Summary: Presence of witnesses on the fateful day in the court is a condition precedent for closing the right of other party to cross-examine them and in their absence, the said right cannot be taken away. 20Service 37551/25 Karam Elahi Vs Medical Superintendent Lahore General Hospital etc Mr. Justice Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi 30- 01- 2026 2026 LHC 1233

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Opinion of Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar --- (a) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 186---Advisory jurisdiction of Supreme Court---Scope, nature and effect---President of Pakistan may seek opinion of Supreme Court on any question of law which he considers of public importance---Advisory jurisdiction, though not deciding a lis between parties in the ordinary sense, is a solemn constitutional jurisdiction requiring due deliberation, evaluation of arguments and formulation of opinion by the Court---Opinion rendered in Presidential Reference is not strictly binding like an inter-partes judgment, but carries significant credence, persuasive value and moral authority, and ought to be respected by constitutional organs---Questions referred to Supreme Court should not be ambiguous, indeterminate or incapable of formulation of opinion---Supreme Court is empowered to consider whether reference raises a constitutional question of public importance and to answer it accordingly. (b) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 4, 9, 10-A & 186---Presidential Reference concerning trial of Shaheed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto---Fair trial and due process---Larger Bench had opined that proceedings of trial by Lahore High Court and appeal before Supreme Court did not meet requirements of fundamental right to fair trial and due process enshrined in Arts. 4 and 9 of the Constitution and later expressly guaranteed under Art.10-A---Although conviction had attained finality after dismissal of review petition, advisory jurisdiction was invoked to examine grave blemishes and glitches in the murder trial which had damaged public confidence in fairness of proceedings---Reference was maintainable to the extent of constitutional questions relating to fair trial, due process and administration of justice. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 156, 160, 169, 170 & 173---Investigation and reinvestigation---Closed case---Effect---Police are required to conduct investigation impartially and collect evidence from all possible angles, including material favourable to accused---If evidence is insufficient, Investigating Officer may release accused under S.169, Cr.P.C.; if sufficient evidence exists, report is to be submitted under S.173, Cr.P.C.---After first investigation in murder case had been closed and cancellation report submitted before Magistrate, matter was resurrected years later without complaint by legal heirs or any aggrieved person and without lawful justification---No independent reasoning or cogent justification was available for reinvestigation---Reinvestigation must not be routinely ordered to favour influential persons or punish non-influential persons; if used improperly, it becomes a dangerous tool undermining integrity of criminal justice system and poses serious threat to administration of justice. Cited Cases: • Noor Mohd Holt Ltd. v. Department of Trade and others 1978 3 All ER 280 • Wiseman v. Borneman 1971 AC 297 (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 28, 190 & 526---Transfer of murder trial from Court of Sessions to High Court---Jurisdiction and procedure---Offence under S.302, PPC is ordinarily triable by Court of Sessions, while High Court may try such case only when lawfully transferred or otherwise within jurisdiction---Transfer of case from Sessions Court to Lahore High Court was allowed in slipshod manner on very next day after Sessions Judge framed charge, without notice to accused, without considering statutory parameters and without judicially examining whether transfer was necessary for ends of justice---Transfer was not sought for convenience or safety but had effect of depriving accused of ordinary forum and ordinary first appellate scrutiny---Such hurried transfer raised serious concerns regarding fairness and due process. (e) Administration of justice---- ----Bias---Judicial impartiality---Fair trial---Test for bias---Justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done---A Judge must decide cases according to law and conscience without fear, favour, affection, pressure, annoyance or external influence---Where circumstances create a reasonable apprehension in mind of prudent person that Judge may not act with complete impartiality, the proceedings are tainted---Bias may be personal, pecuniary, official, political, or arise from conduct showing prejudice, hostility, pressure or predisposition---In the murder trial under consideration, allegations of bias, pressure, annoyance with counsel and unusual haste created circumstances affecting appearance and substance of fair trial. Cited Cases: • Ms. Benazir Bhutto v. President of Pakistan 1998 SCMR 1405 • R. v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy 1924 1 KB 256 • Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Proprietors 1852 3 HLC 759 • Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC) Ltd. v. Lannon 1969 1 QB 577 • R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte No.2 1999 1 WLR 876 • Porter v. Magill 2002 2 AC 357 • Ali Asad Zaidi v. The State PLD 2001 SC 663 • State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar AIR 2013 SC 364 (f) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 4, 9 & 10-A---Doctrine of natural justice and due process---Criminal trial---Presumption of innocence---Accused as favourite child of law---In every criminal trial, burden lies on prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; accused is not to be treated as an unfavourable child of law but remains entitled to all safeguards of fair trial---Scrutiny of prosecution evidence must be independent, impartial and free from bias or prejudice---Personal bias, preconceived mind or jaundiced eye of Judge tarnishes fairness of trial and undermines equal protection of law---No person can be condemned without fair opportunity to explain, contest and defend---Fair trial and due process are sacred obligations for every Court and tribunal. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Riaz v. Khurram Shahzad 2024 SCMR 51 • Junaid Wazir v. Superintendent of Police 2024 SCMR 181 • Federation of Pakistan v. Zahid Malik 2023 SCMR 603 • Umar Khan v. Chief Post Master, GPO Karachi 2022 SCMR 745 • Capital Development Authority v. Sabir Hussain 2023 SCMR 627 • Raja Muhammad Shahid v. Inspector General of Police 2023 SCMR 1135 • Government of Balochistan v. Ghulam Rasool 2024 SCMR 1185 • Inspector General of Police, Quetta v. Zia Muhammad 2023 SCMR 1583 (g) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---- ----Approver/accomplice evidence---Evidentiary value---Corroboration---Evidence of an approver is an acid test for Court; Court must examine whether such testimony is trustworthy and supported by independent reliable corroboration---An accomplice is generally unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars---Approver may be competent witness, but rule of prudence demands great care and caution before relying upon such testimony, particularly in capital cases---Corroboration must not be merely formal but must connect accused with commission of offence through independent and reliable evidence. (h) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 374 & 376---Confirmation of death sentence---Trial by High Court in original criminal jurisdiction---Where death sentence is awarded by Court of Sessions, proceedings are submitted to High Court for confirmation under S.374, Cr.P.C., and sentence cannot be executed unless confirmed---However, where High Court itself conducts murder trial and convicts accused under original jurisdiction, no further confirmation by a larger bench of High Court is required; rather remedy lies by appeal before Supreme Court under Art.185 of the Constitution---In such situation, constitutional and appellate scrutiny by Supreme Court assumes heightened importance. (i) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 185---Right of appeal---Murder trial conducted by High Court---Denial of ordinary appellate forum---Where murder trial is conducted by Court of Sessions, convict ordinarily has appeal before High Court and further remedy before Supreme Court---But where High Court withdraws case and tries it itself, accused is deprived of ordinary first appellate forum and can approach Supreme Court directly---Supreme Court, in such cases, should ordinarily be inclined to grant leave and examine case carefully to ensure safe administration of criminal justice, especially where death sentence is involved---In the case of Mr. Bhutto, direct appeal before Supreme Court after trial by High Court left no ordinary appellate reappraisal by High Court. (j) Media interviews and post-retirement disclosures---- ----Judicial conduct---Bias and public confidence---Subsequent interviews of former Judge suggesting pressure, annoyance with defence counsel, and external atmosphere surrounding proceedings could not by themselves unsettle a final judicial decision, but they were relevant in understanding cumulative circumstances showing fair trial concerns---Such disclosures, read with record of proceedings, corroborated apprehension that trial and appeal were not conducted in atmosphere required by constitutional guarantees of due process and impartial justice. (k) Sentence---- ----Death penalty---Mitigating circumstances---Role of Judge---Judge must not be influenced by appeasement, flattery, malice, annoyance with counsel, or emotional pressure while deciding punishment---Criminal Court retains power to consider mitigating circumstances and impose lesser sentence where justice so demands---In murder cases before Supreme Court, Court may confirm death sentence, alter it to life imprisonment, or grant acquittal depending on record---In Bhutto review proceedings, submission seeking commutation rather than acquittal was recorded, but Court still had power to consider whether punishment could be altered---On independent appraisal of record and peculiar circumstances, death sentence was not safe to maintain; life