Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Art. 199---Equitable jurisdiction---Scope of constitutional jurisdiction of High Courts---Relief not sanctioned by law---High Court not empowered to grant relief on compassion, equity or personal notions---Sindh High Court issued mandamus directing holding of “super/supplementary examination” despite absence of enabling law---Held, High Courts must adjudicate strictly in accordance with law; cannot fill legal vacuum by conscience or compassion; cannot intrude into policy-making or internal administration of educational institutions by fashioning remedies unsupported by statute, rules or regulations. (b) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Art. 199(1)(a)(i)---Writ of mandamus---Prerequisites---Existence of legal right and corresponding legal duty---Absence of statutory backing---Judicial overreach Mandamus---When maintainable---Held, writ of mandamus commands performance of a duty imposed by law; sine qua non is a legal right in petitioner and a legal duty unlawfully omitted by the authority---Where no law requires holding of a “special/super supplementary examination”, mandamus cannot be issued to compel its conduct---High Court’s direction, including assigning compliance/oversight role to Additional Advocate General Sindh, amounted to creating authority/power not sanctioned by law and exceeded permissible limits of constitutional adjudication. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Azam Khan Swati v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2023 Islamabad 184 • Muhammad Azam Khan v. Government of N.W.F.P. through Chief Secretary, 1998 SCMR 204 • Prof. Dr. Sheikh Israr Ahmed v. Government of Punjab, 2025 PLC (C.S.) 182 (c) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Art. 25A---Art. 199(1)(c)---Enforcement of fundamental rights---Limits---Proportionality---Relief must be within law Right to education---Exercise of constitutional jurisdiction---Held, jurisdiction under Art.199(1)(c), though broader, remains constrained by constitutional mandate; High Court cannot adopt disproportionate measures or grant relief solely on compassion/equity in absence of legal sanction---Courts must exercise restraint in educational matters and avoid substituting academic/administrative decisions of competent university authorities unless policy/law offends natural justice, constitutional guarantees or statutory command---Direction to hold an examination not contemplated by university framework was beyond jurisdiction. Cited Cases: • Khyber Medical University v. Aimal Khan, PLD 2022 SC 92 • Prof. Dr. Sheikh Israr Ahmed v. Government of Punjab, 2025 PLC (C.S.) 182 (d) Education governance ----Judicial restraint---Universities’ autonomy---Internal administration---Technical expertise of academic bodies Interference in educational affairs---Held, courts must sparingly interfere in governance of educational institutions; decisions of university authorities should not be dislodged where taken in accordance with law and not violative of fundamental rights---High Court’s intervention by directing a “special/super supplementary examination” disrupted university’s academic framework and exceeded constitutional limits. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Umar Wahid v. University of Health Sciences, Lahore, PLD 2006 SC 300 • Khyber Medical University v. Aimal Khan, PLD 2022 SC 92 (e) Evidence and factual appraisal in constitutional jurisdiction ----Plea of lack of notice---Conduct of student---Record indicating schedule known to student body Special examination---Justification for equitable relief---Held, respondent’s plea that timetable was not uploaded did not persuade; respondent appeared in other supplementary examinations but missed the first, rendering claim implausible; record indicated “all students” appeared, suggesting schedule was known generally and omission lay with respondent rather than university---No exceptional legal circumstance made out warranting judicial intervention beyond statutory framework. (f) Precedent and stare decisis ----Constitution of Pakistan, 1973---Arts. 189 & 201---Binding effect of decisions---Doctrine of stare decisis---Court cannot confine precedential value of its own judgment Non-precedent directions---Legality and consequences---Held, once judgment is delivered as public record, it remains open to scrutiny and functions as precedent to the extent it lays down law; court cannot, while granting relief in an individual case, disclaim or confine precedential value to avoid broader consequences---Such self-insulation invites uncertainty and arbitrariness; adherence to stare decisis restrains discretionary decision-making. Cited Cases: • Director General, National Savings, Islamabad v. Balqees Begum, PLD 2013 SC 174 (partly disagreed with as to “equity steps in where law is silent”) • Dossani Travels (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Messrs Travels Shop, PLD 2014 SC 1 • Riaz Hussain through LRs v. Chairman Federal Land Commissioner (CPLA Nos. 962–964 of 2023) (re stare decisis, as referred) (g) Constitutional adjudication ----Role of judiciary---Courts of law, not courts of compassion---Judicial oath---Complete justice---Art. 187 (scope distinguished) Conscience, compassion and rule of law---Held, judiciary’s legitimacy lies in interpreting and applying law, not in dispensing compassion; High Courts cannot exercise “complete justice” powers and remain strictly bound by law and binding precedent; even superior courts’ “complete justice” jurisdiction does not negate character as courts of law and must operate within constitutional fabric and precedent. Cited Cases: • Director General, National Savings, Islamabad v. Balqees Begum, PLD 2013 SC 174 (equity cannot override law; further latitude disapproved) • Dossani Travels (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Messrs Travels Shop, PLD 2014 SC 1 Disposition: Petition converted into appeal; appeal accepted; impugned order dated 06.11.2025 of Sindh High Court, Circuit Court Larkana, set aside; writ petition filed by respondent dismissed (F.C.P.L.A. No. 14 of 2025, decided on 07.01.2026).

Summary: Opinion of Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar --- (a) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 186---Advisory jurisdiction of Supreme Court---Scope, nature and effect---President of Pakistan may seek opinion of Supreme Court on any question of law which he considers of public importance---Advisory jurisdiction, though not deciding a lis between parties in the ordinary sense, is a solemn constitutional jurisdiction requiring due deliberation, evaluation of arguments and formulation of opinion by the Court---Opinion rendered in Presidential Reference is not strictly binding like an inter-partes judgment, but carries significant credence, persuasive value and moral authority, and ought to be respected by constitutional organs---Questions referred to Supreme Court should not be ambiguous, indeterminate or incapable of formulation of opinion---Supreme Court is empowered to consider whether reference raises a constitutional question of public importance and to answer it accordingly. (b) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 4, 9, 10-A & 186---Presidential Reference concerning trial of Shaheed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto---Fair trial and due process---Larger Bench had opined that proceedings of trial by Lahore High Court and appeal before Supreme Court did not meet requirements of fundamental right to fair trial and due process enshrined in Arts. 4 and 9 of the Constitution and later expressly guaranteed under Art.10-A---Although conviction had attained finality after dismissal of review petition, advisory jurisdiction was invoked to examine grave blemishes and glitches in the murder trial which had damaged public confidence in fairness of proceedings---Reference was maintainable to the extent of constitutional questions relating to fair trial, due process and administration of justice. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 156, 160, 169, 170 & 173---Investigation and reinvestigation---Closed case---Effect---Police are required to conduct investigation impartially and collect evidence from all possible angles, including material favourable to accused---If evidence is insufficient, Investigating Officer may release accused under S.169, Cr.P.C.; if sufficient evidence exists, report is to be submitted under S.173, Cr.P.C.---After first investigation in murder case had been closed and cancellation report submitted before Magistrate, matter was resurrected years later without complaint by legal heirs or any aggrieved person and without lawful justification---No independent reasoning or cogent justification was available for reinvestigation---Reinvestigation must not be routinely ordered to favour influential persons or punish non-influential persons; if used improperly, it becomes a dangerous tool undermining integrity of criminal justice system and poses serious threat to administration of justice. Cited Cases: • Noor Mohd Holt Ltd. v. Department of Trade and others 1978 3 All ER 280 • Wiseman v. Borneman 1971 AC 297 (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 28, 190 & 526---Transfer of murder trial from Court of Sessions to High Court---Jurisdiction and procedure---Offence under S.302, PPC is ordinarily triable by Court of Sessions, while High Court may try such case only when lawfully transferred or otherwise within jurisdiction---Transfer of case from Sessions Court to Lahore High Court was allowed in slipshod manner on very next day after Sessions Judge framed charge, without notice to accused, without considering statutory parameters and without judicially examining whether transfer was necessary for ends of justice---Transfer was not sought for convenience or safety but had effect of depriving accused of ordinary forum and ordinary first appellate scrutiny---Such hurried transfer raised serious concerns regarding fairness and due process. (e) Administration of justice---- ----Bias---Judicial impartiality---Fair trial---Test for bias---Justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done---A Judge must decide cases according to law and conscience without fear, favour, affection, pressure, annoyance or external influence---Where circumstances create a reasonable apprehension in mind of prudent person that Judge may not act with complete impartiality, the proceedings are tainted---Bias may be personal, pecuniary, official, political, or arise from conduct showing prejudice, hostility, pressure or predisposition---In the murder trial under consideration, allegations of bias, pressure, annoyance with counsel and unusual haste created circumstances affecting appearance and substance of fair trial. Cited Cases: • Ms. Benazir Bhutto v. President of Pakistan 1998 SCMR 1405 • R. v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy 1924 1 KB 256 • Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Proprietors 1852 3 HLC 759 • Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC) Ltd. v. Lannon 1969 1 QB 577 • R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte No.2 1999 1 WLR 876 • Porter v. Magill 2002 2 AC 357 • Ali Asad Zaidi v. The State PLD 2001 SC 663 • State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar AIR 2013 SC 364 (f) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 4, 9 & 10-A---Doctrine of natural justice and due process---Criminal trial---Presumption of innocence---Accused as favourite child of law---In every criminal trial, burden lies on prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; accused is not to be treated as an unfavourable child of law but remains entitled to all safeguards of fair trial---Scrutiny of prosecution evidence must be independent, impartial and free from bias or prejudice---Personal bias, preconceived mind or jaundiced eye of Judge tarnishes fairness of trial and undermines equal protection of law---No person can be condemned without fair opportunity to explain, contest and defend---Fair trial and due process are sacred obligations for every Court and tribunal. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Riaz v. Khurram Shahzad 2024 SCMR 51 • Junaid Wazir v. Superintendent of Police 2024 SCMR 181 • Federation of Pakistan v. Zahid Malik 2023 SCMR 603 • Umar Khan v. Chief Post Master, GPO Karachi 2022 SCMR 745 • Capital Development Authority v. Sabir Hussain 2023 SCMR 627 • Raja Muhammad Shahid v. Inspector General of Police 2023 SCMR 1135 • Government of Balochistan v. Ghulam Rasool 2024 SCMR 1185 • Inspector General of Police, Quetta v. Zia Muhammad 2023 SCMR 1583 (g) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---- ----Approver/accomplice evidence---Evidentiary value---Corroboration---Evidence of an approver is an acid test for Court; Court must examine whether such testimony is trustworthy and supported by independent reliable corroboration---An accomplice is generally unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars---Approver may be competent witness, but rule of prudence demands great care and caution before relying upon such testimony, particularly in capital cases---Corroboration must not be merely formal but must connect accused with commission of offence through independent and reliable evidence. (h) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 374 & 376---Confirmation of death sentence---Trial by High Court in original criminal jurisdiction---Where death sentence is awarded by Court of Sessions, proceedings are submitted to High Court for confirmation under S.374, Cr.P.C., and sentence cannot be executed unless confirmed---However, where High Court itself conducts murder trial and convicts accused under original jurisdiction, no further confirmation by a larger bench of High Court is required; rather remedy lies by appeal before Supreme Court under Art.185 of the Constitution---In such situation, constitutional and appellate scrutiny by Supreme Court assumes heightened importance. (i) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 185---Right of appeal---Murder trial conducted by High Court---Denial of ordinary appellate forum---Where murder trial is conducted by Court of Sessions, convict ordinarily has appeal before High Court and further remedy before Supreme Court---But where High Court withdraws case and tries it itself, accused is deprived of ordinary first appellate forum and can approach Supreme Court directly---Supreme Court, in such cases, should ordinarily be inclined to grant leave and examine case carefully to ensure safe administration of criminal justice, especially where death sentence is involved---In the case of Mr. Bhutto, direct appeal before Supreme Court after trial by High Court left no ordinary appellate reappraisal by High Court. (j) Media interviews and post-retirement disclosures---- ----Judicial conduct---Bias and public confidence---Subsequent interviews of former Judge suggesting pressure, annoyance with defence counsel, and external atmosphere surrounding proceedings could not by themselves unsettle a final judicial decision, but they were relevant in understanding cumulative circumstances showing fair