Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)— Art. 138 — Delegation of public functions — Scope — Private entities cannot be conferred public functions of Provincial Government — Validity of Stamp Act amendments tested against constitutional principles.Held, power to perform public functions (e.g., examination, impounding of instruments under Stamp Act) can only be conferred on public officers subordinate to the Provincial Government in terms of Article 138; attempt to extend these functions to private entities (insurance companies, housing societies, real estate brokers, etc.) by expanding definition of "public office" under S.2(22A) of Stamp Act is unconstitutional and contrary to principles enunciated in Mustafa Impex v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 2016 SC 808).(b) Stamp Act, 1899— Ss. 2(22A), 2(22B), 33, 35, 73 — Definition of 'public office' and its implications — Power of Stamp Auditor to inspect records — Scope — Petitioners held not to fall within 'public office' definition post-2021 amendment — Stamp audit notices declared ultra vires.Court held that the 2021 amendment to the Stamp Act deliberately omitted “companies registered under Companies Act, 1913” from the definition of ‘public office’, evidencing legislative intent to exclude such companies from stamp audit jurisdiction. Hence, audit notices issued to insurance companies (petitioners) were unconstitutional and beyond the powers of the Chief Inspector of Stamps.(c) Interpretation of Statutes— Legislative omission — Effect — Intent of legislature inferred from omission of specific words in amended statute.Omission of phrase “a body registered under the Companies Act, 1913” from S.2(22A) of Stamp Act (post-2021 amendment) shows legislative intent to exclude such companies from the purview of ‘public office’ — Any inclusion by interpretation would amount to rewriting statute and violate settled principles of interpretation.Referenced: Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts by Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner.(d) Administrative Law— Judicial review — Ultra vires action by public authority — Audit notices by Chief Inspector of Stamps to insurance companies — Legality.Held, Chief Inspector of Stamps acted without lawful authority in issuing notices for inspection and audit of insurance company records, as neither the Audit Rules nor the 1899 Act (post-2021) permitted such jurisdiction over private, federally regulated insurance companies.(e) West Pakistan Stamp Inspection and Audit Rules, 1949— Applicability — Stamp audit scope limited to government departments listed in Appendix II — Petitioners not included — Notices declared illegal.Audit Rules do not empower Stamp Auditors to inspect accounts of private insurance companies; such entities not listed in Appendix II. Thus, no lawful jurisdiction to compel audit of petitioners.Disposition:Petitions allowed.Definition of 'public office' (S.2(22A)) and 'public officer' (S.2(22B)) declared unconstitutional to the extent of inclusion of private entities.Impugned notices held without lawful authority and of no legal effect.

Summary: (a) Constitutional Law – Articles 142, 138, Fourth Schedule, Item 29 & 59 – Legislative competence – Taxation of trans-provincial insurance companies – Stamp duty – ConstitutionalityPetitioners, trans-provincial insurance companies regulated by federal law, challenged the jurisdiction of the Province of Punjab to levy or collect stamp duty under the Stamp Act, 1899 on insurance policies. The Court held that the business of insurance is exclusively regulated under federal law as per Item 29 and 59 of the Federal Legislative List. Imposition of stamp duty on such insurance companies by the provincial government violated Articles 141, 142 and the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution. The impugned notices issued under Section 73 of the Stamp Act were ultra vires and unconstitutional.→ Sui Southern Gas Co. Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (2018 SCMR 802) relied upon.(b) Constitutional Law – Article 138 – Delegation of public functions – Delegation to private entities – Scope and limitationThe Court observed that public functions, including impounding of instruments and collection of stamp duties, can only be delegated to public officers under Article 138 of the Constitution. The inclusion of private entities such as commercial concerns and companies within the definition of “public office” under Section 2(22A) of the Stamp Act, 1899 was held unconstitutional. Such delegation of public functions to private bodies was contrary to constitutional jurisprudence laid down in Mustafa Impex v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2016 SC 808).