imprisonment would have met ends of justice. Cited Case: • Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto v. The State PLD 1979 SC 741 (l) Administration of justice---- ----Delay in answering Presidential Reference---Effect---Reference was answered after nearly thirteen years---Delay in adjudication undermines confidence in justice system, as justice delayed is justice denied---Courts must decide matters within reasonable time because prolonged pendency can prejudice rights of parties and create possibility of injustice---Proper balance in Court docket is necessary so that powerful or constitutionally significant matters do not unjustly eclipse other important matters, yet matters raising fundamental fairness concerns are not left unanswered. (m) Islamic jurisprudence---- ----Doctrine of repentance---Question framed in Presidential Reference---No opinion by larger Bench---One question in Reference sought opinion regarding doctrine of repentance under Islamic jurisprudence, but no opinion was rendered by Supreme Court on that question---Where trial itself was found to have been unfair and proceedings below were tainted by denial of fair trial and due process, unresolved question of repentance remained unanswered and did not alter conclusion regarding constitutional infirmities in trial process. (n) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 186---Reporting of opinion to President---After recording opinion on questions arising from Reference, office was directed to report opinion through proper channel to worthy President of Pakistan in terms of Art.186 of the Constitution. Disposition: Opinion was rendered in Reference No.01/2011 under Art.186 of the Constitution; Supreme Court, through the larger Bench, had already opined that the trial of Shaheed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and appellate proceedings did not meet requirements of fair trial and due process under Arts.4 and 9 of the Constitution and later Art.10-A; Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar, in his separate opinion, further examined advisory jurisdiction, reinvestigation, transfer of trial to High Court, bias, natural justice, approver evidence, confirmation of death sentence, right of appeal, media interviews, mitigating circumstances and doctrine of repentance; office was directed to report the opinion to the President of Pakistan through proper channel.

Summary: (Against judgment dated 19.10.2018 passed in W.P. No. 2672-P of 2017 by Peshawar High Court, Peshawar and stay application). Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)--- ----S.13---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.115---Eviction proceedings---Tenant denying landlord’s title---Remedy for the tenant---Maintainability of ejectment petition---Scope---Respondents instituted a suit for recovery of produce and ejectment against the petitioners which was decreed; the petitioners’ appeal, revision petition, and constitutional petition before the High Court all failed, whereafter they approached the Supreme Court through filing of the present petition---Issue before the Supreme Court was as to “whether the tenant, while retaining possession, could dispute the landlord’s title on the basis of an alleged ownership claim, and whether ejectment proceedings in such circumstances remained maintainable?”---Held: Where a person entered into possession as a tenant, he was estopped from disputing the title of the landlord so long as he continues to retain possession under the tenancy---The principle of estoppel was embodied in Article 115 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, which debarred a tenant from denying the title of the landlord during the continuance of tenancy---Unless and until the tenant established his alleged proprietary rights before a competent forum, the relationship between the parties continued to be regulated by tenancy law---If a tenant disputed the proprietary title of the landlord, he had to first vacate and surrender possession, and only thereafter could contest title---As regards the second question as to maintainability of ejectment proceedings was concerned, even if the tenant asserted acquisition of ownership rights by purchase of a share in the property, such assertion by itself did not render ejectment proceedings incompetent, particularly because the Rent Controller exercised a limited jurisdiction and could not adjudicate upon complicated questions of title---Impugned judgment of the High Court did not warrant any interference---Leave was refused and petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Mst. Seema Begum v. Muhammad Ishaq and others PLD 2009 SC 45; Barkat Masih v. Manzoor Ahmad (deceased) through L.Rs. 2006 SCMR 1068; Nazir Ahmad v. Mst. Sardar Bibi and others 1989 SCMR 913; Ghulam Mustafa and others v. Mst. Muhammadi Begum and others 1991 SCMR 432; Muhammad Nazir v. Saeed Subhani 2002 SCMR 1540 and Waheed Ullah v. Mst. Rehana Nasim and others 2004 SCMR 1568 rel. Muhammad Javed Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (via video link, Peshawar). Abdul Sattar Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1 to 6 (via video link Peshawar). Nemo for other Respondents. Date of hearing: 29th January, 2026.

