Summary: (Direct appeal against the judgment dated 01.07.2021 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in HCA No. 340/2006). Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 42 & 54---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 117 & 120---Suit for declaration and injunction---Benami transaction---Proof---Onus to prove---Assets in the name of spouse or children---Appellants / plaintiff's claimed that suit properties were Benami transactions in favour of respondent / defendant, who was their real mother---Contention of appellants / plaintiffs was that they had been deprived of their legal share by respondent / defendant who was just an ostensible owner---Validity---Attributes of "Benami transaction", in reality means a transaction in the name of another person to describe and express a transaction of a property who holds that property as an ostensible owner for its beneficial owner---In fact, it is a genre of transaction where somebody recompenses for the property but does not get hold of it in his personal name---Person in whose name such type of property is purchased is called Benamidar and the property so purchased is called Benami property---Despite the fact a Benami property is purchased in the name of someone else, the person who sponsored the transaction is the real owner---By and large, the assets acquired in the name of spouse or a child for which the money is paid from known sources of income is called Benami property---Onerous sense of duty lies on the party who raises plea of Benami transaction to prove by adducing unimpeachable evidence---Court is not required to decide such pleas on the basis of mere suspicion---Mode and manner of transaction is to be established by corroborating intentions of parties at the relevant time which could be congregated from surrounding circumstances such as relationship/association of parties, the motive or aspiration implicit in transactions including subsequent comportment and factum of possession of the property and custody of title documents---Best possible evidence could have been adduced by deceased himself if he had any dispute with regard to title of properties which he never raised in his lifetime---Even if properties were purchased through funds or resources of deceased husband, then both husband and wife were privy to such arrangements/transactions in their own marital relationship---After passing of several years, children could not question or challenge title or ownership of properties in the name of their mother without any cogent proof or trustworthy evidence that she was actually an ostensible owner---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by High Court---Appeal was dismissed. Chancery Law Chronicles; https: // www. clcbd. org/ glossary/ 321.html ; Pether Perumal v. Muniandy 1908 ILR 35 Cal 551 (558) P.C.; Gurkaran v. Shella AIR 1918 PC 140; Ch. Ghulam Rasool v. Nusrat Rasool PLD 2008 SC 146 and Abdul Majeed v. Amir Muhammad 2005 SCMR 577 rel. Aminuddin Ansari, Advocate Supreme Court and K.A. Wahab, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants. Respondents Ex-parte. Date of hearing: 17th July, 2025. MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, J.--- This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 01.07.2021 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in H.C.A. No. 340 of 2006.

Summary: (a) Family appeal—Computation of limitation—Exclusion of time for obtaining certified copies—Where an appellant applies for certified copies within the prescribed period and the appeal is filed immediately after receipt thereof, the period spent in obtaining such copies must be excluded in computing limitation. Failure to exclude this period constitutes a material illegality. (b) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Shariat Appellate Bench of the High Court Act, 2017—Section 7—Limitation for filing family appeal—Thirty days’ limitation prescribed—Exclusion of copy-preparation period mandatory under settled legal principles—Appeal filed on September 26, 2023, against judgment dated August 25, 2023, remained within limitation after exclusion of September 16–18, 2023, period consumed in obtaining copies. (c) Procedural law—Substantial justice versus technicalities—Courts are not to adopt rigid or mechanical interpretation of limitation provisions to defeat a party’s substantive right; procedural rules are handmaids of justice, not its mistress. (d) Remand—Scope—Where appeal dismissed on erroneous technical ground without adjudication on merits, matter to be remanded for decision afresh after hearing both sides. Disposition: Appeal accepted—Judgment of High Court dated 11-09-2024 set aside—Case remanded to High Court for decision on merits within three months.