Summary: NOTE — Athar Minallah, J. (Separate opinion upholding death sentence) (a) Criminal law—Extra-judicial custodial killing by law-enforcement official—Quantum of sentence—Principles for sentencing under S. 302(b), PPC ----S. 302(b), PPC; Ss. 164, 342, 374 & 544-A, Cr.P.C.; Frontier Corps Ordinance, 1959, Ss. 3, 7, 15; Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 9 Facts—Member of Frontier Corps (Balochistan) shot an unarmed young university student eight times in the back while in custody, in presence of his parents—Trial Court convicted him under S. 302(b), PPC and sentenced him to death; High Court confirmed death—By majority (2-1) Supreme Court altered to life imprisonment; present opinion records dissent. Held (per Athar Minallah, J.): The act constituted an extra-judicial custodial killing—gruesome, brutal, shocking, and outrageous to public conscience, thus falling within “fasad-fil-arz” under S. 299(ee), PPC—Appellant was a trained, armed member of a disciplined paramilitary force, bound by fiduciary duty to protect citizens—Weapon and bullets issued for official duty were misused for a cowardly act—No provocation or mitigating circumstance existed; plea of anger or sorrow over injured colleagues could not justify vigilante killing—Retracted confession and lack of remorse excluded any leniency—Trial Court rightly awarded death, lawfully confirmed by High Court—Sentence commuted by majority lacked justification; dissenting judge upheld death penalty. (b) Sentencing discretion—Deterrence, retribution, proportionality ----S. 302(b), PPC; S. 367(5), Cr.P.C.; “having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case” Court reiterated that sentencing under S. 302(b) requires judicial discretion, balancing aggravating and mitigating factors—Deterrence, proportionality, reformation, and retribution are concurrent objectives—Where offender is a law-enforcement officer, breach of authority and trust aggravates culpability—Extra-judicial killings, enforced disappearances, and custodial murders undermine the rule of law and must attract the severest punishment to restore public confidence and deter impunity—Leniency in such cases frustrates deterrence and trivializes the crime. (c) Jurisdiction—Trial by Sessions Court vs. military forum ----Frontier Corps Ordinance, 1959; Pakistan Army Act, 1952; Constitution, Art. 245 Plea that offence should have been tried by military court rejected—Accused governed by Frontier Corps Ordinance, 1959, not by Army Act—Sessions Judge, Mekran at Turbat had competent jurisdiction—Transparent, open trial before civilian court served public interest—Reference to military forum would have been unconstitutional and against public trust. (d) Role of law-enforcement agencies—Duty of care and fiduciary responsibility ----Frontier Corps Ordinance, 1959, Ss. 3, 7, 15; Constitution, Art. 9 Members of Frontier Corps and similar forces are entrusted to protect citizens against aggression and owe a fiduciary duty of care—Any abuse of authority resulting in custodial killing erodes public confidence, violates fundamental right to life under Art. 9, Constitution, and constitutes aggravated breach of duty—Such conduct invites the highest standard of accountability and the most severe penal consequence. (e) Sentencing precedents—When death penalty justified Courts must impose death when aggravating factors outweigh mitigation—Dissent relied on settled jurisprudence emphasizing deterrence and proportionality: Khurram Malik v. State PLD 2006 SC 354 Abdul Malik v. State PLD 2006 SC 365 Zarin v. State 1976 SCMR 359 Rajasab Khan v. State PLD 1976 SC 452 Muhammad Sharif v. State 1991 SCMR 1622 Noor Muhammad v. State 1999 SCMR 2722 Ms. Najiba v. Ahmed Sultan 2001 SCMR 988 Dilawar Hussain v. State 2013 SCMR 1582 Hassan v. State PLD 2013 SC 793 Zafar v. State 1999 SCMR 2028 Muhammad Ilyas v. Muhammad Sufian PLD 2001 SC 465 Asad Mahmood v. Akhlaq 2010 SCMR 868 Suo Motu Rangers Killing Case PLD 2011 SC 799 Shahid Zafar v. State PLD 2014 SC 809 Rashid Ali v. State 2011 SCMR 1037 Mumtaz Qadri v. State PLD 2016 SC 17 Muhammad Aslam v. State PLD 2006 SC 465 Held, these precedents affirm that members of disciplined forces who kill unarmed civilians in custody merit no mercy; deterrence and societal condemnation demand the death penalty. (f) Disposition (Dissenting view) Conviction under S. 302(b), PPC maintained; death sentence confirmed—Appeal dismissed—Reasons recorded as dissent from majority judgment commuting the sentence to life imprisonment.