Summary: (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---- ----Art. 115---Estoppel of tenant---Tenant denying title of landlord---Scope---Respondents instituted suit for recovery of produce and ejectment against petitioners, which was decreed by Trial Court and such decree was maintained by appellate, revisional and constitutional forums---Supreme Court held that where a person enters into possession as tenant, he is estopped from disputing title of landlord so long as he continues to retain possession under tenancy---Doctrine embodied in Art.115 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 is founded on public policy and prevents tenant from approbating and reprobating simultaneously---Tenant who subsequently asserts ownership rights cannot retain possession as tenant and, at same time, deny landlord’s title. Cited Case: • Mst. Seema Begum v. Muhammad Ishaq and others PLD 2009 SC 45 (b) Landlord and tenant---- ----Tenant asserting ownership/proprietary rights---Duty to first surrender possession---Tenant disputing proprietary title of landlord must first vacate and surrender possession and thereafter may contest his alleged title before competent forum---Law does not permit tenant to continue possession under tenancy while simultaneously setting up hostile title against landlord---If tenant ultimately succeeds in establishing his proprietary rights, he may enforce decree according to law with all its consequences. Cited Case: • Barkat Masih v. Manzoor Ahmad deceased through L.Rs. 2006 SCMR 1068 (c) Landlord and tenant---- ----Agreement to sell or alleged purchase by tenant---Effect on tenancy---Mere assertion of ownership on basis of agreement to sell or alleged acquisition of proprietary rights does not defeat maintainability of ejectment proceedings---Until tenant establishes his claim before competent Court, landlord continues to enjoy status of owner/landlord and relationship between parties remains regulated by tenancy---Tenant cannot legitimately resist ejectment proceedings merely on ground of alleged sale agreement or ownership claim. Cited Cases: • Mst. Seema Begum v. Muhammad Ishaq and others PLD 2009 SC 45 • Muhammad Nazir v. Saeed Subhani 2002 SCMR 1540 • Waheed Ullah v. Mst. Rehana Nasim and others 2004 SCMR 1568 (d) Ejectment proceedings---- ----Maintainability---Tenant claiming purchase of share/co-ownership---Effect---Ejectment proceedings remain maintainable even where tenant asserts that he has acquired ownership rights by purchase of a share in the property---Such assertion does not automatically terminate tenancy nor oust jurisdiction of forum deciding ejectment---Tenant’s plea of ownership cannot be made basis to resist ejectment where his possession qua demised premises remains that of tenant. Cited Cases: • Nazir Ahmad v. Mst. Sardar Bibi and others 1989 SCMR 913 • Ghulam Mustafa and others v. Mst. Muhammadi Begum and others 1991 SCMR 432 (e) Rent Controller / ejectment forum---- ----Limited jurisdiction---Complicated question of title---Proper remedy---Forum exercising limited jurisdiction in ejectment proceedings cannot adjudicate upon complicated questions of ownership title between parties---Where tenant claims to have purchased a share or acquired co-ownership, proper remedy is to seek partition through competent civil forum and not to resist ejectment proceedings by raising disputed title questions before ejectment forum. (f) Landlord and tenant---- ----Tenant claiming co-ownership by purchase of share---Proper recourse---Tenant claiming co-ownership cannot use such plea as shield against ejectment while retaining possession under tenancy---His remedy is to file suit for partition or appropriate proceedings before competent civil forum---Ejectment cannot be refused merely because tenant claims purchase of a share, where his position in respect of disputed premises remains that of tenant. Cited Case: • Ghulam Mustafa and others v. Mst. Muhammadi Begum and others 1991 SCMR 432 (g) Constitutional jurisdiction---- ----Concurrent findings---Interference by Supreme Court---Suit for recovery of produce and ejectment was decreed by Trial Court; appeal, revision, second revision and constitutional petition were dismissed---High Court correctly construed law relating to estoppel of tenant, surrender of possession, maintainability of ejectment proceedings and remedy of partition---No illegality or jurisdictional defect warranting interference by Supreme Court was shown---Petition was devoid of merit. Disposition: Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.806-P of 2018 was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused; Supreme Court held that tenant asserting ownership/co-ownership must first surrender possession before contesting title, ejectment proceedings remain maintainable, and remedy for alleged co-ownership lies through partition before competent civil forum. CMA No.1877-P of 2018 became infructuous and was disposed of accordingly.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: In a suit for dissolution of marriage, the court is required to make proper efforts to reconcile the matter in terms Section 10(3) of the Family Court Act, 1964 and on failure of reconciliation proceedings is empowered to pass a decree for dissolution of marriage but said Section does not provide that in every case, where reconciliation proceedings are declared as not successful, the decree for dissolution of marriage on basis of Khula is definitely to be passed, rather the Court has to assess whether wife through her voluntary decision really requires marriage to be dissolved or not. 24First Appeal Against Order(F.A.O.) 68910/22 Oil Marketing Association of Pakistan Vs Oil Companies Advisory Council etc Mr. Justice Raheel Kamran 29- 01- 2026 2025 LHC 8281