trial concerns---Such disclosures, read with record of proceedings, corroborated apprehension that trial and appeal were not conducted in atmosphere required by constitutional guarantees of due process and impartial justice. (k) Sentence---- ----Death penalty---Mitigating circumstances---Role of Judge---Judge must not be influenced by appeasement, flattery, malice, annoyance with counsel, or emotional pressure while deciding punishment---Criminal Court retains power to consider mitigating circumstances and impose lesser sentence where justice so demands---In murder cases before Supreme Court, Court may confirm death sentence, alter it to life imprisonment, or grant acquittal depending on record---In Bhutto review proceedings, submission seeking commutation rather than acquittal was recorded, but Court still had power to consider whether punishment could be altered---On independent appraisal of record and peculiar circumstances, death sentence was not safe to maintain; life imprisonment would have met ends of justice. Cited Case: • Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto v. The State PLD 1979 SC 741 (l) Administration of justice---- ----Delay in answering Presidential Reference---Effect---Reference was answered after nearly thirteen years---Delay in adjudication undermines confidence in justice system, as justice delayed is justice denied---Courts must decide matters within reasonable time because prolonged pendency can prejudice rights of parties and create possibility of injustice---Proper balance in Court docket is necessary so that powerful or constitutionally significant matters do not unjustly eclipse other important matters, yet matters raising fundamental fairness concerns are not left unanswered. (m) Islamic jurisprudence---- ----Doctrine of repentance---Question framed in Presidential Reference---No opinion by larger Bench---One question in Reference sought opinion regarding doctrine of repentance under Islamic jurisprudence, but no opinion was rendered by Supreme Court on that question---Where trial itself was found to have been unfair and proceedings below were tainted by denial of fair trial and due process, unresolved question of repentance remained unanswered and did not alter conclusion regarding constitutional infirmities in trial process. (n) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 186---Reporting of opinion to President---After recording opinion on questions arising from Reference, office was directed to report opinion through proper channel to worthy President of Pakistan in terms of Art.186 of the Constitution. Disposition: Opinion was rendered in Reference No.01/2011 under Art.186 of the Constitution; Supreme Court, through the larger Bench, had already opined that the trial of Shaheed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and appellate proceedings did not meet requirements of fair trial and due process under Arts.4 and 9 of the Constitution and later Art.10-A; Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar, in his separate opinion, further examined advisory jurisdiction, reinvestigation, transfer of trial to High Court, bias, natural justice, approver evidence, confirmation of death sentence, right of appeal, media interviews, mitigating circumstances and doctrine of repentance; office was directed to report the opinion to the President of Pakistan through proper channel.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---- ----Ss. 82-A to 82-G---Banking Mohtasib---Jurisdiction---Fraudulent or unauthorized withdrawals/debit entries---Scope---Banking Mohtasib has jurisdiction to inquire into complaints of banking mal-practices, violation of banking laws, rules, regulations or guidelines, and maladministration---Under S.82-B(5)(a)(iii), Banking Mohtasib may entertain complaints regarding fraudulent or unauthorized withdrawals or debit entries in accounts---Such jurisdiction, however, is confined to banking maladministration/non-compliance and does not extend to full trial of complex disputed civil liability where evidence is required. (b) Payment Systems and Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 2007---- ----Ss. 2(t), 3, 15, 30, 40, 41, 50, 55, 67 & 71---Electronic Fund Transfers---Unauthorized/fraudulent transactions---Rights and liabilities of bank and consumer---PSEFT Act is special statute governing Electronic Fund Transfers, consumer protection, disclosure requirements, secure means of transfer, and liability for unauthorized transactions---Civil action for damages/liability under the Act lies before Court of competent jurisdiction---Financial Institution bears burden under S.41 to prove authorization of transaction or that conditions of consumer liability and required disclosures were satisfied. (c) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---- ----Ss. 82-A & 82-B---Payment Systems and Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 2007---Jurisdiction of Banking Mohtasib and civil Court---Concurrent fields distinguished---Complaint regarding bank’s non-compliance with SBP rules, circulars, guidelines, standards or directions may fall within Banking Mohtasib’s jurisdiction as maladministration---However, where primary controversy is whether disputed Electronic Fund Transfer was authorized, fraudulent, caused by disclosure of credentials, or due to bank/customer negligence, such matter involves disputed facts and civil liability, requiring trial before Court under PSEFT Act. Cited Cases: • Habib Bank Limited v. Federation of Pakistan 2018 CLD 1152 • Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2020 CLD 829 (d) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---- ----Banking Mohtasib---Quasi-judicial forum---Not a Court---Disputed questions of fact---Effect---Banking Mohtasib is not a Court and cannot exercise judicial power reserved for Courts under constitutional scheme---Where complaint requires determination of disputed facts, recording of evidence, adjudication of property/civil rights, and affixation of liability between bank and customer, Banking Mohtasib cannot give binding decision by resorting to Ss.82-B and 82-E of Banking Companies Ordinance. Cited Cases: • Shafaatullah Qureshi v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2001 SC 142 • United Bank Limited v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2018 Lahore 322 • United Bank Limited v. Federation of Pakistan 2018 CLD 587 • Habib Bank Limited v. Federation of Pakistan 2022 CLD 769 • Saleem Ahmed Jan v. Deputy Commissioner, Islamabad 2024 CLC 953 • United Bank Limited v. President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 2025 CLD 834 (e) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 10-A, 23, 24 & 175---Judicial power---Fair trial---Electronic banking fraud disputes---Dispute involving money withdrawn/transferred from customer’s account concerns property rights and civil obligations of parties---Such rights must be adjudicated through fair trial by Court exercising judicial power---Quasi-judicial/executive forum not under supervisory control of High Court cannot be entrusted with binding adjudication of such disputed civil liability. Cited Cases: • National Commission on Status of Women v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2019 SC 218 • Mehram Ali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1998 SC 1445 • Government of Balochistan v. Azizullah Memon PLD 1993 SC 341 • Ziaullah v. Najeebullah PLD 2003 SC 656 • Iftikhar Ahmad v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited PLD 1984 Lahore 69 • Messrs Summit Bank Limited v. Messrs Qasim and Co. 2015 CLD 1377 (f) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---- ----Ss. 82-A & 82-B---SBP directions/circulars---Non-compliance by bank---Maladministration---Where complaint is founded on bank’s violation of SBP rules, guidelines, circulars or directions, Banking Mohtasib may exercise jurisdiction to inquire into maladministration and recommend/award compensation according to law---Non-compliance with SBP directions may constitute banking malpractice/maladministration, but it does not automatically prove every subsequent electronic transaction to be unauthorized or fraudulent. (g) Payment Systems and Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 2007---- ----Ss. 30, 40 & 41---Unauthorized EFT---Consumer credentials---Bank’s burden---Disclosure by customer---Effect---Where customer admittedly disclosed personal credentials to unknown caller and disputed transactions followed, liability cannot be determined merely by assumption---Bank may rely on disclosures, indemnities, OTPs, two-factor authentication and customer alerts, while customer may rely on bank’s non-compliance or lack of proper authentication---Such rival claims require evidence unless bank’s breach of mandatory SBP circular is admitted or apparent. (h) State Bank of Pakistan---- ----PSD Circular No.09 of 2018---Activation/reactivation of internet/mobile banking---Biometric verification---Customer education---Effect of non-compliance---SBP Circular required banks to activate/reactivate online banking services, including internet/mobile banking, after biometric verification at branch, where staff would educate customers regarding online banking frauds and preventive measures---Where disputed mobile banking application was created after said Circular and bank failed to comply, case amounted to maladministration and Banking Mohtasib was justified in exercising jurisdiction. (i) State Bank of Pakistan---- ----PSD Circular No.02 of 2020---Covid-19 relaxation---Biometric verification suspended---Alternative authentication required---Effect---During Covid-19 period, biometric verification requirement for internet/mobile banking activation was suspended, but banks were still required to ensure customer authentication and verification through appropriate measures and ensure safety/security of transactions---Banking Mohtasib, in such cases, was required to examine whether bank complied with PSD Circular No.02 of 2020; if disputed questions of fact arose, Banking Mohtasib ought to decline jurisdiction. (j) Banking Mohtasib---- ----Mobile banking application---Whether solicited or activated by customer---OTP/personal credentials---Disputed fact---Where customer denied requesting mobile banking facility and bank asserted that application was registered by entering credentials and OTP sent to registered mobile number, controversy involved disputed factual questions---Banking Mohtasib could not conclusively determine such controversy without trial and evidence by a competent Court. (k) Banking Mohtasib---- ----Regulations for Payment Cards Security---Misapplication---Mobile banking application dispute---Banking Mohtasib relied upon clause relating to customer consent for use of payment cards on alternate delivery channels---High Court held such reliance misconceived where actual issue was whether mobile banking application was created by customer or fraudster---Payment-card consent provision did not resolve disputed question regarding creation/activation of mobile banking application. (l) Offences in respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984---- ----Criminal liability and Banking Mohtasib proceedings---Same facts---Effect---Where complaint also alleges misappropriation, fraud or bank staff involvement, criminal liability may proceed before competent Special Court, but mere existence of possible criminal offence does not by itself oust Banking Mohtasib’s civil/maladministration jurisdiction---To extent complaint involves disputed civil liability requiring evidence, proper remedy remains before competent Court. Cited Case: • Soneri Bank Limited v. Messrs Pak Land Corporation (Pvt.) Limited 2013 CLD 1756 (m) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---- ----S. 82-D---Complaint before Banking Mohtasib---Prior intimation to bank---Procedure---Customer must intimate bank in writing of intention to file complaint; if bank fails to respond or gives unsatisfactory response within statutory period, complaint may be filed before Banking Mohtasib within prescribed time---Such procedure does not enlarge Mohtasib’s jurisdiction to decide matters requiring judicial trial. (n) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 199---Laches---Challenge to order without jurisdiction---Delay not always fatal---Delay in filing constitutional petition is not invariably fatal and depends on facts and justice of case---Where impugned orders raise question of jurisdiction and exercise of judicial power by Banking Mohtasib, High Court may overlook delay and decide matter on merits---Laches cannot be used to perpetuate order passed without jurisdiction. Cited Cases: • Settlement Authority v. Mst. Akhtar Sultana PLD 1976 SC 410 • Hafiz Muhammad Shafaq-ud-Din v. District Judge Khushab 2015 MLD 1081 • Park View Enclave (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Capital Development Authority 2018 CLC 947 (o) Banking Mohtasib---- ----Complaints where Banking Mohtasib orders set aside and complaints dismissed---Electronic transactions involving disputed facts---In W.P. Nos.2062/2021, 4636/2021, 4637/2021, 1192/2022, 1239/2022, 3465/2022, 3466/2022 and 3556/2024, matters were found to be civil disputes requiring trial rather than pure maladministration---Impugned orders of Banking Mohtasib and President were set aside and complaints were dismissed. (p) Banking Mohtasib---- ----Complaints remanded---Effect of Covid relaxation circular not considered---In W.P. Nos.1844/2023, 2696/2023, 2883/2023 and 4279/2023, Banking Mohtasib failed to consider effect of SBP PSD Circular No.02 of 2020, whereby biometric verification requirement was suspended but alternate authentication/security obligations remained---Matters remanded to Banking Mohtasib for fresh decision after hearing parties and determining whether bank complied with applicable SBP circular; if disputed facts arose, jurisdiction to be declined. (q) Banking Mohtasib---- ----Orders closing complaints restored---President’s reversal set aside---In W.P. Nos.3374/2023, 368/2024, 369/2024 and 1239/2024, Banking Mohtasib had closed complaints wholly or partially because customers were internet banking users, had shared credentials, or dispute required detailed inquiry---President allowed representations without proper basis merely by treating customers as victims of internet fraud---High Court set aside President’s orders and restored Banking Mohtasib’s orders closing complaints. (r) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)---- ----Banking Mohtasib---No wholesale exclusion of jurisdiction in EFT matters---Principle---Banking Mohtasib may entertain complaints of bank maladministration, violation of SBP circulars, or failure to comply with banking laws even if matter concerns electronic banking---However, where disputed facts concerning authorization, fraud, credentials, OTP, two-factor authentication, contributory negligence, or actual liability arise, Banking Mohtasib should refrain from adjudication and leave parties to competent civil forum under PSEFT Act. Disposition: W.P. Nos.3464/2022, 1843/2023 and 1927/2023 were dismissed. Remaining petitions were allowed: Impugned Orders I and II passed by Banking Mohtasib and President were set aside and complaints in W.P. Nos.2062/2021, 4636/2021, 4637/2021, 1192/2022, 1239/2022, 3465/2022, 3466/2022 and 3556/2024 were dismissed; complaints in W.P. Nos.1844/2023, 2696/2023, 2883/2023 and 4279/2023 were remanded to Banking Mohtasib for fresh decision. Impugned Orders IV passed by President in W.P. Nos.3374/2023, 368/2024, 369/2024 and 1239/2024 were set aside and Orders III passed by Banking Mohtasib were restored.