Summary: The practice of conducting media interviews of accused persons while in custody, and exposing them in a manner that subjects them to public humiliation, is strongly deprecated. 284Crl. Appeal- Against Conviction- PPC 102-23 USMAN ALI VS STATE Mr. Justice Sadiq Mahmud Khurram 08- 09- 2025 2025 LHC 7583

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969— —Ss. 32, 80, 81 & 179—Jurisdiction—Recovery of short-levied taxes—Scope— Customs authorities retain jurisdiction, within five-year limitation, to recover sales tax and advance income tax at the import stage, even where discovered after clearance of goods due to wrongly granted exemption. Insertion of “taxes” in S.32 by Finance Act, 2014 and “including recovery” in S.6(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 by Finance Act, 2015, coupled with omission of S.11 Sales Tax Act by Finance Act, 2024, show legislative intent to vest post-clearance recovery jurisdiction in Customs. Sections 80 and 81 envisage assessment not concluded at clearance stage; S.179 provides adjudicatory machinery. (b) Sales Tax Act, 1990— —S. 6(1)—Collection and recovery at import stage—Extent— Import-stage sales tax is charged, paid, enforced and recovered in the same manner and time as customs duty. With omission of general recovery jurisdiction of Inland Revenue (earlier S.11), S.6(1) now stands as sole operative provision, incorporating Customs Act machinery for collection and recovery of sales tax at import. (c) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001— —S. 148(5) & (6)—Advance income tax at import stage— Sub-sections (5) and (6) synchronize collection of advance income tax with customs duty, borrowing Customs Act provisions “so far as they relate to collection”. Scheme envisages that Customs may recover unpaid advance tax discovered through post-clearance audit. (d) Fiscal statutes—Amendments—Retrospective application— Amendments by Finance Acts 2012, 2014 and 2015 to Customs Act and Sales Tax Act are procedural; they regulate forum and machinery for collection but do not create new liabilities. Being procedural, they apply retrospectively unless expressly excluded. (e) Constitutional law— —Art. 199—High Court jurisdiction— Sindh High Court erred in holding Customs lacked jurisdiction to recover import-stage sales tax and income tax post clearance; impugned judgments set aside. Dissent (Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J.) (f) Customs Act, 1969—Sales Tax Act, 1990—Income Tax Ordinance, 2001—Jurisdiction— Held, Customs’ jurisdiction limited to import stage only. Post-clearance recovery of sales tax or income tax lies exclusively with Inland Revenue authorities under respective statutes. Amendments inserting “taxes” (Customs Act) or “including recovery” (Sales Tax Act) do not confer adjudicatory powers to Customs absent express conferment. Import-stage jurisdiction ends once goods are cleared under S.80 of Customs Act; subsequent proceedings must be by Inland Revenue. Civil Petitions dismissed. Cited Cases Gulistan Textile Mills v. Federation of Pakistan 2019 PTD 393 (Lahore High Court) (distinguished) Banwari Lal v. Mahesh AIR 1918 PC 188 Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakur Khan PLD 1984 SC 289 Other jurisprudence on court-fees and jurisdiction referred for analogy. ----Disposition: By majority (Afridi, C.J. and Shakeel Ahmad, J.)—Petitions converted into appeals—Allowed—Sindh High Court judgments/orders set aside—Customs authorities declared competent to recover short-levied sales tax and advance income tax post-clearance. Dissent (Siddiqui, J.)—Leave refused—Customs jurisdiction confined to import stage; post-clearance recovery lies with Inland Revenue.