(c) Statutory Interpretation – Stamp Act, 1899 – Section 2(22A), Section 73 – Audit Rules – Omission of companies from definition of “public office”The Court held that the 2021 amendment to Section 2(22A) of the Stamp Act, which omitted “a body registered under the Companies Act, 1913,” from the definition of “public office,” indicated legislative intent to exclude private companies such as petitioners from audit jurisdiction. The impugned notices, which directed the companies to undergo audit under Section 73, were issued without lawful authority.(d) Provincial Legislation – Stamp duty audit – West Pakistan Stamp Inspection and Audit Rules, 1949 – ScopeUnder Rule 7 of the Audit Rules and Appendix II, only specified public offices such as courts, government departments, and official receivers fall within the audit domain. Private insurance companies were not listed. The stamp auditors appointed by the Board of Revenue lacked legal mandate to audit petitioners’ records.(e) DispositionPetitions allowed. The definition of “public office” under Section 2(22A) of the Stamp Act, 1899, to the extent it included private bodies, declared unconstitutional. Notices issued by the Chief Inspector of Stamps were declared without lawful authority and struck down.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Sections 302(b) & 34 – Conviction – Murder of wife – Incident inside matrimonial home – Ocular account – Medical evidence – Failure to explain – Presumption – Article 122, QSO, 1984.Where a woman was murdered in her matrimonial home and the accused–her husband–failed to offer any plausible explanation for her death, such silence attracted the presumption under Article 122 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The accused neither informed the police nor assisted in funeral proceedings. Ocular testimony of the complainant (father of deceased) and another relative, supported by prompt registration of FIR and corroborative medical evidence, proved the prosecution case beyond doubt. Despite acquittal of co-accused, the direct role of the appellant was consistent and established.—Held: Conviction and life sentence maintained.[Cf. PLD 2003 SC 477; PLD 1997 SC 03](b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302(b) – Sentence – Life imprisonment – Enhancement of sentence – Scope – When not warranted.Where the prosecution successfully establishes culpability for murder but fails to bring on record any aggravating circumstances warranting the extreme penalty, sentence of life imprisonment is appropriate. Petition for enhancement filed by complainant found to be without merit.—Held: Criminal Revision dismissed.[Cf. PLD 2023 Lahore 412](c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.544-A – Compensation – Imposition – Validity.The trial court rightly awarded Rs.300,000/- as compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased under Section 544-A Cr.P.C., with default clause of six months' simple imprisonment. The same was upheld.—Held: Provision mandatory; no illegality.[Cf. 2022 SCMR 1150](d) Criminal Law – Delay in FIR – Explained delay – Not fatal.Where the FIR was registered within reasonable time after preliminary statement at the crime scene and the delay was explained by presence of police at the spot, site plan preparation, and coordination with complainant, such delay was not deemed deliberate or fatal.—Held: Delay sufficiently explained; prosecution version remained credible.[Cf. PLD 2021 SC 600; 2020 SCMR 45](e) Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 122 – Burden of proof – Murder inside home – Husband’s silence – Adverse presumption.Husband’s failure to explain how his wife died inside their house raised strong adverse inference. As the incident occurred in the room of the appellant’s house and he neither reported nor explained the occurrence, it supported the prosecution’s case.—Held: Presumption under Article 122 attracted.[Cf. 2012 SCMR 419; PLD 2017 SC 394](f) Acquittal – Scope of interference – Double presumption of innocence – When not disturbed.Appeal against acquittal of co-accused dismissed where the trial court had advanced sound reasons for acquittal, and no perversity, illegality, misreading or non-reading of evidence was shown.—Held: P.S.L.A. dismissed.[Cf. 2023 SCMR 1499; PLD 2019 SC 527]Disposition:Criminal Appeal No.10245/2022 dismissed.Criminal Revision No.28168/2022 dismissed.P.S.L.A. No.28166/2022 dismissed.

