Summary: (a) Illegal Dispossession Act (XI of 2005)----Ss. 3, 4 & 5(2)---Summary trial---Sixty-day time frame---"Shall"---Directory as to conclusion of trial; mandatory as to recording of reasons for delay---Petitioner's complaint under Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act, filed in February 2016, remained pending before the Additional Sessions Judge-III, Khairpur, for more than ten years without sufficient reasons recorded for the delay---Held, that the Act is a special law designed to criminalize property grabbing and to protect lawful owners and occupiers, providing a quick remedy compared with civil litigation---S. 5(2) stipulates that the Trial Court shall proceed from day to day and decide the case within sixty days after taking cognizance, and for any delay shall record sufficient reasons---Word "shall" in the first part of S. 5(2), requiring day-to-day proceedings and conclusion within sixty days, is directory in nature and does not strip the Court of power to extend the timeframe, but extensions should not become routine and must be granted only in exceptional circumstances for which sufficient reasons are recorded---Such direction must not be taken lightly or rendered toothless by treating it as merely optional---Word "shall" in the latter part of S. 5(2), requiring recording of sufficient reasons for any delay, is mandatory, leaving the Court with no option but to record reasons whenever the prescribed period is exceeded---If the Trial Court were to sit indefinitely on a complaint under the Act, the result would be inconsistent with the entire scheme of the legislature, rendering the special law ineffective. (b) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 10-A, 24, 37(d) & 187---Fair trial and due process---Right to property---Inexpensive and expeditious justice---Directions to courts exercising jurisdiction under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005---Inordinate delay of more than ten years without recording sufficient reasons denied expeditious justice to complainant and accused alike, negated the right to fair trial and due process under Art. 10-A, ran against the Principles of Policy in Art. 37(d), and constituted a clear violation of the Act---Art. 24 mandates that no person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law---Delay was not an isolated failure but reflected a systematic failure in implementation of the Constitution, law, rules and prescribed procedure---Where an interim order is challenged before a higher forum, the Trial Court sometimes suspends proceedings in the absence of any restraining order, thereby frustrating the purpose of the Act---Under Art. 187 the Supreme Court may issue such directions as may be necessary for doing complete justice, which obligate all executive and judicial authorities including the High Courts to act upon those directions---Court issued country-wide instructions, in addition to the procedure prescribed by the Act: (i) every Trial Court seized of a complaint under the Act, upon taking cognizance, should complete the same within the 60-day time frame specified by S. 5(2) and maintain a day-to-day order sheet; (ii) where the trial cannot proceed on the date fixed, the Trial Court shall specifically record sufficient reasons in the order sheet, and bare references to "non-availability of witnesses" or "adjournment sought by counsel" shall not constitute sufficient reasons; (iii) no adjournment shall be granted as a routine, and any adjournment shall be based on justifiable reason; (iv) Member Inspection Team of the respective High Courts/Director General District Judiciary shall periodically monitor all cases pending under the Act, identifying date of filing, date of cognizance/framing of charge, status, and reasons where the sixty-day period has been exceeded; (v) the complaint shall accompany the list of witnesses and parties and counsel shall ensure presence on each date; (vi) if any party challenges an interim order before a higher forum, the Trial Court must proceed with the trial unless a restraining order is passed by that forum. Disposition: Petition dismissed as not pressed; Trial Court directed to proceed expeditiously on day-to-day basis and decide the complaint within sixty working days from receipt of the order; parties and counsel to cooperate; no unnecessary adjournment to be granted; if the trial cannot be concluded within the stipulated period, the Trial Court shall record sufficient reasons; copy of the order transmitted to Registrars of all High Courts for information, necessary action and strict compliance. (Crl.P. No.818 of 2026, against order dated 04.05.2026 of the High Court of Sindh, Sukkur Bench, in Crl. Revision No.S-107/2025, Supreme Court of Pakistan, order dated 25.05.2026, by Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J.; Approved for Reporting)

Summary: (a) Pre-emption---Mandatory requirements of S. 13 of the relevant Pre-emption Act, 1987---Precedent of Mst. Kalsoom Begum---Held, earlier reliance on Kalsoom Begum line displaced after Civil Review Petition No. 522 of 2020 (arising from C.A. 1664/2014) allowed and that judgment set aside as overlooking mandatory S. 13 requirements and binding authorities---Impugned High Court judgment well reasoned and correctly appraised law and evidence. Disposition: Appeal dismissed; no order as to costs. Dated 25.05.2026.

