Summary: Background: This case involves a dispute between M/s Sprint Oil and Gas Services Pakistan FZC (the petitioner) and Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL), concerning the reimbursement of sales tax paid by the petitioner for cementation works carried out for OGDCL under two contracts. The petitioner contended that OGDCL was liable to reimburse the sales tax under provincial laws, while OGDCL disputed this claim. ---Issues: Whether the Islamabad High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition filed by the petitioner.Whether the petitioner had exhausted other available remedies before invoking constitutional jurisdiction. ---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court held that the Islamabad High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petitioner's writ petition. It reasoned that provincial laws, particularly those related to sales tax, fall under the jurisdiction of the High Court of the respective province where they are enacted. Since the cementation works were not carried out in Islamabad and federal law interpretation was not required, the Islamabad High Court had no jurisdiction over the matter. Additionally, the Court noted that the petitioner had other adequate remedies available, such as arbitration or filing a suit, which should have been pursued before resorting to constitutional jurisdiction.The Court also emphasized that parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a court through agreement and highlighted the principle that jurisdiction is inherent to the court's authority. It refrained from delving into the merits of the case regarding the sales tax reimbursement, as it could impact the rights of the parties, leaving them free to litigate those issues separately. ---Citations/Precedents: Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation v Muhammad Akram AlizaiPetrosin Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. v Oil and Gas Company Ltd.Nasiruddin Ghori v Federation of PakistanPrinciple reiterated in Eden Builders Pvt. Ltd. Lahore v Muhammad Aslam---Quote:Only the High Court of the province which has enacted a provincial law can interpret it. A High Court?s jurisdiction under Article 199 may not be invoked when contracts have to be interpreted, nor when evidence is required to be recorded. In its writ jurisdiction a High Court also does not enter the realm of disputed facts.

Summary: (a) Constitutional Law—Violation of Due Process & Fair Trial Rights----Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974, Art. 44—Doctrine of Audi Alteram Partem—ApplicabilityHeld, ex-parte modification of the Proprietary Rights Transfer Order (PRTO) without summoning the necessary party was a clear violation of the principles of natural justice and due process—The doctrine of audi alteram partem (right to be heard) was violated, as the petitioner and proforma respondents were not given an opportunity to defend their rights before the Custodian of Evacuee Property—Right to a fair trial and due process is constitutionally guaranteed, and any decision given in violation of such rights is liable to be set aside.(b) Allotment & Cancellation of Evacuee Property—Jurisdiction & Legality----Modification of allotment order without legal notice—EffectHeld, the modification of the PRTO in favour of respondent No. 3 was illegal and void ab initio as it was done in violation of the due process—Allotment rights of evacuee property must be determined after following legal procedures, and the Custodian was bound to ensure fair hearing before making any modifications—Failure to properly summon the affected party rendered the order legally unsustainable.(c) Pending Adjudication Before Commissioner Rehabilitation—Effect on Custodian’s Order----Overlapping jurisdiction—Legal implicationsHeld, the issue of allotment rights of all allottees of the disputed survey land was already pending before the Commissioner Rehabilitation—Custodian’s modification order contradicted the previous direction for determining entitlements, making it legally unsustainable—Jurisdictional conflict must be resolved before any final order on allotment rights can be passed.(d) Writ Jurisdiction & Judicial Review—Custodian’s Order Set Aside----High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction—Scope & powersHeld, High Court had jurisdiction to review the Custodian’s order under Article 44 of the AJK Interim Constitution, 1974—Since the impugned order was passed without affording a fair hearing, it warranted interference—The Custodian was directed to decide the matter afresh after receiving the Commissioner’s report and granting a full opportunity of hearing to all parties.Disposition:Writ petition allowed—Impugned order set aside—Case remanded for fresh decision after due process.