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Life imprisonment---Leave to appeal---Petitioner was convicted under S.302(b), PPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life for committing qatl-i-amd of deceased Muhammad Abbass, with compensation of Rs.500,000 under S.544-A, Cr.P.C. and benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C.---High Court maintained conviction and sentence---Supreme Court, on reappraisal of evidence, found ocular account unimpeachable, consistent and corroborated by medical evidence and forensic recovery---Impugned judgment was well reasoned and required no interference---Leave to appeal was refused and petition was dismissed. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 154---Delay in registration of FIR---Delay attributable to police and not informant---Effect---Occurrence took place at 10:20 p.m. on 10.08.2017, while FIR was formally registered at 4:30 p.m. on 11.08.2017---Roznamcha entry showed that informant had reported matter to police within thirty minutes with same version against petitioner---Delay was caused by police and not by informant---Victim or prosecution could not be made to suffer due to omission, inefficiency or neglect of police officials over which complainant/victim had no control---While considering delay, Court must examine whether delay is attributable to informant in reporting crime, and not delay caused by failure of police to discharge statutory duty of promptly registering FIR. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---- ----Art. 21---Previous or subsequent conduct---Prompt conduct of informant---Relevance---Conduct of party or person in relation to fact in issue is relevant under Art.21---Informant’s conduct in immediately approaching police and reporting incident within thirty minutes was relevant and showed promptitude---Formal delay in FIR registration was therefore not fatal where contemporaneous Roznamcha entry supported prompt reporting by informant. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 154---Registration of FIR---Mandatory duty of police---Police cannot delay or refuse registration once information of cognizable offence is received---Registration of case under S.154, Cr.P.C. cannot be refused or delayed where information regarding commission of cognizable offence has been given to or received by Officer Incharge of Police Station---Police officer cannot assume role of adjudicator, Magistrate or Court by first conducting inquiry into credibility of information before recording it---FIR is primary step to set criminal law in motion and enable investigation according to Cr.P.C.---Police are not legally justified in waiting for heirs of deceased to complete funeral rites before registering FIR. Cited Cases: • Seeta Ram v. The State Jail Petition No.51 of 2023 • Muhammad Bashir v. Station House Officer, Okara and others PLD 2007 SC 539 • Syed Qambar Ali Shah v. Province of Sindh and others 2024 SCMR 1123 (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 154 & 162---Inquiry before FIR---Effect---Investigation or inquiry to find correctness or otherwise of information before registration of FIR would be hit by S.162, Cr.P.C.---Police may commence investigation on credible information or knowledge of cognizable offence from any source and need not wait for formal complainant to appear---Where police have reason to believe cognizable offence has been committed, they must take initiative, investigate and preserve evidence without delay. (f) Criminal trial---- ----Ocular account---Related witnesses---Evidentiary value---Eyewitnesses gave consistent and unimpeachable account on material particulars---Lengthy cross-examination failed to discredit them---Accused and deceased were related to each other, therefore question of mistaken identity or false implication did not arise---Related witnesses are not to be discarded merely because of relationship if their testimony is confidence-inspiring and supported by other evidence---Conviction could safely be maintained on such evidence. (g) Criminal trial---- ----Medical evidence---Harmony with ocular account---Firearm injuries---Medical evidence showed injuries were caused by firearm from distance of about two to three feet, which was consistent with statements of eyewitnesses---Duration between injuries and post-mortem also corroborated prosecution testimony---No material contradiction existed between ocular and medical evidence. (h) Criminal trial---- ----Recovery of weapon---Positive forensic report---Corroborative value---Recovery of 9mm pistol was effected from accused and forensic report confirmed use of weapon in commission of offence---Such recovery, read with ocular and medical evidence, further corroborated prosecution case. (i) Criminal trial---- ----Minor contradictions---Effect---Minor contradictions not going to root of prosecution case do not justify discarding otherwise reliable evidence---Natural course of conduct, passage of time, exaggeration due to anxiety for justice and human fallibility may result in minor discrepancies---Where contradictions are not vital, whole prosecution evidence cannot be discarded. Cited Case: • Sher Afzal v. The State 2024 SCMR 894 (j) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 4(h), 154 & 200---“Complainant” and “informant”---Distinction---Use of terms interchangeably deprecated---“Complaint” under S.4(h), Cr.P.C. means allegation made orally or in writing to Magistrate with view to his taking action under Code and does not include police report---Proceedings under S.200, Cr.P.C. give status of complainant to person who files complaint before Magistrate---Person who furnishes information to police for registration of FIR under S.154, Cr.P.C. is only an informant---FIR is not complaint within meaning of S.4(h), Cr.P.C.; it is information recorded by police under S.154, Cr.P.C.---State is prosecutor/complainant in prosecutions initiated on basis of FIR---Terminological confusion is not mere semantic lapse but may blur well-defined procedural distinctions. Cited Cases: • Ganesha v. Sharanappa and another Criminal Appeal No.1948 of 2013 • Wajid Khan v. The State 2020 PCrLJ 454 (k) Police proceedings---- ----Use of words “Faryaadi” and “Muddai”---Legality---Use discontinued---Terms “Faryaadi” in Sindh and “Muddai” in other federating units for person furnishing information to police were not supported by statutory scheme of Cr.P.C.