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- S. 9 & S. 42 ---- Declaratory suit --- Inheritance claim based on benami transaction ---- Maintainability and burden of proof ---- Scope Plaintiffs, the daughters of the deceased Nasiruddin Ansari, filed a declaratory suit claiming that two properties—House No. C-35, Block-9, Works Cooperative Housing Society, Karachi and House No. A-153, Block-L, North Nazimabad, Karachi—though titled in the name of their mother, were benami assets purchased by their late father. They sought declaration of benami ownership and their share in inheritance. The Trial Court decreed the suit, but the High Court allowed the appeal, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish the benami nature of the transactions. Supreme Court observed that the assertion of benami ownership was based on inferences and lacked documentary or credible oral evidence. The mere assertion in the plaint without explaining the motive or mechanics of the alleged benami arrangement was insufficient. Held, that for a transaction to be declared benami, the burden lies heavily on the party making such assertion, which must be proven through unimpeachable evidence, and not merely on suspicion. Key indicators such as possession of title documents, financial sources, property control, enjoyment of usufruct, and conduct of parties must align to prove a benami transaction. In the present case, there was no evidence that the deceased husband ever disputed the ownership of the properties during his lifetime, nor was there any express or implied agreement to hold the properties benami. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed for lack of merit. Cited Cases: • Ch. Ghulam Rasool v. Nusrat Rasool PLD 2008 SC 146 • Abdul Majeed v. Amir Muhammad 2005 SCMR 577 • Pether Perumal v. Muniandy ILR 35 Cal 551 (PC) • Gurkaran v. Shella AIR 1918 PC 140 • 4 BLC 17 • Rotofrusy on Civil Law and Rulings, Vol. 1, p. 115 (b) Islamic Law ---- Inheritance --- Challenge to mother’s exclusive ownership by legal heirs (children) after father’s death ---- Requirements for establishing ostensible ownership Under Islamic inheritance principles, the ownership of a spouse cannot be presumed to be ostensible or fictitious merely due to the relationship or timing of purchase. Supreme Court held that once a wife acquires property in her name, it cannot be presumed benami unless a clear agreement or arrangement exists between the actual payer and the named owner. Even where purchase funds might be linked to the husband, absent a specific agreement and evidence that the wife held the property for the husband's benefit, children cannot challenge the title decades later without conclusive proof. Held, that silence or inaction of the deceased during his lifetime regarding the ownership of the properties is a strong indicator of intent to transfer beneficial ownership to the wife. Properties were acquired in 1960 and 1970, and the father passed away in 1985 without raising any dispute. As such, challenge by legal heirs in 1993 lacked legal foundation and was rightly rejected. (c) Benami Transactions ---- Concept, essential elements, and evidentiary burden ---- Source of funds not conclusive ---- Judicial principles restated A benami transaction implies that the property is held by an ostensible owner for the benefit of the person who funded it. However, the source of funds, while relevant, is not conclusive to prove benami character. The Court reiterated that essential conditions include: (i) an express or implied agreement between the real and ostensible owner for the benefit of the former, and (ii) proof that the transaction was directly between the real owner and the seller. Additionally, corroborative factors such as who retained control, paid taxes, and enjoyed possession are critical. Held, that suspicion or delayed assertions by heirs are insufficient to displace documented title, particularly where the alleged real owner (deceased husband) never questioned the wife's ownership during his lifetime. Disposition: Appeal dismissed. No interference warranted in the judgment of the High Court.