Summary: Background: The petitioner, representing the legal heirs of a deceased, filed a suit for declaration and injunction to claim inheritance rights over land that was previously allotted on lease. The petitioner sought to invalidate several historical mutations (ownership transfers) from 1935 and 1937, arguing that these were contrary to Christian inheritance laws. The respondents countered, arguing that the petitioner was not the rightful heir, as the original heir (the petitioner's claimed mother) had predeceased the allottee. -----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioner, as the alleged daughter of the original allottee, was entitled to the disputed inheritance under Christian inheritance law. -----2- Whether the historical mutations (ownership changes) were valid and conformed to the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912. -----3- Whether the suit was time-barred, given the delay of over 70 years before the petitioner brought the claim. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Petitioner's Status as Heir: The court held that while the petitioner's relationship as the original allottee’s daughter was initially contested, the petitioner was unable to substantiate her claim through sufficient evidence. Furthermore, the court determined that the mutations were legally valid under the tenancy succession rules set out in the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, which prioritize widow rights over unmarried daughters. --Legitimacy of Historical Mutations: The mutations transferring the original tenant's property to the widow (later transferring it upon her remarriage) were validly sanctioned according to Sections 20 and 21 of the Act. These provisions restrict tenancy inheritance to widows and male descendants unless no such heirs exist, thus precluding the petitioner’s inheritance claim. --Limitation: The court upheld that the petitioner's suit was time-barred, as the petitioner did not seek to challenge the disputed mutations within a reasonable time frame, waiting over 70 years to file suit. The court emphasized that the principle of limitation applies even in inheritance matters, particularly where longstanding public records and third-party interests were established without challenge. -----Citations/Precedents: Mst. Inayat Bibi through legal heirs v. Issac Nazir Ullah and others (PLD 1992 SC 385) Mst. GRANA through Legal Heirs and others v. SAHIB KAMALA BIBI and others (PLD 2014 SC 167) Mst. Phaphan v. Muhammad Bakhsh (2005 SCMR 1278) Lal Khan v. Muhammad Yousaf (PLD 2011 SC 657) Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh (2007 SCMR 1446) Syed KAUSAR ALI SHAH and others v. Syed FARHAT HUSSAIN SHAH and others (2022 SCMR 1558)

Summary: Background: The appellants filed a civil appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Kotli, on April 24, 2013. They challenged the trial court's dismissal of their suit for declaration, cancellation of a decree dated April 15, 1989, and a perpetual injunction to prevent the respondents from interfering with their possession of the disputed land. The appellants claimed that they had legally purchased the land, including rights to Shamlat-e-Deh land, and were rightful owners. The respondents, however, contested these claims, leading to the dismissal of the initial suit by the trial court. ----Issues: 1- Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for declaration and perpetual injunction to protect their possession of the disputed land. 2- Whether civil courts have jurisdiction to issue a decree related to Shamlat-e-Deh land. 3- Whether the decree dated April 15, 1989, was valid or should be annulled. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir ruled in favor of the appellants, Abdul Ghani and Malik Hussain, and dismissed the counter-appeal filed by Muhammad Nisar and others. The court's reasoning was as follows: Jurisdiction and Perpetual Injunction: The court clarified that civil courts do indeed have jurisdiction to issue a decree for perpetual injunction related to Shamlat-e-Deh land under the Specific Relief Act. The court found that the trial court's dismissal of the suit on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction was incorrect. The plaintiffs' possession of the land was supported by evidence, and they were entitled to legal protection from interference by the respondents. Evasive Denial as Admission: The court noted that the respondents’ evasive denials in their written statements amounted to an admission of the plaintiffs’ claims. Since the respondents did not provide specific refutations, the plaintiffs’ ownership claims were effectively undisputed. As such, the plaintiffs were entitled to their share of the Shamlat-e-Deh land, as specified in the sale deeds. Cancellation of the 1989 Decree: The court affirmed the annulment of the decree dated April 15, 1989, by the Additional District Judge. The court found that no decree for declaration could be validly issued regarding Shamlat-e-Deh land, and therefore, the original decree was beyond the jurisdiction of the court that issued it (coram non judice). The appeal filed by Abdul Ghani and Malik Hussain was accepted, granting them a perpetual injunction preventing the respondents from interfering with their possession of the land, subject to the partition of the Shamlat-e-Deh land under relevant law. The counter-appeal filed by Muhammad Nisar and others was dismissed as lacking merit. The impugned judgment was sustained to the extent of the annulment of the decree dated April 15, 1989. ----Citations/Precedents: 2009 SCR 382 2013 SCR 185 PLJ 2005 S.C. (AJK) 26