---Such terms wrongly portray citizen as supplicant or seeker of favour rather than rights-bearing person invoking protection of law---Citizen approaches police as matter of right, not mercy or charity---Police officers are public servants paid from public funds and are bound to serve citizens---Use of such terminology was legally misconceived, constitutionally impermissible and inconsistent with Articles 4, 9, 10-A and 14 of the Constitution---Use of terms “Faryaadi” and “Muddai” in police proceedings was directed to be discontinued. (l) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 4, 9, 10-A & 14---Citizen-centric policing---Dignity and lawful treatment---Police duty to register cognizable offence---Any practice treating citizen reporting cognizable offence as supplicant offends constitutional guarantees of lawful treatment, access to justice, fair treatment, dignity and protection of life, liberty and security---Terminology used by courts and public institutions shapes procedural understanding, institutional behaviour and lived experience of constitutional rights---Language of public authorities must reflect legislative intent, constitutional values and procedural clarity---Institutional practices perpetuating unconstitutional hierarchies undermine rights-based application of criminal law. (m) Police proceedings---- ----Address to Station House Officer---Expression “Bakhidmat Janaab SHO” discouraged---Phrase “Bakhidmat Janaab SHO” has no legal sanction and implies subordinate tone inconsistent with citizen-centric policing---It is not citizen who is at service of SHO; rather SHO is at service of citizen---Simple address “Janaab SHO” was held sufficient. (n) Police Rules, 1934---- ----Form No.24.2(1)---Use of term “complainant”---Need for revision---Police Rules and Form No.24.2(1) use term “complainant” in contexts where “informant” should be used---Such usage is not in consonance with Cr.P.C., which does not recognize complaint to police officer---Several spelling mistakes were also noticed in Police Rules, 1934---Revision of Police Rules was considered necessary so that forms and terminology conform to Cr.P.C. (o) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 201---Delayed registration of FIR by police---Loss or disappearance of evidence---Criminal liability of police officer---Where Officer Incharge of Police Station delays registration of FIR after receiving information of cognizable offence, it shall be presumed that such delay was caused to benefit accused unless police official proves contrary---Burden of proof lies on delinquent police officer---S.201, PPC uses expression “whoever” and creates no exception in favour of public functionaries or police officials---Police officer delaying or refusing FIR registration, thereby causing concealment, loss or disappearance of evidence, may be proceeded against under S.201, PPC like any private citizen---Departmental proceedings do not bar criminal liability. Cited Cases: • Malik Asad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 420 • Muhammad Bashir v. The State PLD 2007 SC 539 • Lal Khan v. The State 2006 SCMR 1841 • The State v. Abdul Khaliq PLD 2011 SC 554 (p) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 190---Power of Magistrate/District and Sessions Judge---Delay in FIR by police---Show-cause notice---Where deliberate delay or inaction by Officer Incharge of Police Station results in concealment, loss or destruction of evidence, District and Sessions Judges and Magistrates taking cognizance under S.190, Cr.P.C. are competent, on their own observation or on application of informant/victim, to call such officer and proceed under S.201, PPC or any other applicable law, if satisfied that delay was caused by police officer---Such action shall be taken after serving show-cause notice to concerned police officer. (q) Police Order, 2002---- ----Art. 155---Delayed FIR registration---Departmental proceedings---Since S.154, Cr.P.C. is mandatory, delayed registration amounts to wilful breach or neglect of law by police officer---Trial Court judges shall refer matter to District Police Officer concerned for initiation of departmental proceedings where police delays FIR registration---Earlier Police Act, 1861 also carried provisions penalizing neglect of duty---Departmental action and criminal prosecution may proceed in their respective fields. (r) Criminal administration of justice---- ----Prompt FIR registration---Forensic evidence---Delay prejudicing investigation---Time is essence in criminal investigation, particularly for preservation of forensic evidence---Delay between commission/reporting of crime and police response increases risk that evidence may be contaminated, destroyed or lost by victim, witnesses or passersby---Delayed FIR registration causes delayed start to investigation and may prejudice merits of case. (s) Supreme Court directions---- ----Prompt registration of FIR---Discontinuance of incorrect terminology---Internal policing---Directions issued---Inspector Generals of Police of all provinces and ICT were directed to ensure prompt FIR registration under S.154, Cr.P.C. where information relates to cognizable offence---If information is initially entered in Roznamcha/daily diary, it shall be treated as part of FIR and incorporated accordingly---IGPs were directed to ensure mechanism of internal policing to curb excess/misuse of powers by police officers---Prosecutor Generals of provinces and ICT were expected to advise police authorities and frame SOPs in accordance with Cr.P.C.---Police Rules, particularly FIR form, were directed to be brought in line with Cr.P.C. in consultation with relevant departments. (t) Supreme Court directions---- ----Province of Sindh---Delay in FIR registration---Report and disciplinary action---Since delayed FIR registration was noticed to be more prevalent in Sindh, Prosecutor General Sindh was directed to submit report within one month regarding average delay in registration of FIRs in heinous offences during last two years in Sindh---Inspector General of Police Sindh was directed to initiate departmental proceedings against police officers who caused delay in FIR registration in the present case---District and Sessions Judges in Sindh were directed to ensure that in lower courts the complainant/informant is not referred to as “Faryaadi” while calling cases. Disposition: Criminal Petition No.1021 of 2021 was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused; conviction and sentence of petitioner under S.302(b), PPC were maintained; Supreme Court held that delay in formal FIR registration was caused by police and not informant; directions were issued for prompt FIR registration, discontinuance of terms “Faryaadi” and “Muddai”, correction of police terminology/forms, possible criminal and departmental action against police officers causing deliberate delay, and circulation of judgment to High Courts, District Courts, Inspector Generals of Police and Prosecutor Generals of all provinces and ICT.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Conviction and sentence maintained---Petitioner was convicted under S.302(b), PPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life for committing qatl-i-amd of deceased Muhammad Abbass, with compensation of Rs.500,000 under S.544-A, Cr.P.C. and benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C.---High Court maintained conviction and sentence---Supreme Court held that ocular account was unimpeachable, consistent on material particulars, supported by medical evidence and corroborated by recovery of 9mm pistol with positive forensic report---Impugned judgment was well reasoned and did not warrant interference---Leave to appeal was refused. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 154---Delay in registration of FIR---Delay caused by police and not by informant---Effect---Occurrence took place at 10:20 p.m. on 10.08.2017 while FIR was formally registered at 4:30 p.m. on 11.08.2017---Roznamcha entry showed that informant had reported matter to police within thirty minutes with same version against petitioner---Delay in registration of FIR was caused by police and not by informant---Victim/prosecution could not be made to suffer due to omission, inefficiency or negligence of police officials---While examining delay, Court must consider whether delay was attributable to informant in reporting crime, and not delay caused by failure of police to perform statutory duty. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---- ----Art. 21---Subsequent conduct---Prompt reporting by informant---Relevance---Conduct of informant immediately after occurrence was relevant---Informant promptly approached police and reported occurrence within thirty minutes, as reflected in Roznamcha entry---Such conduct established due promptitude and excluded inference that delay was attributable to informant. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 154---Registration of FIR---Mandatory duty of police---Police cannot refuse or delay registration---Once information relating to commission of cognizable offence is received by Officer Incharge of Police Station, registration of FIR cannot be refused or delayed---Police officer cannot assume role of adjudicator, Magistrate or Court by first inquiring into credibility of information before recording it---FIR is primary step for setting criminal law in motion and enabling investigation---Police are not justified in waiting for heirs of deceased to complete funeral rites before registering FIR. Cited Cases: • Seeta Ram v. The State Jail Petition No.51 of 2023 • Muhammad Bashir v. Station House Officer, Okara and others PLD 2007 SC 539 • Syed Qambar Ali Shah v. Province of Sindh and others 2024 SCMR 1123 (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 154 & 162---Inquiry before registration of FIR---Effect---Investigation or inquiry into correctness of information before registration of FIR would be hit by S.162, Cr.P.C.---Police may commence investigation upon credible information or knowledge of cognizable offence from any source and need not wait for a formal complainant to appear---Police must act promptly to investigate and preserve evidence. (f) Criminal trial---- ----Ocular account---Related witnesses---Evidentiary value---Eyewitnesses gave consistent and unimpeachable ocular account on all material particulars---Lengthy cross-examination failed to discredit them---Accused and deceased were related, therefore question of mistaken identity or false implication did not arise---Related witnesses may be relied upon where testimony is confidence-inspiring and supported by other evidence. (g) Criminal trial---- ----Medical evidence---Consistency with ocular account---Firearm injuries---Medical evidence showed injuries caused by firearm from distance of about two to three feet, which was consistent with statements of eyewitnesses---Duration between injuries and post-mortem also supported prosecution version---No material contradiction existed between ocular and medical evidence. (h) Criminal trial---- ----Recovery of weapon---Positive forensic report---Corroborative value---9mm pistol was recovered from accused and forensic report confirmed its use in commission of offence---Recovery, read with ocular and medical evidence, further strengthened prosecution case. (i) Criminal trial---- ----Minor contradictions---Effect---Minor contradictions not going to root of prosecution case do not justify discarding otherwise reliable evidence---Human memory, passage of time and anxiety for justice may naturally cause minor discrepancies---Whole prosecution evidence could not be discarded on minor contradictions not vital to case. Cited Case: • Sher Afzal v. The State 2024 SCMR 894 (j) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 4(h), 154 & 200---“Complainant” and “informant”---Distinction---FIR is not a complaint---Complaint under S.4(h), Cr.P.C. means allegation made orally or in writing to Magistrate with view to his taking action under Code and does not include police report---Proceedings under S.200, Cr.P.C. give status of complainant to person filing complaint before Magistrate---Person furnishing information to police for registration of FIR under S.154, Cr.P.C. is only an informant---Use of expressions “complainant” and “informant” interchangeably is unsupported by statute and has legal consequences. Cited Cases: • Ganesha v. Sharanappa and another Criminal Appeal No.1948 of 2013 • Wajid Khan v. The State 2020 PCrLJ 454 (k) Police proceedings---- ----Use of terms “Faryaadi” and “Muddai”---Discontinued---Terms “Faryaadi” and “Muddai” used in police proceedings to describe person furnishing information to police are not supported by Cr.P.C.---Such terms portray citizen as supplicant or seeker of mercy rather than rights-bearing person invoking protection of law---Citizen approaches police as matter of right and not as matter of charity, grace or indulgence---Use of such terminology was legally misconceived and constitutionally impermissible---Supreme Court directed discontinuance of terms “Faryaadi” and “Muddai” in police proceedings. (l) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 4, 9, 10-A & 14---Citizen-centric policing---Dignity of citizen---Due process and lawful treatment---Police officers are public servants entrusted with constitutional and statutory duties to protect life, liberty and security of person---Terminology portraying citizen as supplicant violates dignity and undermines constitutional guarantees of lawful treatment, access to justice and fair treatment---Courts and executive authorities must use language reflecting legislative intent, constitutional values and procedural clarity. (m) Police proceedings---- ----Applications to Station House Officer---Expression “Bakhidmat Janaab SHO” discouraged---Phrase “Bakhidmat Janaab SHO” has no legal backing and implies subordinate tone---It is not citizen who is at service of SHO; rather SHO serves citizens---Simple address “Janaab SHO” shall suffice. (n) Police Rules, 1934---- ----Form No.24.2(1)---Use of word “complainant”---Need for revision---Police Rules, 1934 and FIR form use word “complainant” where “informant” should be used---Cr.P.C. does not recognize complaint to police officer---Police Rules and FIR forms should be brought in line with Cr.P.C.---Spelling mistakes in Police Rules were also noticed and revision was considered necessary. (o) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 201---Delayed registration of FIR by police---Concealment, loss or disappearance of evidence---Criminal liability of police officer---Where Officer Incharge of Police Station delays FIR registration after receiving information of cognizable offence, presumption shall be that delay was caused to benefit accused unless police official proves contrary---S.201, PPC uses expression “whoever” and creates no exception for police officials or public functionaries---Police officer stands on no higher pedestal than private citizen where concealment or disappearance of evidence is concerned---If deliberate delay results in loss, destruction or disappearance of evidence, criminal liability under S.201, PPC is attracted. Cited Cases: • Malik Asad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 420 • Muhammad Bashir v. The State PLD 2007 SC 539 • Lal Khan v. The State 2006 SCMR 1841 • The State v. Abdul Khaliq PLD 2011 SC 554 (p) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 190---Magistrate and Sessions Judge---Power to proceed against police officer delaying FIR---Where deliberate delay or inaction by Officer Incharge of Police Station results in concealment, loss or destruction of evidence, District and Sessions Judges as well as Magistrates taking cognizance under S.190, Cr.P.C. are competent to call such officer on their own observation or on application of informant/victim---If satisfied after show-cause notice that delay was caused by police officer, such officer may be proceeded