Summary: Arbitration: Revision Against dismissal of Section 8 Arbitration Application.

Summary: Background:CRTG- Matracon JV, the petitioner, challenged the order of the Additional District Judge (ADJ) which dismissed their application for the appointment of an arbitrator under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act. The dispute arose from a construction contract for a high-rise building in Islamabad, where the petitioner claimed an exchange rate uplift in the contract price due to legislative changes. This claim was initially rejected by the Engineer under Clause 67.1 of the General Conditions of the Contract. The petitioner sought arbitration as per Clause 67.2 but failed to appoint an arbitrator by mutual consent, leading to the application under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act.Issues:Whether the dispute regarding the exchange rate uplift claim falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement in the construction contract.The appropriateness of the ADJ's examination of the contract's clauses in determining the arbitrability of the dispute.Whether the petitioner's claim regarding exchange rate variation due to legislative changes was valid under the terms of the Contract.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Islamabad High Court held that the ADJ incorrectly delved into the merits of the dispute, which was reserved for the arbitrator to decide. The Court clarified that under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act, the civil court's role is merely to ascertain the existence of an arbitration agreement and the parties' failure to appoint an arbitrator. The court is not to interpret the contract clauses to determine the validity or otherwise of the claims in dispute.The Court noted that the dispute resolution clause (Clause 67.1 titled "Settlement of Disputes") was broadly framed, encompassing any disputes arising out of or in connection with the contract, including the validity of claims based on exchange rate variations due to legislative changes. It was emphasized that the distinction between contract price variations due to legislative changes and ordinary market-based currency fluctuations is significant and reserved for the arbitrator's determination.Consequently, the revision petition was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the petitioner's application was restored before the ADJ for the appointment of an arbitrator as per the Arbitration Act.----Citations/Precedents:Section 8 of the Arbitration Act, 1940The Union of Indian vs. Mangaldas N. Varma ((1958) 2 MLJ 16)Union of India vs. Om Parkash (1976 AIR 1745)Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Engineering, Science and Technology v. Messrs Hassan Construction Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. (1998 CLC 485)AJ Corporation v. Fauji Fertilizer Bin Qasim Limited (2013 CLD 636)

Summary: Background:This case arises from a legal dispute in Pakistan involving a partnership for a petrol pump business, dating back to 1997 between Haji Musharraf Mahmood Khan (petitioner) and Sardarzada Zafar Abbas (respondent). After disagreements, an arbitrator was appointed, and an award was announced in 2001. The petitioner sought to have the award confirmed by the court, leading to various legal challenges and remands between trial courts and the Lahore High Court (LHC). The Civil Revision at the center of this appeal, initially dismissed for non-prosecution in 2016, led to further legal challenges when the petitioner sought to revive the case. The revival was rejected by the LHC in 2017 due to a failure to file within the prescribed 60 days and lack of vigilant pursuit by the petitioner.---Issues:The core issues addressed by the Supreme Court include:Whether the LHC erred in sustaining the office objection against the revival of the civil revision dismissed for non-prosecution based on technicalities without sufficient cause.The applicability of procedural laws and statutory limitation periods in the context of reviving a dismissed revision petition.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court of Pakistan found that the LHC had improperly applied procedural limitations by enforcing a 60-day period for the revival of the case, which contradicted the broader three-year limitation period provided under Article 181 of the Limitation Act for situations not specifically covered elsewhere. The Court emphasized that legal processes should not be unduly hindered by technicalities and that justice must be served by addressing matters on their merits. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the LHC's order, restored the civil revision, and directed the LHC to decide the matter on its merits.---Citations/Precedents:Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Guides the revisional jurisdiction of high courts.Limitation Act, 1908: Specifically, Article 181 used for filing applications where no other limitation period is prescribed.Manager, Jammu and Kashmir State Property v. Khuda Yar (PLD 1975 SC 678): Highlighted that technicalities should not obstruct justice.Muhammad Sadiq Vs Mst. Bashiran and others (PLD 2000 SC 820): Discusses the absence of a specific provision for recalling a revision dismissed for non-prosecution.Wali and others v. Manak and others (PLD 1965 SC 651): Advocates for adjudication on merits.House Building Finance Corporation v. Mrs. Sarwar Jehan (PLD 1992 Karachi 329): Applies to situations without specific procedural guidance under the C.P.C.Mandi Hassan alias Mehdi Hussain and another Vs. Muhammad Arif (PLD 2015 SC 137): Discusses the use of Section 151, C.P.C., for restoring a revision dismissed for non-prosecution.Mst. Jameela Bibi (Deceased) through LRs Vs. Mst. Fatima Bibi (Deceased) through LRs (2023 SCMR 485): Pertains to limitation periods for restoration applications.Ghulam Qadir and others v. Sh. Abdul Wadood and others (PLD 2016 SC 712): Concerns the applicability of Article 181 of the Limitation Act.