Summary: Background: The petitioner filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell, declaration, and injunction. He claimed to have entered into an agreement with the respondents regarding the purchase of a property. The respondents made a consenting statement, and the judgment was passed by the Trial Court based on ex-parte evidence. The petitioner later filed an application for the correction of the decree, as it did not include any finding regarding the specific performance of the agreement and injunction. Both the Trial Court and the Lower Appellate Court declined to correct the judgment. -----Issues: 1- Whether the Trial Court's omission to include findings on the specific performance of the agreement and injunction in its decree was an inadvertent slip. 2- Whether the High Court could direct the correction of the judgment under Section 152, C.P.C. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Accidental Omission: The High Court held that the failure of the Trial Court to include findings on the specific performance of the agreement and injunction was not deliberate. It was deemed an inadvertent accidental slip, falling within the ambit of Section 152, C.P.C., which allows for the correction of such errors. --Jurisdiction under Section 152, C.P.C.: The Court emphasized that Section 152, C.P.C., permits the correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes or errors arising from any accidental slip or omission. This provision aims to foster justice, suppress mischief, and avoid multiplicity of proceedings. --High Court's Direction: The High Court set aside the orders of the Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court. It directed the Trial Court to make necessary corrections by incorporating the reliefs of specific performance and perpetual injunction into the decree. The constitutional petition was allowed, and the matter was remanded to the Trial Court for necessary correction in the judgment. -----Citations/Precedents: Syed Saadi Jafri Zainabi v. Land Acquisition Collector and Assistant Commissioner PLD 1992 SC 472 Muhammad Akram v. DDCO, Rahim Yar Khan and others 2017 SCMR 56 Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd. v. Messrs Ali Asbestos Industries Ltd. and 5 others 1990 MLD 130 Mst. Forosha v. Fazal Gul and others PLD 1983 SC 220 Amjad Butt v. Amjad Ali 2017 CLC Note 45

Summary: (Allowed) The petitioner argued that the jurisdiction for the dispute was exclusively with the civil courts in Lahore, as stated in Clause 25 of the agreement. The respondents contended that the inclusion of Clause 25 was without their consent and alleged fraud. The Supreme Court, considered the arguments and examined the relevant law. While not discussing the merits of the case, the Court focused on the issue of whether Clause 25, conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the civil court in Lahore, was binding on the parties. The Court cited precedent and established that parties can select a particular court through mutual agreement for the determination of their dispute. Given that the agreement was signed in Lahore and related documents were executed and registered there, the Court concluded that the civil court in Lahore had jurisdiction over the matter. Therefore, the Court allowed the petition, converted it into an appeal, and set aside the orders of the lower courts. The petitioner's application under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC was also allowed, and the plaintiffs were directed to file their case in the civil court at Lahore.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-------Ss.42 & 54---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.2(9) & O.XX, R.5---Suit fordeclaration and permanent injunction---Court to state its decision on each issue---Scope---Petitioners filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the respondentsclaiming therein that they were owners in possession of suit property but the respondentswere interfering in their possession---Claim of respondents was that they were in possessionof a part of property since the time of their ancestors; that they were regularly paying cessesof property and that their rights were protected under the Balochistan Tenancy Ordinance,1978---Trial Court dismissed the suit---Appellate Court declared the petitioners as owner ofproperty and respondents as possessor of property in question---Validity---Oral anddocumentary evidence produced by the petitioners was not taken into consideration by theTrial Court---Respondents had produced a private decision/document, which was not worthof a proof as per the law, but the decision was given outright weightage---Such evidence hadno legal sanctity as per the law; thus as per S. 2(9) of C.P.C., the decision of Trial Courtcould not be termed as a "judgment" neither the mandatory provision of O.XX, R.5, C.P.C.was complied with by the Trial Court---Report prepared by revenue official was neithertaken into consideration nor any findings were recorded in that respect---Appellate Court hadnot discharged its judicial responsibilities as per the provision of law---Revision petition wasaccepted and the matter was remanded to Trial Court for framing of additional issues anddecision on merits.Pakistan Refinery Ltd. Karachi v. Barrett Hodgson Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. and others2019 SCMR 1726 rel.Muhammad Idress v. Muhammad Pervaiz 2010 SCMR 5 and Nasreen Bibi v. AbdulRashid 2012 MLD 642 ref.(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------S.96 & O.XLI, R. 31---Appeal---Contents of judgment---Scope---Appellate Court, beinga final court on facts, has to reappraise the entire oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties issue-wise, and to record its independent findings on the question of facts and lawraised by the parties.Pakistan Refinery Ltd. Karachi v. Barrett Hodgson Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. and others2019 SCMR 1726 rel.(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------S.96 & O.XLI, R. 31---Appeal---Contents of judgment---Scope---Appeal is a valuableright of the parties---Entire case of the parties is open to analysis on the question of facts andlaw before the Appellate Court---Judgment of the Appellate Court must therefore reflect thatits findings are supported by reasoning on all the points for determination---Merely agreeingwith the findings recorded by the Trial Court shows that the Appellate Court has notrecorded its own independent findings.(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.XX, R. 5---Court to state its decision on each issue---Scope---In appealable case it isdesirable that the court should as may be practical pronounce its opinion on all issues whichwere raised in a case.Ghulam Mehdi v. Rajab Ali 2022 YLR 937 rel.