Summary: PLJ 2023 SC (AJK) 127 [Appellate Jurisdiction] Present Kh Muhammad Nasim and Raza Ali Khan JJ ALLAH DITTA - - Appellant versus Ms BOARD OF REVENUE AZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR MUZAFFARABAD and 12 others - - Respondents CA No 12 of 2022 decided on 2432023 (On appeal from the judgment of the High Court dated 08022022 in Writ Petition No 742022) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution 1974 - - - - - - Arts 44 42 (10) - - Writ petition - - Dismissed - - Maintainability - - Non - joinder of necessary party - - Challenge to - - It is settled principle of law that order passed by an authority cannot be set aside without arraying authority as party in line of respondents - - In writ petition only arrayed Board of Revenue and failed to array Commissioner Mirpur Division which was necessary party - - High Court has committed no illegality while dismissing writ petition on ground of non - joinder of necessary party - - Writ petition was not maintainable without arraying necessary party and rightly dismissed by High Court there is no need to attend other points raised by counsel for appellant as same would be an exercise in futility - - Appeal dismissed [Pp 129 130 131] A B C 2003 SCR 142 2016 SCR 33 Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan Advocate for Appellant Raja Zafar Hussain Khan Advocate for Respondents No 2 - 13Judgement Result:Appeal dismissed

Summary: ---Quote: "Every citizen has a right of political and social justice, freedom of speech and thought. Print and electronic media are the means of receiving and providing such information to and from the people. Upon exercise of right of freedom of speech and expression, politically motivated FIRs are being registered for offences under sections 121-A, 124, 153-A, 505 of the PPC, without following the procedure, as provided in section 196 of the Cr.P.C., which is an illegality. The Government must tolerate the criticism of its political opponents being the chosen representatives of the people, instead of considering them as enemy of State." -----Background: ---- The High Court had dismissed his criminal revision for acquittal in a case involving allegations of conspiracy and incitement against the state. The FIR, No. 691 dated 09.08.2022, was registered against Shahbaz Gill and others, including the petitioner, under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) based on views expressed by Gill during a live telecast on ARY News. -----Issues: 1) Whether the Trial Court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of offences under sections 121-A, 124, 153-A, and 505 of the PPC without a complaint by the Federal or Provincial Government as required by Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. ---2) Whether the registration of the FIR and subsequent proceedings against the petitioner were valid. ---3) Whether there was sufficient material to frame charges against the petitioner. ------Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Jurisdiction and Section 196 of the Code: The court emphasized that Section 196 of the Code mandates a complaint by the Federal or Provincial Government for offences under sections 121-A, 124, 153-A, and 505 of the PPC. The FIR was registered with the permission of the Secretary, Ministry of Interior, which did not satisfy the requirements of Section 196, as the Secretary was not authorized to delegate this power further. Thus, the Trial Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of these offences based on the FIR. -----Registration of FIR and Proceedings: The court found that the FIR was registered without adhering to the mandatory procedure prescribed by Section 196. The petitioner was not initially named in the FIR but was implicated later based on the investigation. The main evidence against the petitioner, a transcript allegedly obtained from the main accused, was contested and lacked clear evidentiary value. -----Material for Framing Charges: The court held that there was insufficient material to frame charges against the petitioner. The petitioner could not be held responsible for the actions of the main accused without prima facie cogent evidence. The court highlighted the misuse of authority and the potential chilling effect on media freedom, stressing the importance of protecting constitutional rights. ----Outcome: The petition was converted into an appeal and allowed. The judgments of the High Court and the Trial Court were set aside. The proceedings initiated against the petitioner based on FIR No. 691 were quashed. The petitioner was acquitted from the case. ----Citations/Precedents: Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Mustafa Impex v. Government of Pakistan; PLD 2016 SC 808. The State v. Raja Abdul Rehman; 2005 SCMR 1544. Zahoor-ud-Din v. Khushi Muhammad; 1998 SCMR 1840.