Summary: Barrier of limitation does not come in the way of Gas Utility Companies for recovery of any outstanding amounts due against the defaulting consumers. 292Criminal Proceedings 45714/25 Kainat . Vs DG ACE etc Mr. Justice Tanveer Ahmad Sheikh 28-08- 2025 2025 LHC 5385

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 51(6)(d)(e), 106(3)(c), 187, 188 & 225—Elections Act, 2017, Ss. 57, 60, 62, 64, 66, 67, 98 & 104—Elections Rules, 2017, R.94 (Explanation)—Reserved seats—Allocation of reserved seats for women and non-Muslims—Powers and jurisdiction of Election Commission of Pakistan—Scope of judicial review—Interpretation of constitutional provisions. The Supreme Court held that the scheme of the Constitution and election laws for elections to reserved seats is identical in principle to that governing general seats. Nomination papers must be filed, scrutinized, and lists of candidates for reserved seats must be submitted by political parties in accordance with constitutional timelines. Since the Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC) neither contested the general election as a political party nor submitted any list of candidates for reserved seats before the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), it was not entitled to any allocation of reserved seats. The unanimous dismissal of SIC’s appeals before the Supreme Court in 2024 had attained finality; therefore, SIC had no standing to reopen or contest the issue in review. (b) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 187—“Complete justice”—Scope—Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court—Limits. Article 187 is not a stand-alone provision and can be invoked only when the Court is properly seised of a lis under Articles 184, 185, 186 or 188 of the Constitution. The provision does not authorize the Court to legislate or grant relief to a person not before it, or to extend jurisdiction beyond the pleadings. The majority in the impugned judgment (PLD 2025 SC 67) had erred by granting relief to the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), which was neither a party to the proceedings nor had sought such relief. Substitution of constitutional text for subjective notions of equity or political preference constitutes a reviewable error apparent on the face of the record. (c) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 51, 106, 187 & 225—Elections Act, 2017, Ss. 66 & 67—Certificates of party affiliation—Validity. Certificates of party affiliation issued under Section 66 of the Elections Act, 2017, by the purported Chairman of PTI were held to be a nullity as his election was not recognized under the law; consequently, candidates filing such certificates were to be treated as independents under Section 67(2) of the Act. (d) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 225—Elections Act, 2017—Challenge to election results—Mandatory procedure—Effect of non-observance. The Court reaffirmed that any grievance against the decision of Returning Officers or election results must be pursued under the procedure prescribed by Article 225 of the Constitution and the Elections Act, 2017. PTI and its candidates, having failed to challenge the Returning Officers’ orders declaring them independents, could not later claim that their seats be treated as PTI seats. (e) Constitutional law ----Review jurisdiction—Scope—Error apparent on the face of the record—Grounds. A review lies when a judgment is based on an erroneous assumption of material facts, contravenes a provision of law, departs from settled construction of the Constitution, or renders a constitutional provision inoperative for affected persons. Relief granted to a non-party, alteration of constitutional timelines, or exercise of legislative power in the guise of adjudication amounts to such an error warranting review. (f) Courts and jurisdiction ----Functus officio—Special bench for clarifications—Legality. Upon pronouncement of a judgment, all members of the Court become functus officio. The majority in the impugned judgment had constituted itself into a special bench for issuing further directions and clarifications; such constitution was unprecedented and contrary to law. After acceptance of the review petitions and setting aside of the impugned judgment, that self-constituted bench and its subsequent clarifications stood annulled. (g) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 27-A, C.P.C.