Summary: The case involves a dispute over the ownership and sale of commercial property No.B-2(b) in Liaquat Market, Iqbal Road, Rawalpindi. The property was originally rented out to Raja Ali Zaman and Raja Muhammad Banaras by the Evacuee Trust Property Board (ETPB). The appellants sought outright sale of the property, which was initially approved by the Federal Minister for Social Welfare & Rural Development but later restrained by the Federal Government. The ETPB filed a suit against the appellants for declaration, cancellation of the sale deed, and injunction. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the appellate court dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-objection of the appellants on Issue No. 1. The High Court, however, set aside the judgments of the lower courts and decreed the suit of the ETPB. The main argument raised by the appellants is that the High Court erred in heavily relying on a judgment passed by the Supreme Court in a different case (Messrs. Mustafa Impex, Karachi & others v. Govt. of Pakistan thr. Secretary Finance, Islamabad & others). They argue that the constitutional provision cited in that judgment does not apply to their case as it was enacted after the sale deed was executed. On the other hand, the ETPB argues that the sale deed was executed incompetently and in violation of relevant ETPB laws and rules. They contend that no approval was granted by the Federal Government for the sale and that the entire process was initiated through an unauthorized memorandum. They emphasize that the sale of ETPB-owned land can only proceed with proper authorization and approval. The Supreme Court is tasked with determining the following questions:1) Under what law or rules is ETPB authorized to sell property under its ownership? 2) How can authorization be granted for the sale of land under ETPB's management/control by the Federal Government or ETPB itself? 3) If there is a violation of law, rules, or procedure, what effect would it have on the parties' rights? During the pendency of the appeal, an application was filed to implead various persons who had subsequently purchased shops in the suit property. Supreme Court stated that if there was no approval from the Federal Government, the Sale Deed itself would be considered illegal and ineffective because, according to Article 173 of the Constitution, the President would not be deemed to have approved the sale of the suit property through the Federal Government. The High Court correctly concluded that the Sale Deed was obtained without the approval of the Federal Government, rendering it illegal and void from the beginning. Based on the discussion above, Supreme Court stated that the High Court's judgment is well-reasoned and has reached the correct conclusion after considering all the available evidence. The Learned Counsel for the Appellants has not identified any misinterpretation or omission of evidence, nor has he provided any grounds to support a different perspective from that of the High Court. Therefore, this appeal lacks merit and is dismissed.

Summary: The petitioners, feeling aggrieved, filed a suit for declaration, cancellation of the order, and injunction against the respondents in the Court of Civil Judge-II, Quetta. The petitioners alleged that they entered into a written agreement with the respondents for a private partition of the properties, resulting in the house in Quetta falling into their share and the house in Chaman falling into the respondents' share. The trial court consolidated both suits and dismissed the petitioners' suit while decreeing the respondents' suit, declaring the house in Quetta as joint property among the legal heirs. The petitioners filed appeals, and the appellate court upheld the trial court's decision regarding the property in Quetta but modified the decision regarding the property in Chaman, declaring it also as joint property among the legal heirs. The respondents filed a civil revision petition before the High Court of Balochistan, which accepted the petition and set aside the modification made by the appellate court, maintaining the trial court's judgment. However, the High Court held that the suit regarding the property in Chaman was not competent before the civil court in Quetta due to territorial jurisdiction issues. The Supreme Court analyzed the jurisdictional issue and held that both the courts in Quetta and Chaman had jurisdiction over the suits since the cause of action and the relief sought were related to the left-over properties of the parties' predecessor. The Court emphasized that the purpose of Section 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to avoid conflicting decisions and allow parties to choose a convenient court for adjudication. Therefore, the finding of the High Court on the jurisdiction issue was deemed unsustainable. On the merits of the case, the Court examined the evidence and found that the leasehold rights of the property in Chaman were initially purchased by the petitioners' predecessor, but the record of the Municipal Corporation Chaman (MCC) showed a subsequent transfer of the property to respondent No.8. The respondents failed to provide evidence of the transfer or disclose the basis of the transaction. The Court also noted discrepancies in the MCC record and the registered lease deed, raising questions about the transfer of rights without the petitioner's knowledge or consent. Based on the analysis, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's decision regarding the property in Quetta should be upheld, and the respondents' claim to the property in Chaman lacked sufficient evidence. The Court granted leave to appeal to the petitioners.

