Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: -

Summary: Order passed under O.XXXIX R. 3 CPC is not appealable .

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------Ss. 22-A, 22-B & 154---Order of ex-officio Justice of Peace to register FIR---Scope---Application under S.22-A, Cr.P.C. was allowed by the Justice of Peace and SHO was directed to register the case in accordance with law---Validity---Station House Officer had no authority to refuse to record the statement of complainant in the relevant register irrespective of its authenticity/ correctness or falsity of such statement---High Court was not supposed to comment on the possible outcome of the inquiry and investigation which was to be conducted by SHO after recording statement of respondent---Whatever was the stance of the applicants, it should first be brought to the notice of SHO to falsify the statement of respondent, if any, incorporated in the FIR---If the statement of respondent after inquiry and investigation found to be false, the SHO could prosecute respondent under S. 182, P.P.C.---Criminal miscellaneous application was dismissed accordingly. Brig. (Retd.) Imtiaz Ahmad v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Interior Division, Islamabad and 2 others 1994 SCMR 2142 ref. Muhammad Bashir v. Station House Officer, Okara Cantt. and others PLD 2007 SC 539 and Younas Abbas and others v. Additional Sessions Judge Chakwal and others PLD 2016 SC 581 rel.

Summary: Acquittal granted----Ghulam Rasool alias Gudda was convicted by the Anti-Terrorism Court for offenses under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code and the Anti-Terrorism Act. The charges included kidnapping, terrorism-related offenses, and other criminal acts. The appellate court, after considering the arguments presented by both the appellant's counsel and the Deputy Prosecutor General, has acquitted Ghulam Rasool alias Gudda. The court raised doubts about the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, highlighting inconsistencies in their statements and the lack of corroborative evidence. The judgment emphasized that the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused, and, as a result, the conviction and sentences were set aside.

Summary: The petitioner claimed ownership of certain property obtained through auction from the Settlement Department. The court considered the jurisdictional issues raised under sections 8 and 14 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975. The petitioner sought a declaration that the property was not Evacuee Trust Property and contested a notice issued by the authorities. The court emphasized that the jurisdiction of the civil court to determine the property's status as Evacuee Trust Property was expressly prohibited by law. Ultimately, the court dismissed the civil revision petition, upholding the decisions of the lower courts that had declared the jurisdiction of the civil court as barred in this case.

