Summary: When, according to eyewitness accounts, the deceased, who was in an injured condition, was taken to the hospital, he succumbed to his injuries on the way. However, the inquest report prepared at the place of the occurrence indicates that the dead body was lying on the ground. This suggests that none of the cited eyewitnesses, including the complainant, were present at the place of occurrence. Attempts were made to justify the delay in registering the case, which was spent on inducing and procuring witnesses and subsequently tailoring the prosecution's story.

Summary: Minority opinion of 2025 SCP 164 ---- (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Arts. 8(3)(a), 175(3), 2A, 9, 10, 10A, 19A, 25, 227----Independence of judiciary---Fundamental rights---Military courts---Trial of civilians---Validity---Scope Trial of civilians under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952 (PAA), held unconstitutional—Clause (d) of s. 2(1) of PAA, which brought civilians under military jurisdiction, not covered by the exemption from fundamental rights under Art. 8(3)(a) of the Constitution—Courts martial being executive forums are outside the scope of Art. 175(3) and cannot exercise judicial functions over civilians—Such trials violate rights to liberty, due process, fair trial, equality, and Islamic injunctions as guaranteed under Arts. 2A, 9, 10, 10A, 19A, 25, and 227—Military officers presiding over such trials do not meet the constitutional standard of independence and impartiality required of judicial officers. (b) Pakistan Army Act, 1952 ----S. 2(1)(d), S. 59---Scope---Trial of civilians by courts martial---Jurisdiction---Excess of constitutional limits Clause (d) of s. 2(1) PAA allowing trial of civilians by military courts declared ultra vires the Constitution—Such provision does not serve disciplinary purposes for Armed Forces personnel and hence cannot qualify for constitutional exemption—Convictions and sentences of civilians by courts martial declared to be coram non judice and set aside. (c) Pakistan’s International Obligations ----International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (ICCPR)---UN Human Rights Principles---Right to fair trial---Trial of civilians by military courts---Violation Supreme Court held that military trials of civilians violate Pakistan’s international obligations under ICCPR and other UN treaties—Right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal is fundamental—Military courts comprising serving officers cannot satisfy such standards in case of civilians. (d) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ----S. 169---Transfer of cases from military to civil courts---Post-decision implementation Civilians previously convicted by military courts for incidents of 9th May 2023 to be treated as under-trial prisoners—Their cases stand transferred to competent civil courts for trial under regular criminal law—Those acquitted or who have completed their sentences before courts martial deemed discharged under S. 169 Cr.P.C. (e) Article 245 of the Constitution ----Scope and limits---Use of armed forces---Functionality---Excess of jurisdiction Trial of civilians by Armed Forces for offences allegedly committed during civil unrest on 9th May 2023 declared beyond the functional scope permitted under Article 245 of the Constitution—Such judicial functions are not assigned to military authorities.

Summary: Majority Opinion ----- (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 8(3), 8(5), 10-A, 175(3), 184(3), 233 & 268 Challenge to the constitutionality of trials of civilians by Military Courts under Pakistan Army Act, 1952—Scope and maintainability—Original judgment passed in constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 184(3) declaring clause (d)(i) & (ii) of S.2(1) and S.59(4) of Pakistan Army Act, 1952 as ultra vires the Constitution was set aside in intra-court appeals—Held, by majority of five Judges, that the impugned judgment could not be sustained in view of constitutional limitations under Art.8(5) which excludes application of Chapter on Fundamental Rights where expressly so provided—Majority held that no fundamental right had been suspended, nor could the impugned provisions be struck down on that basis—Provisions of Army Act, 1952 reinstated—Legality of trials of civilians under military jurisdiction upheld—Reference made to national security incidents of 9th May 2023 involving attacks on military installations—Held, Army Act provisions applied in such context and did not violate Arts.10-A or 175(3) of the Constitution. (b) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 10-A—Right to fair trial—Scope—Held, that provisions of Pakistan Army Act, 1952 and rules framed thereunder sufficiently provide for fair trial and due process for accused persons, including civilians—Trial procedure under the Army Act was held compliant with accepted criminal justice principles—However, Court emphasized distinction between existence of fair trial provisions and their actual application—Right of appeal to High Court declared to be essential for meeting the standard of due process—Government directed to amend law within 45 days to provide independent right of appeal in High Court against convictions of civilians by Court Martial—Limitation period for such appeals to begin from date of amendment. (c) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 175(3)—Separation of judiciary—Contention that Military Courts exercising judicial power over civilians violated Art.175(3) not accepted by majority—Military Courts held to be constitutionally recognized under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, and not in derogation of judicial independence where jurisdiction is lawfully conferred—Reference made to PLD 2015 SC 401 and PLD 1996 SC 632 upholding military trial framework. (d) Pakistan Army Act, 1952 ----S.2(1)(d)(i)&(ii), S.59(4), S.133-B—Jurisdiction over civilians—Restoration of provisions allowing military trials of civilians for acts involving seduction from duty or offences under the Official Secrets Act, 1923 in relation to defence works and military affairs—Held, that the provisions were constitutionally valid and protected under Art.268 of the Constitution, having been enacted via Defence Services Laws Amendment Ordinance, 1967—Court Martial process held compliant with constitutional norms of fair trial where right of appeal is provided. (e) Legislative Direction ----Fair trial—Judicial recommendation—While