Summary: Article 10-A of the Constitution guarantees the fundamental right to a fair trial and due process in the determination of criminal charges as well as civil rights and obligations. Under Article 187 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court possesses the authority to issue such directions, orders, or decrees as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it. This constitutional power obligates all executive and judicial authorities including the High Courts, throughout Pakistan to act upon the directions of the Supreme Court to ensure effective implementation of statutory mandates for the purpose of regulating judicial process.

Summary: 1) The Scope & Pre-conditions for instituting a Constitutional Petition as PIL (2) PIL is a weapon which has to be used with great care, caution and circumspection and judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity seeking is not lurking (3) This Court will always underscore the pursuit of sensationalized publicity as such actions undermines the integrity and importance of the relevant institutions, organizations and entities, which serves no one's purpose at the end.

Summary: Consequently, the case of the petitioners squarely falls within the scope and ambit of Section 2(c) of the Act, 2018. The exclusion pertaining to "project employees" ceased to operate once the petitioners were adjusted and retained against duly sanctioned posts in BPS-01 to BPS-09, which had been created under the current budget through the Schedule of New Expenditure (SNE) pursuant to the approval accorded by the Ministry of Finance and the then Chief Minister, Punjab, vide order dated 23.12.2021. Thereafter, their contractual appointments were continuously extended from time to time by the Provincial Cabinet, being the competent authority, against sanctioned posts in BS-01 to BS-09.

Summary: 1) Status of PLRA Employees & Competent Authority vis-a-viz proceedings conducted under the PEEDA, 2006 (2) The Ratio Decidendi of Muhammad Arshad's case (2025 SCMR 2071) (3) Prerogative of the employer to decide the question of quantum of punishment, once the misconduct is proved.

Summary: 1) Recognition & Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award, the scope of proceedings and challenge; (2) Objection, viz the absence of an Arbitration Agreement between the parties has to be raised at the outset before the Arbitral Tribunal (3) Effect of Hague Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalization of Foreign Public Documents of 1961 ("Apostille Convention"), which was enforced on 09.03.2023, followed by the promulgation of the Apostille Act, 2024.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.199 & 212---Civil Servants Act, 1973, S.10---Trade and Investment Officers at Pakistan’s Missions abroad---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Selection and foreign posting pursuant to a special policy did not constitute ordinary transfer or posting forming part of terms and conditions of civil service---Petitioners sought enforcement of rights arising from notified selection policy rather than service rights under S.10 of Civil Servants Act, 1973---Bar under Art.212 was therefore not attracted and constitutional petitions were maintainable. Cited Cases: • Altaf Hussain Khuhro and 3 others v. Federation of Pakistan and 6 others 2023 SCMR 796 • Dr. Muhammad Saleem v. Government of Balochistan and others 2023 SCMR 2119 • Sajid Mehmood Raja and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2013 PLC (C.S.) 864 • Dr. Masood Saleem v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division and another 2013 PLC (C.S.) 1062 • Muhammad Irfan Wahid v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, Islamabad and another 2024 PLC (C.S.) 556 • Zaigham Abbas and 10 others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource Development and others 2021 PLC (C.S.) 486 (b) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Executive and policy matters---Judicial review---Courts ordinarily exercised restraint in polycentric matters involving policy, administration and security, but such deference did not place executive action beyond judicial scrutiny---Where notified policy was departed from without cogent reasons, discretion was exercised arbitrarily, material facts were suppressed or fundamental rights were violated, constitutional jurisdiction could validly be invoked. (c) General Clauses Act, 1897----S.24-A---Administrative order---Speaking order---Requirement of reasons---Statutory discretion had to be exercised reasonably, fairly, justly and for advancement of statutory purpose---Reasons were a substantive safeguard demonstrating independent application of mind, consideration of relevant material and a rational basis capable of satisfying the test of a reasonable person---Mere reproduction of