Summary: The case pertains to sexual harassment at the workplace, wherein thepetitioner was serving as an Assistant Professor at the University ofLahore and was also a student of Doctorate at the same university. Thepetitioner was accused of sexual misconduct by one of his students. The student claimed that the petitioner has sexually harassed her by sendingher vulgar text messages while she was making an academic query. Shealso alleged that the petitioner used to force her to come to his bacheloraccommodation and cook food for him. Moreover, she alleged that whenshe, being the class representative for girls, asked for class results, thepetitioner diverted the conversation towards sex and expressed hisintention for a sexual relation. She also claimed that some other girls alsofaced sexual harassment from him. An inquiry was initiated, and thepetitioner was dismissed from the service under the Protection againstHarassment of Women at the Workplace (Amendment) Act 2012 and wasalso expelled from the Doctorate program. The petitioner filed an appealagainst this decision to Ombudsperson. The Ombudsperson altered thepunishment from ëdismissalí to ëremovalí from the service, the differencebeing that ëdismissal from serviceí renders the employee disqualified fromfuture employment while ëremoval from serviceí does not bar from futureemployment. Against this decision, the petitioner filed an appeal beforethe Governor of Punjab which got dismissed for being not maintainable.Therefore, the petitioner filed a writ petition before the Lahore High Courtunder Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973(ëConstitutioní) and challenged the orders issued by the University onground of violation of the due process right as guaranteed under Article10A of the Constitution. In the writ petition, the counsel for the petitionerargued that he was not given an opportunity for a personal hearing andwas, thus, condemned unheard. Furthermore, the petitioner argued that theAct was not applicable to his case and the case against him was based onjealousy. On the other side, the respondents opposed these arguments andprayed for dismissal of the petitioner. In light of these arguments, the courtframed three primary issues:I. Whether the Respondents were justified to impose penalty ofremoval from service against the Petitioner, under the Act?II. Whether the Respondents were justified to expel the Petitionerfrom the PhD. programme of the University?III. Whether this petition can be dismissed in limine? To determine the first moot problem, the court begun with thereiteration of legislatureís commitment to provide a safe and secureenvironment for women, as encapsulated in the objectives of theProtection against Harassment of Women at Workplace Act 2010 (asamended by the Punjab Protection Against Harassment of Women at theWorkplace (Amendment) Act 2012). The court also referred to theconstitutional obligations as enshrined under Articles 14, 25 and 34 toprotect the dignity of persons, and take special measures to ensure equaland full participation of women in all spheres of national life. AlthoughArticle 34, being part of the Principles of Policy, is not justiciable, itsviolation combined with the violation of other provisions of law providesa cogent ground to decree an order. Against these legislative commitmentsto ensure the protection of women from harassment at workplace, thecourt closely looked into the definitions of harassment, workplace,employee, and the employer to determine the merits of the case. Referringto the definition of harassment as provided under section 2(h) of the Act,the court observed that it provides an exhaustive list of the acts (including,any unwelcome sexual advance, request for sexual favours or other verbalor written communication, or physical conduct of a sexual nature, orsexually demeaning attitudes) linked with employment or workenvironment, which may be considered as harassment.Keeping the legislative intent ìto protect all employees from beingharassed or exploited during employmentî in consideration, the courtliberally interpreted the definitions of employee and workplace and heldthat: ìany worker whoever is employed in any manner or capacity with theemployer is protected from being harassed.î3 Therefore, in light of suchinterpretations of the definition clause, the petitioner, being a teacher, washeld as the employee as well as the student of the University who in hisemployment as teacher exploited and harassed the student by sending hervulgar messages for illicit purpose.4 With these observations, the courtheld that the petitioner has failed to prove any illegality or legal perversityin the impugned orders (decreed by the University committee and theOmbudsperson), and, thus, the respondents were justified in imposing thepenalty of removal from service under the Act.5For the second issue pertaining to the expulsion of the petitioner fromthe PhD program, the court relied upon the constitutional obligation toprovide a safe and secure environment, and ensure equal participation ofwomen in the national life. In view of these constitutional obligations, thecourt held that given that the petitioner had been found guilty; his presencein the university would be a threat to the victim and other female students.Therefore, ìto create a safe and healthy educational environment for allthe female students, the presence of the petitioner in the said University isunwarranted and unjustified.î6In the final issue, the court recognized the inconvenience causedbecause of the general practice adopted by the courts whereby they issuenotices to the parties instead of dismissing the petition at limine stage.Given the unnecessary inconvenience caused and the increasing backlogof the cases in Pakistan, the court opined for adopting the Limine ControlDoctrine in application of which, the court may exercise its discretion indisposing of the matter before it, at the beginning. However, suchdiscretion is supposed to be ìgrounded on good public policy and casemanagement place.î7In light of the aforementioned discussion, the court dismissed the petition--------------- The court discussed the Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace (Amendment) Act, 2012, emphasizing the need for a safe working environment for women and the constitutional duty to protect women's rights. The court referred to jurisprudence on sexual harassment globally, highlighting the detrimental impact of harassment on victims and the importance of addressing such issues. The court concluded that the petition lacked merit and applied the doctrine of "Limine Control" to dismiss the petition at the limine stage, suggesting that the trial courts should judiciously control frivolous claims to maintain efficiency and public confidence in the judicial system.

Summary: Contract employees in question are governed by the National Database and Registration Authority Employees (Service) Regulations, 2002 which are non-statutory in nature and therefore they cannot be granted relief in constitutional jurisdiction.-----NADRA introduced a scheme in 2012 that provided two options for these employees. One option was to continue as contractual employees with revised terms, and the other was to be "regularized" as permanent employees. The appellants chose Option I, which maintained their contractual status with revised terms.The main issue in the case revolved around the termination clause in the contract. The termination clause in the original contracts allowed for termination on thirty days' notice, but after the exercise of Option I, the termination clause was changed to require three months' notice.The appellants were terminated from their positions, and they challenged the termination in the High Court through constitutional petitions. The High Court dismissed their petitions, stating that the National Database and Registration Authority Employees (Service) Regulations, 2002 were non-statutory and thus the court couldn't intervene in matters related to service terms and conditions.The appellants appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court considered whether the termination clauses were reasonable and valid. It analyzed similar cases involving termination from service by statutory bodies and examined whether the termination clauses violated principles of natural justice. The court also distinguished between the regular employees and contractual employees and the implications of their chosen options.Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that the termination clauses in the contracts were valid and upheld the High Court's decision to dismiss the constitutional petitions filed by the appellants.