upholding military jurisdiction, Supreme Court recommended legislative reform to ensure compliance with international human rights standards, including ICCPR—Parliament directed to legislate independent appellate mechanism for civilians convicted by Military Courts within 45 days—Judgment does not bar challenges to transfer of cases to Military Courts or Anti-Terrorism Courts before High Courts, which shall decide such matters on merit. Cited Cases: • Brig. (Retd.) F.B. Ali v. The State PLD 1975 SC 506 • Shahida Zahir Abbasi v. President of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 632 • District Bar Association, Rawalpindi v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2015 SC 401 • Col. (R) Muhammad Akram v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2009 FSC 36 • Jurist Foundation v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2020 SC 1 ----- Disposition: Appeals allowed by majority (5–2). Judgment dated 23.10.2023 declaring provisions of Army Act ultra vires set aside. Provisions restored. Government directed to legislate independent appellate remedy in High Court for civilians convicted by Military Courts.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 452, 429, 337-A(iii), 337-F(iii), 337-F(v), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault, or wrongful restraint, mischief by killing or maiming cattle of any value or any animal of the value of fifty rupees, shajjah-i-hashimah, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, causing shajjah-i-khafifah, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Delay of 04-days and 1½ hours in reporting the matter to the police---Consequential---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party, due to which one person died and five persons sustained firearm injuries---Incident in this case occurred on 30.05.2017 at about 4:30 p.m. but the matter was reported to the police on 03.06.2017 at about 6:05 p.m. i.e. after the delay of 04-days & 1½ hours but no plausible explanation was offered by the prosecution for such long delay---However, immediately after the occurrence Rapat No.18 dated 30.05.2017 was entered at 5:50 p.m. wherein it was specifically mentioned that injured persons, in injured condition came at Police Station and stated that appellant along with 12 other named and 7/8 unknown accused who were armed with dands, sotas and firearm weapons injured them---When the occurrence had already been reported in the form of Rapat No.18, there was no occasion for the complainant to re-report the matter through written application after the delay of more than four days---Evidently, first Investigating Officer visited the place of occurrence after the incorporation of Rapat No.18 but no complaint was presented to him at the spot by complainant in order to get registered FIR as per version introduced later on---Such fact was very much relevant because had the incident taken place in the manner and mode the complainant narrated through application, it would have been reported immediately to said Police Official at the spot---Complainant party through a protracted trial remained fail in justifying as to what precluded them to report the crime to the police promptly---Rapat No.18 showed that the injured persons arrived at Police Station, however, in the said Rapat the description of injuries and the role assigned to the accused were missing---It was mentioned in Rapat No.18 that the accused caused injuries to the injured persons by using blunt as well as firearm weapons---Therefore, it could be concluded that in fact Rapat No.18 was the exact information which was conveyed to police immediately after the incident, however, later on the facts were concocted and the FIR was chalked out after deliberation and consultation--- Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Muhammad Jahangir and another v. The State and others 2024 SCMR 1741 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 452, 429, 337- A(iii), 337-F(iii), 337-F(v), 148 & 149--- Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault, or wrongful restraint, mischief by killing or maiming cattle of any value or any animal of the value of fifty rupees, shajjah-i-hashimah, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, causing shajjah-i-khafifah, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Statements of injured witnesses--- Scope---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party, due to which one person died and five persons sustained firearm injuries---Story of homicide incident was narrated by complainant and injured persons---Out of these witnesses, the former four witnesses claimed to have endured firearm injuries on different parts of their bodies and the foregoing fact was described by the prosecution as affirmative proof of their truthful depositions---Acknowledged that the receipt of grievous hurt by an eye-witness in the murder incident though was a factor which reflected positively an assumption of his presence at the spot but it was not a conclusive proof about the truth of his deposition---For handing down guilty verdict to an accused in such incident, the testimony of an injured eye-witness was still required to be tested on the touchstone of the principles laid down for the appraisal of evidence---Injured witness of murder incident seldom tells lie might be true in a case of single accused but was an overstatement when the number of assailants was more than one---However, it would wholly be unjust to raise the superstructure of conviction on the deposition of injured witness, without subjecting it to strict test of scrutiny for adjudging his credibility---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Amin Ali v. The State 2011 SCMR 323 and Nazir Ahmad v. Muhammad Iqbal and another 2011 SCMR 527 rel. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 452, 429, 337- A(iii), 337-F(iii), 337-F(v), 148 & 149--- Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault, or wrongful restraint, mischief by killing or maiming cattle of any value or any animal of the value of fifty rupees, shajjah-i-hashimah, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, causing shajjah-i-khafifah, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Contradictions in the statements of witnesses---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party, due to which one person died and five persons sustained firearm injuries---All the four injured witnesses after the occurrence as per story of the prosecution were taken to police station from where after preparation of police papers they were dispatched to THQ Hospital for their medical examination---However, the version of said witnesses of the ocular account was not supported by one of the injured witnesses produced by complainant party---Version of said injured witness stood corroborated from the statement of first Investigating Officer who was the first Police Officer who visited the place of occurrence immediately after getting knowledge and made it clear during the course of his examination-in-chief that on 30.05.2017 he prepared the injury statements of injured persons and sent them to THQ Hospital with Police Constable for their medical examination--- Medico-Legal Certificates of the injured witnesses categorically contained the fact that all the injured were medically examined through Police Constable, meaning thereby that the witnesses of ocular account stood belied before the Court regarding the manner and mode of incident and the examination of injured who were never taken to police station immediately after the occurrence, rather their injury statements were prepared by Police Officer at the spot and that too prior to the registration of the FIR---Admission on part of the complainant that the injured were shifted to the hospital via Rescue-1122 manifested that they were not taken to Police Station rather were shifted directly to the hospital---Besides that said Police Officer also stated that he prepared injury statement of buffalo of complainant and sent it to Veterinary Hospital for its medical examination---Perusal of said injury statements revealed that the reference of Rapat No. 18 dated 30.05.2017 was mentioned therein---By the time the Police Officer visited the spot, no FIR had been registered---Thus, without registration of FIR said Police Officer was not empowered to prepare and investigate the case---Furthermore, it was evident from record that neither Police Officer was joined with investigation nor he handed over the injury statements of the injured to Investigating Officer to be taken into possession vide recovery memo in that case in order to endorse the fact that after Rapat No.18 the proceedings were conducted in accordance with law and in this way the injury statements prepared by Police Officer lost its evidentiary value---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 452, 429, 337-A(iii), 337-F(iii), 337-F(v), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault, or wrongful restraint, mischief by killing or maiming cattle of any value or any animal of the value of fifty rupees, shajjah-i-hashimah, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, causing shajjah-i-khafifah, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Defective investigation---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party, due to which one person died and five persons sustained firearm injuries---Record showed that despite the visit of Police Officer at the crime scene on 30.05.2017 the crime empties were not taken into possession by him, rather according to record the same were secured by Investigating Officer during his visit at the crime scene on 03.06.2017---Nowhere in the prosecution evidence it had come on record that the crime scene was secured and the crime empties recovered later on were lying at the same places and in the same position as mentioned by Investigating Officer---Another Police witness during cross-examination also admitted that the case diary of 03.06.2017 was silent as to whether the crime scene was secured---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 452, 429, 337-A(iii), 337-F(iii), 337-F(v), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault, or wrongful restraint, mischief by killing or maiming cattle of any value or any animal of the value of fifty rupees, shajjah-i-hashimah, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, causing shajjah-i-khafifah, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Recovery of weapons of offence and crime empties---Inconsequential---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party, due to which one person died and five persons sustained firearm injuries---Record showed that during investigation, .222 bore rifles were recovered from three appellants and pistol .30 bore and pump action gun were recovered by other two appellants--- According to reports of Forensic Science Agency, .222 bore rifle, pistol .30 bore & pump action recovered from appellants were found wedded with the respective crime empties secured from the spot---However, the evidence of Investigating Officer had caused a serious dent in the case of prosecution who while recording his statement before the Court deposed that on 03.06.2017 he took into possession 8 crimeempties of 12 bore from the roof top of the house of injured witness which were converted into sealed parcel and were taken into possession vide recovery memo---However, recovery memo contained the fact that the said crime empties were taken into possession by Investigation Officer from thoroughfare and not from the rooftop of the house of injured witness---Similarly, Investigating Officer mentioned that he secured 12 crime empties of .12 bore, 3 crime empties of 12 bore, 4 crime empties of .222 bore from the street near the house of occurrence which were converted into sealed parcel and were taken into possession vide recovery memo whereas vide recovery memo 8 crime empties were taken into possession by Investigating Officer from the rooftop of injured person and not from the street near the house of occurrence---In this way the positive report of Forensic Science Agency lost its evidentiary value whereas the reports of Forensic Science Agency regarding the recovery of weapons of the remaining appellants were negative---Thus, positive reports of Forensic Science Agency further lost legal acceptance as corroboratory piece of evidence when seen in the context the ocular account stood disbelieved---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Muhammad Hassan v. The State 2024 SCMR 1427 rel. (f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 452, 429, 337-A(iii), 337-F(iii), 337-F(v), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault, or wrongful restraint, mischief by killing or maiming cattle of any value or any animal of the value of fifty rupees, shajjah-i-hashimah, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, causing shajjah-i-khafifah, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Improvements