—Notice to Attorney-General—Constitutionality of rules. Explanation to Rule 94 of the Election Rules, 2017, could not have been struck down without prior notice to the Attorney-General for Pakistan as mandated by Order XXVII-A, C.P.C. The question of validity of the said Explanation was left open to be decided in appropriate proceedings after such notice. (h) Review petitions—Maintainability—Parties entitled to seek review—Authority of ECP to file review petition. The Court held that review petitions filed by political parties and individuals directly affected by the impugned judgment were maintainable. The Election Commission of Pakistan, being the constitutional body responsible for superintendence of elections, possessed the right to seek review where a question of law affecting its jurisdiction and future conduct of elections was involved. (i) Constitutional law ----Doctrine of separation of powers—Judicial restraint—Observations. The Court emphasized that judicial power must not transgress into the legislative domain. Relief granted beyond the pleadings and in disregard of express constitutional mandates undermines the constitutional scheme and the separation of powers. (g) Disposition— By a majority of seven judges (Amin-ud-Din Khan, Senior Judge; Musarrat Hilali; Naeem Akhter Afghan; Shahid Bilal Hassan; Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar; Aamer Farooq; and Ali Baqar Najafi, JJ.), all Civil Review Petitions were allowed; the impugned majority judgment dated 12.07.2024 (PLD 2025 SC 67) was set aside; Civil Appeals Nos. 333 and 334 of 2024 filed by the Sunni Ittehad Council were dismissed, and the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 25.03.2024 was restored. Justice Jamal Khan Mandokhel partly allowed the review petitions to the extent of forty-one seats. Justices Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi allowed the review petitions with directions to the ECP to undertake a de novo exercise regarding affiliation of all eighty returned candidates and decide allocation of reserved seats within fifteen days. Cited Cases: • Suba v. Fatima Bibi 1996 SCMR 158 • Pakistan v. Fecto Belarus Tractors Ltd. PLD 2002 SC 208 • Managing Director SSGC v. Ghulam Abbas PLD 2003 SC 724 • Muhammad Siddiqul Farooq v. The State 2010 SCMR 198 • Dr. Raja Aamer Zaman v. Omar Ayub Khan 2015 SCMR 1303 • Basharat Ali Khan v. Muhammad Akbar 2017 SCMR 309 • Justice Qazi Faez Isa v. President of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 119 • Nadia Naz v. President of Pakistan 2023 PLC (C.S.) 1353 • Supreme Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2024 SC 1199 • Inter Quest Informatics Services v. Commissioner of Income Tax 2025 SCMR 257.

Summary: (a) Court Fees Act, 1870— —Ss. 28 & 34—Payment of deficient court fee—Scope— Court Fees Act, like fiscal legislation, is designed to ensure revenue collection for the State and not to empower litigants to defeat adversaries on technical grounds—Where a document is filed with deficient court fee, Court must determine the exact deficiency and allow reasonable time for rectification—Once deficiency is removed within time granted, document relates back to original filing date—Rejection without prior assessment and opportunity violates principles of fairness. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)— —S. 149 & O. VII, R. 11(c); O. XLI, R. 3—Rectification of deficiency in court fee— Section 149 CPC permits curing deficiency in court fee even after expiry of limitation—Obligation of trial and appellate courts is to ascertain exact shortfall and grant time to pay—Order VII, R.11(c) CPC applies equally to plaints and memoranda of appeal; rejection is unlawful unless deficiency first determined and reasonable opportunity granted. (c) Constitutional Law— —Art. 10-A—Right to fair trial— Failure of appellate court to determine deficiency in court fee before rejecting memorandum of appeal amounted to denial of fair trial guaranteed under Art.10-A of the Constitution—Technical lapse cannot override substantive justice where absence of contumacy or mala fide is evident. (d) Administration of justice— —Judicial discretion—Exercise in matters of court fee— Discretion to condone or extend time to make up deficiency is to be exercised in furtherance of justice—Rigid application of rules should not hinder access to justice—Leniency may be denied only where contumacy, mala fide, or deliberate non-compliance is established. Cited Cases Banwari Lal v. Mahesh AIR 1918 PC 188 Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakur Khan PLD 1984 SC 289 Mst. Parveen v. Mst. Jamsheda Begum PLD 1983 SC 227 Yaqoob Khan v. Rasool Khan 1981 SCMR 155 Ch. Nazir Ahmed v. Abdul Karim PLD 1990 SC 42 Assistant Commissioner & Land Acquisition Collector, Badin v. Haji Abdul Shakoor 1997 SCMR 919 Noor Muhammad v. Muhammad Sharif 1988 SCMR 1955 Malik Allah Dad v. Yasin 1990 SCMR 1638 Muhammad Hanif v. Muhammad PLD 1990 SC 859 Mukhi Chatromal v. Khubchand 1993 SCMR 1113 Sardar Ahmed Yar Jang v. Sardar Noor Ahmed Khan PLD 1994 SC 688 Zulfiqar Ali v. Mst. Sajida Begum 1995 SCMR 911 Disposition Petition converted into appeal—Allowed—Orders of District Judge (14.04.2016) and High Court (03.12.2020) set aside—Matter remanded to District Judge, Bhakkar to determine exact court fee deficiency, grant reasonable time to petitioner for payment, and then decide case on merits.