a conclusion supplied by another agency did not constitute a lawful speaking order. (d) General Clauses Act, 1897----S.24-A---Trade and Investment Officers---Representations dismissed on intelligence agency’s recommendation of “not suitable for posting abroad”---Secretary, Ministry of Commerce neither examined underlying reports nor identified any adverse service record, disciplinary proceeding, misconduct or objective disqualification---Order merely repeated existence of security-clearance requirement and delegated statutory decision-making function to intelligence agency---Such order was non-speaking, irrational and passed without independent exercise of discretion. Cited Cases: • Montgomery Flour and General Mills Ltd., Montgomery v. Director, Food Purchases, West Pakistan PLD 1957 Lahore 914 • Abid Hasan v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation 2005 SCMR 25 • Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 • Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (e) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.4 & 10-A---Natural justice---Audi alteram partem---Adverse intelligence material---No person could lawfully be deprived of an appointment or posting carrying civil consequences on the basis of secret material without being confronted with its substance and afforded a meaningful opportunity to explain or rebut it---Where full disclosure was legitimately sensitive, fairness could be secured through limited disclosure, in-camera procedure or other protected mode---Confidentiality could not be invoked as an absolute cloak to defeat due process. Cited Cases: • Hazara (Hill Tract) Improvement Trust through Chairman and others v. Mst. Qaisra Elahi and others 2005 SCMR 678 • Raziuddin v. Chairman, Pakistan Airlines Corporation and 2 others PLD 1992 SC 531 • Government of Punjab and another v. S. Tassadaq Hussain Bokhari PLD 1986 SC 162 • Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division and others v. Dr. Muhammad Arif and others 2017 SCMR 969 • Muhammad Tahir Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division and others 2025 PLC (C.S.) 555 (f) Right of Access to Information Act, 2017---Official Secrets Act, 1923---Intelligence reports---Claim of confidentiality---For withholding adverse material, respondents were required to establish a lawful classification through competent notification, order or binding direction and record reasons supporting such protection---No material was produced showing that vetting reports were lawfully classified or immune from disclosure---Bare invocation of secrecy statutes was insufficient. (g) Evidence---Adverse inference---Non-production of intelligence reports---Reports forming sole basis of adverse decision were not produced before High Court despite specific judicial directions---Where decision-making authority had not examined reports, respondents could not place them before Court and affected candidates remained unaware of their contents, adverse inference arose that reports either lacked substantive material or could not withstand scrutiny---Decision resting upon such unproduced material lacked evidentiary foundation. (h) Administrative law---Security vetting---S.R.O. No.801(I)/2022, dated 17.06.2022---Scope of Special Vetting Agency’s mandate---Intelligence Bureau could ascertain and report objectively verifiable facts such as existence of pending inquiry, criminal proceedings or investigation against candidate---It was not empowered to determine professional competence, comparative suitability or fitness for appointment, which belonged to selection machinery established under governing policy---Unreasoned label of “not suitable” could not veto selection board’s assessment and approval granted by Prime Minister. (i) Trade and Investment Officers Policy Guidelines, 2024---Eligibility and disqualification---Policy exhaustively specified categories of ineligibility, including pending disciplinary proceedings, major penalties, plea bargain or voluntary return, improper application, deficient performance reports, maximum foreign tenure and prior recall for unsatisfactory performance---Undisclosed security opinion or non-completion of post-selection formalities was not prescribed as an additional ground of disqualification---Administrative authority could not introduce new eligibility conditions through implication or practice. (j) Administrative law---Selection process---Post-selection and pre-departure formalities---Nature---Health declaration, security-vetting proforma, undertaking, personal profile, diplomatic passport and travel arrangements were procedural steps intended to implement an appointment already approved---Once candidate had cleared written and psychometric tests, interview, merit evaluation, competent-authority approval and mandatory training, subsequent formalities could not be