Summary: Background:The petitioner, Mukhtar Ahmad Ali, sought information from the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding various aspects of the Court's staffing and service rules.The petitioner argued that he had the fundamental right to access this information under Article 19A of the Constitution and the Right of Access to Information Act, 2017.After initially being denied the requested information, the petitioner appealed to the Pakistan Information Commission, which ruled in his favor. However, the Registrar challenged this ruling through a writ petition before the Islamabad High Court.---Issues:Whether the Right of Access to Information Act, 2017 applies to the Supreme Court of Pakistan.Whether the petitioner has the right to access the requested information under Article 19A of the Constitution.Whether the Registrar's refusal to provide the requested information was justified.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court held that while the Right of Access to Information Act, 2017 does not apply to the Supreme Court, Article 19A of the Constitution does. Access to information is deemed a fundamental right essential for democratic governance and accountability.The Court emphasized historical precedents and principles, including those from early Islam, to underscore the importance of transparency and accountability in governance.It ruled that the information sought by the petitioner was not sensitive and did not contravene public interest. Therefore, the Registrar should have provided the requested information to the petitioner.The Court directed the Registrar of the Supreme Court to provide the requested information to the petitioner within seven days and ordered a refund of the court fees paid by the petitioner.Given the public importance of the case, the judgment was ordered to be translated into Urdu, with the English version considered the official decision.---Citations/Precedents:Manzoor Elahi v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1975 Supreme Court 66Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1988 Supreme Court 416Principles of Policy set out in the Constitution of Pakistan, Article 38(a)---Quote:The Right of Information Act (2017) is applicable to courts set up under Federal Law. The Supreme Court is not established under a law but under the Constitution, therefore, the Act is not applicable to it. However, Article 19A of the Constitution is applicable, whereunder the Supreme Court should have provided the information which was sought. Registrar directed to provide the requested information to the petitioner within 7 days and refund the court fee paid by the petitioner.

Summary: Background:In the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench case of Khushdil Khan Malik v. Federation of Pakistan and others (W.P.No.3542/2022), the petitioner, Khushdil Khan Malik, filed a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. He challenged the actions of various respondents related to the non-consideration of his name for the conferment of the Civil Award of "Sitara-i-Imtiaz" by the President of Pakistan.----Issues:The petitioner alleged that the non-inclusion of his name in the list forwarded to the President for awards was illegal, arbitrary, and violated the judgments of superior courts. He argued that the omission was non-transparent and based on malice, and he sought judicial intervention to have his recommendations considered for the award.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:Justice Jawad Hassan ruled that the conferment of a civil award is not a vested right of any citizen and thus cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The court found that the nomination and consideration process for such awards is a discretionary administrative action, guided by specific criteria and procedures outlined by the government. The judge noted that while the petitioner's name was initially recommended by a nominating agency (Federal Government Educational Institutions), it was not forwarded by the Ministry of Defence to the Cabinet Division, which is responsible for the final nominations.The court concluded that the petitioner did not demonstrate any legal right to the award that the judiciary could enforce under Article 199 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the petitioner was not found to be an aggrieved person as defined by law, having suffered no legal grievance or infringement of a fundamental right. The writ petition was dismissed on the grounds of maintainability.----Citations/Precedents:Muhammad Akbar v. Federation of Pakistan, Ministry of Law and Justice (1996 SCMR 1017), which held that government is not bound to accept recommendations for appointments or awards, and such recommendations do not confer a vested right.Nazir A. Khan Swati v. Ministry of Law & Justice and others (1998 PLC [C.S.] 372), which clarified that mere nomination does not create a vested right.Dr. Imran Khattak and another v. Ms. Sofia Waqar Khattak, PSO to Chief Justice and others (2014 SCMR 122), asserting that judges are bound by the law and cannot act on personal discretion beyond legal confines.

Summary: Detailed judgement in Urdu

Summary: (a) Environmental Law—Compliance with Environmental Regulations ----Azad Jammu and Kashmir Environmental Protection Act, 2000—Installation of BTS towers—Requirement of Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)—Appellants challenged the issuance of Environmental Protection Orders (EPO) and compliance requirements under Section 11 of the Act—Supreme Appellate Court upheld the requirement for filing IEE/EIA regardless of whether the project commenced before or after the promulgation of the 2009 Regulations—Held, the Act, 2000 applies to all projects to ensure environmental protection, irrespective of commencement date. (b) Environmental Law—Adverse Environmental Effects ----Definition and impact—The court discussed the adverse environmental effects caused by BTS towers, including RF radiation, noise pollution, and health hazards such as cancer and metabolic disturbances—Held, BTS towers fall under the ambit of projects requiring regulatory oversight due to their significant environmental and health impacts as defined under Section 2(i) of the Act. (c) Powers of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ----Authority to regulate BTS towers—Sections 5, 6, 7, and 32 of the AJ&K Environmental Protection Act, 2000—EPA empowered to enforce compliance, issue guidelines, and require NOCs for environmental approvals—Court affirmed that the EPA acted within its statutory mandate to regulate BTS installations. (d) Constitutional Rights—Right to Life and Environmental Protection ----Articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution of Pakistan, and Article 4 of AJ&K Interim Constitution, 1974—Court reiterated that the right to life includes the right to an unpolluted environment—Environmental regulations serve as a safeguard for present and future generations, and compliance with such laws is a constitutional obligation. (e) Judicial Precedent—Precautionary Principle ----Court emphasized the precautionary principle enshrined in environmental jurisprudence—Proactive measures are necessary to prevent environmental harm, even in the absence of conclusive scientific evidence, as noted in Shehla Zia v. WAPDA [PLD 1994 SC 693] and Messrs Rabbiya Associates v. Zong [PLD 2011 Karachi 132]. Disposition: Both appeals were dismissed with no order as to costs. Appellant No. 1 (Mobilink) had complied with the EPO and obtained NOCs for its BTS towers, while other appellants were directed to secure NOCs for their operations. The Environmental Protection Orders were upheld as lawful and within the scope of the EPA's authority.