Summary: In order to succeed in obtaining temporary injunction in a case, a plaintiff has to establish co-existence of three conditions/ingredients i.e., (i) prima facie case; (ii) possibility of suffering irreparable loss if temporary injunction is declined; and (iii) the balance of convenience leans in his favour. Of the above referred three conditions, existence of prima facie case is foundational and the other two conditions are considered only once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case in his favour.

Summary: PLJ 2022 Peshawar 170 [Mingora Bench (Dar - ul - Qaza) Swat] Present Muhammad Naeem Anwar J Mst BAKHT BEGUM - - Petitioner versus AFARIN KHAN and 12 others - - Respondents CR No 429 - M of 2018 decided on 3062022 Specific Relief Act 1877 (I of 1877) - - - - - - Ss 9 42 - - Suit for declaration and possession by petitioner - - Suit for injunction filed by respondent - - Wrong entries in revenue record - - Deprivation from sharai shares - - Transfer of property to petitioner in lieu of dower - - Consolidated judgment - - Concurrent findings - - Non - producing of marginal witnesses of mutation - - Longstanding entries - - Marginal witnesses of mutation neither were produced before trial Court nor their non - production was explained through any plausible justification - - Factum of fixation of initial dower and enhancement thereof was required to be proved through positive and convincing evidence by petitioner but she has not been able even to place on record an iota of evidence that when where in whose presence and under what circumstances her dower was enhanced by her husband - - Long standing entries of revenue papers carry presumption of truth these entries are not sacrosanct or cannot be termed as a gospel truth and when same are challenged beneficiary thereof is required to prove it in accordance with law - - Petitioner will not be allowed to approbate and reprobate by alleging gift in her favour and by transferring of disputed property through enhancement of her dower - - It was bounded duty of petitioner to authenticate her contentions accordance with dictates of superior Court but she could not do so [Pp 172 173 174] A B C D E 2008 SCMR 1259 2104 MLD 1384 PLD 2019 Lahore 76 Civil Procedure Code 1908 (V of 1908) - - - - - - S 115 - - Interference of High Court - - High Court cannot interfere in findings of fact on ground that on re - appraisal of evidence it is possible to reach to a different conclusion unless it is shown that such a finding by lower Court suffered from misreading or non - reading of evidence which had affected findings on merits [P 174] F Ref 1998 SCMR 760 Mr Zahid Hussain Advocate for PetitionerJudgement Result:Petition dismissed

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S. 8---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S. 52---Suit for possession through partition---Lis pendens, principle of---Applicability---Grant of temporary injunction---Petitioner filed application for registration of sale deed qua transfer of property during the pendency of suit and existence of status quo order, which was concurrently refused by the courts below---Validity---Petitioner/vendor was a contesting party before the trial court in the pending suit filed by the respondent and if he was allowed to alienate the property in question in favour of petitioner/vendee, then definitely it would adversely affect the interest and cause of respondent---Pendency of a suit in any court or proceeding, which was not collusive and in which any right to immovable property was directly and specifically in question, the property could not be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under the decree or order, which may be made therein---Findings of the courts below did not suffer from any illegality or irregularity---Civil revision was dismissed, in circumstances. Farzand Ali v. Khuda Bakhsh PLD 2015 SC 187 rel. (b) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)--- ----S. 52---Principle of lis pendens---Object and purpose---Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TPA) in legal parlance is known as principle of "lis pendens", which literally means a pending suit or cause---Doctrine of "lis pendens" has been defined as jurisdiction, power, or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit pending the continuance of the action and until final judgment therein---Object and purpose of S.52 of TPA is to protect the parties to the litigation against alienation by them during the pendency of litigation---If the vendor is allowed to alienate the disputed property during the pendency of the suit, then, indeed, there would be no end to the pending litigation and certainly justice would be defeated, which is neither permissible nor desirable under the law---Section 52 of TPA is based upon the well-known maxim of equity "pendente lite nihil innovetur", which means that during the pendency of litigation nothing new should be introduced, which adversely affects the rights of the litigating parties. Tariq Khan Hoti for Petitioners. Fawad Khan for Respondents. Date of hearing: 20th April, 2022.