Summary: Illegal disposition requirements ---- (a) Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 —- Ss. 3, 4 & 5 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Ss. 435 & 439 — Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A Maintainability of complaint — Concurrent civil litigation — Jurisdiction of trial court — Scope of inquiry under the 2005 Act — Remedial purpose — Complaint under Ss. 3 & 4 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 was dismissed by trial court without trial, solely on grounds that (i) petitioner and respondent were co-owners in un-partitioned land, and (ii) civil litigation was pending — High Court upheld dismissal relying on judgments in Habib Ullah v. Abdul Manan (2012 SCMR 1533) and Bashir Ahmed v. ASJ Faisalabad (PLD 2010 SC 661) — Held, both precedents had been declared "not good law" by Gulshan Bibi v. Muhammad Sadiq (PLD 2016 SC 769) — Dismissal of complaint solely due to pending civil litigation or co-ownership status is contrary to established law — Sessions court is duty-bound to determine from available material whether unlawful dispossession occurred, even in presence of parallel civil proceedings — Complaint under 2005 Act is maintainable unless trial court determines that it is being misused to convert a civil dispute into criminal liability — Dual-track nature of civil and criminal liabilities underlies the Act’s independent remedial character. Cited Cases: • Gulshan Bibi v. Muhammad Sadiq (PLD 2016 SC 769) • Muhammad Naseem v. Fareeda Gul (2016 SCMR 1931) • Abdul Majeed v. The State (2017 SCMR 390) • Criminal Petitions No. 66-K & 67-K of 2024 (2024 SCP 243) Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed; matter remanded to trial court for determination in accordance with 2005 Act. (b) Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 —- S. 5(1), Second Proviso Scope of inquiry — Role of trial court — Failure to investigate key factual questions — Effect — Trial court failed to investigate core factual issue of actual possession prior to alleged dispossession, despite calling for police report — Inquiry report submitted under order dated 19.12.2020 was deficient and failed to address possession status of complainant prior to occurrence — Held, trial court should have invoked second proviso to S. 5(1) and directed further inquiry — Instead, it erroneously dismissed the complaint without trial — Jurisdictional error committed by trial court by not determining whether alleged illegal dispossession actually occurred. Judicial Direction: On remand, trial court must conduct inquiry in accordance with 2005 Act and determine (i) if petitioner was dispossessed, and (ii) effect of delay, if any, in filing complaint. (c) Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 —- S. 3 — Scope and elements — Applicability test Conditions for application — Legal test from Mumtaz Hussain case reaffirmed — Four elements required for S. 3 offence: Property must be immovable; Complainant must be lawful owner or in lawful possession; Accused must have unlawfully entered the property; Such entry must be with intent to dispossess — Held, trial and High Court failed to properly apply this test — No findings rendered as to actual possession prior to occurrence — Summary dismissal without factual determination was unlawful. Cited Case: • Mumtaz Hussain v. Dr. Nasir Khan (2010 SCMR 1254) (d) Criminal Jurisdiction — Civil proceedings pending — Concurrent remedy — No bar on maintainability Dual-track proceedings — Civil litigation does not preclude prosecution under 2005 Act — Held, pendency of civil litigation regarding same immovable property does not nullify jurisdiction of criminal court under the 2005 Act — Criminal liability must be adjudicated on its own merits and cannot be defeated by citing pending civil suits — A person cannot take law into own hands, dispossess lawful occupier, and avoid criminal prosecution merely due to co-existing civil claims. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Naseem v. Fareeda Gul (2016 SCMR 1931) • Abdul Majeed v. The State (2017 SCMR 390) • Criminal Petitions No. 66-K & 67-K of 2024 (2024 SCP 243) Final Disposition: Leave to appeal granted. Petition converted to appeal and allowed. Judgments of High Court and trial court set aside. Matter remanded to trial court to proceed under 2005 Act, assess legality of alleged dispossession, and determine effect of delay in filing complaint.