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S. 12---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S. 3---Intra Court Appeal---Limitation, computation of---Office objection, removal of---Scope---Order in question was passed on 27-09-2023 and appellants without waiting for its certified copy filed appeal within twenty days---Seal affixed at opening form reflected that it was diarized on 17-10-2023 upon receiving sanction letter from Solicitor Department---After removal of objections including but not limited to submission of Court fee and attestation of affidavits, Intra Court Appeal was re-submitted on 23-10-2023---Respondent raised objection to maintainability of Intra Court Appeal barred by limitation---Validity---Intra Court Appeal was not barred by time---Objection was overruled in circumstances. (b) Police Rules, 1934--- ----R. 12.16---Recruits Medical Examination---Scope---Conditions of Police service make it imperative that medical examination with respect to candidates should be strict---Any candidate who lacks physical standards or intelligence criteria must be rejected. (c) Police Rules, 1934--- ---Chap. XII---Sub-Inspectors and Inspectors (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2013, R. 7(3)---Appointments and enrolments---Criteria for evaluation of initial recruitment is not contrary to each other and Sub-Inspectors and Inspectors (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2013 has only overriding effect if anything contrary contained in Chapter XII of Police Rules, 1934 is pointed out. (d) Police Rules, 1934--- ----R. 12.16---Sub-Inspectors and Inspectors (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2013, R. 7 (3)---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S. 3---Intra Court Appeal---Appointment of Sub-Inspector---Height, determination of---Recommendation of Punjab Public Service Commission---Authorities withdrew appointment letter of respondent / candidate on the plea that his height was not up to the required criteria---Judge in Chambers of High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction directed the authorities to issue appointment letter to respondent / candidate in view of dictum laid down in case titled Muhammad Wasif Khan v. I.G. Police and others passed in W.P. No. 11877/2017---Validity---Mere recommendation of Punjab Public Service Commission was not enough to secure appointment as certification under R. 12.16 of Police Rules, 1934 was mandatory---Respondent / candidate did not assume a vested right in his favour as verification of physical standards was condition precedent to such appointments---Order passed by High Court in case titled Muhammad Wasif Khan v. I.G. Police and others passed in W.P. No. 11877/2017 had been rendered without reference to the applicable statutory provisions and was in disregard to relevant legal framework, as such the same was per incuriam---Case relied upon by Judge in Chambers of High Court did not constitute a binding precedent and could not be relied upon---Full Bench of High Court set aside judgment passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court as the same was founded on reasoning adopted in Muhammad Wasif Khan v. I.G. Police and others passed in W.P. No. 11877/2017, which judgment could not be sustained in law---Intra Court Appeal was allowed in circumstances. Writ Petition No.3805 of 2023; I.C.A. No.407 of 2019; Multiline Associates v. Ardeshir Cowasjee and 2 others PLD 1995 SC 423; Muhammad Shahid Nawaz v. Inspector General of Police Writ Petition No.2530 of 2021; Yousaf Haroon and others v. Punjab Public Service Commission, Agha Khan/Davis Road, Lahore through Secretary and others PLD 2001 SC 1012; The Agricultural and Research Department and others v. Muhammad Tariq Javed and others 2019 CLC 1972; The Inspector General of Police Punjab through District Police Officer v. Abdul Salam and others 2019 CLC 1156; Civil Appeals Nos.288 and 289 of 2022 and C.M.As. Nos.819-L and 1803-L of 2021; Silver Star Insurance Company Limited. Lahore through Chief Executive v. Messrs Kamal Pipes Industries, Lahore and another 2023 CLD 1342; Muhammad Hussain and another v. Muhammad Shafi and others 2004 SCMR 1947; Mirza Nasir and 2 others v. Mirza Hakim-ud-Din, Managing Director, Jahangir Engineering Company, Gujranwala and 2 others 2001 MLD 431; Government of the Punjab and others v. Muhammad Ahmad Intra Court Appeal No.37 of 2022; Javed Ali and another v. Inspector General of Police, Sindh and others 2024 SCMR 1896; Chaudhary Pervez Elahi v. Deputy Speaker, Provincial Assembly of Punjab, Lahore and others PLD 2023 SC 539; Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance Division and another v. Abdul Rasheed Memon 2025 SCMR 532 and Messrs International Tanners and Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others 2004 PTD 2180 ref. Muhammad Wasif Khan v. IG Police and others Writ Petition No.11877 of 2017 per incuriam. (e) Precedent--- ----Per incuriam---Decision rendered per incuriam is devoid of precedential authority and does not have binding effect in subsequent cases. Khalid Ishaq, Advocate General Punjab and Ch. Awais Ahmad Qazi, Additional Advocate General along with Ghulam Hussain Chohan, SSP (Legal), Lahore and Javaid Iqbal Dogar, DSP (Legal)/CCPO Office, Lahore for Appellants. Ch. Sultan Mehmood and Sarman Mushtaq Ch. for Respondent No.1. Saad Ali, Law Officer for Respondent No.2. Date of hearing: 6th December, 2024.