made by witnesses in their statements---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party, due to which one person died and five persons sustained firearm injuries---As per complaint when the accused entered the house of complainant, they maltreated the women-folk present there and thereafter the whole incident took place---However, complainant when appearing before the Trial Court, did not utter a single word regarding the maltreatment of his women-folk---Though injured witness in his examination-in-chief stated that the accused gave slaps to their ladies, however during cross-examination admitted that he did not produce any lady before any of the Investigating Officers for recording of her statement---Besides that no Medico-Legal Certificate of any of the women was available on the file---All the narration of said facts spoke volume that either no woman was present at the crime scene or the story of maltreatment to the complainant's women folk was introduced just to aggravate the incident by giving it a colour of ghairat (honour)---Investigating Officer during evidence stated that he had taken blood with the help of cotton from different places i.e. four places---Contrarily, the memo through which the blood through cotton was taken into possession showed that the same was done from one place--- All the witnesses of ocular account made dishonest improvements, thus it was not safe to rely upon them---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Muhammad Arif v. The State 2019 SCMR 631 rel. (g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 452, 429, 337-A(iii), 337-F(iii), 337-F(v), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault, or wrongful restraint, mischief by killing or maiming cattle of any value or any animal of the value of fifty rupees, shajjah-i-hashimah, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, causing shajjah-i-khafifah, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Medical evidence contradicting ocular account---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party, due to which one person died and five persons sustained firearm injuries---Medical evidence in this case was furnished by Veterinary Officer and two Medical Officers---One of the Medical Officers medically examined the deceased then injured along with five other injured persons---During the medical examination of the deceased then injured, Medical Officer observed one firearm punctured wound measuring 1 cm x 1 cm on the left side of head just above the left ear---Contrarily, other Medical Officer during autopsy of deceased noted two firearm entry wounds each measuring 1 cm x 1 cm present on the left ear---On dissection, the Medical Officer observed that there were two holes in the skull, corresponding to the both wounds---In this way, the medical evidence contradicted the ocular account whereby the single firearm injury from .30 bore pistol was attributed to appellant---In such scenario, the existence of second shot at the skull of the deceased which was not attributed to anybody casted a colossal doubt on the prosecution case--- As per record, complainant along with injured witness and deceased, the then injured, were referred to DHQ Hospital, for further treatment---Thus, it was crystal clear that the three injured remained under treatment in the DHQ Hospital but no record therefrom was produced nor any Medical Officer under whose supervision they remained admitted appeared in the dock to support the prosecution case---Moreover, the injuries of complainant and injured were declared by Radiologist as Ss. 337-F(iii) & 337-F(v), P.P.C but no Radiologist was produced---Once Radiologist was not produced in proof of the x-ray report qua the declared injuries, the same could not be used for maintaining the conviction of the accused---Case of the prosecution was further falsified from the fact that as per prosecution case the shot fired by appellant hit at the head of deceased---However, during postmortem examination of deceased he was found in receipt of two firearm injuries and during postmortem examination two foreign bodies were recovered---Subsequent thereto, those two foreign bodies were dispatched to the office of Forensic Science Agency and report was received therefrom---Perusal of Report of Forensic Science Laboratory showed that the said metallic pieces did not match with the weapon recovered from appellant---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Abdul Jabbar and another v. The State 2019 SCMR 129 and Muhammad Bakhsh v. The State and others 1986 PCr.LJ 2718 rel. (h) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 452, 429, 337- A(iii), 337-F(iii), 337-F(v), 148 & 149--- Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault, or wrongful restraint, mischief by killing or maiming cattle of any value or any animal of the value of fifty rupees, shajjah-i-hashimah, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, causing shajjah-i-khafifah, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Motive not proved---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party, due to which one person died and five persons sustained firearm injuries---Motive set out in the FIR was that on 17.05.2017 brother of complainant/witness had purchased a piece of land measuring 21-Marlas from one “SA” due to which the accused-party had nourished grudge---In this regard, it was observed that though all the witnesses of ocular account stated in their statements regarding the motive part of the incident, however no documentary evidence was produced by the prosecution---Besides that “SA” from whom brother of the complainant/witness purchased the property in dispute was not associated during investigation nor he was produced during trial---Said aspect was candidly admitted by Investigating Officer---Thus, it could conveniently be held that prosecution could not prove its motive part of the case---Once the motive is set up by the prosecution and the same is not proved, the prosecution shall suffer---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Sarfraz and another v. The State 2023 SCMR 670 rel. (i) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---Single doubt creating circumstance is sufficient to form the basis of an acquittal. Tariq Parvez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345; Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 and Muhammad Imran v. The State 2020 SCMR 857 rel. Malik Fawad Awan, Farrukh Gulzar and Mudassar Naveed Chatha