Summary: Scope of Section 24 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009. 304Crl. Misc. 32072/25 Muhammad Uzair Vs The State etc. Mr. Justice Tanveer Ahmad Sheikh 05- 08- 2025 2025 LHC 5326

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Arts. 4, 9 & 10A ---- Right to fair and timely trial ---- Delay in adjudication as constitutional infraction ---- Access to justice undermined by systemic delay Fourteen years elapsed between the original auction of immovable property and the final hearing before the Supreme Court, during which the petitioner’s appeal remained pending for over a decade before the High Court. The Court held that such delay, though administrative on the surface, constitutes a constitutional violation of Articles 4, 9, and 10A, which guarantee the right to due process and meaningful access to justice. Held, justice delayed for such an extraordinary duration is justice effectively denied; prolonged pendency rendered the petitioner’s claim moot, fragile, and extinguished by time. Remedy without timeliness is not a remedy in law. Cited Cases: • Baz Muhammad Kakar v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2012 SC 923 • Khan Asfandyar Wali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2001 SC 607 • Liaqat Hussain v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1999 SC 504 • Mehram Ali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1998 SC 1445 • Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 324 • Government of Balochistan v. Azizullah Memon PLD 1993 SC 341 • Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1988 SC 416 (b) Civil Procedure --- Execution proceedings --- Challenge to auction of immovable property --- Concurrent findings by courts below --- No interference by Supreme Court Petitioner challenged the 2011 auction of immovable property conducted in execution of a 2010 money decree. His objections were dismissed at trial, and the appellate challenge before the High Court remained pending for over ten years. The Supreme Court, after independent examination of the record, upheld the concurrent findings of the courts below and found no merit in the objections to the auction proceedings. Petition was also dismissed for non-prosecution as no representative appeared to argue the case, despite notice. (c) Judicial governance --- Systemic delay --- Structural reforms required --- Judicial credibility dependent on timely adjudication The Court observed that over 2.2 million cases were pending nationwide, including nearly 56,000 before the Supreme Court itself. Such delays erode public trust, discourage economic investment, distort contractual enforcement, and disproportionately burden the vulnerable. Held, delay is not merely a docket management issue but a challenge to constitutional governance and the legitimacy of the justice system. It calls for intelligent case management, elimination of queue-jumping, prioritization of constitutional and high-impact matters, and technology-assisted scheduling using artificial intelligence tools without compromising judicial discretion. (d) Comparative constitutional law --- Judicial efficiency --- International models of reform cited --- Technology and procedural restructuring as imperatives The Court referenced judicial innovations in Singapore, UK, Brazil, Estonia, Canada, China, Denmark, and Australia, where digital dashboards, automated scheduling, and e-filing systems have transformed judicial delivery from passive docket handling to active justice management. Held, Pakistani courts must draw inspiration from such global experiences and adopt institutional reform through administrative discipline, structural redesign, and technological modernization to combat the endemic delay and deliver timely, citizen-centric justice. Disposition: Petition dismissed both on merits and for non-prosecution. Supreme Court calls for urgent judicial reform to ensure timely access to justice.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 07.09.2017, passed by the High Court of Balochistan Quetta in C.P. No. 267 of 2012). (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 185(3) & 199---Contractual dispute---Security deposit, forfeiture of---Executing court not to travel beyond the scope of decree---Principle---High Court under its Constitutional jurisdiction making factual inquiry in the matter and granting relief releasing security amount which relief was neither granted nor even prayed for before the Trial Court---Legality---Facts in brevity were that the father of the petitioners was awarded a contract in 1986 for construction of the Balochistan High Court building but due to alleged unsatisfactory performance he was blacklisted by the C&W Department and his security deposit was forfeited---Being aggrieved, father of