---Held, the claim of ownership based on alleged gift was unsupported by evidence and contrary to settled principles of law. Relied on: Mst. Shumal Begum v. Mst. Gulzar Begum (1994 SCMR 818); Haji Faqir Muhammad v. Pir Muhammad (1997 SCMR 1811); Maqsood Ahmad v. Salman Ali (PLD 2003 SC 31) **(d) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)---Power of attorney---Termination---Effect of principal’s death---Death of principal extinguishes power of attorney---Registered general power of attorney executed in 1990 became ineffective upon death of principal in 2000---Appellant’s continued possession and reliance upon power of attorney posthumously was held unlawful and without legal force. Relied on: Muhammad Nawaz v. Muhammad Khan (2016 CLC Note 62) **(e) Civil Procedure---Appeal---Findings of fact---Interference by appellate court---Scope---Where findings of the trial court are based on proper appreciation of evidence, no interference is warranted---Held, learned trial court rightly dismissed the suit due to lack of evidence and legal infirmities in appellant’s claim---Regular First Appeal dismissed being without merit. Appeal Dismissed.

Summary: Conviction upheld --- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----S. 302(b)---Qatl-e-amd (Intentional Murder)---Multiple murders committed in broad daylight---Conviction based on direct evidence---Death sentence upheldAppellants, Sher Afzal and Muhammad Latif, were convicted under S. 302(b), PPC, for the brutal murder of five persons over a land dispute. The trial court awarded the death penalty to both appellants, which was maintained by the Lahore High Court. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions, finding that the prosecution had established the case beyond reasonable doubt through credible, confidence-inspiring eyewitness testimony, corroborated by medical evidence. The incident, which occurred in broad daylight, was witnessed by closely related individuals, and the issue of mistaken identity did not arise. The motive was well-established and remained unshaken during cross-examination.----Cited Cases:• Muhammad Hayat and another v. The State (2021 SCMR 92)(b) Criminal Law---Evidentiary Value of Eyewitness Testimony:----Interested witnesses---Reliability of testimony of closely related witnesses---ScopeThe appellants challenged the testimony of eyewitnesses on the ground that they were close relatives of the deceased. The Supreme Court dismissed this contention, holding that mere relationship with the deceased does not discredit testimony if it is otherwise found to be natural, reliable, and consistent. The principle that "interested witnesses" are unreliable was deemed inapplicable in the absence of evidence of false implication. The court reiterated that substitution of an innocent person in a case involving the brutal murder of five close family members was highly improbable.----Cited Cases:• Haji v. The State (2010 SCMR 650)• Nasir Ahmed v. The State (2023 SCMR 478)(c) Criminal Law---Benefit of Doubt:----Principle of reasonable doubt---Scope and application---Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibusThe appellants argued that contradictions in the prosecution’s evidence entitled them to the benefit of doubt. The court rejected this argument, holding that minor discrepancies that do not go to the root of the case cannot be the sole ground for acquittal. The principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus was held to be inapplicable unless material contradictions affected the core of the prosecution’s case. Instead, the court reaffirmed the doctrine of “sifting the grain from the chaff,” requiring judges to evaluate evidence holistically rather than discard it entirely based on immaterial contradictions.----Cited Cases:• Muhammad Riaz v. Khurram Shehzad (2024 SCMR 51)• Khairu v. The State (1981 SCMR 1136)• Khadim Hussain v. The State (2010 SCMR 1090)• Muhammad Makki v. The State (2021 SCMR 1672)• Sardaruddin v. The State (2023 SCMR 527)(d) Criminal Law---Corroboration of Medical Evidence:----Medical evidence corroborating eyewitness accounts---Admissibility and evidentiary weightPost-mortem reports confirmed that all deceased individuals had sustained firearm injuries corresponding to the prosecution’s version of events. The prosecution's case was further reinforced by reports from the chemical examiner and serologist, as well as the recovery of blood-stained earth. The Supreme Court held that while recovery evidence was inconsequential in this case, the unimpeachable medical evidence corroborating the eyewitness testimony was sufficient to sustain the conviction.-----Cited Cases:• Muhammad Afzal v. The State (2017 SCMR 1645)• Amanullah Khan v. The State (2023 SCMR 487)(e) Motive in Criminal Cases:----Motive established through prosecution evidence---Significance in direct evidence casesThe prosecution successfully established the motive as a longstanding land dispute between the accused and the deceased. The court reaffirmed that motive strengthens the prosecution’s case, particularly in circumstantial evidence cases, but is also relevant in direct evidence cases where it helps eliminate doubt regarding wrongful implication. The motive testimony remained consistent and unshaken throughout the proceedings, further reinforcing the guilt of the accused.-----Cited Cases:• Maqbool Ahmed v. The State (1992 SCMR 2279)• Wharton’s Criminal Evidence (13th Edition, Vol. I, p. 316)(f) Death Sentence---Circumstances Justifying Capital Punishment:----Brutality of the crime---Murder of five family members in cold blood---No mitigating circumstances---Death sentence maintainedThe court declined to convert the death sentence to life imprisonment, emphasizing the premeditated nature of the crime, the number of victims, and the absence of mitigating factors. The brutal and ruthless execution of five family members warranted the most severe penalty. The court reiterated that awarding a lesser sentence in such cases would not serve the ends of justice.----Disposition:Appeals dismissed. Convictions and death sentences of both appellants maintained.

