Summary: "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S. 24-A---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 18 & 25---Suit for declaration and injunction---Interim injunction, grant of---License, renewal of---Right to trade and business---Discrimination---Plaintiffs were licensed by Civil Aviation Authority to operate commercial airline for passengers and cargo---Grievance of plaintiffs was that authorities declined to renew the license on the plea that some of the Directors and Shareholders of plaintiff company required security clearance---Validity---Denial of security clearance was not as required under the law---Such was not only devoid of serious reasoning of security/ intelligence agencies but also hit by S.24-A of General Clauses Act, 1897---In absence of detailed reasoning as to the adverse observation, it would not be possible for plaintiffs to comply with such anonymous terms---Change of directorship or Chief Executive Officer, was not the solution as it would amount to denying a right as guaranteed to each citizen of Pakistan in terms of Arts. 18 & 25 of the Constitution---Letter of government advising plaintiff company through Civil Aviation Authority that they could either get security clearance from the Directorate of Inter Service Intelligence or concerned Director/Chief Executive Officer should be considered to be changed was of no consequence at all---Denial to renew a license to plaintiff company on account of dual nationality of Directors amounted to curtailing a right guaranteed under Arts. 18 & 25 of the Constitution unless valid reasons were provided---High Court directed plaintiffs to respond to queries and provide all information and documents as and when required by the concerned authority/security agencies---High Court suspended the orders passed by the authorities---Interim injunction was granted in circumstances."

Summary: The background of the case is that the petitioners had filed a suit in 2004 for a declaration and mandatory injunction regarding their alleged investment in Joy Foam Pvt. Ltd. However, the civil court returned their plaint, directing them to file it before the appropriate forum. Subsequently, in 2010, the petitioners filed the present petition, which the respondents argue is substantially different from the original plaint. The document discussed legal precedents, including one from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which emphasized that when a court returns a plaint due to jurisdiction issues, the party is not obligated to file the same plaint again and can file a fresh suit or petition. However, they must consider the issue of limitation. The respondents argued that the present petition is barred by limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, as the cause of action arose in 2003 when the initial suit was filed. The document cited judgments supporting the view that a fresh petition or application can be subject to the period of limitation, and such applications should not be entertained when the original suit for the same relief has become time-barred. The document presents arguments and legal precedents to support the rejection of the petition on the grounds of jurisdiction and limitation.

Summary: Background: Eastern Testing Services (Pvt.) Ltd. (Petitioner), a company incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, challenged two orders issued by the Deputy Registrar of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) concerning the removal of the company’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Respondent No.4. The petitioner company contended that the CEO was removed through a valid resolution passed in an Extraordinary General Meeting (EOGM) held on 19-03-2011, although a prior injunctive order had been issued against such action. The SECP, however, questioned the validity of the EOGM, citing the injunctive order, and withdrew the letter recognizing the CEO's removal. The petitioner challenged the SECP’s orders directly in the High Court without seeking available remedies under the Ordinance. -----Issues: 1- Jurisdiction and Review Authority of the SECP: Did the Deputy Registrar of SECP have the authority to review his earlier decision acknowledging the CEO’s removal? -----2- Maintainability of Constitutional Petition under Article 199: Can the petitioner bypass statutory remedies available under the Companies Ordinance and SECP Act and seek relief directly through the High Court’s constitutional jurisdiction? -----3- Effect of Injunctive Order: Did the injunctive order restraining the holding of the EOGM render the meeting and its decisions void, particularly if the order was not served on the company? -----Holding / Reasoning / Outcome: --Jurisdiction of SECP: The High Court affirmed that the SECP had the authority to review its prior decision under Section 484 of the Companies Ordinance. The court noted that powers granted under the Ordinance provide sufficient mechanisms for the SECP to address issues such as disputed corporate actions. --Maintainability of the Petition under Article 199: The High Court found the petition non-maintainable, holding that the petitioner should have availed itself of the alternate statutory remedies before approaching the court. The judgment emphasized that the High Court’s constitutional jurisdiction is to be exercised only in exceptional cases where statutory remedies are inadequate, or where the impugned actions are palpably without jurisdiction, malafide, or coram non judice. --Effect of the Injunctive Order: The court held that the question of whether the injunctive order was served on the company, and thus whether it was bound by the order when holding the EOGM, raised disputed questions of fact not suitable for resolution in constitutional jurisdiction. This determination, it stated, was within the purview of the SECP's statutory review process. -----Citations/Precedents: Scope of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Article 199): Tariq Transport Company, Lahore vs. Sargodha-Bhera Bus Service, PLD 1958 SC 437 Lt. Col. Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan vs. Controller of Estate Duty, PLD 1961 SC 119 Murree Brewery Co. Ltd. vs. Pakistan, PLD 1972 SC 279 Khalid Mehmood vs. Collector of Customs, 1999 SCMR 1881