petitioners filed a suit which was decreed to the extent of declaring him an "A" class contractor and setting aside the blacklisting---His subsequent execution application for recovery of the forfeited security was dismissed by the executing court on the premise that suit to the extent of release of security amount was not decreed---During appeal before the High Court, the contractor died, and his legal heirs (petitioners) were impleaded---The High Court converted the matter into a Constitutional petition, and after summoning the record and probing into the matter, partly allowed the petitioner by ordering the C&W Department to pay Rs. 20,12,668/- to the legal heirs from the security deposit, leading the petitioner to seek recovery of the full Rs. 68,67,668/- on account of security deposit from the C&W Department by challenging the partial payment order---Pivotal question before the Supreme Court was as to "Whether the petitioners were entitled to recover the full security amount withheld by the C&W Department despite the Trial Court's decree not expressly granting such relief, and whether the High Court while exercising its Constitutional jurisdiction was justified in ordering partial payment of Rs. 20,12,668/- on account of security release after conducting factual inquiry in the matter?"---Held: A perusal of the prayer clause set out in the plaint reflected that the petitioners had not made any prayer for release of security amount---The order for release of the security amount by the High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction was objected to by the C&W Department stating that it had already been released to the contractor---Factual controversy raised by the parties could only be resolved after recording pro and contra evidence through a civil suit---The High Court mainly keeping in view exigency in the matter involved, decided to get such matter examined by summoning official record, carrying out full-fledged inquiry in presence of the parties, which exercise could not have been done in writ jurisdiction---The scope and ambit of the proceedings before the High Court, in the present case, was limited to the extent of judgment and decree of the Trial Court and the order passed by the executing court dismissing the execution application on the ground that the claim for recovery of the security amount mentioned in execution application was not decreed in favour of the contractor (father of petitioners)---The High Court had not attended to any of the prayers and the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and order of the executing court, and proceeded to decide the case after making a detailed inquiry---Thus, High Court exceeded its authority by passing the impugned judgment, which called for interference---High Court under its Constitutional jurisdiction could not entertain matters requiring factual inquiry which was the prerogative and domain of the Trial Court---Findings, conclusions and directions issued to the C&W Department for payment of security amount to the petitioners was beyond the Constitutional mandate and authority of the High Court---Impugned judgment was set aside and the petition filed by the legal heirs of the contractor seeking release of remaining security was dismissed and leave was refused, whereas, petition filed by the Department was converted into an appeal and was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, exercise of---Matters requiring factual inquiry---Scope---High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution cannot entertain matters requiring factual inquiry which is the prerogative and privilege of the Trial Court to examine such controversies so as to be disposed of on merit after taking into consideration the evidence led by the parties. Waqar Ahmed and others v. The Federation of Pakistan through Cabinet Secretariat, Establishment Division, Islamabad and others 2024 SCMR 1877 rel. (c) Jurisdiction--- ----Principle---It is constitutionally impressible for the Courts to expand and enlarge their jurisdictional domain which is neither allowed by the Constitution nor by the law. Federal Government Employees Housing Authority through Director General, Islamabad v. Ednan Syed and others PLD 2025 SC 11 rel. Khalil Ahmed Panezai, Advocate Supreme Court and Abdus Saleem Ansari, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in C.P. No. 182-Q of 2017). Zahoor Ahmad Baloch, Additional Advocate General, Balochistan for Petitioners (in C.P. No. 191-Q of 2017). Zahoor Ahmad Baloch, Additional Advocate General, Balochistan for Respondents (in C.P. No. 182-Q of 2017). Khalil Ahmed Panezai, Advocate Supreme Court and Abdus Saleem Ansari, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents (in C.P. No. 191-Q of 2017). Date of hearing: 14th July, 2025.