Summary: ----Ss.9, 20 & O.VII, R.10---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.42 & 54---Suit for declaration and permanent injunction against a public functionary---Trial Court returning the plaint due to lack of territorial jurisdiction---Jurisdiction of civil court---Exercise of jurisdiction by civil courts against mala fide acts of public functionaries despite statutory bar---High Court remanding the matter to Trial Court to record evidence and decide the matter on merits---Brief facts were that the petitioner filed a civil suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief before the civil court at Quetta, relating to matters of the Balochistan Squash Association (BSA), of which he had previously held office---During the proceedings, it emerged that the Pakistan Squash Federation (PSF) held its 43rd Annual General Meeting and that subsequent elections and organizational steps concerning BSA were conducted there---Notices were issued, written statements were filed, and issues were framed by the Trial Court---The Trial Court ultimately returned the plaint under O.VII R.10, C.P.C. on the ground that the impugned meeting and related actions occurred at Islamabad, outside its territorial jurisdiction---Appellate court upheld Trial Court’s order---The petitioner then filed the present constitutional petition challenging the orders of the courts below---Held: Trial Court after considering that controversy, was required to decide the suit by recording of evidence, the provisions of O.VII, R.10, C.P.C. could not be pressed into service to non-suit the petitioner---When an action of the public authority was stated to be without jurisdiction and void, the plaintiff was within his rights to maintain suit before civil court under S.9 of the C.P.C.---Where a statute provided an alternate remedy or forum, then, if the act of public functionary was statedly mala fide, void or without jurisdiction, then the general jurisdiction of a civil court under S.9 of the C.P.C. was not barred---Courts below failed to appreciate the facts of the case in light of relevant law provisions---Orders passed by courts below were set aside and the matter was remanded to the Trial Court for affording opportunity of leading evidence to the parties for decision on merits---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.20---Jurisdiction of courts, invocation of---Determination---Components---Meaning, essence and concept---Section 20 of C.P.C. confers jurisdiction on a Court in two ways---Firstly, on the basis of where a defendant resides, carries on business or works for gain within its local limits---Secondly on the basis of where the cause of action wholly or in part arose within its local limits---Jurisdiction means the authority to decide---The concept of jurisdiction of a Court encompasses (i) territorial jurisdiction, (ii) pecuniary jurisdiction and (iii) subject matter jurisdiction---The concept of jurisdiction has its genesis in the physical power of a Court to issue process to persons within the reach of the Court---Shorn of all extraneous ‘frills’, this is the essence of jurisdiction---A Court is to decide matters when persons relating thereto are within its reach. Bahoo Dying Industries (Private) Limited v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited and others PLD 2021 Lah. 186; Dr. Raees M. Mushtaque through General Attorney v. Province of Sindh through Secretary Food and 3 others 2018 MLD 918 and Taisei Corporation v. A.M. Construction Company (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2012 Lah. 455 ref. (c) Jurisdiction--- ----Concept of---The concept of jurisdiction has its genesis in the physical power of a Court to issue process to persons within the reach of the Court---The jurisdiction of a legal forum/Court includes its (i) territorial jurisdiction; (ii) pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) subject matter jurisdiction---The jurisdiction is always conferred upon the Courts by a law and it cannot be decided by the parties inter se---The territorial jurisdiction refers to a Court’s power over actions and parties within the bounds of a particular territory---If a Court does not have territorial jurisdiction over the events or persons within it, then the Court cannot give a binding decision regarding the rights of the parties. Messrs Muhammad Tufail and Company through Muhammad Tufail (deceased) through Legal Heirs PLD 2017 SC 51 rel. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.9---Statutory bar on jurisdiction of civil court---Actions of public functionary being challenged before the civil court despite the statutory bar---Civil courts empowered to exercise jurisdiction if orders passed with mala fide---Raison d`etre---Where a statute provides an alternate remedy or forum, then, if the act of public functionary is statedly mala fide, void or without jurisdiction, then the general jurisdiction of a civil court under S.9 of the C.P.C. is not barred---With regard to bar of jurisdiction contained in any statute, it is settled that if in any statute, there is a bar of plenary jurisdiction of civil court, the bar will be applicable if the authority acts in accordance with the said statute, and its acts, orders do not violate the jurisdiction conferred upon that authority under the said statute then the bar of jurisdiction contained in the said statute applies and if the authority acts or passes any order in violation of the jurisdiction vested in it under the said statute and transgresses jurisdiction or the orders or action if scrutinized keeping in view the jurisdiction available under the said statute and the orders or action is found without jurisdiction then certainly the bar contained in the said statute on the plenary jurisdiction of the civil court is not applicable and the suit would be competent---When an action of a public authority is stated to be without jurisdiction and void, then plaintiff is within his rights to maintain suit before civil court under S.9, C.P.C. Muhammad Nazir Khan v. Ahmad and 2 others 2008 SCMR 521 rel. Fehmida Kiran v. Chairman House Allotment Committee / Secretary S&GAD and others 2023 MLD 659 ref. (e) Administration of justice--- ----Question of fact or a mixed question of law and fact, cannot be effectively decided without recording of evidence. Petitioner in person. Ms. Salma Fateh, Assistant Advocate General, assisted by Murid Ali, Deputy Director and Abdul Qadir, Assistant Director Sports for Respondent No. 1. Naseer Ahmed Bangulzai, Deputy Attorney General for Respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 3 proceeded against ex parte on 29-4-2024. Matiullah Khan Kakar, for Respondents Nos. 4 and 5. Date of hearing: 18th March, 2025.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 199 & 212---Civil service---Non-payment of salaries etc., grievance of---Invoking constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Claim of the petitioners was that they were appointed in 2012 by the Education Department Govt. of Sindh, after fulfilling the codal formalities, however, they were not paid their monthly salaries, which led them to challenge the matter before the Service Tribunal by filing service appeal---Service Tribunal issued directions to the Education Department to scrutinize the petitioner's cases and after completing the codal formalities to release their salaries---Subsequently, the petitioners' cases were placed before the Scrutiny Committee and the Secretary, School Education Department , on the basis of the findings of the Scrutiny Committee, passed order issuing a list of eligible appointees for joining the service---Petitioners were not declared eligible during the scrutiny process---Admittedly, the petitioners were civil servants and matter related to terms and conditions of service i.e. the release of salaries, seniority and promotion---However, instead of challenging the findings of the Scrutiny Committee through a departmental appeal or a service appeal, they filed the instant petition before this/High Court for seeking relief for matters pertaining to the year 2012---Relief sought by the petitioners cannot be granted under the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Petitioners had, on their own accord, availed the remedy by filing a service appeal before the Service Tribunal for the same relief---High Court in view of Art.212 of the Constitution lacks jurisdiction to entertain such matters, as the dispute essentially involves questions of law and fact which have already been decided---Constitutional petition, being merit-less, was dismissed. Salahuddin Chandio for Petitioners. Ali Safdar Depar, A.A.G. for Respondents. Date of hearing: 18th March, 2025.

Summary: Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The word "compensation" has intentionally been employed by the Legislature which means compulsory payment on the part of State/Government against the compulsory acquisition. In case of acknowledgment made by the State/Government during the course of trial, the State/Government cannot raise plea of limitation at a belated stage to deprive a party from its right of compensation as fresh limitation is to be computed from the time when acknowledgment was made by the State/Government, meaning thereby acquiescence and promissory estoppel will come in its way.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The word "compensation" has intentionally been employed by the Legislature which means compulsory payment on the part of State/Government against the compulsory acquisition. In case of acknowledgment made by the State/Government during the course of trial, the State/Government cannot raise plea of limitation at a belated stage to deprive a party from its right of compensation as fresh limitation is to be computed from the time when acknowledgment was made by the State/Government, meaning thereby acquiescence and promissory estoppel will come in its way. 614Crl. Appeal- Against Conviction- ATA / STA 551-16 PARVAIZ @IRFAN VS STATE ETC Mr. Justice Muhammad Jawad Zafar 20- 03- 2025 2025 LHC 7284 2026 PCr.LJ 134 [Lahore (Multan Bench)]

Summary: Summary pending