Summary: Facts:Taisei Corporation, a Japanese company, entered into a subcontract with A.M. Construction Company (AMC), a Pakistani company, for part of a highway project in Baluchistan, Pakistan. The subcontract contained an arbitration agreement for disputes to be settled under ICC rules in Singapore.Disputes arose, and AMC initiated arbitration proceedings, resulting in an award on 9 September 2011 ("Award").Taisei challenged the Award's jurisdiction in Lahore, Pakistan, under the Arbitration Act 1940, which was dismissed. Taisei appealed this decision.Concurrently, Taisei sought enforcement of the Award in Sindh High Court under the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitration Agreement and Foreign Award Act 2011 ("2011 Act"), which was initially dismissed but later remanded by a Division Bench.----Issues:Whether the Award is a "foreign arbitral award" under the 2011 Act.Whether the 2011 Act applies retrospectively to the Award made before its enactment.----Judgment:The Supreme Court found the Award to be a "foreign arbitral award" as per the 2011 Act's definition, irrelevant of the governing law of the subcontract or the arbitration agreement.The 2011 Act was held to apply retrospectively to all foreign arbitral awards made on or after 14 July 2005, regardless of when the arbitration proceedings commenced.The Court allowed Civil Appeal No. 722 of 2012, setting aside the judgments of the Lahore High Court and the Civil Court, Lahore. Taisei's application under the 2011 Act was accepted due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction at the lower courts.Civil Appeal No. 2649 of 2016 was dismissed, affirming the Division Bench of the Sindh High Court's judgment to remand Taisei's petition for enforcement of the Award under the 2011 Act.----Principle:This judgment underscores the "foreign arbitral award" definition under the 2011 Act and its retrospective application, emphasizing minimal court interference and a pro-enforcement bias in the context of international commercial arbitration. It affirms the judiciary's supportive role in arbitration, ensuring that arbitral awards, especially foreign ones, are recognized and enforced with minimal interference, aligning with the global trend towards efficient and autonomous dispute resolution in international trade and commerce.---Discussion on: (i) Minimal interference and support for the arbitration by the courts as an alternate mode of dispute resolution, underlined. (ii) Pro-enforcement bias of the New York Convention for enforcing foreign awards, explained. (iii) The definition of ?foreign arbitral award? provided in the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitration Agreement and Foreign Award Act 2011, interpreted. (iv) Retrospective applicability of the 2011 Act to arbitration agreements and foreign awards, expounded.