elevated above substantive selection or used to annul it. (k) General Clauses Act, 1897----S.21---Locus poenitentiae---Vested rights---Power to rescind administrative order ceased once order had taken effect and valuable rights had been created and acted upon---Petitioners had been selected on merit, approved by competent authority, issued provisional offers, accepted those offers, relieved for mandatory training and completed substantial pre-departure requirements---Cumulative effect was creation of accrued and vested rights which could not be withdrawn by executive fiat. Cited Cases: • Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Muhammad Himayatullah Faruqhi PLD 1969 SC 407 • Messrs Army Welfare Sugar Mills Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1992 SCMR 1652 (l) Administrative law---Legitimate expectation---Selection under notified policy---Candidates participating in process possessed legitimate expectation that appointments would be governed by advertisement and Policy Guidelines, 2024---Policy did not contemplate post-selection disqualification through undisclosed intelligence reports or re-advertisement before exhaustion of waiting list---Authority could not arbitrarily depart from policy after candidates had completed prescribed process and secured approval. Cited Cases: • Uzma Manzoor and others v. Vice Chancellor, Khushal Khan Khattak University, Karak and others 2022 SCMR 694 • Muhammad Irfan Wahid v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, Islamabad and another 2024 PLC (C.S.) 556 (m) Administrative law---Civil consequences---Denial of foreign posting---Respondents’ assertion that intelligence report caused no adverse consequence was inconsistent with reliance upon same report to deny petitioners approved appointments---Denial affected professional reputation, appointment earned on merit and future prospects of foreign posting and therefore unquestionably entailed civil consequences---Authority could not approbate and reprobate simultaneously. (n) Trade and Investment Officers Policy Guidelines, 2024---Waiting list---Vacancies arising during recruitment cycle---Policy expressly provided for maintenance and utilization of waiting list---Where selected candidate declined offer or became ineligible, next eligible candidate in order of merit was to be considered---Re-advertisement before exhaustion of waiting list rendered policy mechanism nugatory and constituted unlawful departure from notified procedure. Cited Cases: • Government of N.W.F.P. through Secretary, Education Department, Peshawar v. Qasim Shah 2009 SCMR 382 • Government of Punjab through Secretary, Cooperative Societies Department, Lahore and others v. Asad Abbas 2022 SCMR 739 (o) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.25---Equality before law---Waiting-list candidates---One candidate from waiting list was appointed after earlier selected candidate declined offer, whereas other candidates similarly placed were denied consideration and posts were ordered to be re-advertised---Selective application of same policy without rational justification constituted discrimination and arbitrary preference---Administrative discretion could not be exercised differently among persons belonging to same class without lawful basis. (p) Rules of Business, 1973---Secretariat Instructions, 2021---Summary for Prime Minister---Duty of full and candid disclosure---Decision-making summary was required to contain complete, objective and self-contained statement of material facts, including existence of pending litigation, approved selection, accrued rights and applicable waiting-list policy---Summary seeking re-advertisement failed to disclose that posts were sub judice and candidates had completed selection process---Approval obtained upon incomplete factual presentation did not constitute informed exercise of competent authority’s discretion. (q) Administrative law---Sub judice matter---Executive re-advertisement---During pendency of proceedings concerning selected candidates, Ministry procured approval to re-advertise disputed posts without updating competent authority about litigation and later relied upon such approval as fait accompli---Executive action designed to alter subject matter or render pending proceedings infructuous amounted to overreach and could not be countenanced. (r) Administrative discretion---Structured exercise---No executive discretion was absolute---Discretion had to be exercised for purpose for which conferred, upon relevant material, within policy and statutory limits and by choosing only among lawful alternatives---Re-advertisement in disregard of existing merit and waiting lists was not a lawful alternative and therefore did not fall within permissible discretion. Cited Case: • Montgomery Flour and General Mills v. Director Food PLD 1988 Lahore 725 (s) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.19-A & 10-A---Non-disclosure of administrative decision and supporting summary---Selective disclosure of extracts without complete reasons or material frustrated transparency, impaired right to information and denied meaningful opportunity to challenge executive action---Decision adversely affecting selected candidates could not lawfully rest upon opaque and incomplete record. (t) Administrative law---Completed selection---Finality---Approval of final merit list by Prime Minister represented definitive determination of candidates’ suitability under Policy, 2024---Unreasoned recommendation of intelligence officer, unsupported by misconduct, criminal proceeding or other objective disqualification, could not override decision of selection board and competent authority---Permitting such veto would negate rule of law and accountable exercise of public power. Disposition---All writ petitions allowed---Order dated 13.11.2025 dismissing petitioners’ representations and decision approving re-advertisement through Summary dated 22.12.2025 set aside as without lawful authority---Ministry of Commerce directed to issue final appointment letters within fifteen days to petitioners already issued provisional offers and complete pre-departure formalities within thirty days for their postings at respective Trade Missions abroad---Any vacancies directed to be filled by considering waiting-list candidates strictly in order of merit before issuance of any fresh advertisement. Ali Waheed Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and others, Writ Petitions Nos.4837, 4842, 4843, 4844, 4897 and 5523 of 2025 and 486, 902 and 1351 of 2026, Islamabad High Court, heard on 12.05.2026 and announced on 25.05.2026.

Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (1987)----S. 13(3)---Suit for possession through right of pre-emption---Talb-i-Muwathibat and Talb-i-Ishhad---Mandatory requirements---Non-mention of date of Talb-i-Ishhad in the plaint---Fatal defect---Petitioner instituted a suit for possession through right of pre-emption in respect of property measuring 4 Kanals in Mouza Kurar, Tehsil Paharpur, District Dera Ismail Khan, claiming superior right as co-sharer and contiguous owner---Case was that respondents purchased the property through mutation No.1630 dated 23.08.2005 for Rs.60,000/-, though Rs.1,40,000/- was reflected in the mutation to defeat the right of pre-emption; petitioner claimed knowledge of the sale on 28.08.2005 at about 05:00 p.m. through one Rasheed Ahmad, immediate Talb-i-Muwathibat, and thereafter Talb-i-Ishhad in the presence of witnesses by notices through registered post---Trial Court, while returning findings in his favour on certain issues including status as co-sharer and limitation, dismissed the suit for failure to establish due performance of Talb-i-Ishhad in accordance with S. 13(3); appeal and civil revision were dismissed and concurrent findings maintained---Held, that the right of pre-emption is a very weak right and, to succeed, the plaintiff must plead that before filing the suit he had fulfilled the requirements of Talbs and thereafter prove performance of Talb-i-Muwathibat and Talb-i-Ishhad---Performance of both Talbs is sine qua non for a decree; if performance of a single Talb skips or is not proved, the superstructure of the suit falls to the ground---It is mandatory to mention in the plaint the date, place and time of Talb-i-Muwathibat, from which the statutory period of fourteen days is calculated, and the date of issuing notice of Talb-i-Ishhad; a plaint lacking those particulars is fatal---Admittedly the plaint did not disclose the date of performance of Talb-i-Ishhad, which omission, in view of Mian Pir Muhammad, was fatal---Requirement of specifically pleading essential particulars of Talbs is not a mere technical formality but is intrinsically linked to the statutory scheme under S. 13(3)---Even otherwise, petitioner failed to establish through cogent evidence due performance of Talb-i-Ishhad; neither factum of proper service of notice upon the vendees was proved nor was the evidence sufficient to meet the strict standard---Concurrent findings called for no interference---Petition dismissed; leave refused. (b) Civil Procedure Code----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of fact---Scope---Held, that the revisional Court is not vested with unlimited authority to reappraise evidence or disturb concurrent findings merely on the basis of a different possible view---Jurisdiction is confined to examining jurisdictional defects: where the Court below has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, including procedural errors affecting the ultimate decision---Such jurisdiction, though exceptional, is for supervisory correction and not to substitute findings of fact---Concurrent findings of fact, if based on proper appreciation of evidence and not suffering from misreading, non-reading, illegality or material irregularity, are not open to interference in revisional jurisdiction---No jurisdictional defect, illegality or material irregularity having been pointed out, and the findings of the courts below being based on proper appreciation of evidence and in consonance with settled principles, there was no warrant for interference by the Supreme Court under Art. 185(3) of the Constitution. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Riaz v. Muhammad Ramzan 2023 SCMR 1305 • Sardar Muhammad (deceased) through LRs v. Taj Muhammad (deceased) through LRs and others 2023 SCMR 1113 • Mian Pir Muhammad and another v. Faqir Muhammad through L.Rs. and others PLD 2007 SC 302 • Ijaz Ahmed v. Noor ul Ameen 2022 SCMR 1522 Disposition: Civil petition dismissed; leave to appeal refused. (C.P. No.4168 of 2022, Supreme Court of Pakistan, Islamabad, decided 21.05.2026; Approved for Reporting.)

Summary: (a) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)----S. 18---Reference to Referee Court---Alleged agreement fixing compensation at Rs.117,000 per kanal between acquiring department and landowners---Bar to enhancement of compensation---Burden of proof---Acquiring department contended that compensation had been fixed through mutual consent and agreement with landowners---High Court found that not a shred of evidence was available to show that landowners or their representatives participated in the alleged meeting with the Land Acquisition Collector---Held, that a plea founded upon an alleged agreement relinquishing or restricting a statutory right had to be established through clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence---Mere assertions or internal departmental understandings could not be treated as a binding arrangement against landowners, particularly where the consequence would be deprivation of their statutory right to seek a reference under S. 18 of the Act---In absence of any contemporaneous material, such as a written agreement, consent statement or other reliable evidence demonstrating that landowners knowingly and voluntarily accepted compensation at the asserted rate in full and final settlement of their claims, no legally enforceable agreement could be inferred---Burden to establish such an agreement squarely rested upon acquiring department, which it had failed to discharge---Supreme Court agreed with the reasoning of the High Court and issue was answered in the negative. (b) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)----Ss. 18 & 23---Determination of compensation---Potential value of acquired land---Concurrent findings of fact---Interference by Supreme Court---High Court had undertaken a detailed analysis of the location and potentiality of the acquired land, and had considered its nature and character, existing and future utility, proximity to the main road, educational institutions, petrol pumps, commercial markets, shops, plazas, residential houses and other relevant factors affecting market value---Held, that determination of compensation in land acquisition matters was essentially a question of fact, to be assessed on the basis of relevant material reflecting market value and potentiality of the land at the time of acquisition---Unless such assessment was shown to be based on misreading of evidence, non-consideration of material facts or misapplication of any principle of law, Supreme Court would ordinarily not interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below---No misreading of evidence, non-consideration of material facts or misapplication of any principle of law having been found in the conclusions of the Referee Court and the High Court, no interference was warranted and the issue was answered in the negative. (c) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)----S. 23(2)---Additional sum of fifteen per centum on market value for compulsory nature of acquisition---Referee Court awarding 15% per annum from date of notification under S. 4 till payment---Legality---Held, that S. 23(2) of the Act did not contemplate payment of such amount on a recurring annual basis---Where the language of a provision was plain and unambiguous, Court was bound to give effect to its literal meaning and could not read into the provision words which the legislature had consciously omitted---Provision created a statutory entitlement of a fixed nature in the form of an additional solatium, intended to be compensatory in character and not interest-bearing or time-dependent---Additional amount of 15% was payable only once on the market value determined for the acquired land, as compensation for compulsory nature of the acquisition---Direction of Referee Court, maintained by High Court, awarding 15% per annum from date of