for Appellants. Asghar Ali Gill and Jumshaid Nasir Gill for the Complainant. Muhammad Akhlaq, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State. Date of hearing: 6th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---National Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (XIX of 1949), Preamble---Disciplinary proceedings---Allegation of misconduct---Employee of National Bank of Pakistan---Inquiry officer finding charge not proved and recommending exoneration---Department nevertheless imposing penalty of degradation in pay scale for one year---Permissibility and legality---Constitutional petition, filing of---Maintainability---Briefly, petitioner was appointed as a cash officer in the National Bank of Pakistan (the “bank”)---He was issued a show-cause notice along with a charge-sheet by the bank---Through a memorandum he was downgraded by one step in his pay scale with immediate effect for a period of one year---Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner approached the High Court through the present writ petition---Held: it was observed by the inquiry officer that the specific accusation concerning the approval of fourteen expense vouchers lacked tangible evidence---Crucially, the petitioner’s alleged signatures on the questioned documents were neither subjected to forensic examination nor verified through any scientific or technical process, as such, there was no conclusive proof establishing the petitioner’s complicity in the alleged misconduct---The inquiry officer further opined that the allegations were ambiguous, speculative, and fraught with doubt---Despite the inquiry’s clear and favorable findings, the respondent bank authorities proceeded to punish the petitioner without any additional or independent justification, thereby undermining the principles of natural justice and fair inquiry---In these circumstances, and in the interest of justice, High Court was of the considered view that the disciplinary action taken against the petitioner employee was arbitrary, unjustified, and without lawful authority---Impugned order having been passed in contravention of due process and contrary to the findings of the inquiry officer was unsustainable in the eyes of law---Employee of NBP could maintain writ petition in relation to his grievance regarding service matters---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional petition, filing of---Maintainability---Employees of National Bank of Pakistan (NBP)---Status and scope for the purpose of filing constitutional petition with regards to service matters---National Bank of Pakistan is a statutory body established under the National Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1949, and its employees are employees of a statutory corporation and thus fall within the purview of Art. 199 (5) of the Constitution---National Bank of Pakistan being a statutory corporation is amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High court under Art. 199 of the Constitution and also its employees can avail the recourse to the writ jurisdiction for the redressal of their grievances in respect of their service matters. Muhammad Naeem v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2023 SCMR 301 rel. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional petition---Disciplinary proceedings, challenge to---Inquiry officer recommending exoneration on the ground that no charge stood proved---Department nevertheless imposing penalty of degradation in pay scale for a period of one year---Permissibility---Sanctity and binding effect of inquiry proceedings and the inquiry officer’s findings---Scope---In presence of clear and favorable findings by the inquiry officer the department cannot proceed to punish the employee without any additional or independent justification, otherwise, it would undermine the principles of natural justice and fair inquiry---In such circumstances the disciplinary action taken against an employee would be arbitrary, unjustified and without lawful authority. Sarmad Faraz Abbasi for Petitioner. Malik Khushal Khan for Respondents. Date of hearing: 6th May, 2025.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 561-A & 221---Quashing of order---Amendment of charge---Scope---Complainant lodged FIR against the petitioner for offences under Ss.382, 506, 148 & 149, P.P.C---Trial Court framed the charge for offences under Ss.382 & 506, P.P.C against the petitioners---Complainant instituted a criminal revision petition against the said order, which was accepted and Trial Court was directed to frame charge for offences under Sections 395, 455, 148 & 149, P.P.C---Validity---According to FIR on 17.04.2024 at about 09:00 A.M. petitioners (accused) along with 22/25 unknown culprits, all armed with rifles/pistols, emerged at the petrol pump of complainant---Said accused persons took staff members of the petrol pump as hostages on arm's point and removed CCTV cameras as well as cash amount of Rs.950,000/- and account books forcibly---Said accused persons also snatched arms held by security guards, cheque book and other valuable documents and fled away from the scene---Charge always has to be framed on the prima facie averments of allegations levelled in the FIR, statement of the witnesses under S.161, of Cr.P.C. and report under S.173, of Cr.P.C.---Offence under S.382, P.P.C and under S.395, P.P.C relate to the same family of the offences, as such from the prima facie averments of contents of the FIR, statements of the witnesses recorded under S.161, of Cr.P.C. and report under S.173, of Cr.P.C., the Trial Court was supposed to frame the charge for more graver and serious offence---In the case in hand offences under Ss.395/455/148/149, P.P.C were prima facie made out, as such this fact was rightly observed and taken into consideration by the Revisional Court, while passing the impugned order, which was found to be fully in consonance with the facts and law---Petition was dismissed, in limine. Ghulam Haider Buriro v. The State 2018 MLD 469 rel. Rana Muhammad Javed Iqbal for Petitioners. Ashfaq Ahmad Malik, Deputy Prosecutor General along with Nasir Hussain, S.I. for the State. Muhammad Fayyaz Mansab for the Complainant. Tanveer Ahmad Sheikh, J .--- The order dated 30.04.2025, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jahanian was assailed through the present petition, whereby a criminal revision moved by respondent No.2/complainant against an order dated 30.11.2024 passed by learned Magistrate framing the formal charge, was accepted and order of the learned Magistrate dated 30.11.2024, was set aside and request for amendment in the charge was allowed.