Summary: (a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----Ss. 14, 17 & 42---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art. 178---Application to make the Award of Arbitrator as Rule of Court, filing of---Limitation, commencing date of---Scope---Appellate Court held that the award cannot be made Rule of the Court as it was not filed by the petitioner within 90-day time period stipulated under Art. 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908, ('the Act 1908')---Whether the limitation period commences from the date of issuance of formal notice in writing by the Arbitrator(s) to the parties or the general knowledge of the parties about making and signing of the award is sufficient to non-suit a litigant on question of limitation?---Held: Article 178 of the Act 1908 clearly depicts that the limitation starts from "the date of service of the notice of the making of the award"---Section 14(1) of the Act 1940 makes it clear that the Arbitrators after making and signing of the award have to give a notice, in writing, of the making and signing of the award to the parties---The requirement of a notice in writing is important as the service of notice is the point from which the limitation for making an application to the Court for filing the award commences per Art. 178 of Act 1908---Section 14(1) of the Act 1940 is to be also read with S. 42 of the Act 1940, which (S. 42) provides that any notice that is required to be served by an Arbitrator shall be served in the manner provided in the arbitration agreement or if there is no such provision then by delivering it to the person on whom it is to be served or by sending it by post at the usual address of such person---Provisions under S. 42 of the Act 1940 make it clear that the Act 1940 provides a clear and specific manner in which the notice is to be served by the Arbitrator(s)---There is no room of implied notice under the law in respect of making and signing of the award---Provisions of S. 42 of the Act, 1940 have technical meanings and can only be construed as requiring issuance of a separate notice in writing by the Arbitrator(s) notwithstanding the fact that a party has knowledge of the passing of the award through receipt of any instrument (cheque in the present case) handed over to him for satisfaction of amount awarded by the Arbitrator(s)---Law of limitation contemplates general principle of administration of justice, which has the effect of preventing a party from having recourse to redressal of rights through judicial process even where such rights subsist and therefore, any law whereby the recourse to the Court(s) is restricted, must be construed strictly---The proceedings should only be held to be barred by time if the chicaneries of law of limitation are made applicable in strictest sense---High Court set-aside the impugned judgment rendered by the Appellate Court and directed that the appeal of the respondent shall be deemed to be pending, which shall be decided on its merits after extending an opportunity of hearing to the parties---Revision was allowed accordingly. Muhammad Shafi and others v. Muhammad Sabir and others PLD 1960 Lah. 591 ref. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----First Sched., Arts. 178 & 181---Arbitration Act (X of 1940), S. 14---Application to make the Award of Arbitrator as Rule of Court, filing of---Limitation, commencing date of---Scope---Appellate Court held that the award cannot be made Rule of the Court as it was not filed by the petitioner within 90-day time period stipulated under Art. 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908, ('the Act 1908')---Question as to how the limitation is to be governed, if no notice is given by the Arbitrator(s) to the party---Held, that in such eventuality it is Art. 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which is residuary clause that will be applicable and the same contemplates a period of three years--- High Court set-aside the impugned judgment rendered by the Appellate Court and directed that, the appeal of the respondent shall be deemed to be pending, which shall be decided on its merits after extending an opportunity of hearing to the parties---Revision was allowed accordingly. (c) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----Ss. 14, 17 & 42---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Arts. 178 & 181---Application to make the Award of Arbitrator as Rule of Court, filing of---Limitation, commencing date of---Scope---Whether the limitation period commences from the date of issuance of formal notice in writing by the Arbitrator(s) to the parties or the general knowledge of the parties about making and signing of the award is sufficient to non-suit a litigant on question of limitation?---Held: The Arbitration Act, 1940,('the Act 1940') makes it clear that after an award is rendered, any party thereto or any person claiming thereunder may request the Arbitrator(s) or the Umpire to cause the award or its signed copy thereof, together with any disposition or the document, which may have been taken and/or proved, to be filed in the Court---Pertinently, no limitation has been provided under the Act 1908 whereby the party is required to make a request to the Arbitrators or the Umpire to cause the award to be filed in the Court and again residuary Art. 181 of the Act 1908 is applicable and a party to arbitration proceedings can make such a request to the Arbitrators within three years' time period from the date of making and signing of the award---Imperatively, the object of giving notice to the parties is to enable them to file an application for setting aside the award---Pertinently, when the respondent filed an application for cancellation of the award, he also categorically acknowledged that the Arbitrators had not issued any formal notice, in writing, to the parties regarding making of the award---High Court set-aside the impugned judgment rendered by the Appellate Court and directed that the appeal of the respondent shall be deemed to be pending, which shall be decided on its merits after extending an opportunity of hearing to the parties---Revision was allowed accordingly. (d) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----Ss. 14, 17 & 42---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Arts. 158 & 178---Application to make the Award of Arbitrator as Rule of Court, filing of---Limitation, commencing date of---Scope---Appellate Court held that the award cannot be made Rule of the Court as it was not filed by the petitioner within 90-day time period stipulated under Art. 