against under S.201, PPC and any other applicable law. (q) Police Order, 2002---- ----Art. 155---Delayed FIR registration---Departmental proceedings---Since S.154, Cr.P.C. is mandatory, delayed registration of FIR amounts to wilful breach or neglect of mandatory provision of law---Trial Courts shall refer matter to concerned District Police Officer for departmental proceedings against police officer responsible for delay---Departmental and criminal liabilities operate independently. (r) Criminal administration of justice---- ----Prompt FIR registration---Preservation of forensic evidence---Delay prejudicing investigation---Time is of essence in criminal investigation, especially for preservation of forensic evidence---Delay between crime, report to police and police response increases likelihood of contamination, destruction or disappearance of evidence---Delayed FIR registration means delayed start of investigation and may prejudice merits of case. (s) Supreme Court directions---- ----Prompt FIR registration---Internal policing---SOPs---Inspector Generals of Police of all provinces and ICT were directed to ensure prompt registration of FIR once information of cognizable offence is furnished to Officer Incharge of Police Station---If information is initially entered in Roznamcha/daily diary, it shall be treated as part of FIR and incorporated accordingly---IGPs were directed to ensure internal policing mechanism to curb misuse/excess of police powers---Prosecutor Generals of provinces and ICT were expected to advise police authorities and frame SOPs in accordance with Cr.P.C.---Police Rules, particularly FIR form, were directed to be brought in line with Cr.P.C. (t) Supreme Court directions---- ----Sindh---Delayed FIR registration---Report and disciplinary action---Practice of delayed FIR registration was noticed to be more prevalent in Sindh---Prosecutor General Sindh was directed to submit report within one month regarding average delay in registration of FIRs in heinous offences during last two years in Sindh---Inspector General of Police Sindh was directed to initiate departmental proceedings against police officers who caused delay in registration of FIR in present case---District and Sessions Judges of Sindh were directed to ensure that in lower courts “complainant” or “informant” is not referred to as “Faryaadi” while calling case. Disposition: Criminal Petition No.1021 of 2021 was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused; conviction and sentence of petitioner under S.302(b), PPC were maintained; Supreme Court held that formal delay in FIR registration was caused by police and not informant; directions were issued for prompt FIR registration, discontinuance of terms “Faryaadi” and “Muddai”, correction of police forms/terminology, criminal and departmental action against police officers causing deliberate delay, and circulation of judgment to High Courts, District Courts, Inspector Generals of Police and Prosecutor Generals of all provinces and ICT.

Summary: (Against judgment dated 19.10.2018 passed in W.P. No. 2672-P of 2017 by Peshawar High Court, Peshawar and stay application). Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)--- ----S.13---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.115---Eviction proceedings---Tenant denying landlord’s title---Remedy for the tenant---Maintainability of ejectment petition---Scope---Respondents instituted a suit for recovery of produce and ejectment against the petitioners which was decreed; the petitioners’ appeal, revision petition, and constitutional petition before the High Court all failed, whereafter they approached the Supreme Court through filing of the present petition---Issue before the Supreme Court was as to “whether the tenant, while retaining possession, could dispute the landlord’s title on the basis of an alleged ownership claim, and whether ejectment proceedings in such circumstances remained maintainable?”---Held: Where a person entered into possession as a tenant, he was estopped from disputing the title of the landlord so long as he continues to retain possession under the tenancy---The principle of estoppel was embodied in Article 115 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, which debarred a tenant from denying the title of the landlord during the continuance of tenancy---Unless and until the tenant established his alleged proprietary rights before a competent forum, the relationship between the parties continued to be regulated by tenancy law---If a tenant disputed the proprietary title of the landlord, he had to first vacate and surrender possession, and only thereafter could contest title---As regards the second question as to maintainability of ejectment proceedings was concerned, even if the tenant asserted acquisition of ownership rights by purchase of a share in the property, such assertion by itself did not render ejectment proceedings incompetent, particularly because the Rent Controller exercised a limited jurisdiction and could not adjudicate upon complicated questions of title---Impugned judgment of the High Court did not warrant any interference---Leave was refused and petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Mst. Seema Begum v. Muhammad Ishaq and others PLD 2009 SC 45; Barkat Masih v. Manzoor Ahmad (deceased) through L.Rs. 2006 SCMR 1068; Nazir Ahmad v. Mst. Sardar Bibi and others 1989 SCMR 913; Ghulam Mustafa and others v. Mst. Muhammadi Begum and others 1991 SCMR 432; Muhammad Nazir v. Saeed Subhani 2002 SCMR 1540 and Waheed Ullah v. Mst. Rehana Nasim and others 2004 SCMR 1568 rel. Muhammad Javed Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (via video link, Peshawar). Abdul Sattar Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1 to 6 (via video link Peshawar). Nemo for other Respondents. Date of hearing: 29th January, 2026.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: In a suit for dissolution of marriage, the court is required to make proper efforts to reconcile the matter in terms Section 10(3) of the Family Court Act, 1964 and on failure of reconciliation proceedings is empowered to pass a decree for dissolution of marriage but said Section does not provide that in every case, where reconciliation proceedings are declared as not successful, the decree for dissolution of marriage on basis of Khula is definitely to be passed, rather the Court has to assess whether wife through her voluntary decision really requires marriage to be dissolved or not.

Summary: Promptly lodged FIR-Effect- FIR registered within two hours of the incident leaves no room for consultation or the weaving of a false story. Testimony of victim of rape-Evidentiary value- Victim of sexual assault stands on a higher pedestal than an injured witness; if her testimony is confidence-inspiring, it requires no further corroboration to sustain a conviction. Social stigma in conservative society-Presumption against false implication- In a conservative society, it is highly improbable that a complainant would expose a minor daughter to the "deathless shame" of a rape trial merely to falsely implicate an innocent person. Medical and Scientific Evidence-DNA as "Gold Standard"- Ocular account found unimpeachable fortification through positive Forensic DNA and Serology Analysis, which serves as a conclusive scientific link between the accused and the offence. Defense plea-Absence of evidence- A defense version consisting of stark denials and unproven allegations of previous enmity, without producing a single witness in support, is rendered a "mere moonshine" in the face of strong prosecution evidence.