Summary: It is a settled principle that once a court has conclusively affirmed a factual finding on a material issue, particularly relating to the validity of the main transaction, it cannot, without lawful justification or cogent reasons, render a subsequent finding that directly negates its own earlier conclusion. Such an approach is contrary to settled judicial norms and violates the doctrine of consistency in judicial reasoning. Such findings of fact cannot be contradicted by subsequent inconsistent observations within the same judgment unless supported by sound legal grounds and clear reasoning. 316Jail Appeal 12100/22 Muhammad Qasim Vs The State Mr. Justice Farooq Haider 11- 07- 2025 2025 LHC 5055 2025 YLR 2492 (Lahore)

Summary: (a) Agricultural Produce Markets ----Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939 (APMA 1939), S. 2(a) & Schedule (Miscellaneous: “Fish (Fresh & Dry)”); Ss. 4(2), 6(1), 26(1), 27 & Rules 1940—Scope of scheduled items—Whether “fishmeal” falls within “Fish (Fresh & Dry)”—Held: No. The Schedule’s plain wording covers fish as an article of produce in fresh/dry form for trade, not the manufactured by-product “fishmeal” used as animal feed. A notification under S.27 or fee schedule entries (e.g., item (xv) mentioning only “Fish (Fresh & Dry)”) cannot expand the Schedule beyond the statute’s definition; regulatory demands premised on treating fishmeal as “Fish (Fresh & Dry)” lack legal sanction. (b) Interpretation—Literal and purposive construction ----Statutory Interpretation—Litera legis; purposive approach—Where the Schedule expressly says “Fish (Fresh & Dry),” courts must give effect to the ordinary meaning; purposive reading cannot be used to re-write or enlarge the listed commodity to include industrial derivatives like fishmeal. Notifications/rules framed under S.27 must conform to, not override, the parent Act’s text and purpose. (c) Successor framework & overlap ----Sindh Wholesale Agricultural Produce Markets (Development & Regulation) Act, 2010 (“2010 Act”), Ss. 2(a), 21, 22 & 24—Repeal, override, and transfer to market companies—2010 Act defines “agricultural produce” to include fish/seafood and by-products capable of human consumption for wholesale trade; items not capable of human consumption (e.g., fishmeal as animal feed) do not qualify—Although the Province has not fully implemented the 2010 regime (transfer to market companies pending), the 2010 Act’s overriding clause and definitional compass reinforce that fishmeal does not fit the regulated “agricultural produce” category for market-licensing/fee purposes under the cited frameworks. (d) Regulatory competence & demand notices ----Administrative action—Ultra vires—A market committee cannot, by demand notice or licensing insistence, create a charge on a product outside the statutory Schedule/definition—Courts will strike such notices where the commodity is not covered. Cited Cases: — (g) Disposition — Civil Petition dismissed; leave to appeal refused. High Court’s order striking down the demand notice sustained; fishmeal is not “Fish (Fresh & Dry)” under the APMA 1939 Schedule and, under the 2010 Act, by-products not for human consumption do not constitute “agricultural produce” for wholesale market regulation.

Summary: Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (XI of 1963)--- ----Ss.1, 5, 17 & Preamble---Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979), S.15---Eviction petition before Rent Controller---Maintainability---Property situated within limits of Cantonment area---Jurisdiction of Rent Controller---If property is situated within territorial limits of Cantonment area the provisions of Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963 would become applicable---The petitioner/landlord filed a rent case before the Rent Controller seeking eviction of respondent No.1/tenant from a tenement on the ground of default in rent payment---The Rent Controller, however, refused to assume jurisdiction holding that the matter fell under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 rather than the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979---The petitioner’s appeal was dismissed affirming the Rent Controller’s decision---The petitioner/landlord then filed the present Constitutional petition before the High Court challenging the concurrent findings of both lower courts regarding jurisdiction and seeking eviction of the respondent/ tenant from the tenement---Question for determination before the High Court was as to “Whether the Rent Controller had jurisdiction to entertain the eviction proceedings under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 in respect of a property situated within the territorial limits of a cantonment area, or whether such jurisdiction exclusively lay under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963”?---Held: Section 1 and Preamble of the Act 1963 indicated that the same was applicable to certain classes of buildings and tenements “within the limits of the cantonment areas”---Moreover, S.5 of the Act 1963 specifically ousted the jurisdiction of any other court, other than the one established under the Act 1963---The tenement lay within the territorial limits of the cantonment and therefore the provisions of the Act 1963 were applicable thereto---Courts below had correctly refused to assume jurisdiction in the matter---Concurrent findings of courts below required no interference---Present Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. I.S.G.A. Ltd. v. Mrs. Rfit Fakhir 1985 CLC 364 and Nasir Mehmood v. Khawar Hussain and 5 others 2014 CLC 832 ref. Abbas Rasheed Rizvi for Petitioner along with Shoaib Ali Khatian. Abdul Moiz Jaffri for Respondent. Ahmed Khan Khaskheli, A.A.G. Dates of hearing: 29th April and 19th May, 2025.