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908, ('the Act 1908')---Whether a Court can dismiss the objections to the award but at the same time refuse to make the award a Rule of the Court on the ground that the application of a party for filing/making the award a Rule of the Court was not within limitation---Held: Pertinently, once an award is before the Court, either through the Arbitrator(s) or any party (for example the respondent), then in terms of S. 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, ('the Act 1940'), it is the duty of Court to examine the same and see whether it suffers from any patent illegality or if there is any cause to remit the award to the Arbitrator(s) irrespective of the fact that opposite party (the petitioner in present case) has not approached the Court within time---Provision of S. 17 of the Act 1940 is couched in mandatory terms as the same is signified by use of the word "shall" and cast a duty upon the Court to pass a decree if it sees no cause to remit or set-aside the award---The proceedings under S. 17 commence once an award has been filed in the Court---The very fact that the respondent filed an application seeking cancellation/setting aside of the award means that it was admitted that the award had been made and that the proceedings under S. 17 of the Act 1940 shall commence---Once an award comes before the Court then the Court has got jurisdiction to take further proceedings in accordance with the law and pass a decree thereon---Thus, once the award is before the Court, it is the duty of the Court to scrutinize the award, which is independent of the fact whether any side has objected to the same or not or the application of one of the parties to arbitration proceedings is time barred---In present case, the Trial Court discharged that duty and passed the decree on the basis of the award in favour of the petitioner whereas the Appellate Court has upended the said findings without touching the merits of the case by merely holding that the application of the petitioner to make the award a Rule of Court was time barred which in-fact was not as examined hereinabove, and hence, the finding of the Appellate Court below is erroneous and not sustainable---High Court set-aside the impugned judgment rendered by the Appellate Court and directed that the appeal of the respondent shall be deemed to be pending, which shall be decided on its merits after extending an opportunity of hearing to the parties---Revision was allowed accordingly. Noor Muhammad v. A.D.J. Nankana Sahib and others 1996 CLC 268; Messrs Awan Industries Ltd. v. The Executive Engineer, Lined Channel Division and another 1992 SCMR 65 and A. Qutbuddin Khan v. Chec Milliwala Dredging Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. 2014 SCMR 1268 ref. Syed Kabeer Ahmad Mehmood for Petitioner. Abdul Salam Alvi for Respondent No.1. Date of Hearing: 19th February, 2024.

Summary: Issues:Limitation Period: Whether the 90-day limitation period for filing the award in court, as per Article 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908, starts from a formal written notice by the arbitrators or if general knowledge of the award suffices.Court's Authority: Whether a court can reject objections to an award yet refuse to enforce it on the grounds of the enforcement application being filed out of time.----Holding/Reasoning:The Lahore High Court found that the Appellate Court erred in its decision to not enforce the award based solely on the issue of timeliness without considering the merits. The court emphasized that the limitation period starts only upon the formal written notice of the award's issuance, as required by the Arbitration Act, 1940. It was further held that the presence of general knowledge about the award does not suffice to start the limitation period. Consequently, the petition was allowed, the Appellate Court's judgment was set aside, and the case was remanded for a decision on the merits, expected to be concluded within two months.----Citations/Precedents:Article 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908: Specifies a 90-day limitation period for filing an arbitration award in court, starting from the date of service of the notice of the award's making.---Section 14(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940: Mandates that arbitrators must provide a written notice to the parties upon making and signing the award.----Muhammad Shafi and others v. Muhammad Sabir and others (PLD 1960 Lahore 591): Highlighted the strict interpretation of laws restricting court access.----Noor Muhammad vs ADJ Nankana Sahib etc. (1996 CLC 268): Stressed that once an award is filed in court, the court has the jurisdiction to proceed as per the law.----M/s. Awan Industries Ltd. v. The Executive Engineer, Lined Channel Division and another (1992 SCMR 65): Established the court's power to set aside an award without waiting for an objection to be filed, regardless of timeliness.----A. Qutbuddin Khan v. Chec Milliwala Dredging Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. (2014 SCMR 1268): Reiterated the court's duty to scrutinize the award once filed, irrespective of objections or timeliness.