Summary: Tanveer Sarwar petitioned the Lahore High Court seeking a direction to the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) to file complaints against members of National and Provincial Assemblies who allegedly failed to disclose Toshakhana gifts in their statements of assets and liabilities. The petitioner argued that such concealment constitutes an offense under the Elections Act, 2017. The petitioner also alleged discrimination, asserting that the ECP initiated proceedings only against Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi, the former Prime Minister, who had been convicted.The ECP defended its actions, stating that the complaint against Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi was in response to a reference from the Speaker of the National Assembly, and no such reference was forwarded against other legislators. The court was informed that the petitioner's writ petition was not maintainable as an alternate remedy existed through filing complaints under section 190(2) of the Act.The court examined Section 137 of the Elections Act, which mandates the submission of statements of assets and liabilities by legislators and outlines penalties for false submissions. It noted that the petitioner had an alternate remedy through the complaint process under section 190(2) of the Act.The court emphasized the limitations of its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution and cited previous judgments to support the dismissal of the writ petition. It concluded that the petition lacked merit and was accordingly dismissed on 29.12.2023 by Justice Raheel Kamran.This judgment underscores the importance of following the prescribed legal procedures, and it highlights the availability of alternate remedies provided by law in addressing grievances related to the Elections Act, 2017.

Summary: Background: The petitioners, legal heirs of Alam Deen, filed a constitutional writ petition under Article 44 of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974. They challenged the Proprietary Rights Transfer Order (PRTO) No.14554 dated 18.05.2001 and the decision of the Custodian Evacuee Property dated 03.04.2019. The land in dispute, originally allotted to Alam Deen in 1950, was partially transferred to the petitioners' father and his brother. However, portions of the land were transferred to respondents Sheikh Hafeez-ur-Rehman and Sheikh Tahir Qayyum under contested circumstances. ----Issues: 1- Whether the Custodian's decision dated 03.04.2019 should be annulled. 2- Whether the petitioners' claim over the disputed land is barred by laches. 3- Whether the proprietary rights transfer orders (PRTO) were issued against the law and facts. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Annulment of Custodian’s Decision: The court held that the petitioners sought declaratory relief requiring detailed inquiry into disputed facts, which is beyond the scope of writ jurisdiction. Consequently, the petitioners' prayer for annulment of the Custodian's decision was dismissed. --Laches: The court found the petitioners' claim barred by laches. Despite residing in the same vicinity, the petitioners failed to challenge the PRTO for approximately 18 years. Their delayed and belated approach was deemed fatal to their claim. --Proprietary Rights Transfer Orders: The court determined that the findings of fact recorded by the Custodian were supported by the record. The Custodian, as a special tribunal, exercised its jurisdiction appropriately, and the court declined to interfere with its decision. ----Citations/Precedents: PLD 2023 High Court (AJK) 11: Tentative assessment at the bail stage. PLD 1973 SC 24 - Rahim Shah vs. Chief Election Commission: Conditions for grant of Certiorari. PLJ 2001 SC (AJ&K) 368 - Makhan Khan vs. Custodian: Discretion exercised by the Custodian. 2016 MLD 1382 - Ch. Mohammad Shoukat vs. Custodian: Finality of Custodian’s orders. The court emphasized that a party having a right must act promptly to assert it. Delayed action and implied abandonment or waiver of rights weaken the claimant's position. The constitutional petition was dismissed, with no order as to costs.