Summary: Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----Ss.18(3), 30, 79, 104 & 131---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.42 & 54---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Notification S.R.O. 18(I)/2015, dated 14-1-2015---Suit for declaration and injunction---Interim injunction, grant of---Rate of duty---Determination---Principle---Plaintiffs imported goods from foreign supplier under contract executed prior to issuance of Notification S.R.O. 18(I)/2015, dated 14-1-2015---Plea raised by plaintiffs was that authorities be restrained from applying/deducting regulatory duty in terms of notification S.R.O. 18(I)/2015, dated 14-1-2015---Validity---Manner and method of date of determination of rate of duty on goods imported into Pakistan were subject to Ss.79 & 104 of Customs Act, 1969, and date of determination of rate of duty on goods exported was subject to provisions of S.131 of Customs Act, 1969---Imposition and collection of regulatory duty on "import" and "export" was different and distinct and no analogy could be drawn for interpreting the provision of one section of the statute with the other section in the same statute by referring to case-law dealing with one particular levy---Provisions of notification S.R.O. 18(I)/2015, dated 14-1-2015, were applicable on shipments of plaintiffs in terms of S.30 of Customs Act, 1969, irrespective of the fact that plaintiffs had entered into contract for purchase of consignments with foreign suppliers and opened letter of credits prior to 14-1-2015---High Court declined to grant interim injunction against applicability of notification S.R.O. 18(I)/2015, dated 14-1-2015---Suit was dismissed in circumstances.

Summary: [Order Vii, Rule 11 C.P.C (Allowed.)] (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 42 & 54---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.23, 189 & 201---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.11, Expln.VI & O.VII, R.11---Suit for declaration and injunction---Res judicata, principle of---Rejection of plaint---Public importance issue---Plaintiffs were residents of road in question and they assailed commercialization of the road---Defendants sought rejection of plaint on the plea that commercialization of road in question had already been decided in earlier proceedings in presence of plaintiff's registered Association--- Validity--- Once registered Association of residents of the area was present before Court and 'issue' of public importance for and on behalf of residents was raised by them and the Court had decided the 'issue', the individual members or other residents of same locality were bound by the decision of Court on that particular 'issue' in which they were very much interested and they could not claim that such decision of the Court on the said 'issue' was not binding on them because they were not individually party to that judgment---Plaintiffs were no other than the community of residents of same locality and the issue re-agitated by them through the suit had already stood answered by Division Bench of High Court, therefore, earlier judgment was binding on them in terms of Expln.VI to S.11, C.P.C.---Plaintiffs abused process of Court in denying defendants to freely exercise their fundamental right to acquire, hold and 'dispose of property' guaranteed to them by Art.23 of the Constitution---Plaintiffs attempted to persuade the Court to pass orders against mandate of Arts.189 & 201 of the Constitution---Suit was dismissed with costs in circumstances.