Summary: Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961) --- ----S.7---Rules under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, R.3(b)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Refusal of local authority to issue divorce certificate, challenge to---Divorce obtained abroad---Confirmation and registration of divorce in Pakistan---Jurisdiction of Union Council/Cantonment Board---‘Permanent residence’ in Pakistan being the determinative factor---Scope---Availability of alternate and efficacious remedy---Maintainability of constitutional petition ---Briefly, the petitioner/husband, a Pakistani national holding dual nationality, married respondent No.3/wife in Pakistan under Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, and the couple later resided in the United States, where three children were born---Their marriage was dissolved through a divorce decree passed by a District Court in Harris County Texas---Subsequently, the petitioner submitted a divorce deed before the Cantonment Board authorities in Pakistan seeking confirmation of divorce and issuance of a divorce certificate, asserting that the marriage continued to reflect in Pakistani official records---The competent authorities dismissed the application on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, leading the petitioner to file the present constitutional petition before the High Court challenging the order of authorities ---Held: Petitioner in the present petition and also in the divorce application filed before authorities had failed to establish his permanent residency in Pakistan---In the absence of the petitioner establishing conclusively his status as a permanent resident in Pakistan, the petitioner had an alternate and efficacious remedy available to him as laid down under the Rules and Notification SRO No. 1086(K)/61 dated 09.11.1961 and the petitioner was at liberty to adopt the procedure and obtain a divorce certificate in accordance with the relevant provisions of law, without any of his fundamental rights being infringed---Present constitutional petition being devoid of merit was dismissed, in circumstances. Sufyan Zaman for Petitioner. Zain A. Soomro for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Ms. Sana Valika for Respondent No. 3 along with Qazi Umair Ali. Dates of hearing: 9th, 24th April and 9th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan: ----Art. 199 & Art. 185(3) Constitutional jurisdiction—Scope—Factual inquiry—High Court converted civil miscellaneous appeal into a constitutional petition and proceeded to conduct a factual inquiry into whether the security amount was paid to the contractor—Held, High Court exceeded its constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 by deciding disputed questions of fact without recording evidence—Such matters fall within domain of civil courts with plenary jurisdiction—Exercise of writ jurisdiction in such context was impermissible—Impugned judgment set aside. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908): ----Execution of decree—Scope—Suit and execution confined to reliefs specifically decreed Contractor’s original suit decreed only to the extent of declaratory reliefs regarding blacklisting and interference with contractual rights—No relief for release of security amount was granted—Executing court rightly dismissed execution application as decree did not include direction for release of funds—High Court erred in going beyond trial court decree while exercising writ jurisdiction. (c) Public Contract—Blacklisting of contractor—Legal heirs' entitlement—Limitation of remedy: Father of petitioners was blacklisted in 1991 and filed suit in 2004, which was partly decreed in 2006—After death of contractor, legal heirs were substituted—Held, their claim for recovery of security amount beyond what was decreed could only be pursued through appropriate civil forum—not through writ jurisdiction—Petition for release of remaining amount dismissed. (d) Jurisdiction—Factual controversies—Remedy before competent court: Disputed factual matters such as whether amount was already released by department, and extent of liability, require evidence and cannot be adjudicated summarily in constitutional proceedings—Reference made to Waqar Ahmed v. Federation (2024 SCMR 1877) and Federal Government Employees Housing Authority v. Ednan Syed (PLD 2025 SC 11), affirming that courts cannot expand jurisdictional bounds to conduct factual inquiry in writ jurisdiction. ----Disposition: Civil Petition No. 191-Q/2017 filed by the Province of Balochistan was converted into appeal and allowed—Impugned judgment of High Court dated 07.09.2017 set aside.