Summary: As per the legislative intent, in the event of a procedural gap in the Trade Organizations Act 2013, the relevant provisions of the Companies Act 2017 will apply by default, ensuring a comprehensive and cohesive regulatory framework.(a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973:—Art. 199—Writ jurisdiction—Maintainability—Availability of alternate remedy—Scope—Petitioner challenged letters issued by members and Regulator of Trade Organizations concerning convening of executive committee meeting and initiating a no-confidence motion against the President of BCCI. Respondents raised objection regarding maintainability on grounds that an alternate statutory remedy under S.21(2) of the Trade Organization Act, 2013 was available. Held, petitioner had not availed alternate efficacious remedy before invoking constitutional jurisdiction—Availability of specific appellate forum under statute bars entertainment of constitutional petition in absence of valid justification—Petition dismissed as not maintainable.[2020 CLD 251 and 2023 SCMR 236 ref.](b) Trade Organizations Act, 2013:—Ss. 3(2)(b), 6(1)(c), 14(3)(g), 21—Applicability of Companies Act, 2017—Trade organizations—Scope—Petitioner argued that Companies Act, 2017 was inapplicable to trade organizations governed by Trade Organizations Act, 2013. Held, Trade Organizations Act expressly enables incorporation and regulation of trade bodies under Companies Act, 2017—Act requires trade organizations to be registered under Companies Act and comply with its provisions—Regulator’s direction to convene meeting for no-confidence motion under Section 190 of Companies Act was lawful and within jurisdiction—BCCI being licensed under the 2013 Act and registered under Section 42 of the Companies Act, 2017, must comply with both laws.[2024 CLD 1266 relied on](c) Companies Act, 2017:—S. 190—Removal of Chief Executive—Procedure—Applicability to Trade Bodies—Trade organizations incorporated under Companies Act are bound by its provisions—Section 190 prescribes mechanism for removal of Chief Executive via majority vote of Board of Directors—No-confidence motion initiated by Executive Committee of BCCI is in conformity with this provision—Regulator’s directive aligned with statutory procedure.[Clause 14(1) of BCCI license and S.14(3)(g) of the 2013 Act also referred](d) General Clauses Act, 1897:—S. 24-A—Exercise of statutory powers—Requirement of lawful authority and due process—Petitioner alleged violation of S.24-A in issuance of letters for no-confidence motion—Held, the Regulator's directions were neither arbitrary nor unlawful but exercised within authority conferred under statute—Due process was followed—Section 24-A not violated.(e) Companies—Corporate personality—Board resolution—Requirement—Where legal action is taken on behalf of a company, a board resolution is required. However, if an individual official is sued in personal capacity, such resolution is not necessary—Petitioner’s challenge regarding absence of resolution by Respondent No.3 thus held misconceived.[2021 CLD 960 and 2023 SCMR 236 cited](f) Statutory interpretation—Special law v. general law—Harmonious construction—Petitioner’s claim that special law (Trade Organizations Act) overrides general law (Companies Act, 2017) held misconceived—Court held that both statutes must be read harmoniously—Companies Act is explicitly applicable to trade organizations per licensing and registration framework under Trade Organizations Act.----Disposition:Writ Petition dismissed. Directions of Regulator upheld.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Section 215 of the Contract Act, 1872 equips the principal with a right to repudiate the transaction when agent deals on his own account, in the business of the agency without principal's consent.