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199(1)(a)(ii), Arts. 7 & 78; Fourth Schedule, Part-II, Entry 6; Fourth Schedule, Part-I, Entry 30 Maintainability—Stock exchange as “person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation”—Held, Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) is a voluntary corporate entity and not a statutory creation; the 2012 Act corporatizes/demutualizes/integrates existing exchanges but does not establish PSX as a State instrumentality; mere regulatory oversight by SECP does not convert PSX’s commercial activities into sovereign/public functions; PSX does not utilize or receive public funds and any charges/penalties accrue as its income and are not credited to the Federal Consolidated Fund under Art. 78—Consequently, PSX is not amenable to writ under Art. 199(1)(a)(ii). Cited Cases: • Pakistan Stock Exchange Ltd. v. Province of Sindh, 2024 CLD 580 • Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1997 SC 84 (b) Securities laws—nature of “regulations” and penalties ----Stock Exchanges (Corporatization, Demutualization and Integration) Act, 2012; Securities Act, 2015, Ss. 2(x), 2(xlvi), 2(xlix), 2(lv), 5, 7, 11, 160 & 161 Statutory “regulations” under the 2015 Act are those made by SECP; PSX’s “regulations” are internal instruments governing its marketplace and do not confer statutory power to impose penalties; no appeal lies under S. 161 against PSX-imposed measures; such amounts are not statutory exactions but form part of PSX’s income distributed per corporate law—PSX therefore not performing sovereign/regulatory functions of the State. Cited Cases: • Pakistan Stock Exchange Ltd. v. Province of Sindh, 2024 CLD 580 (c) Judicial review—scope of “person” and “functions” ----Art. 199(1)(a)(ii) read with Art. 199(5) Even where a respondent qualifies as a “person,” judicial review lies only if the impugned act was performed in connection with the “affairs” of the Federation/Province/local authority; PSX’s privately funded, profit-maximizing operations and internal disciplinary regime do not satisfy that test. Cited Cases: • Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1997 SC 84 • Pakistan Stock Exchange Ltd. v. Province of Sindh, 2024 CLD 580 (d) Necessary party—SECP ----Art. 199(1)(a)(ii) SECP impleaded without any “act done,” “proceeding taken,” or order passed against the petitioner in the arbitral matter—No cause of action or maintainable prayer made out—SECP neither a necessary nor a proper party. (e) Arbitration—alternative remedy and Kompetenz-Kompetenz ----PSX Rule Book (Chapter 18: Investors’ Claims, Securities Brokers’ Disputes and Arbitration Regulations) Ongoing institutional arbitration provides an adequate and efficacious remedy; objections on limitation and tribunal jurisdiction fall within the arbitral tribunal’s Kompetenz-Kompetenz and must be decided in that forum; constitutional writ not ordinarily invocable to interdict pending arbitration absent exceptional grounds, none shown. (f) Constitutional benches—post-26th Amendment framework ----Arts. 175, 175-A, 199(1)(a)(ii) & 202-A; Constitution (Twenty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2024 Court records that reasons are rendered by the Constitutional High Court for the short order dated 13.11.2024; applying the “dominant relief” test, Art. 199(1)(a)(ii) governed the petitioner’s prayer for declarations (“without lawful authority,” “of no legal effect”), thus falling within the High Court’s constitutional jurisdiction to issue reasons for the earlier short order. (g) Disposition --- Constitutional petition not maintainable; writ does not lie against PSX; no grounds made out against SECP; parties relegated to the agreed arbitral mechanism under PSX Regulations; petition dismissed vide short order dated 13.11.2024—present judgment contains reasons.

Summary: Background: In this case, the petitioner, a professional athlete, seeks to vacate an arbitration award that denied their appeal of a disciplinary decision made by a league's commissioner. The commissioner had suspended the athlete for six games after finding them in violation of the league's personal conduct policy. The athlete challenged the arbitration award, arguing that the commissioner exceeded his authority and that the arbitration process was fundamentally unfair. ----Issues: 1- Did the commissioner exceed his authority in issuing the suspension? 2- Was the arbitration process fundamentally unfair? ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court upheld the arbitration award, denying the petitioner's request to vacate it. The court found that the commissioner acted within his authority as outlined in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the league and the players' association. The CBA granted the commissioner broad discretion to discipline players for conduct detrimental to the league. The court also determined that the arbitration process was fair, as the petitioner was given ample opportunity to present their case and was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings. The petitioner's request to vacate the arbitration award was denied, and the six-game suspension was upheld. ----Citations/Precedents: Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984): Established the principle of judicial deference to administrative agencies' interpretation of their governing statutes. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001): Emphasized the limited scope of judicial review of arbitration awards. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010): Held that arbitrators derive their powers from the agreement of the parties and cannot exceed those powers. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564 (2013): Reinforced the principle that courts must uphold an arbitrator’s decision if it arguably construes the parties' contract. National Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 820 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2016): Supported broad deference to the commissioner’s disciplinary authority under the CBA.