Summary: (a) Islamabad Capital Territory Child Marriage Restraint Act (XI of 2025)--- ----Ss. 2(a), 3, 10 & 11---Child marriage---Effect---Child marriage is deemed valid under Shariah/Islamic jurisprudence on the basis of consent and attainment of puberty, however, the same is criminalized under the Islamabad Capital Territory Child Marriage Restraint Act, 2025, if the marriage is contracted under the age of eighteen years---Such marriage contracted inter se both or either of the contracting party under eighteen is not void under the Shariah, it is nonetheless punishable by law and treated as contrary to public policy, especially where it undermines minor’s physical, emotional, and educational development. (b) Islamabad Capital Territory Child Marriage Restraint Act (XI of 2025)--- ----Ss. 2(a) & 3---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 11---Majority Act (XI of 1875), S. 2---Contract of marriage---Principle---Marriage contract stands on a distinct footing from contracts governed by Contract Act, 1872 owing to personal, religious, and socio cultural dimensions uniquely attached to matrimonial unions---Contractual capacity under S.11 of Contract Act, 1872 is attained upon reaching the age of majority as defined under Majority Act, 1875---Matters pertaining to marriage, dower, and divorce have been expressly excluded, under S.2 of Majority Act, 1875 from its application---Unlike commercial contracts, which are founded purely on legal capacity, marriage contracts are governed under special enactments, wherein determination of age has not been made categorically by the legislature, thereby allowing involvement of personal laws---Minor girl attaining puberty has capacity to contract a valid marriage, provided she gives free and informed consent---Under the Muslim Personal Law, puberty is presumed at the age of fifteen, and once attained, a Muslim female is considered sui juris, capable of entering into a marital contract without the necessity of a guardian’s consent. Mauj Ali v. Syed Safdar Hussain Shah and another 1970 SCMR 437; Mst. Bakhshi v. Bashir Ahmad and another PLD 1970 SC 323; Tahira Bibi v. Station House Officer and others PLD 2020 Lah. 811; Muhammad Safeer v. Additional Sessions Judge (West) Islamabad and others PLD 2018 Isl. 385; Mst. Shazia and another v. S.H.O. Police Station Kumb, District Khairpur and others 2011 YLR 493; Allah Bakhsh v. Safdar and others 2006 YLR 2936; Zafar Khan v. Muhammad Ashraf Bhatti and another PLD 1975 Lah. 234; Ghulam Hussain v. Nawaz Ali and another 1975 PCr.LJ 1049; Mushtaq Ahmad v. Mirza Muhammad Amin and another PLD 1962 (W. P.) Kar. 442; Allah Nawaz v. Station House Officer, Police Station Mahmood Kot District, Muzaffargarh PLD 2013 Lah. 243; Muhammad Aslam v. The State 2012 PCr.LJ 11; Ghulam Qadir v. the Judge Family Court, Murree and another 1988 CLC 113 and Muhammad Azam v. The State and another 2018 PCr. LJ Note 175 rel. (c) Islamabad Capital Territory Child Marriage Restraint Act (XI of 2025)--- ----Ss. 2(a), 3, 10 & 11---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Habeas corpus---Custody of wife---Petitioner sought recovery of his wife who was minor at the time of her Nikkah with him---Alleged detenue was produced by police before High Court and the alleged detenue unequivocally affirmed that she had contracted marriage with petitioner of her own choice and expressed her desire to reside with him, explicitly declining to return to her parents---Even during stay of alleged detenueat Crisis Centre, she had consistently maintained such position---Held: Alleged detenue had attained puberty and had given free and voluntary consent; she was at liberty to reside with the petitioner---Marriage in question could not be invalidated under the provisions of Islamabad Capital Territory Child Marriage Restraint Act, 2025, rather it stipulated punishment for those participating or promoting the same---Marriage contracted inter se the parties was not in contravention to the injunctions of Islam or any statutory provision---Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly. Mst. Mumtaz Bibi v. Qasim and others PLD 2022 Isl. 228; Mst. Bakhshi v. Bashir Ahmad PLD 1970 SC 323; Mauj Ali v. Safdar Hussain 1970 SCMR 437; Muhammad Khalid v. Magistrate 1st Class and others PLD 2021 Lah. 21; Nasreen Bibi v. Station House Officer and others 2024 PCr.LJ 2058 and Ghulam Hussain v. Nawaz Ali and another 1975 PCr.LJ 1049 rel. Ms. Shumaila Rafique Awan for Petitioner. Mirza Irfan Ghazanfar for Respondents Nos. 3 and 5. Ms. Ramsha Khalid, State Counsel. Assisted by: Ms. Amna Danial Khawaja, Judicial Law Clerk. Date of hearing: 11th July, 2025. (a) order parents, legal guardian or current carer, if any, of the child to make representations to the Court;