Summary: Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--- ----Ss.42, 53 & 172---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 175F (1)(c) & 199---Entries in revenue record, assailing of--- Jurisdiction---Title, determination of---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Petitioners were aggrieved of order passed by High Court maintaining refusal of revenue authorities to implement an old mutation in their favour---Validity---Revenue entries do not by themselves confer title but carry a presumption of correctness until rebutted in accordance with law---Where correctness, validity or enforceability of old mutations is disputed, particularly when such mutations have remained unimplemented for decades, the matter inevitably involves disputed question of facts and title requiring proper adjudication and cannot be determined by revenue authorities---Extraordinary Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is intended to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy in cases where illegality or impropriety of action in question is apparent on the face of record and can be determined without undertaking an elaborate inquiry or recording evidence---Where controversy involves intricate disputed or contentious questions of fact, the resolution of which necessitates recording an appraisal of evidence by parties, such matters fall within the domain of Court of plenary jurisdiction and High Court in exercise of its Constitution jurisdiction cannot assume the role of fact-finding forum or enter into such factual controversies---Revenue officer is not competent to decide questions of title and Civil Court alone is competent to decide it---Findings recorded by revenue authorities were based on plausible appreciation of record and did not suffer from any legal infirmity---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Muhammad Yousaf v. Khan Bahadur through Legal Heirs 1992 SCMR 2334; Dildar Ahmad and others v. Member (Judicial-III), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another 2013 SCMR 906; Nazir Ahmad and another v. Maula Bakhsh 1987 SCMR 61; Fida Hussain and another v. Mst. Saiqa 2011 SCMR 1990 and Waqar Ahmed and others v. The Federation of Pakistan 2024 SCMR 1877 rel. Ch. Muhammad Masood Jahangir, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. Waseem Mumtaz Malik, Additional Advocate General for Respondents. Date of hearing: 28th January, 2026.

Summary: Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967—Ss. 42, 44, 52, 53, 166 & 172(2)(vi)—Specific Relief Act, 1877—S. 42—Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 175F(1)(c) & 199—Revenue record—Old sanctioned mutations—Non-implementation for over a century—Correction of entries—Clerical or arithmetical mistake—Contentious dispute—Jurisdiction of revenue authorities—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the alleged non-implementation of Mutation No. 117 dated 29.12.1907 and Mutations Nos. 401 and 402 dated 30.01.1913 could not be treated as a mere clerical or arithmetical mistake capable of correction by revenue authorities under S. 166 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967. The Court observed that where implementation of century-old mutations would potentially disturb long-standing revenue entries, affect possible intervening alienations, and prejudice third parties not before the forum, the matter plainly assumes a contentious character. In such circumstances, the limited power of correction available to revenue authorities cannot be invoked for deciding substantive controversies affecting proprietary rights. The Court further held that the discretion under S. 166 is not unbridled and is confined to cases free from factual controversy and incapable of adversely affecting vested rights without proper adjudication. Revenue law—Record-of-rights—Presumption of correctness—Remedy against adverse entry—The Court held that Ss. 42, 44, and 52 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 collectively regulate the preparation, evidentiary value, and correction of the record-of-rights, and once entries are incorporated therein, a presumption of truth attaches to them until the contrary is proved or lawful substitution is made. To dislodge such presumption, the law itself provides a remedy through S. 53 of the Act, enabling an aggrieved person to institute a suit for declaration under S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, where he is prejudiced by an entry in the record-of-rights or periodical record relating