Summary: Background:Haji Shinkai (the appellant) brought an appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against the judgment of the High Court of Balochistan. The appellant sought restoration of a decree issued by the Trial Court, claiming ownership of land based on an arbitration award (Ex.P.8) obtained through arbitration proceedings.---Issues:Whether the appellant's suit seeking to enforce the arbitration award was maintainable under Section 32 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.Whether the modification made by the High Court to the Trial Court's decree was justified.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The court held that the appellant's suit was not maintainable under Section 32 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which prohibits suits challenging the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or award. The appellant's claim sought to enforce the arbitration award, thus falling within the scope of Section 32's prohibition. Additionally, the court found that the appellant failed to prove that the defendants voluntarily acted upon the arbitration award, rendering the suit incompetent.Regarding the modification made by the High Court to the Trial Court's decree, the court deemed it unjustified since the appellant had not complied with the requirements set by the High Court. Therefore, the modification was deemed to have lost its effect.As a result, the court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision that the appellant's suit was not maintainable under Section 32 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and no costs were awarded.---Citations/Precedents:Ch. Muhammad Saleem v. Muhammad Akram and others (PLD 1971 SC 516)Abdul Karim v. Bashir Ahmed (PLD 1974 SC 61)Bibi Najma v. Abdul Rehman (1998 SCMR 1304)Narbadabai & Ors. v. Natverlal Chunilal Bhalakia (AIR 1953 Bombay 386)Abdul Karim v.Bashir Ahmad (PLD 1967 Lah 365)Moolchand Jothajee v. Rashid Jamshed Sons (AIR 1946 Madras 346)M. Gulamali Abulhussein & Co.v. Vishwambharlal (AIR 1949 Bombay 158)Ramchander Singh & others v. Munshi Mian (AIR 1950 Patna 48)Kanhyalal Vishweshwarlal Mahjan v. Ramchandra Shankarrao Holkar (AIR 1959 Madhya Pradesh 415)Abdur Rehman v. Hamid Khan (1988 SCMR 1146)Awan Industries v. Executive Engineer, Lined Channel Div. (1992 SCMR 65)

Summary: Difference between jurisdictions of Civil Court under Section 9 of CPC and under Section 2(c) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 ------ An Award after withdrawal of ordinary suit cannot be held illegal merely because order of reference was not obtained under Section 21 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 --- The case revolved around a dispute between two parties that had initially referred their matter to arbitration without obtaining a court order, resulting in the dismissal of the suit. Subsequently, the arbitrators issued an award, and the petitioners sought a judgment according to the award under Sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act of 1940.The core legal issue before the court was whether a decree should be passed under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) or if judgment should be pronounced according to the award under Section 17 of the Act of 1940. Despite the court's opinion that Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC might not be directly applicable, it acknowledged the fundamental principle that parties have the option to settle disputes outside of court.The court delved into the various types of arbitration under the Act of 1940, distinguishing between arbitration without court intervention, arbitration with court intervention when no suit is pending, and arbitration in suits. The judgment analyzed the historical background of arbitration laws in British India, leading to the promulgation of the Act of 1940.The court critiqued the lower courts' decisions that declared the arbitration agreement and award as illegal due to the absence of a court order for reference under Section 21. It emphasized that such an agreement, entered into after the withdrawal of a suit, should not be treated as unlawful. The judgment cited relevant legal provisions, including Sections 14, 17, and 47 of the Act of 1940, as well as Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC.In conclusion, the court set aside the impugned orders, allowing the petitioners' application under Sections 14 and 17 of the Act of 1940 to be deemed pending. The written compromise deed was to be returned for consideration by the lower court, with instructions to pronounce judgment under Section 17 of the Act of 1940 if all legal formalities were fulfilled. The matter was remanded to the Civil Court.