Summary: The petitioner, serving as Assistant Director (Staff) in the Capital Development Authority (CDA), was allotted Suite No. 23 in the Government Hostel, Islamabad. The respondent sought to cancel this allotment, which the petitioner alleged was being done unlawfully and with malafide intent. The petitioner filed a civil suit seeking an injunction to prevent the cancellation. The application for the injunction was initially granted as a status quo order but was later dismissed by the Civil Judge on 30.09.2013. The petitioner’s subsequent appeal to the District Judge was also dismissed on 16.12.2013. Aggrieved by these decisions, the petitioner filed this Civil Revision before the Islamabad High Court. ------ Issues: ------ 1) Whether the respondent’s cancellation of the allotment was lawful and within the scope of its authority. ------ 2) Whether the lower courts erred in dismissing the petitioner’s application for an injunction. ------ 3) Whether the petitioner satisfied the requirements for the grant of an injunction, namely: Prima facie arguable case. Balance of convenience. Irreparable loss. ------ Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Islamabad High Court dismissed the Civil Revision petition. The final show-cause notice issued by the respondent on 06.06.2013 was valid, based on objections raised by the National Assembly regarding the occupancy of the suite. Under Rule 11 of the Federal Government Hostel Rules, 1983, the authority has sole discretion to cancel allotments at any time. The petitioner failed to meet the legal requirements for the grant of an injunction: ------ Prima facie case: The petitioner did not present compelling evidence to support their claim. ------ Balance of convenience: The respondent acted within the framework of the rules and in response to objections raised by the National Assembly. Irreparable loss: The petitioner did not demonstrate that the cancellation would cause significant or irreparable harm. ------ Outcome: The petition was deemed to lack merit and was dismissed. All associated applications were rendered infructuous and disposed of accordingly. ------ Citations/Precedents: Federal Government Hostel Rules, 1983 (Rule 11): Provides the authority with the discretion to cancel allotments. Order 39, Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC): Governs the grant of temporary injunctions and was central to the petitioner’s application.

Summary: Benami transaction-------Suit for decarlation, possession, rendition of accounts and injunction---House mutated inname of step-mother of plaintiff was alleged to be purchased by his deceased father asbenamidar---Proof---Plaintiff's witnesses had not deposed in court to have witnessed payment ofsale price of suit house by plaintiff's father---Plaintiff had admitted not to be present at time ofsuit transaction---Plaintiff had failed to prove purchase of suit house and payment of its price byhis father---Step-mother during life-time of her husband had transferred suit house to a thirdperson through mutation, but he did not challenge same---Plaintiff's oral version was contrary tosuch documentary evidence---Admission of witness of step-mother in cross-examination thatdeceased had made payment of sale price of suit house, would not carry any weight as burden toprove suit transaction to be benami was lying on plaintiff---Deceased during his life time hadnever claimed that his wife (plaintiff s step-mother) was benamidar of suit house---Suit wasdismissed in circumstances. 2001 CLC 1599 and 2005 SCMR 577 ref.Abdul Haq v. Mst. Surrya Begum 2002 SCMR 1330 and Ghulam Murtaza v. Mst. AsiaBibi and others PLD 2010 SC 569 rel.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-------Ss. 42 & 54---Suit for declaration and injunction---Concurrent findings of fact by two Courtsbelow---Forest department claimed to be owner in possession of suit land and alleged that cuttingof trees and raising of construction by defendants was illegal---Trial Court as well as LowerAppellate Court concurrently decided the suit and appeal in favour of Forest department---Validity---No illegality or irregularity were found in both the judgments passed by two Courtsbelow warranting interference by High Court by way of setting aside the same---Defendantsfailed to rebut claim of Forest department that land in dispute was not allotted to it or ProvincialGovernment was not owner of the same---Concurrent findings of facts arrived at by two Courtsbelow were on record which normally could not be disturbed by High Court unless it was provedthat the same were shocking, ridiculous or artificial---Defendants failed to specify any portion ofevidence which had been misread, non-read or misappreciated and only general type of groundshad been raised by defendants---Both the Courts below after proper appraisal of evidence andmaterial available on record passed well-reasoned and exhaustive judgments after attending each and every aspect of the case---High Court did not find any misreading or non-reading ofevidence and declined to interfere in concurrent judgments passed by two Courts below---Revision was dismissed in circumstances.(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-------Ss. 42 & 54---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.11---Suit for declaration and injunction---Res judicata, principle of---Applicability---Suit filed by plaintiffs was dismissed on the principleof res judicata as same having been filed by defendant-department had already been decreedagainst plaintiffs---Plea raised by plaintiffs was that since their suit was dismissed at the strengthof findings recorded by Trial Court in suit filed by defendant-department and the findings wereupheld by Lower Appellate Court, yet were sub judice before High Court, therefore, plaintiffswere non-suited at a premature stage---Validity---Plea of plaintiffs though attractive yetintrinsically lost significance, as the suit was filed by plaintiffs and defendant-department wasalready having a decree in its favour application under S.11, C.P.C. was fully attracted---Plaintiffs failed to prove their claim and Courts below rightly passed judgments and decreeswhich were not open to any exception---High Court declined to interfere in judgments anddecrees passed by two Courts below---Revision was dismissed in circumstances.S.M. Shafi Ahmad Zaidi through Legal Heirs v. Malik Hassan Ali Khan (Moin) throughLegal Heirs relevant at page 342), reported in 2002 SCMR 338 rel.