Summary: (a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997) [as amended by Control of Narcotic Substances (Amendment) Act (XX of 2022)]--- ----S.9(1), Sr. No.(6)(c)--Possession and transportation of narcotic substances---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Prosecution case was that 1100-grams heroin was recovered from the possession of accused---Complainant stated that accused was apprehended with the help of accompanying lady constable and on her search heroin weighing 1100-grams was recovered---Lady Constable had reiterated almost the same story---Complaint indicated that one Head Constable took the same to the police station to set the criminal law into motion, and FIR was lodged---In addition to the said key role, per prosecution case, the said Head Constable approached Investigating Officer, after that the said Investigating Officer started the process of investigation, who stated in his examination-in-chief that he recorded the statement of Lady Constable and another Constable---No reason whatsoever came on record that why the statement under S.161,Cr.P.C., of Head Constable, was not recorded---Neither the statement under S.161,Cr.P.C., of Head Constable was recorded nor he was introduced as witness in the list of witnesses of report under S.173,Cr.P.C.---First Information Report and statement of the Duty Officer was not enough to prove the vital evidence of Head Constable---Head Constable was the witness relating to the fact that he had approached the Duty Officer for registration of FIR and thereafter communicated the FIR to the Investigating Officer and only then process of investigation had started---It was a matter of record that heroin was recovered from white coloured shopping bag, which had not been tendered in evidence with exhibit number creating doubt in the prosecution story, which was otherwise neither plausible nor believable---Appeal filed by accused against her conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Minhaj Khan v. The State 2019 SCMR 326 rel. (b) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---If a single doubt is created even then the defence is entitled to the benefit of doubt not as a matter of grace and concession but as a matter of right. Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 and Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 rel. Khadim Hussain Malik for Appellant. Naeem Akber, Deputy Prosecutor General with Allah Ditta, S.I for the State. Date of hearing: 17th March, 2025.

Summary: Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act (XII of 2011)--- ----Ss. 2(19), 2(72C), 3 & 63---Reference---Taxable service---Exempt service---Absence of invoices---Dispute pertained to demand of sales tax on Business Support Services along with renting of premises---Validity---If Appellate Tribunal believed that no substantial material was provided by applicant / taxpayer, then at the same time it was also incumbent upon the Tribunal to confront respondent / Revenue Board Authorities as to from where they had gathered information and made out a case without proper invoices issued by applicant / taxpayer---Various invoices were placed on record by applicant / taxpayer who had discharged the burden as to providing two separate and distinct services---Invoices so produced clearly depicted that there were separate and distinct services to various clients and had charged sales tax accordingly---Applicant / taxpayer was offering / renting the space, which at times also included certain support services---Renting of space remained a separate and distinct service, and mere issuance of a common invoice did not ipso facto make such services wholly taxable---Neither the definition nor the category under which a person was registered could create liability of tax as it was the actual service so rendered which was taxable---High Court set aside orders of the forums below and decided questions in favour of applicant / taxpayer---Reference was allowed accordingly. Young’s (Private) Limited v. Province of Sindh 2019 PTD 389 ref. Sauban Tasleem for Applicant. Shamshad Ahmed for Respondents. Date of hearing: 17th March, 2025.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497(1)---Azad Penal Code (XLV of 1860),Ss. 302(b), 341 & 34---Arms Act (XI of 1878), S. 15(2)---Qatl-i-amd, wrongful restraint, common intention, possession of illicit weapon---Bail ---Statutory delay in conclusion of trial---Bail on the ground of delay in conclusion of trial---Scope---Allegations against the accused-appellants were that they committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing---Record showed that police conducted an investigation and submitted the challan on 22.03.2022---It was alleged that the trial remained delayed due to a parallel private complaint filed by respondent No.2 on 08.04.2022 before the Court, under the same offences---Trial Court stayed the proceedings of the challan case on 28.09.2022---Private complaint was eventually withdrawn by the complainant on 02.03.2024 and the trial of the challan case resumed thereafter---Due to excessive delay in the trial, the appellants moved bail application before the Trial Court on statutory grounds under S.497, Cr.P.C., citing prolonged incarceration exceeding two years without framing of charges---However, the Trial Court dismissed the bail application on 30.03.2024---Feeling aggrieved, the appellants filed a revision petition before the Shariat Appellate Bench of the High Court, which had been dismissed through the impugned judgment, hence, this appeal---It was regrettable state of affairs that the revision petition was filed before the High Court on 29.05.2024, yet it remained pending for nearly eight months---Despite such considerable delay, instead of adjudicating the revision petition on merits, the High Court merely remanded the case to the Trial Court, thereby further prolonging the matter---However, in the present case, the High Court kept the bail matter pending for nearly eight months and, instead of deciding it on its own merits, remanded it to the Trial Court, resulting in further delay---Moreover, in the light of arguments addressed at bar, following points needed resolution in this case; what was the effect of filing of private complaint and its withdrawal in this case; whether the delay in non-conclusion of trial had to be determined from the date of detention of the accused or from the date of submission of challan; and whether the appellants were entitled to concession of bail on statutory ground---Thus, it was the High Court which had to decide these questions itself---In such circumstances, matter was remanded to High Court for deciding the same, within a period of one week. PLD 2022 SC 122; PLD 2022 SC 551; 2022 SCMR 1; 2015 SCMR 1007 and 2004 PCr.LJ 52 ref. Noman Ajmal v. Moheen and others 2020 YLR Note 110, p-105 rel. Tahir Aziz Khan, Advocate for Appellants. Sheikh Masood Iqbal, Advocate General and Raja Gul Majeed Khan, Advocate for the State. Date of hearing: 13th March, 2025.