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997)--- ----S.2(xlii)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Development project, challenge to---Sustainable development, concept of---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Aggrieved person---Policy making domain of the executive authority in matters of development schemes---Scope---A project was initiated to construct a bridge over the Indus river---As part of the project, a flyover at the site of N-55 was under construction---The flyover was part of a 12-kilometer infrastructure initiative deemed essential for regional connectivity and socio-economic uplift---The petitioner challenged the alignment of the flyover contending it was technically flawed and would cause ambiguity and accidents---Held: The concept of ‘sustainable development’ was given recognition for the first time in 1972 in Stockholm Declaration 1972 which meant that ‘Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the future generations’---Instead of supporting the project the petitioner since inception endeavored to stop it by hook or crook as he knew that human development in the area might have crushed his so called hegemony---As per the record the petitioner tried to save his own land from being utilized in the project despite having availed compensation award through land acquisition authorities---Petitioner filed the present petition with unclean hands as he did not disclose in pleadings that for the similar relief he had filed a civil suit and the said relief was declined to him---Petitioner if aggrieved by construction of flyover on the basis of technical faults should have challenged it with promptitude and such a challenge must have been raised before the execution of the project was undertaken---Challenge at a belated stage on any of the claims including those of pro bono publico could not sustain---Once the execution had started, the public exchequer remained under constant burden and delay in the execution of project could have defeated the very concept of time value of money which was primary factor in implementation and execution of project---Petitioner under the garb of public interest litigation brought a ‘publicity interest litigation’ or ‘private inquisitiveness litigation’ with a malicious design to halt the socio economic development of the area and to frustrate a mega development project---Present petition suffered from laches as it was filed nine years after the commencement of project---Any interference into the affairs of executing agency when the project was at almost completion stage would have amounted to judicial overreach and encroachment upon the powers of executive---Petitioner was not an aggrieved person for the purpose of filing of the present Constitutional petition---Petitioner failed to establish that his fundamental rights were at stake in order to make out a case for indulgence of High Court under writ jurisdiction---Present Constitutional petition being misconceived, hit by laches, devoid of merits, was dismissed, in circumstances. Federal Government Employees Housing Authority through Director General Islamabad v. Ednan Syed and others PLD 2025 SC 11; Javed Ibrahim Paracha v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2004 SC 482 and Muhammad Bashir v. Abdul Karim PLD 2004 SC 271 rel. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, exercise of-- -Development projects---Matters of technical expertise---Domain of executive authority---Policy decisions---Scope---Courts are not that well equipped to adjudicate the technical matters relating purely to policy decisions specially those of development projects which fall under the domain of executive authority to decide to adjudicate on a policy decision---Courts no doubt have a duty to see that in decision making, no law is violated and fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution are not transgressed. Federal Government Employees Housing Authority through Director General Islamabad v. Ednan Syed and others PLD 2025 SC 11 rel. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199--- Public development project--- Aggrieved person---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, exercise of---Scope---No doubt the High Court under its writ jurisdiction can issue directions to the entities performing functions in connections with the affairs of Federation and Province, on application of an aggrieved person complaining of infringement of fundamental rights---It is strange how a person can be aggrieved of any agency performing its functions to execute the development project relating to infrastructure development-- -High Court does not interfere in every issue of public concern under Article 199 of the Constitution but only where the action of the executive authority is in violation of law and raises the question of enforcement of a fundamental right. Javed Ibrahim Paracha v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2004 SC 482 and Muhammad Bashir v. Abdul Karim PLD 2004 SC 271 rel. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts, 29, 38 & 199---Public development projects/schemes---Socio economic development---State’s responsibility---Principles of Policy---Scope---Development schemes fall within the policy making domain of the Federal and Provincial Governments---Principles of Policy enshrined in Part II - Chapter 2 of the Constitution hold State responsible for promotion of social and economical well being of the people---Federal and Provincial Government in order to provide basic facilities to people necessary for promotion of social, economic well-being of the people devise policy planning and execution of development projects on the basis of needs and priorities---The implementation of projects is not an easy task, it sucks hard earned money of tax payers---Articles 29 and 38 of Chapter 2, Part-II of the Constitution in this regard make the State responsible to invent policy for socio economic development subject to financial resources---Executive enjoys powers to conceive development projects, and such exercise cannot be ordinarily interfered with by the High Court by invoking its jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution, unless shown to be mala fide or in violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution to every citizen of this Country, thereby affecting the