to a right of which he is in possession. The Court reaffirmed that the statute does envisage an appropriate remedy even where summary correction before revenue authorities is unavailable. In this regard, reliance was placed on Muhammad Yousaf v. Khan Bahadur through Legal Heirs (1992 SCMR 2334). Jurisdiction—Civil court and revenue authorities—Section 172(2)(vi), Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967—Bar of jurisdiction not absolute in contentious matters—The Federal Constitutional Court examined the petitioners’ contention that, because S. 172(2)(vi) bars civil court jurisdiction regarding correction of entries in the record-of-rights, periodical record, or register of mutations, only revenue authorities could grant relief. Rejecting the broad proposition, the Court held that the exclusion recognized in S. 172(2)(vi) operates in matters of correction that are not controversial in nature. Where, however, the dispute involves contentious questions, competing rights, and possible effect on absent parties, the matter cannot be summarily resolved by revenue authorities. The Court relied upon Dildar Ahmad and others v. Member (Judicial-III), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another (2013 SCMR 906), wherein the Supreme Court clarified that only non-controversial corrections in revenue record fall within the exclusive domain of revenue authorities to the exclusion of civil courts. Delay and equity—Laches and acquiescence—Unexplained silence for more than a century—The Court held that the petitioners’ claim was hopelessly belated, having been raised for the first time in the year 2020 in relation to mutations sanctioned in 1907 and 1913. It was observed that the petitioners had failed to produce any material explaining why their predecessors-in-interest did not seek implementation during their lifetime, or why the petitioners themselves remained silent for decades. Such inordinate and unexplained delay attracted the principles of laches and acquiescence with full force. The mere existence of old sanctioned but unimplemented mutations did not automatically entitle the petitioners to their implementation after a lapse of over one hundred years, particularly in the face of possible competing claims and long-standing contrary entries in the revenue record. Constitutional jurisdiction—Article 199—Disputed questions of fact and title—Scope of writ jurisdiction—The Court reiterated that constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 is meant to provide prompt relief where illegality or impropriety is apparent on the face of the record and can be determined without elaborate inquiry or recording of evidence. Where, however, the controversy involves disputed or intricate questions of fact, title, or enforceability of old mutations, requiring proper evidence and adjudication, the High Court cannot assume the role of a fact-finding forum. Such matters fall within the domain of courts of plenary jurisdiction. In support of this proposition, the Court referred to Nazir Ahmad and another v. Maula Bakhsh (1987 SCMR 61), Fida Hussain and another v. Mst. Saiqa (2011 SCMR 1990), and Waqar Ahmed and others v. the Federation of Pakistan (2024 SCMR 1877). The Court accordingly held that the Lahore High Court rightly declined to interfere in constitutional jurisdiction. Natural justice—Affected third parties—No adverse order behind the back of interested persons—The Court observed that during the extraordinarily long interregnum between the sanction of the mutations and the filing of the petitioners’ application, it was highly probable that various transactions, alienations, or changes in possession had taken place, and that third parties may have acquired rights on the basis of the existing revenue entries. Any order directing implementation of the old mutations without impleading such persons or affording them opportunity of hearing would violate the principles of natural justice and risk grave miscarriage of justice. This consideration further demonstrated that the matter was not one of a simple ministerial correction but of substantive adjudication. Case references—Muhammad Yousaf v. Khan Bahadur through Legal Heirs (1992 SCMR 2334); Dildar Ahmad and others v. Member (Judicial-III), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another (2013 SCMR 906); Nazir Ahmad and another v. Maula Bakhsh (1987 SCMR 61); Fida Hussain and another v. Mst. Saiqa (2011 SCMR 1990); Waqar Ahmed and others v. the Federation of Pakistan (2024 SCMR 1877). Petition dismissed—Leave refused—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the controversy regarding implementation of century-old mutations was contentious in nature, could not be resolved by revenue authorities under S. 166 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967, and was not amenable to determination in constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution. Finding no legal infirmity in the orders of the Member Board of Revenue, the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue), and the Lahore High Court, the Court dismissed the petition and refused leave.

Summary: Summary pending