Summary: The appellant challenges the decision of a learned single judge, arguing that the criteria set for considering an injunction application were flawed and violated the ordinance's provisions. The appellant contends that the recovery option could be initiated under Section 15(4) of the ordinance without court intervention if Section 15(2) is strictly complied with.The appellant asserts that the notices sent by the respondent lacked proper compliance with the ordinance's requirements, emphasizing the importance of adherence to Section 15(2). The first notice of demand was allegedly replied to, denying any outstanding amount and calling for an account review. The appellant challenged the issuance and service of the second and third notices, claiming discrepancies in addresses and disputing their delivery. The appellant argued that the learned single judge did not adequately address issues related to the notices and failed to consider the appellant's denial of amounts due. The appellant emphasized strict compliance with Section 15(2) and cites relevant case law to support the argument that procedural requirements must be followed. The court discussed the mandatory nature of Section 15(2) and highlights the significance of complying with the ordinance's provisions, particularly regarding notice issuance and service. The court rejected the presumption drawn by the single judge without proper evidence of the second and third notices' delivery. Consequently, the court sets aside the impugned order, disagreeing with the findings related to Section 15(2) and emphasizing the necessity for compliance with the ordinance's procedural requirements.

Summary: PLJ 2012 AJK 78. Present: Munir Ahmed Chaudhary, J. AHMED DIN - Petitioner versus HAQ NAWAZ and 15 others - Respondents. Revision P. No. 440 of 2010, decided on 6.2.2012. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908) - O. XXXIX, Rr. 1, 2 -----Suit for permanent injunction - Objection raised on the injunction, which was subsequently canceled - Challenged. The road was constructed by the local government for the public's benefit. A commission report submitted to the trial court, following an inspection of the road and surrounding areas, showed no objections raised at that stage. Regarding the maintainability of the suit, it was held that preliminary objections should be resolved prior to any substantive issues. If the plaintiff was unwilling to provide his land for road construction, he could claim compensation from the authorities. Petition dismissed [Pp. 80, 81] A, B. ------Background: The petitioner filed a suit for permanent injunction to prevent the respondents, the local government, from constructing a road on a portion of his land. The petitioner argued that he owned the disputed land and had not consented to the road's construction. The trial court canceled an interim injunction initially granted, and the District Judge upheld this decision. The petitioner then filed a revision petition, contending that constructing the road without his consent was unlawful and seeking to maintain the injunction. -----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioner’s suit for a permanent injunction to prevent road construction on his land is maintainable. -----2- Whether the petitioner, having previously allowed a portion of his land for road construction, is entitled to challenge the road's continued use and seek an injunction. ------Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the petitioner’s suit was not maintainable because he had previously allowed his land to be used for road construction, and the road had been used by the public for several years. Furthermore, since the petitioner did not seek a declaration of ownership in his suit, he could not claim permanent or interim injunction relief. The court noted that the petitioner retains the right to seek compensation if he objects to the land's continued use for public purposes. The court dismissed the revision petition, instructing the trial court to address the maintainability of the suit as a preliminary matter. ------Citations/Precedents: 2002 CLC 571 (Requirement for a declaration of ownership in injunction suits and the need to address preliminary objections regarding suit maintainability)