interest of public at large. Watan Party and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2013 SC 167 rel. (e) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Conduct of petitioner---Petitioner for claiming the equitable relief under Constitutional jurisdiction has to do equity and must appear before the Court with clean hands. Ahmed Hussain Shahani for Petitioner. Liaquat Ali Shar, Additional Advocate General, Sindh assisted by Abdul Waris Bhutto, Assistant Advocate General, Sindh along with Engr. Zulfiqar Ali Kalwar, Project Manager, Ghotki Kandhkot Bridge Project/Respondent No.8, Abdul Ghani, Mukhtiarkar Kandhkot on behalf of Assistant Commissioner, Kandhkot and Deputy Commissioner, Kashmore at Kandhkot, SIP Rukan Din of PS A-Section Kandhkot, SIP Ghulam Bahoo and ASI Qadir Bux of PS B-Section Kandhkot for Respondents. Riaz Hussain Khoso, Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan. Date of hearing: 6th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss.8 & 42---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 117 & 119---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.100---Claim of benami ownership against real brother---Appellant alleging suit property belonged to deceased father and respondent/brother was only a benami holder---Validity---Evidentiary worth---Legal effect examined---Essential elements and burden of proof---Motive and source of funds, proving of---Pre-requisites---Appellant merely filing suit for possession without seeking benami declaration and cancellation of registered deed---Legality and consequences---The key legal issue before the High Court was as to “Whether the concurrent findings of courts below passing decree of possession in favour of the respondent were sustainable when the appellant’s benami plea was unsupported by evidence or proper pleadings, and whether any substantial question of law arose to justify interference under S. 100 C.P.C.”?---Held: Upon court’s query it transpired that no suit for cancellation of registered lease deed in favor of respondent No.1 was instituted by the appellant---Moreover, no suit for declaration was filed by appellant claiming or seeking a declaration that the subject property was owned by his deceased father---Further, sister of parties, who purportedly was appointed as a custodian was not made party in the suit---None of the ingredients pertaining to benami transaction were even pleaded by the appellant and the courts below correctly observed that the entire defense of the appellant was based on his oral and unsubstantiated assertion---Trial Court correctly placed the burden of proving the benami transaction on the appellant and the same was in accordance with Arts. 117 & 119 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Impugned judgments of the Courts below did not suffer from any infirmity, hence, did not warrant interference by High Court under S. 100 of C.P.C. since jurisdiction under S. 100 of C.P.C. was restricted---Appellant failed to highlight any misreading and non-reading of evidence by the courts below---Second appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Benami transaction--- ----Proof---Two essential elements necessary to establish a benami transaction explained---Two essential elements must exist to establish the benami status of the transaction --- The first element is that there must be an agreement express or implied between the ostensible owner and the purchaser for purchase of the property in the name of ostensible owner for the benefit of the person who has to make payment of the consideration, and second element required to be proved is that transaction was actually entered between the real purchaser and seller to which ostensible owner was not party. Ch. Ghulam Rasool v. Nusrat Rasool PLD 2008 SC 146 rel. Manzoor Butt v. Mahmud Sufi 2016 CLC 1284 ref. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.100---Second appeal---Scope---Reappraisal of evidence by second appellate court---Not permissible---Concurrent findings are not interfered with under S. 100 of the C.P.C. unless the lower courts have misread the evidence on record, or may have ignored a material piece of evidence on record through perverse appreciation of evidence---Reappraisal of evidence on record by the second appellate court is not permissible while exercising jurisdiction under S. 100 of the C.P.C. Faqir Syed Anwar Ud Din v. Syed Raza Haider and others PLD 2025 SC 31 rel. Syed Nadeemul Haq for Appellant. Adnan Ahmed for Respondents. Date of hearing: 6th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Registration Act (XVI of 1908)--- ----S. 35(1)---Document presented for registration---Denial of execution---Registering Officer---Powers---Petitioner (principal qua Power of Attorney)sought annulment of the orders of Sub-Registrar and Registrar refusing registration of deed of cancellation of power of attorney ("ABTAL NAMA")---Held: As per plain language of the S.35(1) of the Registration Act, 1908, the registering officer shall register the document so presented for registration and all the persons executing the document have to appear personally before the registering officer in a sense to endorse the said document---In such eventuality, the registering officer is left with no other choice---Denial of execution of the document on part of alleged executant or executants is the only eventuality which can lead to denial qua registering a document on part of the registering officer---Although phrase denial of execution is not defined in law, however, refusal to admit execution ipso facto amounts to denial within the meaning of the Registration Act, 1908---Imperfectness of title qua execution of the document so presented is of no concern for the registering authority---Reasons for refusal qua registering a document are required to be disclosed in specific manner and should match the eventualities provided in the law---High Court set-aside the orders passed by the Sub Registrar and Registrar, and application qua registering the document (Abtal-Nama) would be deemed to be pending before the registering officer, who shall take up and dispose of the matter as per law---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Janki Devi v. Dharam Nath Parsad AIR 1984 Pat 149 (1984 BLJ 247) and Bihar Deed Writers Association v. State of Bihar AIR 1989 Pat 144 ref. (b) Registration Act (XVI of 1908)--- ----S. 35(1)---Document presented for registration---Denial of execution---Registering Officer---Powers---Petitioner (principal qua Power of Attorney) sought annulment of the orders of Sub-Registrar and Registrar refusing registration of deed of cancellation of power of attorney ("ABTAL NAMA")---Held: The order passed by the Sub-Registrar is not in line with the provisions of scheme of Registration Act, 1908 and lack of application of mind on part of the Sub-Registrar is oozing from the face of the decisions impugned---Registration of document under law only recognises and endorses the execution of the same, while the validity, existence and legal value of the document is purely within the domain and province of the Civil Court having jurisdiction over the matter---High Court set-aside the orders passed by the Sub-Registrar and Registrar and application qua registering the document (Abtal-Nama) would be deemed to be pending before the registering officer, who shall take up and dispose of the matter as per law---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. (c) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)--- ----Art. 44---Registration Act ( XVI of 1908) , S. 35(1)---Document presented for registration---Denial of execution by the Registering Officer, assailing of---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Petitioner (principal qua Power of Attorney) filed writ petition seeking annulment of the orders of Sub-Registrar and Registrar refusing registration of deed of cancellation of power of attorney ("ABTAL NAMA")---Objection that alternate statutory remedy of the appeal has not been availed by the petitioner---Validity---It is not an absolute rule that in presence of the alternate remedy, the constitutional petition is not maintainable---As per command of Art.44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, only availability of the alternate remedy under statute is not sufficient qua denial of relief under extraordinary Constitutional jurisdiction---Efficaciousness of the alternate remedy is one of the factors to be considered---Remedy of appeal before the administrative higher fora in the hierarchy of the relevant law cannot always be considered as an efficacious alternate remedy---If it is established that any act of the functionary has taken a track which is in opposition with the scheme of law, countermand of such instrument under judicial review is proper treatment of contra jus orders---An act required to be performed in a specific manner can only be done in such way, otherwise it carries no weight in the eye of law and is regarded as nullity in the eye of law---High Court set-aside the orders passed by the Sub-Registrar and Registrar and application qua registering the document (Abtal-Nama) would be deemed to be pending before the registering officer, who shall take up and dispose of the matter as per law---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Amanat Khan v. Sub-Registrar 2002 CLC 127 ref. Mohammad Yaqoob Khan Mughal for Petitioner. Mushtaq Ahmed Janjua for Respondents Nos. 3 and 4.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.10(4)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Wife filing a suit for dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula---Family court while decreeing the suit compelling the husband to issue a written talaq---Legality and permissibility---Once a decree for khula is passed the marriage stands dissolved and husband cannot be compelled to pronounce talaq whether orally or in writing---Brief facts were that the respondent/plaintiff (wife) filed a suit seeking dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula---Upon her appearance and statement before the court, she gave up her claim to dower and other rights, whereafter the trial court granted a decree for dissolution of marriage through khula directing the petitioner/defendant (husband) to pronounce talaq in writing within ten days---The petitioner/husband himself did not appear, though his mother appeared before the courtand the decree was passed accordingly, forming the basis of the present constitutional petition under Art. 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan---Fundamental issue which required determination was as to "Whether once a decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula had been granted by the court, was it within the jurisdictional competence of the family court to compel the husband to pronounce talaq through a written deed"?---Held: The respondent/wife instituted a suit for dissolution of marriage which culminated in the grant of a decree by the family court solely on the basis of her statement, a practice well established in matters of khula under S.10(4) of the Family Courts Act, 1964---However, Trial Court went further and imposed certain conditions on the petitioner, inter alia, directing him to issue a written talaq within ten days---Imposition of this condition reflected a jurisdictional overreach by the family court---No powers were vested in the family court to impose such unwarranted and extraneous conditions upon the petitioner---Portion of the impugned order whereby unwarranted conditions were imposed upon the petitioner including directives for pronouncement of written talaq, civil imprisonment and imposition of daily compensation was declared to be erroneous and illegal---Decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula was upheld---Constitutional petition was partially allowed, in circumstances. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.10(4)---Wife seeking dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula---Family court compelling the husband to issue a written talaq---Legality and permissibility---Family court has clear statutory authority to dissolve a marriage on the basis of khula when reconciliation fails and the wife persists---The court has no authority to compel the husband to issue a written talaq, nor to impose penalties for not doing so---Once a decree for khula is passed the marriage stands dissolved and husband cannot be compelled to pronounce talaq whether orally or in writing. (c) Administration of justice--- ----Judicial overreach---Scope---Any exercise of power beyond the statutory framework is antithetical to the rule of law and undermines the integrity of the judicial process---When a court steps outside its jurisdiction or renders a decision in contradiction to established legal principles, such a decision is void ab initio and nullity in the eyes of law. Mehr Ali for Petitioner. Malik Sajid Hussain Arshad for Respondents. Date of hearing: 6th May, 2025.