notification under S. 4 till payment of compensation, was contrary to express mandate of S. 23(2) and could not be sustained, as such interpretation would amount to rewriting the statute and converting a one-time statutory solatium into a continuing financial liability, which was impermissible in law---Landowners were entitled to a one-time payment of 15% on the market value as determined in accordance with law. (d) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)----S. 28 [as substituted by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Acquisition (Amendment) Ordinance, 2001]---Additional amount over and above enhanced compensation---Entitlement of landowners to interest at 6% per annum---Section 28, prior to amendment, empowered Court to direct payment of simple interest at the rate of six per centum per annum on the excess sum from date of taking possession to date of payment into Court---By the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Acquisition (Amendment) Ordinance, 2001, the provision was substituted so as to empower Court to direct the Collector to deposit "such amount as determined by it"---Held, that legislature had consciously omitted the expression "simple interest" as well as the fixed rate of 6% per annum, and substituted the same with the expression "such amount as determined by it"---Legislative intent was not to abolish compensatory relief altogether but, in the backdrop of Aslam Khaki v. Muhammad Hashim (PLD 2000 SC 225), to dispense with the concept of statutory "interest" and the rigidity of a fixed rate, and to confer discretion upon Referee Court to determine a just and reasonable compensatory amount having regard to facts of each case---Principles emerging from Govt. of KPK v. Misal Khan (2022 SCMR 277) and Govt. of KPK v. Yousaf Khan (2022 SCMR 1836) were that statutory entitlement to 6% interest under the unamended S. 28 no longer survived; S. 28 as substituted conferred jurisdiction upon Court to determine an additional compensatory amount over and above enhanced compensation to cover the period between dispossession and actual payment; such amount was intended to compensate deprivation of possession and delayed payment; primary basis was proved market rental value of the land; and in absence of such evidence, 6% per annum of enhanced compensation operated as a minimum benchmark of rental value---No evidence having been adduced by landowners to establish actual fair market rental value of the acquired land for the relevant period, case fell squarely within the ratio of Yousaf Khan's case---Landowners were not entitled to claim 6% per annum as interest but were entitled to an additional amount calculated at the rate of 6% per annum of enhanced compensation, as minimum compensatory rental value for deprivation of use of land. (e) Contempt of Court---Criminal original petitions seeking initiation of contempt proceedings for alleged non-compliance of interim order of Supreme Court---Appeals having been finally decided and rights and liabilities of the parties conclusively determined, Supreme Court held that no useful purpose would be served by proceeding further with the contempt petitions and, exercising judicial restraint, refrained from proceeding further---Acquiring department, however, was directed to comply forthwith with the findings and give effect to the determinations made in the judgment---Amount found payable to landowners was to be worked out and recovered through execution proceedings pending before the competent Executing Court, and the needful was to be done within three months of landowners approaching the Executing Court. Cited Cases: • Aslam Khaki v. Muhammad Hashim PLD 2000 SC 225 • Govt. of KPK v. Misal Khan 2022 SCMR 277 • Govt. of KPK v. Yousaf Khan 2022 SCMR 1836 Disposition: Civil Appeals Nos. 8-P and 9-P of 2017 filed by the acquiring department partly allowed to the extent that the direction of the Referee Court, as maintained by the High Court, granting 15% per annum from date of notification under S. 4 till payment was set aside, landowners being entitled to one-time payment of 15% on the market value under S. 23(2); determination of market value and compensation by the Referee Court, as affirmed by the High Court, maintained. Civil Appeals Nos. 272 and 293 of 2017 filed by the landowners partly allowed to the extent that under S. 28 they were held entitled to an additional compensatory amount equivalent to 6% per annum of the enhanced compensation, as minimum rental value, from the date the Collector took possession till the date of deposit of adjudged compensation into Court; their prayer for further enhancement of compensation declined. Criminal Original Petitions Nos. 198 and 199 of 2017 disposed of with the above directions. Judgment by Yahya Afridi, CJ. (Islamabad, 21st of May, 2026; Approved for reporting).